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~ I. INTRODUCTION 
Th~s volume is a collection of papers on major issues and trends that 
wi~l affect the future of intercity transportation. The papers were pre-
pa~ed by individuals representing a diverse array of backgrounds, opin-
io~s, and recognized expertise, in an effort to assemble a rich collec-
tion of discussion mate.ria1. 
Each reader will surely disagree with some of the ideas presented, just 
as in some cases, there is disagreement among the papers themselves. 
That there should be such disagreement is, in fact, desirable. Open, 
well-informed debate among concerned individuals is an important influ-
ence for guiding the evolution of the U.S. intercity transportation sys-
tem in a productive direction. 
While the papers in this report deal with a large and diverse set of con-
siderations, the papers can be categorized as fulfilling one or another 
of the major objectives for this portion of the Study. 
Some of the papers describe important political, social, technological, 
institutional, and economic mechanisms, the workings of which determine 
how future intercity transportation technologies will evolve and be put 
into service. These papers were prepared by acknowledged experts in a 
number of fields and provide essential background issues, facts, and 
established points of view that must not be ignored in debating the future 
of intercity transportation. Papers (by chapter number) that fall into 
this category are: 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
V. 
VI. 
IX. 
XII. 
Current and Future Forms of Intercity Passenger 
Transportation, Rail, Air, and Highway (Bus and 
Automobile) 
Constraints to the Implementation of Intercity 
Transportation Innovations 
The Congressional Politics of Transpor.tation 
Expenditure: Implications for the Future 
Macroeconomic Issues Through the Year 2000 
Financial Issues Impacting Intercity Trans-
portation 
Issues in Regulation of Intercity Transportation 
Resource Availability Inputs to Intercity Trans-
portation to the Year 2000: With Special Reference 
to Energy Resources 
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XIII. The Future of Concern for the Environment 
XIV. Social Impacts on Intercity Transportation 
XV. The Transportation/Communications Trade-Off 
XVI. A Note on Technology Pessimism 
Another group of papers approaches the majc,>r .issues of int.ercity trans-
portation from the point of view of reform. While often explaining the 
mechanisms of the system, sometimes critically, the main thr;!'st of these 
authors is that various improvements are in order, and spec1fic options 
for improvement are presented. A number of the options discussed in the 
papers of this category are candidate transportation technologies. Such 
technology-related papers are included in this volume, rather than in 
Volume 3, primarily because of their advocacy. The papers in this sec-
ond category are: 
XI. 
XVIII. 
XIX. 
xx. 
XXI. 
XXIII. 
Organizational and Regulatory Issues 
The Auto-Industrial Era--Is It At An End? 
Electric Highway Vehicles: A Way To Save Our 
Mobility, Air, Energy, and Fortunes 
Automobile Durability 
Intercity Technology and Organization: A Proposal 
Energy Considerations in Goods Transportation 
Finally, there is a third category of papers that may be describe~ as 
technical analyses. In these papers, the authors explore some' of' the 
important trends affecting the evolution of intercity transportation 
technologies, in most cases tracing out the implications of these trends 
in as explicit a manner as possible. Papers in this third category are: 
VII. 
VIII. 
X. 
XVII. 
XXII. 
'The Cost-Revenue Squeeze in Highway Finance 
Interactions between Capital Funds Sources and 
Technological Changes in Rail and Air Passenger 
Transport 
The Impact of Deregulation 
The Effects of Existing Capital Stocks on Tech-
nology Assessments 
Trends in Freight Transportation: 1975 to 2000 
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It should be noted that the assignment of each paper to one category 
fails to capture the full contribution of certain papers. A number of 
the papers contain material that falls in several categories; thus, a 
pa~ticular paper classified as a background issue paper may well contain 
suggestions about reform, as well as some quantitative analysis of 
trends. Consequently, the classifications should be viewed as only a 
ro~gh guide to the general nature of the papers. 
It should also be noted that the order in which the papers appear in 
this volume is not random but rather is the order in which it seems 
this rather large amount of material can most easily be read and appre-
ciated as a coordinated whole.* The papers are arranged to begin with 
the more comprehensive views of the critical issues and conclude with 
the more specific presentations. In addition, a group of papers on 
closely related subjects generally appear together. 
As this set of papers was developing, it became quite evident that almost 
every paper, while clarifying certain issues and answering some ques-
tions, invariably raised additional questions. that could not be addressed 
adequately in the time available. Also, the opportunity was not avail-
able for substantial synthesis, that is, to prepare papers aimed specifi-
cally at playing out and possibly resolving the identified points of dis-
agreement. Thus, the material presented in this report should be viewed 
not only as a wealth of background data, but also as an unfinished ex-
curcsion into many of the major issues and problems of intercity trans-
portation, indicating topic areas for additional investigation. 
*Detailed abstracts are presented for all but one short paper (XVI) to 
facilitate a rapid perusal of the entire collection. 
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II. CURRENT AND FUTURE FORMS OF INTERCITY PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION 
Rail, Air, and Highway (Bus and Automobile) 
by 
w. L. Garrison, Director 
Institute of Transportation Studies* 
University of California, Berkeley 
*formerly, Institute of Transportation and Traffic Engineering 
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Thls paper poses questions on issues that may affect the future develop-
ment of intercity passenger transportation (ICT). 
Transportation systems divide generally into two forms: continuous 
movement (e.g., the endless belt) and batch movement (e.g., all ICT, in-
cluding cars, buses, trains, and planes). There are two forms for ICT 
technologies: small-batch, vehicle switching (automobiles) and 1arge-
batch, passenger switchins (buses, trains, and planes). These two tech-
nology forms suggest a twofold analysis of technological change: be-
tween systems providing a form of service, and between forms of service. 
Three major paths exist for the introduction of technology: vehicle sup-
plies, guideway and terminal suppliers, and system operators. Oppor-
tunities for technological change exist in the collector, line-haul, dis-
tribution, and switching systems. 
The automobile, highway, and driver elements of the highway system have 
been managed somewhat independently. Vehicle suppliers consider tech-
nological change with the characteristics of drivers and guideways as 
given; guideway producers provide guideways based upon vehicle and op-
erator characteristics; and drivers are licensed and governed by driving 
rules on usage of the vehicles and guideways. At a given point in time, 
the elements of a system are more or less optimized with respect to each 
other, but the possibility of alternative combinations of elements being 
more desirable is excluded. 
In the railroad system, although guideways, terminals, and operations 
are contained in the same institution, technological change is very con-
strained, partly because of the historical separation of right-of-way, 
equipment, and operational matters, and partly because of the priority 
given to freight aspects of the rail business over passenger operations; 
regulation and unionization further limit the system's choices. 
The air system has probably the most joint consideration of equipment, 
guideway, and operation matters of all the ICT systems. 
A generalized cost function relating guideway cost per unit to the num-
ber of units moved shows continuing economies of scale. The ~ine-haul 
portion of the movement achieves considerable scale economies; collection 
and distributor activities are more expensive. Institutiona1·boundaries 
arbitrarily placed on transportation networks limit strategies that 
might involve network optimization;.local authorities provide for access 
to airport, bus, and train stations; the railroads, state and federal 
highway authorities, and the Federal Aviation Administration generally 
provide line-haul routes. 
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Logically flowing from the expanded capacities of line-haul routes due 
to tcchnology advances and to increased system utilization ili a changing 
investment pattern in lightly used routes. This change, including gco-
~raphical rout~ Tl'organizations, route abandonments, and reduced invest-
ments and maintenance, has, however, occurred only to a limited extent 
in rail transportation. Political pres~ures against service deteriora-
tion and route abandonment have served to offlict pressures of changes in 
quantities moved and vehicle and guideway cost characteristics. 
These institutional and political constra1.nts generate inefficiencies and 
mismanagcment in intercity transportation nets. The eastern U.S. rail 
crisis and the highway funding crisis are symptomatic of these matters. 
Rationalization of networks is needed, more so for the rail and highway 
systems than for the airway system. 
The automobile-highway-driver system is currently the only form of vehicle 
switching ICT, and it offers competitive performance for trips up to about 
100 miles; beyond that distance, passenger switching systems (except the 
bus) become competitive. One ICT issue is, then, the nature of systems 
(e.g., helicopters, short takeoff aircraft, and high-speed trains) that 
might compete in the distance range where existing systems do not per-
form well. Additionally, the highway system is always accessible; the 
air system provides only scheduled service. As for spatial competitive-
ness of the two modes, in most areas of the country, automobile guideway 
systems are ubiquitous; air service guideways are constrained within 
corridors. 
Instances of ICT price discrimination from a spatial perspective arise. 
For example, two routes connect A and B (large places), one of which 
passes through C (small place); the price for a long haul (A to B) may 
be less than for a short haul (A to C). Service and price metrics are 
not a linear function of distance measures. Economic analysis may lead 
one to a contrary conclusion. Cost is a function of distance and quantity 
of movement. If prices charged are computed at the cost margin, prices 
should be low in dense (A,to B) markets and high in small (A to C) mar-
kets. Actually, discrimination is against A to B travel and favors A to 
C travel; A to B air fares, for example, tend to be well above cost and 
increase too sharply with distance, with a resulting loss of efficiency. 
One tension in ICT is, therefore, between economic efficiency and spatial 
equity of service. Even if a social reason exists for the subsidization 
of spatial equity, those who travel in dense markets and those institu-
tions that provide service may claim discrimination. 
Broadly, travel in a society reflects social organization. The question 
of passenger versus vehicle switching is one of the conformality of the 
alternatives with social structure. Given a taxonomy of travel types, one 
could match types to ICT system characteristics to test a system's social 
suitability. To date, no data base exists for the identification of the 
different ICT travel markets. 
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The automobile system is subject to a number of forces for change: 
energy and environmental considerations; safety improvements; applica-
tions of communications, computing, and control technologies; potential 
revision of economic evaluation procedures for the system; and an in-
cre~sed supply of mass transit in urban areas. Intercity car travel may 
take two forms: vehicles utilized because of the nature of the trip 
(e.g., campers) and vehicles incorporating special over-the-road tech-
nology features. Rental of vehicles could become the dominant form of 
usage over a period of time with rising vehicle costs. 
Passenger switching systems~equire vehicles of higher and higher pro-
ductivity to offset costs imposed by energy, environmental, safety, and 
labor cost factors, and this pressure is resulting in larger and larger 
vehicles tailoring their operations to denser markets. 
Heavily trafficked corridors are and will be well served by continuing 
investments in existing ICT technologies, including the improvement of 
those supporting the upgrading of passenger rail service. Because of a 
lack of a national crisis or a mandate for new systems, developments are 
likely to grow marginally from existing systems. 
Medium density corridors need alternatives such as new forms of air tech-
nology, gradual expansion of passenger rail service, and/or evolution 
of the highway system (including bus and auto). 
Even as it tracks e'xisting social needs, and technology delivery paths 
and markets, technc~logy can be a tool which shapes social development. 
However, paths for ICT technological change have to be conformal with 
institutions as presently constituted and as altered or created in the 
future. Developments must be responsive to existing societal concerns 
and should anticipate emerging ones. 
ICT properties should include two socially desirable attributes: effi-
ciency and redistribution of goods and services. Barriers affecting the 
distribution of access to ICT systems include money and lack of skills 
(e.g., nondrivers). The larger question of access to full participation 
in social and economic life affects groups of diverse economic back-
grounds, skills, and geographic locations. Regional economic and social 
development are needed to permit access to those activities that travel 
makes possible. 
Clearly, ICT technology must take many forms to meet the needs of dif-
ferent markets, environments, and regional goals. Incrementalism and 
flexibility are important properties of ICT development options in order 
to respond to evolution of social goals. Short-term benefits should be 
highly valued, and short-term disbenefits should be heavily weighted. 
Development benefits must be distributed geographically by income and 
class. 
The automobile, a general-purpose adaptable vehicle, is undergoing changes 
due to pressures to reduce its environmental damage and energy consumption. 
~r---l 
f 1 
. t 
'! 
il 
f 
I 
l 
-~ 
l, 
T--- I~C 
( 
Two major trends are the small lightweight vehicle and the over-the-
road vehicle. Automobile rental is an alternative to ownership. Full 
automation of freeways and vehicles is a possibility. System accessi-
bility could be ameliorated by licensing procedures tailored to particu-
lar vehicles, environments, and individuals; for example, subteenagers 
might be licensed to drive lightweight vehicles on local access roads 
only. The guideway system could be modified to provide a form of dual 
mode; properly equipped chassis could be rented for transport of light-
weight vehicles and special-purpose vehicles (e.g., campers). 
These developments would help to overcome the problems of geographic 
discrimination, pollution, energy consumption, and accessibility within 
the auto-highway system. Major impediments include the need for joint 
decision-making by driver and vehicle licensing agencies, insurance com-
panies, and guideway and vehicle suppliers; and the need for involvement 
of new kinds of actors in the technology and delivery process. 
The process of technology development and deployment requires imagina-
tive actors with a sense of purpose; sponsors of research and develop-
ment; the important activities of testing, production, and implementation; 
and, clients or markets. Current ICT systems are characterized, however, 
by fragmented supplies, institutions, markets, and technology and devel-
opment implementation systems. No one searches for unmet needs and new 
opportunities. The opportunity exists for the creation of imaginative 
ICT technological institutions. The development of technological options 
should be guided by careful evaluation of the determinants of travel and 
of the conditions for the deployment of options. 
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II. CURRENT AND FUTURE FORMS OF INTERCITY PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION 
Rail, Air, and Highway (Bus and Automobile) 
In troduction 
W. L. Garrison 
University of California, Berkeley 
This paper poses issues that may affect the future development of inter-
city passenger transportation. Four intercity systems will be discussed: 
rail, air, bus (highway), and automobile (highway). The discussion will 
be morphological in style; the focus will be on the spatial forms of 
these systems, their services and societal needs for those services, 
their technology development and implemen.tation pathways, and the forms 
of their constraints. The objective is to identify issues bearing on 
technology options for intercity transportation, and these will be identi-
fied where they emerge in the discussion.* 
The first part of the paper will provide a characterization of intercity 
systems. Competition among the systems will then be discussed. Next, 
probable system developments will be considered, assuming that they ad-
here to their present forms during their evolution. Following this, 
other development paths will be considered. 
Jargon. Each intercity system operates on a net composed of Zinks 
serving as collector, line-haul, and distribution routes; these routes 
are also termed the eZements of or the components of the systems. 
The term switch will be used to describe thos'e points on networks where 
travel changes from one element of a network to another. 
• An interchange connecting a freeway and an arterial street is 
a switch. 
• Airports, bus stations, and rail passenger stations are 
switches. 
The term mode will be used in a nonconventional manner. Mode change 
occurs whenever there is a switch. A journey by automobile using local, 
arterial, and freeway facilities is described as a three-mode journey; 
a line-haul, then distributor trip by bus, a two-mode journey;, taxi to 
the airport followed by third level air, line-haul air, and rental car, 
a four-mode journey. 
*Fiscal and regulatory matters are slighted because they do not emerge 
naturally from the approach in this paper and because they are stressed 
elsewhere in this series of papers. 
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Rail routes, highways, and airways will be termed guideways when a general 
te rm is useful. 
Intercity Transportation Systems 
This section will provide a description of the present intercity systems 
and identify two types: small-batch vehicle switching and large batch 
passenger switching. Next, the paths for technology flows to the systems 
will be identified, namely, technology supplied via the vehicle, the 
guideway, and operations. There are many constraints on the systems, and 
these and other factors have led to decision-making about technologies 
that will be termed diSjoint and biased. This material is quite general 
and well known, yet its presentation will require several pages; some 
readers may choose to skip to the next section of the paper. 
". ,;' 
The Systems. Transportat:lon systems of all types divide generally 
into two major forms: continuous movement systems, such as the endless 
belt, and batch movement systems. Automobiles, buses, trains, and planes 
move passengers in batches of different sizes, and all intercity passen-
ger transportation is batch transportation. 
Switching is typically required in intercity movement. The airline pas-
senger typically moves by highway from the point of origin to the airport, 
by plane from airport to airport, and by highway to the point of destina-
tion. A change of planes requires an additional switch. Similar patterns 
hold for rail and bus travel. Bus and rail passengers have higher prob-
abilities than air passengers of using urban transit in the origin-
destination portions of their trips because their stations or switches 
are located in the older sections of cities wllere transit service tends 
to be available. 
Intercity automobile travel typically involves driving on local and ar-
terial streets near the origin and destination points of journey, and on 
high-level facilities, usually a freeway, on the line-haul portion of the 
trip. An important difference between the automobile system and the 
other systems is that the vehicle switches from one mode of travel to 
another (viewing driving on arterial and local streets as different modes 
than freeway travel), whereas passengers s\litch in the other systems. 
The switching impedences or delays at terminals are important in rail, 
air, and bus travel. The issue of what should be done to reduce switch-
ing impedences in passenger sWitchi.ng systems is quite import~nt. 
It may be noted that opportunities for techno~ogical change may be located 
in the collector system, the line-haul system, tb~ distribution system, 
and/or at the switches. This.d.b} a rather obvious point. It is mentioned 
here to remind that the teahru4<J{JY issues Of intepaity ti'anspoptation ape 
not Zimited to the Zine-hauZ portions of the interaity systems. There 
are technology opportunities in each component of the systems. Further, 
effective use of a technology in one system component may require 
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adjustments in other components. Increa~ed line-haul capacity would 
affect collector and distributor systems, for example. 
r 
All intercity passenger movement is in batches and the batches range in 
size from one person in an automobile to several hundred persons in an 
aircraft or train. All movement requires travel in different modes and 
some form of switching. A simple but important matter is whether the 
vehicle switches or whether the traveler must switch from vehicle to ve-
hicle, and there are two forms for the technologies: (1) small-batch, 
vehicle switching and (2) large-batch, passenger switching. The auto-
mobile is in one class; buses, aircraft, and trains ,are in another. This 
is hardly startling observation, for as everyone knows' travel by auto-
mobile is different from travel by air, bus, or rail, and the switching 
of the vehicle is one important difference. Other differences include 
the control of the travel schedule by the traveler and the personal en-
vironment of the automobile as opposed to the public environment of the 
other carriers. It is in the~e ways that the automobile provides one 
form of service and the bus, train, and aircraft another. At one level 
of abstraction, intercity passenger transportation systems compete on the 
basis of cost and elapsed travel time. At another level of abstraction, 
they compete on a quality basis, say the degree to which the service is 
personal as opposed to public. To the extent that there are these quality 
differences, and the extent is unknown, issues of the aompetition among 
teahnoZogies fop mapkets and oppoptunities fop teahnoZogiaaZ ahange must 
be assessed within fopms of sepviae as weZZ as between fo~s of sepviae. 
Markets. Some markets are very sparse or light, and others are very 
heavy or dense. Some serve places separated by many hundreds of miles, 
others are closer. The quantity of travel between two places is mainly 
a function of their sizes and the distance between them, and there is a 
continuum of market sizes. In order to capture these differences in mar-
kets, three types will be recognized here for use later in the discussion: 
situations where there is much demand for movement such as Phi1ade1phia-
New York, or Los Angeles-Chicago; corridors where demands are not nearly 
so high such as Chattanooga-Atlanta; and sparse markets such as travel to 
and from small places. The latter includes travel to and from small 
places in the hinterlands of large cities. 
Patos for Technology. It is useful to consider three technology 
introduction paths: (1) technologies incorporated in vehicles and pro-
vided by vehicle suppliers, (2) technologies provided by guide~ay and 
terminal suppliers, and (3) technologies provided by the system operators. 
In the systems here considered, vehicle equipment is supplied by the pri-
vate sector, mainly by private sector institutions other than the institu-
tions using the equipment. However, the railroads have historically 
assembled some of their freight car equipment; one major bus operator 
assembles buses. Equipment may be leased or owned outright by operators. 
Subj ect to limitations on t:,le variety available in the market, automobiles 
are purchased or leased by (.~ustomers according to their conception of 
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their desires. The survival of the vehicle manufacturers depends in part 
on their ability to evaluate the market and meet needs of customers. The 
automobile has about a ten-year physical life which is shorter than that 
of other intercity transportation equipment, and relatively rapid changes 
in the technology, of the automobile fleet may be imagined. 
Buses, aircraft, and passenger train equipment are purchased or leased by 
operators, and the test of vehicle suitability to the market occurs when 
attempts are made to attract passengers. These vehicles typically have 
a longer physical life than automobiles, and they are utilized much more 
intensively; they deliver many, many more seat miles of travel during 
their lifetime than does an automobile. It is more difficult to fit 
thesa vehicles to their market thml automobiles. An issue fo~ passenge~ 
s1JJitahingeystems is that of m:ztahing vehiaZes to ma~kets: passengep 
pe~aeption of suitabiZity may ahange 1JJith time; vehiaZes a~e p~ahased 
by ope~ato~s ~athe~ than by the finaZ use~s; and vehiaZes a~e utiZized 
by many diffe~nt pe~sons~ eaah of 1JJhom has a pa~tiauZar set of p~efe~­
enaes. 
Equipment technology is based on mechanical engineering knowledge and on 
knowledge of many related fields. It is important to this discussion to 
note that professional groups clre associated wj,th particular vehicle types , 
e.g., aerospace engineers and automotive engineers, and that there is 
little communication among these groups and between those groups supply-
ing technology to other aspects of thesyctp-rns, e.g., the guideways. 
Highway and air guideways and switches, except some bus terminals, are 
provided and operated by the public sector. Historically, the rail guide-
way and switching (terminals and yards) system has been privately owned 
and operated, with terminals sometimes owned and operated in some collec-
tive format. 
The highway physical plant has been developed by the state departments of 
highways in partnership with the Bureau of Public Roads and its successor 
agency, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). These agencies have 
planned route alignments and capacity, and they have set standards for 
design and construction. Excepting pavements, the elevation and curvature, 
drainage facilities, structures., and so on are oriented to a life of 50 
years or more. The basis of the technology is mainly civil engineering 
knowledge, and it is supplied by professionals in the fields of structures, 
soil mechanics, hydraulics, and so on, from consulting firms or employed 
by state highway agencies. 
The spatial framework for the rail guideway system was established in the 
previous century. Private capital was raised (and, on occasion, public 
capital), and private contractors constructed facilities in accordance 
with specifications by railroad properties or as required by money market 
organizations. Over the years these specifications became more stringent, 
especially with respect to structures, rail and ballast, and grade and 
curvatl.lre. Partly as a consequence of rec:tuirements for capital repayment 
to ~arge investments in physical plant, many railroads have been subjected 
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to financial reorganization, and currently most railroads do not have 
access to private capital for guideway investments. In recent years em-
phas~s has been on maintenance of existing facilities and on selective 
upgrading of facilities only in instances where projects are small and 
pass stringent cost-effectiveness tests. However, there has been major 
investment in large, modern freight yards. The situation varies from 
railroad to railroad. In some, the cash flow has not been great enough 
to avoid deferring maintenance. 
The course of technology for the construction of rail guideways has been 
similar to that for highways. It is mainly from and via professional 
civil engineers and has been realized in structures, drainage facilities, 
etc. There has been much communication and sharing of basic civil engi-
neering knowledge between rail, airport, and highway engineers. 
While automobiles are operated by individual drivers, as are buses, there 
is a traffic control form of operations management created and operated 
in part by public sector or consulting traffic engineers. 
An issue arises f~m the separate peer groups~ environments~ aonstraints~ 
eta.~ that p~vide the teahnoZogies that aomprise a transportation system. 
They are quite disconnected. Rarely does an actor or institution regard 
itself as being in the transportation business. Many are involved, few 
are concerned with affairs beyond their immediate role. The automobile 
companies regard themselves as manufacturers of mechanical equipment; 
the engineer building a highway bridge regards himself as a structural 
engineer, he has little interest in or knowledge of the role the bridge 
will play. 
Disjoint-Biased Decision-Making. The vehicles, guideways, and opera-
tions elements of intercity transportation systems receive technology via 
differing paths and with differing conditions, depending on whether or 
not a technology will be used and/or the level at which it will be intro-
duced and utilized~ Additionally, the systems operite under constraints 
that differ from system to system. ~onsequent1y, the intercity systems 
have evolved in response to what may be termed disjoint-biased decision-
making. (Disjoint refers to the manner in which system elements have 
been considered, and biased refers to the differing criteria for deci-
sions from element to element and system to system.) 
The automobile, highway, and driver elements of the highway system have 
been managed in somewhat independent ways. The vehicle supplier con-
siders technological change with the characteristics of drivers and 
guideways as given; the guideway producers (the FHWA, state highway 
departmen ts, etc.) have provided guideways in light of vehicle and op-
erator characteristics; and drivers have been licensed and subjected to 
driving rules developed with reference to the equipment u~.ed and the 
guideways upon which they drive. A similar set of remarks may be made 
about bus systems. 
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The consequence of this is a limitation on the feasible ways the system 
might develop. At any point in time, the elements of the system are more 
or less optimized in relation to each other. But the question of whether 
some other combinations of vehicles, guideways, and operators might be 
more desirable than the extant system does not enter the decision-making. 
An illustration may help to develop this point. 
A major problem with the automobile-highway system is the lack of accessi-
bility to that system; some one-third of persons of eligible age do not 
have drivers' licenses, either because they are not licensable to drive 
or because it is too ~xpensive. To solve this problem, one might imagine 
vehicle and guideway combinations that are much less demanding of driver 
skills. These might utilize simplified vehicles with reductions in vehicle 
cost or complex and expensive vehicles which are used very intensively and 
thus have a lost cost per unit of use. (Personal rapid transit with low 
fares and requiring only that operators knqw where they are going and can 
push a button is an extreme form of a high vehicle productivity, low skill 
operations system.) Decisions about such systems require joint consider-
ation of vehicles, guideways, and operations, but the traditional form 
of decision-making is such that joint considerations are not made. 
While in the railroad system the guideways, terminals, and operations 
have been within the same institution, the pattern of technological 
change has nonetheless been very constrained. This is partly because the 
historical, institutional form of railroads has separated right-of-way, 
vehicle equipment, signals and communications, and opc~rational matters. 
And it is partly because first considerations in guideway and operational 
matters are of the freight aspects of the railroad business. Rail passen-
ger equipment and methods of operating passenger service have been con-
strained to be conformal with freight movements. (These conditions did 
not hold many years ago when there were markets in which passenger busi-
ness was the major business.) Also, regulation and unionization matters 
have limited the range of choices of rail systems. 
The air system has probably had more joint consideration of equipment 
needs, guideway characteristics, and the nature of operations than is 
true of other intercity transportation systems. 
Technological Change Within Present Intercity Transportation Systems 
This section will consider technological change in intercity transporta-
tion, in particular that change which is evolutionary and which occurs 
within the frameworks of existing institutions, paths for technology 
&elivery, and technology development and implementation incentives. First, 
to augment the discussion in the previous section, additional character-
istics of guideways and vehicles will be considered. Competiti.on among 
systems will then be discussed. A discussion of likely systems evolution 
and associated technology closes the section. 
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Guideways and Guideway Utilization. As noted, a transportation sys-
tem operates on a guideway net consisting of collector, line-haul, and 
distribution elements (Figut'e 11-1). Important features of this net are 
the economies of scale associated with its more intensely used segments. 
Collector 
Routes 
............. 
........ 
---
, 
, 
, 
, 
Distributor 
\ Routes 
, 
, 
Line Houl Route , 
" )===============================~------<" 
' .... 
.. '" .,. 
'" .. 
, 
, 
, 
, 
Figure 11-1. THE NETWORK OF AN INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
A generalized cost function relating the guideway cost per unit--say, the 
annual cost of a mile of freeway lane--to the number of units moved--say, 
cars per year--shows continuing economies of scale (Figure 11-2). Line-
haul movement allows considerable scale economies; collector and distri-
bution activities are more expensive. 
Consideration of network geometry and cost permit identification of some 
of the major issues affecting intercity transportation systems. First, 
there are issues resuZting from institutionaZ boundaries arbit~riZy 
pZaaed on networks whiah Zimit st~tegies that might invoZve network op-
timization. In the automobile-highway system, for example, the collector 
and distributor routes are typically local roads provided by land devel-
opers and arterials provided by cities or by cities in partnership with 
the states. The line-haul routes are typically state highways or part 
of the Interstate System, and these are provided by the states in partner-
ship ¥ith the federa~ government. 
Local road or transit authorities provide for access to the airport, bus, 
or train station; and line-haul routes are provided by railroads, the 
state and federal highway organization, or by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA). Airline companies differ in the extent to which they 
are made up of high-use vs. low-use routes. 
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Figure 11-2. GUIDEWAY COST PER UNIT OF USE 
A second matter is that of the forces which have affected investment and 
disinvestment in routes serving different functions. The historical pat-
tern l'.as been that of development of low-density routes; subsequently, 
with advances in technology and increases in system utilization, selected 
routes were upgraded or built anew to handle large volumes of traffic. 
This generalization holds quite well for the highway and air route system, 
and it holds, but not as well, for the railroad system where some of the 
main routes were identified early on. Even so, there have been orders 
of magnitude improvements in the capacities of line-haul routes as tech-
nological, economic, and market forces emerged. 
The logical corollary to increased capacity on line-haul routes is that 
of changirtg investment patterns in more lightly used routes. This change 
in investment might take the forms of geographical reorganization of the 
routes, abandonment in some cases, and reduced levels of investment and 
maintenance where appropriate. These have taken place to a limited ex-
tent in rail transportation. There has been an offsetting force, namely: 
political pressures against deterioration of service and route abandon-
ment. These may be noted especially in the highway plant where the net-
work originally designed to accommodate low-density use by horse-drawn 
vehicles has been continued. Changes in that system may be described as 
layering--the overlaying of arterial, state highway, and then interstate-
type facilities on a horse and wagon net. 
II-16 
I 
/ 
1 
"I 
:1 
i 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
This is an important point, so it will be stated in different words. Early 
network patterns reflected the joint cost of providing the facility and 
using the facility. Presumably, the antecedents of the road network, 
e.g~, trails, were based on this consideration as were the original net-
works of urban and rural roads and streets. The early railroads and early 
air nets also reflected the conditions of the time. There has been polit-
ical pres~ure to maintain those patterns in spite of the very sharp changes 
that have{i occurred in the quantities to be moved and vehicle and guideway 
cost charl,.cteristics. 
The consequences of these two considerations--differences in institutional 
structures from place to place in the net and political pressure that 
tends to preserve established network e1ements--is that to some unknown 
extent intercity nets are inefficient and to some unknown extent they are 
mismanaged. The railroad crisis in the eastern United States is a symp-
tom of these matters as is the crisis in highway funding. To avoid con-
tinuing these problems, it seems axiomatic that issues of new investment 
and new programs for interaity passenger transportation must extend to 
the networks within whiah those developments might be imbedded and to 
the problem of the ratio~alization of networks. 
The remarks above are in one senSI;! less applicable to the airway system 
than to the rail and highway sys tems. Regarding the former, one agency, 
the FAA, provides the guideways, and guideway costs are by far the lesser 
part of the sum of guideway and vehicle operating costs. One major ele-
ment of guideway cost, the number of air traffic controllers provided, 
is (approximately) a linear function of the number of aircraft handled. 
However, the pressure for airport-related navigation facilities and for 
the provision of physical facilities at relatively lightly utilized air-
ports occasions higher costs on lightly used segments of this system than 
on more heavily used segments. 
Competition in Intercity Transportation. Again, intercity transpor-
tation technologies operate in two forms, small-batch vehicle switching 
and large batch passenger switching. For purposes of identifying the 
structure of competition and factors bearing on competition, it is suffi-
cient to deal with these two forms. For convenience, highway and air will 
be used as illustrative of these forms. 
The automobi1e-highway-driver system is currently the only form of vehicle 
switching intercity transportation, and, as usually viewed, it offers com-
petitive performance for trips up to about 100 miles in distance. Beyond 
that length, passenger switching systems, excepting the bus, become com-
petitive. The Bou1aden scheme (Figure 11-3) illustrates the competitive 
pOSition of the two systems. This chart suggests that the competition 
question is only in part that of existing systems competing in a common 
market. The interaity passenger transportation issue is partly that of 
the nature of systems that might aompete in the distanae range where the 
existing systems do not perform well. Helicopters, short takeoff air-
craft, and high-speed trains have been suggested as technological forms 
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1000 
that might provide competitive service in that distance range. The com-
petitiveness of such passenger switching systems turns in a large measure 
on their competitiveness against vehicle switching systems. 
Because all intercity transportation ismultimodal and because speeds on 
local facilities used for the collector-distributor modes of travel are 
less than those on line-haul routes, the time-distance relationship for 
intercity travel takes the form shown in Figure 11-4. 
For origins and destinations separated by approximately 100 miles or less, 
thesl,ltomobile offers the least travel time. Beyond approximately 100 
miles, the aircraft offers the least travel time. 
Figure 11-4 holds for a particular origin and destination and for a par-
ticular availability and density of service; at any point in time, the 
automobile system can offer service along the illustrated time-distance 
relation. The air carrier time-distance relation depends, however, upon 
the schedules. If the desired time of arrival at the destination fits 
the air schedule, then there is no schedule delay. If this is not the 
case, then there may be schedule delays. The magnitude of these delays 
depends upon the frequency of service which, in turn, is a function of 
service density. 
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The cost from origin to destination also, of course, enters the calcula-
tion of modal choice. The situation is complex. It involves whether 
the cost is incurred by the individual or whether it is incurred on the 
part of a second party such as a business organization. It depends on 
more than line-haul cost. Those who are very willing to trade off time 
vs. money may well trade in the origin and distribution portions of their 
travel rather than the line-haul portions; e. g., instead of taking a 
taxi to the airport, take public transportation. 
Regarding the automobile, the number of persons that will travel sharply 
affects the cost competitiveness. A family of four on a trip in an auto-
mobile trade-off cost relationships at levels (approximately) of one per-
son in a car vs. four aircraft fares. If, however, travel involves a 
visit to a congested urban center, then the automobile may require stor-
age and will be of little value or of negative value while undertaking 
the travel purpose. In addition to the standard automobile, there are 
numerous other forms of switching vehic1es--campers, trailers, off-the-
road vehicles, and so on. These are purchased and used for particular 
travel purposes, and they are highly competitive against air transportation. 
In addition to differences in time competitiveness between auto and air 
service, there are differences in the spatial competitiveness of service. 
In most areas of the country, the guideway systems for automobiles are 
more dense than for air service. Also, the automobiles may be used along 
a radius extending in any direction from a city; air service is limited 
to particular corridors. The differences in what might be termed network 
scale of fineness are illustrated on Figure 11-5. (The figure oversimpli-
fies the situation somewhat: charter air service or private aviation 
fills in between those areas where regular service is available.) 
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During the last century, there were many instances of railroad price dis-
crimination from a spatial perspective. (The ICC was created, in part, 
to eliminate this discrimination.) The price charged for long haul, say 
from A to B on Figure II-6, was in many instances less than that charged 
from A to C. The reason for this was the competitive A to B ser-
vice which resulted in rate reductions. This type of spatial discrimina-
tion appears today in similar form but for other reasons. If A and B 
are large places and C is a small place, then the time to get from A 
to B may well be less than that to get from A to C. The cost might 
also be less if there is, no night coach service from A to C and there 
is from A to B, or if the trip from A to C requires using a 
third level carrier. A similar set of remarks about time and costs might 
apply for the highway system, e.g.) if A and B are linked by the Inter-
state, but C is not. This, then, is one form of discrimination: service 
and price metrics are not a linear function of distance measures. Per-
sons living in places such as C and/or using A to C, B to C routes 
feel that this type of discrimination is unfair. 
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Economic arguments lead in another direction. Cost is a function of the 
quantity of movement and of distance, and costs are lower in dense mar-
kets than in sparse. Air transport costs are not a linear function of 
distance. There are terminal costs followed by costs of bringing the 
aircraft to cruise altitude and speed. The plane then decreases speed, 
which increases cost per mile, and lands and incurs terminal cost. If 
prices charged were computed at the cost margin, then prices would be low 
in dense markets and high in small markets. For city pairs separated by 
different cruise distances {and with similar quantities of travel} fares 
would be little different. There is evidence that fares are well above 
cost in the larger markets and that they increase too sharply with dis-
tance. Discrimination is against A to B travel and favors places such as 
C. Moreover, because prices are not computed at the cost margin, there 
is a loss of efficiency, its cost being esti;mated at from $1 billion to 
$2 billion per year. Statements similar to these may be made for auto, 
bus, and rail systems. 
One tension is between economic efficiency and spatial equity of service. 
Is partial spatial equity worth several billion dollars, should more 
efficiency be cost in search of greater equity? Should less equity be 
accepted in favor of efficiency? In a $2 trillion economy, how much is 
spatial equity worth? There is no expert answer for these questions, 
they require political decisions. 
Even if there is a social reason for the~ubsidy of equity, those who 
travel in dense markets and those institutions that provide service may 
claim discrimination. Why should they pay for some national social goal? 
At issue~ then~ are the forms~ inaidenae~ and impaats of spatiaZ disarim-
ination in the provision of interaity passenger serviae. 
A second tension involves technology. Technology development has sup-
ported increased efficiency in dense markets; it has done little for 
sparse markets. One reason for this is clear. The dense markets have 
been the viable economic markets for technology. There has also been 
feedback; technology successes have made the dense markets even more 
viable. Although there may be social reasons for service in sparse mar-
kets, the economic rewards for technology have not been great.. At issue 
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is the aonjeature that teahnology development has been biased and has 
sepved only a limited segment of needs. This conjecture will be treated 
at several places in the subsequent discussion. 
Because of the factors affecting competition, the Bou1adon scheme (Fig-
ure 11-3) does not agree with the division of the market, and the auto-
mobile is utilized well beyond the 100-mi1e radius where its suitability 
according to Bou1adon begins to drop sharply (Figure 11-7) • 
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Figure 11-7. DISTRIBUTION OF PERSON TRIPS BY ROUND TRIP DISTANCE 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of(jransportation, 1972, 
Volume 1, National Tpavel Supvey~ U.s. Government P~inting 
Office, Washington, D.C., 1973 • 
~ Strate, Harry E., Federal Highway Administration, Nationwide 
Pepsonal Tpansportation Study~ Repopt No.1: Automobile 
Oaaupanay~ u.S. Department of Transportation,Washington, D.C., 
April, 1972. 
Ibid~ Report No.2: Annual Miles of Automobile Tpavel~ April 
1972. 
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The travel shown in Figure 11-7 may be interpreted using a modified 
Bouladon scheme, as shown in Figure 11-8. In addition to the one-
passenger, direct time type of automobile transportation competition 
with air (as per Figures 11-3 and 11-4), other types and situations of 
travel appear in endless combinations. Terming Type I that travel of 
one 'person where air is an alternative for distances beyond 100 miles, 
some other types might be: 
-Ol 
o 
=-
>-
-.-
... 
.., 
c: 
Q 
e 
• Q 
• Type II: two or more persons in a car for whom cost con-
siderationsare important; 
• Type III: salesman, uses car to store and transport sample 
and display materials; 
• Type IV: on trips where vehicle will be needed to fulfill 
trip purpose--e.g., driving a camper. 
Suitability 
of the Auto for: 
Demand for: 
Length of Trip -miles 
Figure 11-8. SUITABILITY OF THE AUTOMOBILE FOR TYPES OF TRAVEL 
Air travel could also be divided into trip types with the suitability of 
air travel differing for trip types. Note also that the notion of trip 
types and thus many market divisions is not reflected in empirical work 
on intercity travel, so there is no information available on relative 
sizes of markets. There are data on common carrier air travel between 
city pairs, but data of· travel on other systems is very limited. 
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Broadly, travel is a reflection of social organization, the institutions, 
formal and informal, of society and the associations of people and re-
sources with those institutions. At this level of thinking, the question 
of passenger switching versus vehicle switching systems is one of the 
conformality of each system with social structure. To the extent that a 
taxonomy of travel types captures the ways in which people relate to 
social organizations, matching travel types to system characteristics is 
a test of system social suitability. 
The issue is that thepe is no suitabZe data base fPOm whiah the soaiaZ 
oPgaY!:,!:~ation basis of intepaity tpaveZ ntly be identified. 
The Likely Future of Intercity Transportation. The discussio~ will 
tum now to how the intercity systems might evolve given their character-
istics, their competitive situations, etc. Use of technology to increase 
efficiency, a classic role for technology, provides one forc~ for change. 
In the automobile transport system, efficiencies have been achieved by 
technologies such as freeways; but the institutions and f~,scal arrange-
ment for freeway construction no longer have t~\,ci~ t',apability for extensive 
construction programs, and there is also resisl.'ance 'tc ~?tensive con-
struction, especially in urban areas. In recent decades h1ghway expend-
itures have rtm about 1% of the gross nationf~1 product. The ;demands of 
the existing plant for maintenance and rehabilitation have increased to 
absorb nearly all of the ftmds available. Consequently, the new highway 
construction market for technology is of dec~easing importance, and little 
physical expansion of the guideway system should be expected tmless major 
institutional and ftmding adjustments are made. 
While the cost relationships for automobiles suggest that larger and 
larger vehicles could be produced with small incremental costs, the auto-
mobile is an element of a personal transportation system, and the market 
constrains the gains to be achieved by increasing the number o.t seats in 
automobiles. The reverse is also true. From the standpoint of economies 
of vehicle production, there is not much to be gained by decreasing the 
size of vehicles (the relation between weight and energy uee is another 
matter) • 
Buses gain efficiel1;cy from increased size, but increases in vehicle size 
are thwarted by size limits for vehicles on highways and by market con-
siderations constraining the number of people who can be collected at a 
point at a given time to be moved to another point at: a given time. 
" There are opportunities for technologies and efficiencies that might be 
obtained by passenger trains if these could be formed of larger cars 
ganged into larger trains. The market again thwarts opporttmities for 
such technologies. 
The pattern in air transportation has been that of tailoring vehicle 
efficiencies to route characteristics, and the opporttmities have been 
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captured largely in dense traffic, line-haul situations. To the extent 
that the market permits, opportunities for related technological develop-
ments will continue. 
At issue ape ahanges resuZting in interaity passenger transportation from 
new investment to inarease effiaienay. Given present aonditions~ the 
outZook for ina~ased effiaienay is modest other than in air transporta-
tion. 
There are forces for change that may not increase efficiency as it is 
usually considered but may provide opportunities for technology. The 
automobile syst~m is subject to a number of forces for change. 
1. Energy and environmental considerations will likely occasion 
vehicle noise reductions, weight decreases, and propulsion 
energy efficiencies. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Improvements -in safety are resulting in more complex vehicles 
and a short-run impetus toward a heavier vehicle. Increased 
vehicle inspE';!tion, resulting in improved maintenance and 
safety-motivated investments in guideways, would join with in-
creased complexity to increase vehicle cost. More stringent 
drivers' licensing in the interest of safety coupled with in-
creased insurance cost may reduce accessibility to the automobi1e-
highway sys tem. 
The full impact of communications, computing, and control tech-
nologies has yet to be felt in the automobile-highway system. 
Most of this technology is de1;vered through traffic engineer-
ing and should result in improvements in traffic flow, improved 
safety, and improved driver knowledge about travel conditions. 
Some work has been done with electronic guidance systems (and 
with mechanical guidance systems), and this might begin to 
impact intercity transportation within two decades. One form 
might be that of a lane reserved for bigh-speed travel where 
vehicles are equipped for guidance. This would also have 
impacts on bus and truck movements. 
The potential for revised economic evaluation procedures for 
the automobile-highway system, including new rules for invest-
ment in and use of the system, is also a pressure on the sys-
tem. Because of the external costs incurred but not charged 
to the gas tax income, the driver may be required to pay 
several cents more per mile of travel. Furthermore,. guideway 
investment is made at artificially low interest rates. Ration-
alization of costs would increase costs for automobile opera-
tion one-fourth to one-third over current costs. Additionally, 
there is interest in congestion pricing which might be imple-
mented in urban areas. Freeing the flow of traffic would de-
crease travel times on the origin and destination portions of 
trips; it would also have the effect of making travel more 
expensive (to the user) during periods of congestion. 
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There are progra.::.rs to increase the supply of mass transit in 
urban areas, which might make the automobile less competitive 
and might improve access to terminals. 
A probable reaction to these pressures is a changing ownership pattern 
for atitomobiles, with vehicle types purchased or. rented according to the 
particular demands to be satisfied. A current example is the purchase or 
rental of off-the-road and camping vehicles to meet special ;needs. An-
other probable reaction is the development of lightweight, energy effi-
cient urban vehicles. 
Intercity automobile travel might occur in two forms: in vehicles uti-
lized because of the nature of the trip (e.g., campers), and in vehicles 
incorporating special over-the-road technology features. Rental of ve-
hicles could well become the dominant form over a period of years as the 
cost of the vehicle increases and the economics become more attractive 
for spreading that vehicle cost over more utili~ation per unit of time. 
In addition, renting rather than owning would be congenial to develop-
ment of automated guideways because high-productivity rental vehicle 
companies might be able to afford the investment in necessary equipment, 
and they could absorb the necessary cost. of inspection and maintenance 
associated with vehicle operations. 
Passenger SWitching systems are requiring vehicles of higher and higher 
productivity to offset costs imposed by energy, environmental, safety, 
and increased labor cost factors, and this pressure is resulting in 
larger and larger vehicles best suited for service in denser markets. 
Two emerging factors bear directly on intercity rail transportation. 
One is the desire of states to augment, using state funding, the basic 
frame of Amtrak service, so expansion is occurring where there are mar-
kets identifiable in state frameworks and where there are institutional 
arrangements such that funding is available to service those markets. 
The second matter is more difficult to interpret. Present plans for re-
vitalizing railroad service in the eastern United States call for aban-
donment of lightly used routes, justified by economics of the rail system. 
The states, however, argue for the social benefits over and above those 
'of rail system economics, and state subvention of portions of the net-
works is a distinct possibility. This pattern of subve.ntion might be 
:.,~xtended to passenger service. 
Some other fa~tors are even more speculative. The emerging pattern of 
ownership for rail guideways will surely involve major government partic-
ipation at least in the northe((stern United Stat?s and may spread to 
other parts of the country. The question of govl:irnnien t p.articipation is. 
not so important as are questions of poli,cy about use of rail guideways 
and prices charged. Currently, Amtrak pays the railroads the (approxi-
mate) marginal cos:t for: operating ·its trains over the railroad guideways, 
and'Amtrakcosts are roughly twice passenger revenues. If some other 
prici~g pattern for gUideways were adopted, then the cost situation might 
change" favorably or unfavorably for Amtrak. Improved Amtrak eqUipment 
may increase. ridership and reduce Amtrak deficits which might encourage 
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expansion of service. Additionally, policy with respect to provision of 
service might enable innovative institutions to risk providing service on 
some routes. 
Future development in the Northeast Corridor also requires speculation. 
Studies and Metroliner demonstrations during the last decade suggest op-
portunities for investment in higher speed technologies. While it is 
not impossible to imagine the Congress supporting this regional-specific 
investment, congressional support would more likely require a broad pro-
gram with, perhaps, a baker's dozen of corridors around the nation also 
signaled for development. A pattern of development from current to high-
speed to very high-speed rail-like transportation was described in a 
recent report of the Committee on Transportation of the National Research 
Council,* although that report did not motivate the possibility of devel-
opment from the point of view of the political feasibility of programs. 
The po~nt to be noted is that the technology would evolve in a few well 
defined markets, and while it may have a nitch in future intercity trans-
portation, quantitatively that nitch would be small. 
Turning now to air, there has been extensive study of air vehicles that 
might serve markets with a short stage length, short takeoff and landing 
aircraft, for instance. The cost of time when the aircraft is loading 
and unloading and power and energy requirements for takeoff and landing 
impose cost penalties on these aircraft. However, they would compete at 
least in part in collector-distributor modes for which costs of alterna-
tive forms for transportation are also high, so there are no doubt nitches 
in the market where they will prove competitive. An important supporting 
force is available, namely: the interest of technology supplying organ-
izations. On the other hand, so little is known about the fundamental 
structure of travel that it is very difficult to judge technological op-
portunities, and this market will probably be developed by trial and 
error over a relatively long period of time. 
Intercity travel that is not in a dense traffic corridor and within which 
batches cannot be aggregated to provide dense service by passenger switch-
ing systems will not be well served by passenger SWitching systems. Adapt-
ing systems to better serve that market would seem to require software 
technology that would enable service pooling arrangements to bring batches 
of people together at the correct times and places so that shared travel 
is practicable. This might evolve from bus service, although such ser-
vice might evolve through automobile rental agencies such as the rental 
of intercity vehicles. Current low-density air service forms might in-
crease demand scheduling to serve small markets. The technology needed 
is partly that of software, software to aggregate demands so that the 
service is available at the right time and place, e.g., somewhat similar 
to car pool or dial-a-ride software systems. 
*Committee on Transportation, A Review of Short H auZ Passenger Transport-
ation. National Research Council. 1975. 
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To complete this discussion of the evolution of intercity systems within 
their present frames, brief remarks will be made on how different markets 
might be served. 
Corridors where traffic is heavy are relatively well served by intercity 
transportation technologies. Continuing investments in existing technol-
ogies, including improving technology supporting the upgrading of railroad 
passenger service, will continue to serve these corridors. Corridors in 
this category include, for example, Washington-New York, Milwaukee-Chicago-
Detroit, and Houston-Dallas. 
Corridors with less dense travel are numerous and include, for example, 
Seattle-Portland, St. Louis-Columbus (Ohio), and Nashville-Memphis. Al-
ternatives for development include new forms of air technology, gradual 
expansion of passenger railroad service, and/or evolution of the highway 
system including both auto and bus. 
With the exception of some charter and third level aircraft service, 
sparse markets are now served almost exclusively by the automobile-highway 
system. Representative here are three examples: travel from Chicago to 
numerous vacation sites throughout the Upper Great Lakes; travel from 
cities throughout overlapping market areas; and other travel circumstances 
providing access to all points in the country. Where there are links in 
the Interstate coaligned with this travel, these areas are now relatively 
well served; they are, of course, less well served if these links are 
not available. Technology meeting needs in these markets include auto-
highway technology, small aircraft and support systems technology, and 
software technology for demand scheduling. 
Remarks above have touched on opportunities for technologies resulting 
from efforts to obtain efficiencies through economies of scale and result-
ing from environmental, energy, and safety considerations. As the inter-
aity system evolves in present direations J some portions of the market 
will be better served than other portions. This issue may inarease de-
mands that teahnology be evolved to provide serviae in disadvantaged 
markets. 
Using Technology to Lead Societal Development 
The previous section addressed competition among intercity passenger 
transportation systems and the probable evolution of those systems, given 
present technology characteristics and forces for change. The present 
section will consider the use of technology to support societal develop-
ment. 
First, the ways which technology questions may be asked will be reviewed. 
The section then ponders the nature of the intercity transportation prob-
lem. Finally, properties of societal needs for intercity transportation 
are discussed. 
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Asking Questions about Technology Development. The previous section 
considered the question, given the market as it is currently developing 
and given technologies as they are currently supplied, what forms of tech-
nology development are likely? The same question may be asked without 
limiting it to technologies that can be supplied by existing delivery 
systems. In some nations, agencies other than those involved in delivery 
and operations of transportation technology are charged with R&D on trans-
portation technology, and they tend to pursue technology developments 
that might be applicable to intercity transportation regardless of their 
conformality with existing delivery systems. Work on high-speed, magnet-
ically levitated trains in Germany is an example. 
The question may be further developed. Intercity transportation deals 
with the quantities of things to be moved, movement distances, and time 
parameters. These quantities may be bounded to conform with the charac-
teristics of intercity transportation: for example, distance might be 
bounded 50 to 250 miles. Additionally, the quantities of dollars, land, 
or energy for movements may be identified and bounded. The question then 
can be rephrased, given the boundary conditions and minimization or maxi-
mization criteria within those boundaries, and given extant technology 
and all that might be developed within appropriate time frames, what tech-
nologies should be developed and put in place for intercity transporta-
tion? 
While this might be an appropriate way to ask questions about technology 
in many circumstances, it does not seem to be very appropriate to the 
intercity transportation problem. First, intercity transportation impinges 
on a complicated world of social, economic, technical, and political insti-
tutions. To ask questions of what to do without considering how to do it 
is not very fruitful. Second, transportation is but a means to ends, 
and it is not very fruitful to examine technology questions without much 
attention to purposes. For instance, one might examine intercity trans-
portation technologies with the objective of minimizing energy consump-
tion. While social purposes may be associated with the minimization of 
energy consumption, that is hardly the main social purpose of intercity 
transportation. It is necessary to define the intercity transportation 
question in some larger way. 
The issue is that the appropriate way to ask questions about interaity 
transportation teahnology developments is to phrase them in terms of 
soaial purposes. The question is, namely: given social purposes, what 
developments in intercity transportation are desired and what technologies 
should be developed and implemented in order to achieve those purposes? 
The question is overly simple, in part because it assumes that social 
purposes can be known; even if social purposes could be known, there are 
problems of cohesion of views and adjudication among groups that have 
different purposes. Yet the problem of social purpose is not completely 
intractable. The future is partly knowable because today's individuals, 
social groups, and physical facilities will appear in the future in aged 
forms. Paths for change have to be sought that are conformal with in-
dividuals and institutions as they exist today. and as they might be 
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changed in desirable ways. An issue is that the paths for ahange must be 
feasibZe and desirabZe. FeasibZe paths and the impaats of those paths 
are at issue. 
What Is the Intercity Transportation Problem? This subsection will 
treat some societal concerns as problems of intercity transportation. 
The next will treat c(;mcerns more geneI:ally. 
Intercity transportation hardly ranks as an exposed problem in comparison 
to equal opport~ity, energy, inflation, unemployment, crime, education, 
welfare, and the environment, yet it is related to several of those issues. 
In addition, intercity transportation is closely intertwined with recur-
rent questions of (regional) political powers and resource allocation. 
The discussion will begin with the latter matter; it will be approached 
through a consideration of the impacts of transportation development. 
Short-run intercity transportation impacts are felt directly by users of 
the system and by persons or iinstitutions holding resources directly 
impacted. In the long run, the availability of new transportation service 
affects investment and disinvestment and leads to what may be described 
as reorganization impacts. These impacts may work through economic, 
government, or other institutions, and trarlsportation development may be 
necessary but not sufficient to those reorg'anization impacts. Consider 
some examples. 
1. The improvement of rural roads has caused the near disappear-
ance of hamlets in this country; it has affected the growing 
of subsistence crops on the farm vs. purchasing them in a 
supermarket; it has contributed to the movement of the home-
stead from the farm proper to a rural town, and it has changed 
the style of life in rural areas. 
2. Medical service is now highly specialized, and, associated with 
each specialization, there are market areas of differing size. 
Transportation improvements enabled in part these developments. 
3. Improved transportation has had a sharp impact on warehousing, 
generally decreasing the numbers of warehouses required for 
any given service and decreasing inventories. 
Improvements in the last decade in intercity transportation over relatively 
long stage lengths has impacted on economic, social, and government insti-
tutions ~The general effect of these impacts in major metropolitan areas 
appears to have been that of centralizing control of institutions as 
against decentralization. Transportation alone has not occasioned these 
developments, of course, for computer and communication development have 
played important roles. Also, the notion of control is subtle. Cen-
tralized control with improved transportation and communication may result 
in increased flexibility for actions by regional units. 
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The development in the last two decades of the Interstate System has af-
fected the tributary areas of cities of many sizes and the division of 
activities between larger places on the network vs. smaller places. The 
link, of the Interstate have organized these impacts geographically. 
In short~ those areas of the country well served by the (longer stage) 
air net and by the Interstate have been undergoing reorganization and 
receiving impact:s. Places less well served have been impacted by improve-
ments, but seem not to have shared either in the benefits or disbenefits 
in the same way. They are probably relatively worse off. 
There has not been a spatial, institutional, or individual accounting for 
these impacts on the spatial scale at which they are discussed here, so 
the remarks above, while undoubtedly in the right direction, are specula-
tive. Even so, they are important to the issue of intercity transporta-
tion. At OIle extreme, an option may provide a spatially distributed set 
of reorgani,zation impacts. At another extreme, impacts may be mainly 
limited to selected corridors and places on networks. 
The issue of inte~aity t~anspo~tation in this aonte~ is~ then~ that of 
past and futu~e geog~aphiaaZ impaats. In this geographical frame, the 
issue is coaligned with the geographical bases of political power in the 
federal government and in the states. 
Table 11-1 allows restatement of the intercity transportation problem. 
It shows passenger-miles of travel by the four intercity systems. In the 
case of bus, train, and air, the passenger mileage may be assumed to be 
mainly intercity. Data presented for the automobile are mostly for travel 
within. urban areas, although about 88% of intercity travel is by auto-
mobile. It is the cost per passenger-mile which is chiefly of interest, 
and intercity automobile costs are assumed to approximate that for city 
travel. Automobile costs as shown in tables such as this are low. Those 
costs do not include (a) the time of the driver and (b) several kinds of 
environmental, safety, and guideway costs. For energy cost reasons 
(mainly), automobile costs are increasing faster than costs of other sys-
tems, and automobiles are viewed as wasteful of energy. In addition, 
costs in nonautomobile systems are a function of economies of scale 
and would decrease if there were additional ridership. Society would, 
then, be better off if the competitive position of the passenger switch-
ing systems were enhanced and automobile travel eroded. 
An issue of inte~aity tpanspoptation is that its ppesent physiaaZ fo~at 
is viewed as wastefuZ of ~esoupaes; change to more efficient modes is 
needed. 
In an early section of this paper attention was given to the ways in 
which vehicles, guideways, and operations created and delivered technol-
ogies to the system, and the existence of constraints was noted. Given 
these conditions, what actors and institutions do within the systems must 
be considered rational. That is, within the regulatory and institutional 
conditions within which they work, actors and institutions rationally al-
locate investment resources and develop and create operating procedures. 
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Table 11-1 
OPERATING COST PER PASSENGER-MILE 
Vehicle Type 
Automobile 
Intercity Bus 
Class I 
Other 
Train 
AMTRAK 
Air 
Domestic Trunk 
Local Service 
Passenger-Miles 
(x 106 ) 
2,170,095 
13,576 
12,024 
3,038 
105,997 
8,899 
Operating 
Expenses 
(x 106 ) 
$111,636 
689.6 
192.5 
286 
8,024 
921 
$/Pass-Mile 
$0.05 
0.05 
0.02 
0.09 
0.08 
0.10 
Sources: Avia~ion Daily, Aviation Daily's Airline Statistical 
Annuat3 Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, Washington, D.C., 
1974.: 
Gay, William G., u.S. Department of Transportation, 
Summary of National Transportation Statistics3 
DOT-TSC-OST-74-8, u.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., June 1974. 
National Association of Motor Bus Owners, Bus Facts3 
Washington, D.C., 1973. 
The question of rationality may also be addressed to the boundary condi-
tions within which a particul~r system operates; it is that of whether 
these conditions represent rational ways to allocate national resources. 
The positive argument is that these conditions were established over a 
long time period and r~present an adjudication of the desires of the cit-
izenry in the allocation of national resources. The negative' is that the 
adjudication of interests of the citizenry has been crude at best. Polit-
ical power and interests have changed. Furthermore, the.environment has 
changed radically. The negative argument now seems to override the posi-
tive. 
Consequently, the nature of intercity transportation boundary conditions 
poses an issue: in particular, the regulatory system is wasteful of re-
sources and restricts service options. Adjustment of regulatory pro-
visions may provide new opportunities for technology development and 
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Wh~le regulatory conditions may change to permit more flexibility in the 
pursuit of markets, constraints having to do with environment, safety, 
labor relations and working conditions, and so on appear to be increasing 
in weight. Consequently, one should not infer that technology develop-
ment and delivery systems would necessarily be less bounded in the future; 
one can infer only that boundaries would be different. 
Private sector groups in the transportation community and the secretarial 
level U.S. DOT officers provide a power base for recognition of the bound-
ary conditions problem. 
Socially Desir~ble Attributes of Intercity Transportation. The 
previous subsection reviewed some facets of the intercity passenger trans-
portation problem. This subsection will consider the properties intercity 
transportation should have if it is to conform to social objectives, 
needs, desires, or wants. 
The paragraphs that start the discussion will present some social objec-
tives rather tersely. The discussion will then turn to desirable attri-
butes'. 
Efficiency is a social objective for the simple reason that society has 
many wants and can approach more of these if it operates its components 
efficiently rather than inefficiently. 
Reduction of the maldistribution of goods and services is also a social 
il)bj ective. The distribution of access to intercity transportation sys-
:':ems is less than perfect because of barriers. Money is one such barrier, 
skills for utilizing the facilities are another. In the instance of the 
automobile which provides much of intercity transportation, those who 
cannot drive (some one-third of the persons of eligible age do not have 
drivers' licenses) are limited in access as are those who cannot afford 
to purchase (or rent) and operate an automobile. 
Access to the system is a partial consideration. What is desired is 
access to those activities that travel makes possible, so the broader 
issue is that of access to full participation in social and economic 
life. Not only is this desired for different economic groups and groups 
with different skills, it is desired for persons regardless of their geo-
graphical positions. Adding slightly to this and putting it in a differ-
ent way, a goal of regional economic and social development may be recog-
nized. This goal is recognized in part because appropriate development 
is necessary to creation of opportunities to be achieved by travel,and 
it is recognized in part because it is responsive to the political insti-
tutions of the nation. The nation is a federalism. Requisites are d:t-
vided among the national government, state governments, and local juris~ 
dictions; and political power and institutions are such that geographical 
equity in the form of geographical or regional development is a goal of 
the system. 
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The discussion will turn now to desirable attributes of intercity trans-
portation in light of social wants. In the style of this paper, these 
attributes will be expressed as issues. 
One att~ibute is that of va~iety. The issue is that teahnoZogy must be 
deveZoped and deZivered in many diffe~ent fop,ms. There are numerous 
reasons for this. One stems from the federalized nature of the national 
structure: in many markets that must be satisfied. A single technology 
and technology delivery program to meet some narrowly prescribed goal, 
say, to link all cities with populations greater than two million by 
high-speed ground transportation, is simply unrealistic in light of the 
division of political and other powers. Variety is also required because 
environments differ; there are differences in regional goals. 
Ina~ementaZism, or suitabiZity to ina~ementaZism, is anothe~ issue; it 
wouZd appea~ to be a neaessa~ att~ibute of inte~ity t~anspo~tation 
deveZopment options. This issue properly recognizes the inability to 
determine exactly the values of any alternative program; it recognizes 
the existing technology delivery system and the numerous other institu-
tions that form the starting context for development. 
FZe~ibiZity is anothe~ desi~abZe attribute; it is not gua~anteed by in-
arementaZism. The issue is that deveZopments ought to go fo~a~d so 
that many options ar~ kept open in response to the evoZution of soaiat 
goaZs. 
An impo~tant issue is that sho~t-te~m benefits shouZd be given high vaZue 
and sho~t-term disbenefits shouZd be heaviZy weighted. This attribute 
recognizes the importance of the paths through which change is achieved 
and that these paths must be desircb1e of themselves. So paths that have 
low levels of benefits and/or sharp disbenefits are not tolerable. 
The finat issue is that benefits f~m deveZopment must be dist~ibuted 
geog~aphiaaZZy by inaome and aZass. This attribute stems from the dis-
cussion of ma1distribution and regional development. 
Further Discussion 
This section will enlarge upon two of the themes introduced in previous 
sections. First, the concept of admissible technological developments 
will be introduced and used to integrate the discussion of desirable 
attributes of intercity transportation with materials presented earlier. 
The section will close with a note on the automobile-highway system, an 
extension of earlier remarks on that system. 
Admissible Technology Developments. It will be useful to review the 
previous discussion. A number of pages were devoted to an eclectic review 
of the forms in which intercity transportation is supplied. Competition 
and laissez faire developments were then discussed. Raising the question 
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of intervention in favor of social wants changed the structure of the 
discussion rather sharply. Such intervention requires that there be 
some measure of the desirability of alternatives and an ability to create 
and weight them. Some of the attributes that normative choices must have 
were developed in the preceding section, and the technology will now be 
discussed in light of these. The term admissible is used to describe the 
tecbnology developments to be discussed here. These are admissible in 
the sense that they do not violate the identified attributes. 
Consider, first, technological developments relative to guideways: rail, 
highway, and air. The geographic network of these is very extensively 
developed, but they usually operate at much less than their capacity 
(most capacity problems are at sWitches) and they are subject to strong 
economies of scale: the more the traffic, the less the unit cost. Cur-
rently, many candidate 'technology developments are screened by their 
marketability at points where economies of scale may reduce costs. How-
ever, excepting the efficiency condition, desirable attributes of tech-
nologies suggest that these developments are being screened by the wrong 
market. More to the point, the market identified by economies of scale 
possibilities is such that many technologies produced for it do not lend 
themselves to widely distributed (perceived) geographical benefits. It 
may be that many current laissez faire technology developments would not 
be admissible if they were considered de novo, especially strategies 
that fail distributive tests. 
The issue of distPibution may be attaahed to the goaZs for interaity 
transportation deveZopment and to the physiaaZ faaiZities~ serviaes~ 
and benefits that aaarue from suah goaZs. This sharpZy differentiates 
an interaity transportation program from those whiah strive for nationaZ 
goaZs suah as defense and spaae expZoration. 
The local impacts of intercity transportation development are so blatant 
that they cannot be ignored in any stage of program development, includ-
ing the technological stage. Boundaries are set sharply on the dis-
benefit side. Noise, other environmental pollution, massive taking of 
land, and sharply felt fiscal requirements are untenable. The first 
incidence of benefits is to those individuals who might perceive shorter 
travel times, cost reductions, safety improvements, and improved quality 
of service. There is also a first incidence benefit on land: an immed-
iate consequence of transportation development is that it shifts the 
comparative advantage of places, which is reflected in land values. Less 
directly felt are benefits (and disbenefits) from institutional reorgan-
ization resulting from changed transportation services. 
An issue~ then~ is that in addition to serving a market in an eaonomia 
sense~ the teahnoZogy must aZso respond in a poZitiaaZ sense. That is, 
the technology must touch enough people favorably (and a few unfavorably) 
so that they perceive benefits and are willing to engage in collective 
action, say through voting, to provide system implementation. 
On account of the extant investment in institutions, guideways, and 
vehicles and- because of the requirement for incrementalism, technologies 
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must find their market within existing systems. Doing something other 
than following the existing path is most difficult, for technologies must 
serve their existing markets and must involve in their development and 
implementation existing actors and actor relationships, individuals, and 
institutions. Anothep issue~ then~ is that one cannot sepapate considep-
at ions of technoZogicaZ deveZopment fVom considepations of technoZogy 
deZiver,y systems. This point cannot be made too strongly. There exists 
a duality between the technology delivery system and the kinds of tech-
nologies that are deliverable. Conside~ation of alternatives to tech-
nologies currently developable and deliverable requires study of alterna-
tive ways of developing and delivering those technologies. 
To further examine some of the properties of technology, it is useful to 
return to the economy of scale issue. Figure 11-9 generalizes to total 
transportation cost the sum of guideway cost, vehicle operating cost, and 
infrastructure cost. Any point on the line marked A-A' represents that 
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Figure 11-9. COST PER UNIT VERSUS THE QUANTITY OF TRANSPORTATION: 
IN GENERAL (LINE A-A') AND FOR A PARTICULAR 
TECHNOLOGY (LINE B-B') 
form of guideway, vehicle, and management providing the minimum cost for 
moving a given number of units (e.g., v, c). It is always possible to 
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[ provide transportation at higher costs, so that all the points lying above A-A' represent ways in which a wasteful technology could be supplied. Another way to think of line A-A' is that it represents the tangent 
points of curves such as B-B'; B-B' describes the cost characteristics 
for some guideway, vehicles, and operating institution combination. For 
instance, B-B' might be thought of as the cost vs. quantity relation-
ship for a particular rail length with the capacity of the length, the 
number of vehicles, and the form of operation fixed. In both theory and 
practice there would be a very large number of B-B' relations represent-
ing the technologies of intercity transportation. 
The market for technology as it is currently channeled and realized focuses 
on technology developments on the right-hand side of A-A' • The main 
reason for this is the search for scale economies. 
Figure II-9 nicely illustrates a flexibility problem; as shown,the number 
of units moved has a time dimension, hourly, daily, yearly, or so forth. 
But demand per unit of time is never constant. A system such as B-B' 
might be selected to provide service level v at cost c, yet, demands 
on the system might vary from v' to v" and costs from c to c". 
Consider: 
1. v and c can never be forecast exactly. Further, v and c 
for any route can be expected to change over a series of years 
as urban centers grow or decay and as patterns of travel change. 
Consequently, the nature of the curve B-B' indicates the 
degree of the risk of putting that technology in place for a 
particular service. Generally, one would prefer technologies 
that generate curves more with a shape. 
2. Once this system is in place, v and c can be measured and 
improved estimates made of how they might shift over the years. 
A wise manager would do this and then shift investment in light 
of changes. The question arises of the extent to which the 
installed technology lends itself to disinvestment or invest-
ment as needed. Generally, where heavy investment is made in 
gUideways, a system is not very flexible. The number of vehicles 
in the system can be increased or decreased and switches may 
be more easily inc~~ased or decreased in capacity than may 
gUideways. 
The Automobile-Highway System. The automobile-highway system is 
changing mainly because of environment and energy considerations. Because 
the political and social climate seems to favor change, and because many 
technological changes seem admissible, a short note will be included here 
on this system. Some remarks made previously will be repeated. 
The automobile in its current form has a life of approximately ten years 
and is driven approximately 100,000 miles. Assuming an average occupancy 
of 2.2 persons per vehicle, it delivers approximately 220,000 passenger-
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~ miles of service during its lifetime: 22.000 passenger-miles per year, 60 passenger-miles per day, or 2.5 pa~senger-miles per hour. These latter 
numbers are not very usable because automobile utilization is a function 
Qf its age, the newer the car the more it is used. Also, daily and hourly 
utilization varies greatly as does the utilization of one automobile 
compared to another. In addition to these temporal variations and user 
to user variations, the automobile is used in different driving environ-
ments, e.g., on access streets or freeways, and is used for a wide variety 
of purposes or trip types. The automobile is a general purpose vehicle 
adaptable to many circumstances but perfect for none. 
Small lightweight vehicles are one direction in which suppliers are re-
sponding to environmental and energy problems. Another direction might 
be that of developing special vehicles for medium- to high-speed driving 
using favorable aerodynamic configurations and involving suitable gearing, 
fuel metering, and other elements to reduce fuel consumption. These ve-
hicles would be expensive. Also, investments in aerodynamics and expen-
sive propulsion systems might not be competitive with investments in 
weight reduction and the reduction of propulsion plant size for travel on 
local access streets and arterials. 
The market may thus diverge in two directions: lightweight urban ve-
hicles and medium- to high-speed, speCial purpose, over-the-road vehicles. 
Such divergence could be aided by institutional forms to increase the 
productivity of over-the-road vehicles. The garage of the future might 
have one or more lightweight vehicles. It would also contain an over-
the-road vehicle if that vehicle were used enough for that special purpose 
to warrant the ownership. Over-the-road vehicles might be rented as 
needed. 
This pattern of development would: allow the automobile-highway system to 
respond to both technology developments and social problems. The social 
problem is that there is a lack of access to the system either because 
persons are not licensable or because vehicles are too costly. The in-
expensive light vehicle could ameliorate cost problems. The accessibility 
of the system could be ameliorated by licensing procedures tailored to 
particular vehicles and environments. For example, the subteenager might 
be licensed to drive a lightweight vehicle on local access roads only. 
Such a vehicle might have sharp limitations on horsepower and stringent 
braking requirements. The vehicle itself might not be registered to 
operate on, for example, freeways. 
With intensive utilization, the over-the-road vehicle could warrant invest-
ments in guidance systems, and an evolutionary path could be developed 
leading to full automation of freeway lanes and vehicles. There is a 
clear advantage of this from an energy point of view because over-the-road 
vehicles could have rather small propulsion plants, used at near full load 
most of the time. Spaced control would be necessary to manage the differ-
ing average speeds uphill and downhill that would occur under such a mode 
of propulsion plant utilization. Development of energy storage systems, 
a carbon fuel engine, generator, batteries, and an electric motors system, 
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e.g., would provlde an alternative to dynamic speed controls. Addition-
ally, the guideway system could be modified to provide a form of dual 
mode, and properly equipped chassis could be rented for transport of 
lightweight vehicles and/or special purpose vehicles such as campers. 
This direction of development could well have public support.. It would 
support widely distributed benefits f9r its geographical impacts would be 
widespread. It would deal directly witt, two widely perceived problems of 
the automobile: it insults the environment and uses up energy. It would 
also deal with the problem of accessibility to the auto~obile-highway 
system by persons of different age and income classes. ' 
It should be remarked that there are some major impediments to this di-
rection of development. For one, it would requi:'c !!. level of joint 
decision-making by driver and vehide licensing agenci~s, 'institutions 
providing insurance and other factors affecting operatior.s, guideway sup-
pliers, and vehicle suppliers. Such joint decision-making does not cur-
rently exist. Additionally, such development would require t~2 involve-
ment of new kinds of actors in the technology and delivery process. For 
these reasons, the special purpose vehicles discussed here might be de-
scribed as marginally admissible. 
Closure 
This paper has approached the issues affecting intercity transportation 
by discussing the forms of that transportation and the ways in which its 
technology is and has been produced and implemented. How those forms 
might evolve in the absence of deliberate attempts to attach intercity 
transportation development to social desires was then discussed. Ques-
tions about the relationship of technology to social desires were then 
considered. 
The process of technology development and deployment requires imaginative 
actors with a sense of purpose, sponsors of research and development, 
and the important follow-on of activities of testing, production, and 
implementation, and clients or markets. On reviewing current intercity 
transportation systems, one notes many unfavorable conditions when the 
current process is matched against the issue of using technology in con-
formality with broadly viewed social purposes. The supplier institutions 
are quite fragmented, and actors within, those institutions have restrained 
roles. Much of the technology represents an amalgamation of know-how 
developed in engineering and other fields in light of the progress of 
those fields and their images of goals. Nowhere is there a coupling 
between the needs of transportation broadly conceived and deep streams 
of scientific and technological work. The market is fragmented geograph-
ically and in other ways. Because of lack of knowledge of the market, 
it is viewed mainly as opportunities for efficiency from economies of 
scale in existing systems. No one searches for unmet needs and new oppor-
tunities. 
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One can speculate whether society has had a rich selection of technolog-
ical options from which to chose. Have the forms of the technology 
development and implementation systems been such that society has only a 
meager fare? 
So one may incline to the view that the problem of intercity transporta-
tion is that while many are involved it is nobody'~s business. There is 
no well ~.<.nown and cohesive market structure that d\amands that technology 
meet its needs. There is only a fragmented technology implementation 
structure that is l£mited in what it p~rceives and can do. This poses 
an opportuni,ty for creation of imaginative technological institutions 
and for actors within those institutions. The creation of a variety of 
technological opportunities and the appropriate representation of these 
to the public would assist public decision-makers in identifying what is 
desired and options they wish to sehe. The development of technology 
options need not be simply guided by the rule of developing a technology 
because it is developable. Rather, the development of technological 
options should be guided by careful evaluation of the determinants of 
travel and of the conditions within which options may be deployable. 
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ABSTRACT 
Thts paper considers those elements in the process of innovation relevant 
to intercity passenger transportation. It identifies the participants in 
the process and explains the resources required to implement a successful 
innovation. The objective is to identify those factors aiding or impeding 
the successful introduction of a new technology. 
The innovation process is complex; it begins with conception or invention, 
goes through research and development stages, and finally must pass 
through the "technology delivery" phase in order to reach the market. 
The technology delivery aspects of the process of innovation include all 
matters related to production, marketing, and distribution of the inno-
vation. 
Five distinct parties to the process of innovation in intercity transpor-
tation systems are carriers, both public and private; travelers .and 
shippers; suppliers to carriers of infrastructure, equipment, services 
and capital; government--all levels and all roles including regulation, 
supplier, user, promoter, and "environment creator"; and the general 
public. 
Frequently the carrier is the innovator, instigating and shepherding the 
innovation through the multistep process. Some carriers may Simply 
reject out-of-hand technological innovations in general or those of a 
given character. Others typically embrace certain types of technological 
innovations without detailed economic analysis. Carriers owned by the 
public sector appear more willing to accept the substantial risks associ-
ated with dramatic technological change than do their private sector 
counterparts. 
The consumer/traveler plays a major role in determining the rate at which 
innovations are adopted. There is a substantial interaction between 
carriers, shippers, and travelers. This interaction determines the 
success of a given technological innovation in the market place. 
Suppliers to carriers may produce services in the form of studies and 
analysis associated with the introduction of new techniques and new 
technology; or they may produce equipment for use with the infrastructure, 
including railway locomotives and cars, aircraft, ships, hovercraft, etc. 
Additional suppliers are those who furnish capital to the transport 
sector. Such financing, of course, is a critical factor in the deter-
mination of the extent to which new concepts will be implemented. 
Government can alternately be supplier, shipper and sponsor of travel, 
promoter of transport, and creator and shaper of the economic and social 
environment in which transportation is produced and marketed. 
Although public attitudes can be conditioned by actions of carriers, 
suppliers, and government this does not negate the hypothesis that the 
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general public in the long run plays a significant role in determining 
which transportation innovations will be undertaken and introduced and 
how successful they will be. 
Constraints to innovation in intercity transportation can be divided 
into (1) resource constraints, and (2) social constraints and incentives. 
There are five basic categories of resource cont'ltraints that can be 
identified with respect to transpo~tation innovation: basic technology, 
capital (public or private), labor,management, and land. 
For the next quarter century, there are an abundance of technological 
possibilities to support any kind of transportation innovation that is 
either required or desired. 
Means must be found to minimize the extent to which innovative processes 
relative to intercity transportation are held up awaiting completion of 
the R&D results required to make given technological innovations physi-
cally and economically viable. 
Financial resources provided for intercity transportation emanate from 
both the public and private sectors, depending, of course, upon the 
nature of the resources required, the way in which they will be applied, 
and the public policy of the moment. 
By and large, the labor constraint is manifested through a shortage of 
personnel with special skills required either in the development or 
application of transportation innovations. Labor constraints also grow 
largely out of public policy which generally does not condone wholesale 
labor displacement resulting from technological or organizational change. 
The availability, quality, and quantity of management are also resource 
constraints to innovation. The mixture of public and private sector 
management in itself creates problems with respect to the allocation of 
resources to support innovations in intercity transportation. The public 
enterprise manager generally has less incentive to innovate successfully 
than does his private sector counterpart. 
While land constraints may be felt in the next half century more in the 
context of urban transportation than interurban, there will certainly 
be an increasing number of instances in which a given set of techno-
logical possibilities related to intercity transportation cannot be 
exploited. Development of high speed and efficient tunnelin~ techniques 
is one means of easing the growing land constraints. 
Social constraints and incentives include regulation of all kinds, public 
policy, and labor. 
Regulation represents one of the major social constraints to technological 
change and innovation; it can, however, also provide a substantial 
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ineentive. Regulators will increasingly become aware of the relation-
shtp between economic and other forms of regulation and technological 
change. 
The factors that influence intercity transport innovations include govern-
me~t as promoter of transportation, maintaining balance in the transpor-
tation sector, market aggregation, purchasing philosophy and techniques, 
teet facilities, foreign technology, appreciation of innovation as a 
process, and innovative propensities. 
Regulation is a device that is both promotive and restrictive. Govern-
ment funds research and development, provides operating subsidies, and 
provides infrastructure. An important issue is whether government will 
recognize its potential as a promotive force and whether it will use 
its leverage to serve the explicit ends of public policy. 
A balanced transportation system is one that is responsive to all the 
needs of the traveling and shipping public while providing them with a 
choice of mode and method wherever possible. It is achieved through 
coordinated allocation of public and private funds. 
Market aggregation refers to the willingness and ability of buyers 
(carriers) to define collectively their needs and to pool their pur-
chasing power in order to induce suppliers to provide a higher quality 
or more efficient product or service. The federal government achieves 
market aggregation when it imposes standards that cause technological 
innovations. 
Purchasing philosophy involves the means by which transport enterprises 
acquire infrastructural components and equipment. A performance-
specification approach to purchasing will have a beneficial influence 
on technological innovation. 
Foreign technology represents a particularly important potential spur 
to domestic technological innovation. The availability of foreign 
products embodying different and better technology should induce manu-
facturers to produce competitive or superior equipment. 
One drawback to technological innovation is the lack of test facilities. 
Facilities to test mundane equipment such as railway freight cars and 
locomotives are necessary. 
Those involved in innovation must recognize the continuum of the inno-
vation process, from conception through R&D and production, ahd finally 
to the marketplace. 
Unless society and transport sector entrepreneurs (public and private) 
embrace technological innovation, the likelihood of there being signifi-
cant technological change in intercity transportation in the next 25 to 
50 years is relatively small. Though there is currently widespread 
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public disenchantment with technology, it is expected that the propensity 
to innovate in transportation will increase. 
Constraints over the next 25 years are largely expected to be insti-
tutional, related to definitions and assumptions of responsibilities by 
various parties to the process of innovation in the transport sector. 
Three crucial independent variables are the locus of regulation, the 
balance between competition and economies of scale favored by national 
policy, and social awareness. The locus can be eit'Per highly centralized 
or highly d,ecentra1ized. Centralized authority tends to produce con-
sistent and definitive regulation; it also tends to lack broad-based, 
multifaceted appeal mechanisms. Decentralized regulation tends to pro-
duce overlapping and potentially conflicting regulations. 
There is always a balance struck in the transportation industry between 
emphasis on competiti~n and emphasis on benefiting from economies of 
scale. 
Social awareness is characterized by the degree to which economic issues 
such as concern for the environment, the interest of special interest 
groups, social equity, safety, and security are recognized and function 
as important constraints in the implementation process. 
Eight scenarios, resulting from various possible combinations of the 
extremes of the above independent variables, close the paper. 
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III. CONSTRAINTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION INNOVATIONS 
A. J. Ge11man~ J. P. Price, 
J. J. Grocki, and R. P. Whorf 
Gellman Research Associates, Inc. 
The principal subject of this paper is technological innovation. The 
concern is with getting new technology into the marketplace or, more 
precisely, with determining the issues that influence the introduction 
on a significant scale of technologically innovative infrastructure and 
equipment for intercity transportation. The technological possibilities 
in the various fields are considered in other issue papers in this 
report. The focus here is upon the issues and forces affecting the 
"delivery" of the technological possibilities to the marketplace. 
It is not enough for a product or service to be conceived or that research 
and development activities produce a piece of hardware. If the process of 
innovation is to be completed, the product or service that has been the 
object of the process must be introduced into the marketplace. The inno-
vation process is complex; it begins with conception or invention at 
the extreme furthest from the marketplace, goes through research and 
development stages, and finally must pass through the "technology 
delivery" phase in order to reach the market. A generalized and typical 
relationship between various key elements in the process of innovation 
is shown in the accompanying flowchart (Figure 111-1). The technology 
delivery aspects of the process of innovation include all matters related 
to production, marketing, and distribution of the innovation. 
It is in the technology delivery phase of the innovative process that by 
far the greatest resources are required. Numerous studies have shown 
that typically some 90% of the total resources required to carry through 
the process of innovation are, in fact, expended beyond the R&D phase of 
the process. Completion of R&D activity merely provides the opportunity 
for the innovating organization to reach the market with a believable 
technological possibility; but to realize this opportunity, it generally 
must be willing to commit to the delivery task many times the resources 
that it has expended up to this point in the process. 
This paper is concerned with all the elements in the process of inno-
vation relevant to intercity passenger transportation. It identifies 
the participants in the process and explains the resources required to 
implement a successful innovation. The objective is to identify those 
factors aiding or impeding the successful introduction of a new tech-
nology. The focus, therefore, is on those forces that affect the speed 
and direction of the entrepreneur--public or private--as he attempts to 
move through the process because these are the principal factors affec-
ting implementation of the innovation. 
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Parties to the Process of Innovation 
Five distinct parties to the process of innovation in intercity tr<'lrlS-
po{tation systems can be identified. They are: 
I 
Carriers, both public and private 
• User, that is, traveler
s and shippers 
• Suppliers to carriers of infrastructure, equipment, services, 
and capital 
• Government: all levels and all roles including regulation, 
supplier, user, promoter, and "environment creator" 
• The general public 
Each and every public and private entity involved in supporting, pro-
ducing, or using intercity transportation has a critical role to play 
as far as the process of innovation is concerned. Some of the roles are 
quite obvious and others are far more subtle though nonetheless influ-
ential. 
Carriers. One of the critical participants in th~ process of inno-
vation is the transportation company. Frequently the carrier is the 
innovator, instigating and shepherding the innovation through the multi-
step process. 
Consider the role of the carrier. Transportation companies can, and 
often do, play "dog-in-the-manger." For reasons that mayor may not be 
rational, some carriers may simply reject out-of-hand technological 
innovations in general or those of a given character. Other carriers 
typically embrace certain types of technological innovations almost 
without detailed economic analysis. Perhaps the best example of the 
latter would be the approach to innovative aircraft taken by scheduled, 
certificated airlines. Certainly, the widespread and quite rapid adop-
tion of the Boeing 747 by some primarily domestic carriers is a case in 
point. 
In some cases the extent to which innovation is embraced by carriers 
depends on whether such carriers represent public enterprise or private 
enterprise activities. Except in the area of urban transportation, the 
United States has had little experience with public enterprise carriers. 
In foreign countries, differences in attitude between public and private 
carriers have been evidenced. Those owned by the public sector appear 
more willing to accept the substantial risks associated with dramatic 
technological change than do their private sector counterparts both in 
the same country and in other nations. Indeed, outside the U.S. at 
least, the propensity to accept innovations embodying substantial techno-
logical change seems to be greatest in publicly owned transportation 
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companies where the public sector also has a substantial stake in the 
enterprises that provide the hardware associated with the innovative 
transportation product. 
Travelers and Shippers. Those who travel or ship obviously play 
an important role in determining which technological innovations will 
be successful and which will either be stillborn or will be introduced 
without financial success, however measured. To the extent that the 
traveling publ:i.c rejects a given form of transportation, such transport 
cannot become a significant factor. The same is true where the shipment 
of goods is concerned. 
In this connection, there are instances where travelers (and shippers 
occasionally) embrace a technological possibility that, whether eco-
nomically rational or not, provides an opportunity for profit for carriers 
or transport equipment makers. The automobile and the private aircraft 
are two examples. In either instance, the traveler is producing his own 
transportation, and it is he who principally, although not exclusively, 
makes the associated capital investment decision. Such decisions are 
frequently nonoptimal and hence not economically rational. Nevertheless, 
the influence of the consumer/traveler should not be underestimated. He 
plays a major role in determining the rate at which such developments as 
innovative types of automotive power systems will be adopted. 
Where public transportation is concerned, certainly carriers can influ-
ence the propensities of travelers and shippers to accept technological 
innovation. Carrier marketing programs are often dedicated to such 
effort. The point, of course, is that there is substantial interaction 
between carriers on the one hand and shippers and travelers on the other 
that determines the success of a given technological innovation in the 
marketplace. 
Suppliers to Carriers. Serving as a key factor in determining the 
extent to which technological innovation will succeed or fail are the 
suppliers to carriers. (In this sense, the term "carrier" includes 
operators of automobiles and private aircraft who supply transportation 
services to themselves.) The suppliers having a profound influence on 
the process of technological innovation in intercity t.ransportation span 
a wide spectrum of services and products. For example, they may be 
contractors building highway systems, municipal airports, or railroad 
rights-of-way; they may produce services in the form of studies and 
analyses associated with the introduction of new techniques and new 
technology; or, they may produce equipment for use with the infrastruc-
ture, including railway locomotives and cars, aircraft, ships, hover-
craft, etc. 
Often overlooked in the category of suppliers are those numerous organi-
zations that furnish capital to the transport sector. These entities in 
the United States are both public and private. For example, until 
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recent years, private lending institutions provided the bulk of railroad 
capital. With the launching of AMTRAK and the current reorganization of 
the Northeast ra'l.lroads, there has been an increase in public sector 
pa~ticipation in supplying capital to railroad enterprises. In the high-
way mode, the suppliers of infrastructure capital are largely public 
agtncies whereas equipment capital, especially for intercity transpor-
tation, comes almost entirely from private sources. In aviation, capital 
supply follows substantially the same pattern as in highway transpor-
tation. Regardless of the source or form (loans, equity, debt, or 
leases) of the capital, the willingness of capital-suppliers to finance 
innovation both on the part of suppliers to carriers and of carriers 
themselves is a critical factor determining the extent to lo1hich new 
concepts will be implemented. 
Government. Government at every level is involved with transport 
innovation. Even in modes such as rail where government~ until quite 
recently, has had minimal direct involvement from a financial stand-
point, the role of the government is presently very substantial and 
promises to grow, at least in the near term. Government actually plays 
several different roles: those of supplie~, shipper and sponsor of 
travel, promoter of transport, and creator and shaper of the economic 
and social environment in which transportation is produced and marketed. 
In each and every role, it exerts substantial influence on the develop-
ment and successful implementation of technological innovation in inter-
city transportation. Since governments are so influential in this 
respect, considerable subsequent discussion will be devoted to their 
cole in specific contexts. 
General Public. The general public often plays a significant role 
in determining which transportation innovations will be attempted and 
which will be ultimately successful. This is particularly true since 
government plays so many roles, and plays them so powerfully, and since 
government, by and large, is sensitive to public attitudes in conceiving 
and implementing policies that affect transportation both generally and 
specifically. If the public at large rebels in dramatic fashion against 
aviation-related n.oise, government can be expected to take steps to 
force aircraft and airport operators to make the operating and techno-
logical changes necessary to keep noise within acceptable bounds. 
Although public attitudes can be conditioned by actions of carriers, 
suppliers, and government, this does not negate the hypothesis that the 
general public in the long run plays a significant role in determining 
which transportation innovations will be undertaken and introduced and 
how successful they will be. 
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Constraints to Innovation 
The constraints to innovation in intercity transportation can reasonably 
be divided into two broad categories: (1) resource constraints* and 
(2) social constraints and incentives. 
Resource Contraints. There are five basic categories of resource 
constraints.that can be identified with respect to transportation inno-
. I 
vation~ Th~se are: 
, 
ei B4sic Technology 
i 
.; Capital--Public and/or Private 
• Labor 
• Management 
• Land 
Basic Technology. Essentially, technology is knowledge. In 
this context, the term refers to scientific or technical information that 
leads to production of a specific good or service. New technology, or 
existing technology applied in a new way, is at the foundation of all 
technological innovation. In contrast, nontechnological innovation 
involves new applications or new marketing methods for an established 
product in the expectation of eliciting additional demand or of shifting 
the user's cost function. 
With th\~ technological possibilities that are available to produce trans-
portation innovations, it would seem that in the near term, perhaps for 
the next quarter century, there are an abundance of technological possi-
bilities to support any kind of transportation innovation that is either 
required or desired. The science underlying the development of techno-
logical possibilities (through research and development efforts) is 
quite abundant in the United States. Basic problems arise primarily 
with respect to working through the process of innovation beyond the R&D 
phase. 
This is not to say that all support for R&D activities oriented toward 
transportation should be eliminated in either the public or private 
sector, but rather that the greatest barrier to the implementation of 
intercity transportation innovations are in the "technology delivery" 
*Note that the resource constraints can be recast as the resources 
required to innovate successfully. 
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sY$tem rather than in the steps in the process of innovation that lie 
up~tream from technology delivery. 
As the technological possibilities that now exist are exploited more 
fully in the context of transportation~ there will certainly come a 
shortage of exploitable R&D results. Means must be found to minimize 
th~ extent to which innovative processes relative to intercity trans-
po~tation are held up awaiting com~letion of the R&D results required 
to make given innovations physically and economically viable. 
If any area of transportation is presently experiencing a significant 
shortage of technological possibilities, it must surely be that encom-
passing the mundane aspects of intercity transportation. Public sector 
sponsors of transport-oriented R&D activities have for the most part 
focused upon dramatic technological solutions to perceived transport 
and social problems. Significant public and private funds have been 
devoted to developing very high-speed ground transportation hardware and 
systems and supersonic transports, while precious few resources have 
been allocated to provide the much-needed means for braking railway 
trains in such a way as to lessen damage to cars and their contents, to 
permit use of lighter weight equipment, and to reduce maintenance costs 
both with respect to equipment and infrastructure. In any case, the 
technological possibility gaps left by failure to focus upon the 
requirements for what have been called the "unexciting R&D" needs of 
the transportation sector are relatively easily filled if there is 
leadership to divert resources from dramatic R&D activities to those 
with less exciting but very significant short-term payoffs. 
Capital. One of the most obvious constraints in terms of 
resources relates to the capital devoted to innovative activity. 
Financial resources provided for intercity transportation emanate from 
both public and private sectors, depending upon the nature of the 
resources required, the way in which they will be applied, and the 
public policy of the moment. Shortages of capital can be traced to 
either the public or private sector. In any event, the capital can be 
provided in myriad ways, such as through grants, loans, sales of equity, 
in-kind contributions, etc. The method of providing the capital some-
times affects the process of innovation involved but most often it does 
not. 
One special problem associated with public capital, where innovation is 
concerned, relates to the general public policy toward the proprietary 
rights of the inventor or innovator. If public funds are involved in 
developing a given item of hardware or a given transport system, the 
public sector retains at least nonexclusive, royalty-free rights to use 
the patents and know-how generated as a result of the particular project. 
\n many instances, private sector entrepreneurs with concepts promising 
external benefits substantially in excess of external costs are aborted 
in their innovative programs by the existence of these constraints on 
the use of public funds provided in support of such activities. There 
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is some indication that Congress and other legislative bodies are be-
coming more sophisticated in this area. Such a change in policy would 
add substantial impetus to the development of technological possibilities 
and innovations in the intercity transportation field. 
Labor. Labor represents a resource constraint in some in-
stances. By and large, the labor constraint is manifest through a short-
age of personnel with special skills required either in the development 
of transportation innovations or in the widespread application of such 
innovative hardware techniques. It is doubtful that there will be a 
shortage of labor in the foreseeable future in the United States, but it 
is entirely possible that shortages in certain high-technology skills 
will severely constrain the extent and rate at which certain innovations 
can be diffused throughout the economy. 
Management. In a similar vein, a significant but less obvious 
resource constraint to innovation in the intercity t~ansportation field 
is the availability of management in a quantity and of a quality neces-
sary to support the implementation of transportation innovation on a 
broad front. There are several reasons why the management constraint 
can be a quite severe one. First, transportation has too often not been 
a profitable field of endeavor within the private sector.-Without the 
resonable probability of achieving a profitable result, management has 
less opportunity to exploit the frontiers of technological possibility. 
Thus, management talent is less inclined to enter transportation than 
those fields in which greater opportunities for profit are present and 
especially those in which successful innovation could be achieved. Many 
management rewards, psychic as well as financial, flow from successful 
technological innovation. Where these rewards are not realizable, for 
whatever reason, skilled, aggressive managers tend to shy away. 
The problems of transportation management are compounded by the substan-
tial activities that are provided and managed in the public sector. 
Indeed, except for the railroad and pipeline forms of transportation, 
there is at least a mix of public and private sector management involved 
in intercity movements. Airports, for example, are provided and managed 
by public sector entities while air carriers are generally private 
sector enterprises in the United States. Intercity rail passenger 
service is increasingly provided by AMTRAK, a public corporation, but 
the railroads over whi2h AMTRAK operates are, for the present at least, 
owned by private firms. The mixture of public sector and private 
sector management, ,in itself, creates problems with respect to the 
allocation of resources to support innovations in intercity transpor-
tation. 
But the most significant point for present purposes is that the public 
enterprise manager generally has even less incentive to be entrepre-
neurial and to innovate successfully than does his private sector 
III-16 
SWS.t \. 
i 
t 
J 
I 
.i { 
l ; 
~ 
;11 
i 
., 
i 
1 
I 
I 
1 
! 
l 
1 
1 
1 
I 
.~ 
1 , j 
, 
j 
1 
I j 
j 
1 
I 
1 
j 
~ 
1 
l 
i , 
r 
I 
~ , 
; 
counterpart', even in the field of regulated intercity transportation. 
At least the private sector manager has a profit and loss statement to 
indicate in a general way how well he is performing in the marketplace. 
The public sector manager has no such yardstick and the net result is 
th~t the latter cannot generally know the extent to which innovations 
have been successfully introduced any more than he can know whether he 
has been managing skillfully in a general sense. 
The absence of surrogates for the profit and loss statement and balance 
shee~ available to private enterprise not only denies the public sector 
manager a convenient means for gauging his performance in absolute 
terms, but it also denies him the ability to determine how he is doing 
in comparison with his peers operating other public sector facilities 
of a similar nature. Without such devices, it is generally thought that 
public enterprise managers are less skilled than their private sector 
counterparts and that they allocate resources less wisely. In this 
sense, management quality imposes a significant constraint on the 
implementation of intercity transportation innovations. 
Land. Land or real property represents a very subtle resource 
constraint in the context of intercity transportation. However, as land 
is more intensively used in the United States and as population increases 
and land becomes increasingly costly in many locations, the lack of avail-
ability of real property will become a severe restraint on certain types 
of transportation innovations. While the constraints may be felt in the 
next half century more in the context of urban transportation than inter-
urban, there will certainiy be an increasing number of instances in which 
a given set of technological possibilities related to intercity trans-
portation cannot be exploited primarily (or perhaps solely) because of a 
shortage of land to accommodate the particular innovation. Most cer-
tainly, assembly of a new right-of-way is a principal barrier to con-
struction of a Tokaido-type rail line in the Northeast Corridor. 
One expectation is, of course, that as land constraints become more 
severe, increasing emphasis will be placed upon developing technology 
to relieve such constraints. Much atcention has been paid in the recent 
past and will continue to be paid in the future to the development of 
high-speed and efficient tunneling techniques as one means of easing the 
growing land constraints. 
Social Constraints and Incentives. Social constraints and incen-
tives can be divided into three general categories: 
• Regulation of all kin.ds 
• Public policy 
• Labor 
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Regulation. Many different kinds of regulation apply to the 
production and use of intercity transportation. Virtually every regu-
lation carries with it some implications for the process of innovation 
in the industry or area being regulated. Consequently, regulation 
represents one of the major social constraints to technological change 
and innovation. 
It should also be noted, however, that regulation can also provide a 
substantial incentive to certain types of technological innovation, 
especially in the fields of transportation where so much of the activity 
of transportation enterprises is circumscribed by regulations of various 
sorts. Two contrasting examples will perhaps serve to make the point. 
Consider the domestic airline industry in the United States where the 
Civil Aeronautics Board regulates rates in such a way as to assure that 
identical fares will be charged in each intercity market for the same 
class of service. In such a regulatory environment, carriers and their 
suppliers will focus on every conceivable way to provide a service to 
the public that can be differentiated on every basis except rate or 
price. The net effect of such a rate-identity regulatory philosophy is 
in part to stimulate technological innovations that may not produce more 
efficient or more effective transportation but merely transportation 
with a difference. 
Such distortion of the process of innovation comes into play in 
regulatory mechanism in numerous places in the transport sector 
represents either a constraint or an incentive depending on the 
of the regulation in terms of the process of innovation. It is 
that the overordering of jumbo jets on the part of the airlines 
induced to a significant degree by CAB rate-identity policies. 
frame and engine manufacturers were fully aware from historical 
dent that advertisable differences are perhaps overly important 
carriers operating in such a regulatory environment because new 
different aircraft attract substantially more patronage than is 
wise possible without price differentiation. 
the 
and 
net sum 
likely 
was 
Air-
prece-
to air 
and 
other-
Another example might be one from a nonindustry-specific regulation such 
as that imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA 
establishes noise standards, often in concert with local authorities. 
These, in turn, have a significant effect on shaping the propensity of 
managements of carriers and their suppliers alike to embrace innovations. 
For example, engine manufacturers for both surface and air modes of 
transportation have devoted considerable resources to producipg ever 
quieter power plants in response to the regulations and to the require-
ments imposed through political mechanisms by the general public. 
Regulation will always provide a mixture of constraints and incentives 
to innovation in the transportation field, and the extent to which regu-
lation is promotive or thwarting will change over time. The important 
point is that regulation is a major factor with respect to the implemen-
tation of intercity transportation innovations. This is so whether 
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th~se responsible for regulations are aware of it or not. Indeed, it 
can be anticipated that regulators will increasingly become aware of the 
relationship between economic and other forms of regulation on the one 
hand and technological change on the other. As the linkage becomes more 
clearly evident to the regulators, both the character of regulation and 
its application will improve significantly so as to minimize the unin-
tended negative consequences of regulation as far as technological 
change and innovation are concerned. 
Public Policy. Even more difficult to identify and to assess 
are the implications for innovation from public policy. The concept of 
public policy covers a great deal of territory. Among the more obvious 
and influential areas are those related to income distribution, land use, 
subsidy, and defense. In turn, public policies in each area can have a 
profound influence upon such an a11-'pervasive function as transportation. 
For example, if public policy toward subsidy is, in effect, to deny 
subsidy to private enterprise, the implications for innovation are very 
profound indeed. On the other hand, if subsidy as a matter of general 
policy is made available to a public-interest sector, such as transpor-
tation, on some formula basis (such as that related to rate of return 
on capital), then the implications for private transportation entrepre-
neurs are very different than in the previous example. 
Since there will undoubtedly be constantly changing emphases in public 
policies, it is safe to predict that the implications for the implemen-
tation of intercity transportation innovations that flow from public 
policy will change over time. The net effect of changes in public policy 
is impossible to determine with any degree of precision over the period 
of time covered by the present analysis. This does not mean that public 
policy issues should be ignored in terms of their impact on technological 
change and innovation but rather that there should be continued and 
sophisticated analysis of public policy issues that carry with them 
implications for the process of innovation in intercity transportation. 
Labor. Labor was earlier considered as a potential resource 
constraint on intercity transport innovation. Here, labor represents a 
source of social constraints and incentives to transport-sector entrepre-
neurs and their suppliers. The constraint represented by labor grows 
largely out of public policy which generally does not condone wholesale 
displacement of transport labor resulting from technological or organi-
zational change. Labor must be cushioned against great discontinuities 
th~t would wipe out massive numbers of jobs. Employment in transport 
must be maintained at some given, substantial level, at least over the 
short term. 
Labor contracts and public policy combine to represent a severe con-
straint to certain kinds of innovative activity in the transportation 
field. On the other hand, as transport labor becomes increasingly 
expensive, wherever it is possible to reduce reliance on labor through 
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the substitution of capital-i:ntensive technology, management will tend 
to take advantage of the opportunity. In the latter case, of course, 
labor represents an incentive to innovate. By and large, however, labor 
is more a constraint on technological innovation in intercity transpor-
tation than it is an incentive, and it can be expected to remain so 
throughout the period covered by this analysis. 
Interaction Between Resource and Social Constraints. The accompa-
nying matrix (Table III-I) points out the likely influences on trans-
portation innovation as a result of interactions between resource con-
straints and social constraints. Unfortunately, it is not always 
possible to determine even the direction of the influence of a social 
constraint on a resource constraint without knowing in greater detail 
the nature of each. Nevertheless, such a matrix is useful in framing 
the questions that need to be considered whenever any given specific 
constraint is to be analyzed in terms of others. 
For example, consider the first column in the matrix, "Economic Regu-
lation." It is impossible to say what impact the imposition of economic 
regulations will have on the pool of technology available for exploi-
tation in the form of innovation without specifying what sort of economic 
regulation is involved. The implications of an economic regulation that 
permits a given intercity carrier to achieve a minimum specific rate of 
return on invested capital are quite different from those of a regulation 
establishing rigid floors under the rates to be charged for intercity 
transportation service. In the former case, the question mark found in 
cell lB of the matrix would probably be changed to a plus sign as would 
cells lC and lD as well. Under such circumstances, IE would very likely 
become a minus sign. For minimum rate regulation, on the other hand, 
it would be impossible to determine the effect on cell lA without 
knowing a good deal more about the method of applying such regulations. 
Further, it is likely that lC, and perhaps lE, would be positive provided 
the industry was one where the previous lack of minimum rate regulation 
had placed its financial viability in jeopardy. 
In the case of column 3, "Nonindustry-Specific Regulation," if the 
regulation in question imposed severe penalties on a carrier or industry 
for failure to meet sor~. -::igorous environmental standard, it is quite 
likely that the regulatL.:lrt would induce substantial R&D activity both in 
the public and private sector. This would convert the question mark in 
cell 3A to a plus sign. It is also possible that 3B would become an 
even "stronger" plus and that 3C may also be converted from minus to 
plus, although this is not nearly as clear. The effects on the avail-
ability of land might well be converted to a negative sign in cell 3F 
if the environmental regulations hypothesized were of a certain sort. 
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Table 111-1 
LIKELY INFLUENCE ON TRANSPORT INNOVATION OF INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN RESOURCE AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
Social Constraints 
(1) (2) (3) 
Nonindustry-
Resource Economic Antitrust Specific 
Constraints Regulation Regulation Regulation 
(A) Technology ? (+) ? 
(B) Public $ ? 0 + 
(C) Private $ ? 
(D) Labor 0 0 
(E) Management ? (-) . 
(F) Land 0 0 ? 
Key: + Considerable supportive interaction. 
o No likely interaction. 
Considerable thwarting interaction. 
? Influence dependent upon specific case. 
() Potentially influential as indicated. 
(4) 
Land Use 
Policy 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
? 
(5) 
Subsidy 
Policy 
+ 
+ 
(+) 
+ 
(+) 
? 
(6) 
Defense 
Consider-
ations 
(+) 
(+) 
? 
? 
? 
0 
~ .• -.~-~.......-. ·_~" ___ ,__. ___ ....,......,..7~ ____ ~T" ___ ~_'""'II! 
(7) 
Income 
Distri-
bution 
Goals 
0 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
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High-Leverage Factors Influencing Transportation Innovation 
As pointed out previously, there are a number of particularly influential 
factors that will affect the success or failure of transportation inno-
vation. Many of these factors will determine whether an innovative 
process will begin at all, i.e., whether any measurable resources will 
be devoted to a given innovative process. Among the myriad factors that 
influence intercity transport innovation, eight can be singled out for 
consideration as among the most important and highly leveraged. These 
eight factors are: 
1. Government as promoter of transportation 
2. Maintair ing "balance" in the transportation sector 
3. Market aggregation 
4. Purchasing philosophy and techniques 
5. Test facilities 
6. Foreign technology 
7. Appreciation of innovation as a process 
8. Innovative propensities 
Government as Promoter. In virtually every age, each level of 
government is more or less active as a promoter of transportation 
enterprise. History therefore provides us with every reason to believe 
that governments will continue to promote transportation activities in 
various forms over the next half century and more. The role of promoter 
is manifest in many ways. For example, regulation that protects one 
carrier or one mode of transportation from another clearly promoted the 
activities of the protected carrier or mode. The certificate of public 
convenience and necessity which regulatory authorities issue under many 
circumstances is a device that is both promotive and restrictive. 
Less subtly, government promotes transport activity through the device 
of subsidy. When public funds are made available to provide infra-
structure in the highway and aviation modes to a greater extent than is 
recaptured through user charges, such funds represent a promotional 
subsidy to those modes of transportation. Government also promotes 
transportation activity--and specifically innovation in the transport 
sector--by funding research and development activity directly related 
to transportation. Federal support for the SST development program and 
for the high-speed ground program are cases in point. Such activities 
are sponsored primarily at the federal level, but state and local govern-
ments have also been known to provide funds for R&D work in areas of 
specific concern to them. 
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Government also provides operating subsidies to carriers at various 
times, again a clearly promotional device. Among the most obvious 
examples of such promotional efforts on the part of the government are 
the grants to local service airlines and the "operating differential 
subsidies" pn"!vided by the Maritime Administration to qualifying ship 
operators. The Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) mass 
transit operating subsidy is yet another bold example. 
In promoting intercity transportation in general, and innovation in 
particular, government can distort the process of innovation and the 
relative pace of development among the various modes and methods of 
transportation by providing more resources and support to one mode or 
method than to others. It is undoubtedly true, for example, that the 
federal government has been far more direct in its promotional support 
for competing modes of transportation than it has for the railroads. 
No one can doubt that this has made a substantial difference in the 
innovative propensities and performance in the railroad field over the 
last 50 years. 
Perhaps one of the most important issues in the future for intercity 
transportation innovations is whether the government will become 
cognizant of its potential as a promotive force and whether it will use 
its leverage to serve the explicit ends of public policy. 
Balance in Transportation. Balance in the transportation field is 
given increasing attention, at least in the public pronouncements of 
politicians and in the preambles to legislation associated with trans-
port regulation and promotion activites. The term "balance" in this 
context refers to the existence of a.lternative transportation modes. A 
balanced transportation system is one that is responsive to all the 
needs of the traveling and shipping public while providing them with a 
choice of mode and method wherever possible. It is achieved through 
coordinated allocation of public and private funds. 
This concept of balance is important in the context of intercity trans-
portation innovation. The degree to which it is achieved will signifi-
cantly affect the innovative performance of both transportation carriers 
and their suppliers. Any perception of imbalance can lead to the direct 
or indirect allocation of resources to one mode as compared to others in 
order to cure the perceived imbalance. 
But there are other dimensions of balance that have an even more pro-
found effect on transportation innovation. For example, there is the 
issue of balance between infrastructura1 investment and equipment in-
vestment. Very little attention has been paid to this problem in two 
major modes of transportation: rail and air. As a result, a substan-
tial imbalance has developed. In the former case, there has been too 
much equipment investment and too little infrastructural investment; 
in the latter, the opposite turns out to be the case. To the extent 
that these imbalances are recognized either by public sector or private 
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sector decision-makers, they can substantially influence the allocation 
of resources to and within the transportation field. 
Another aspect of imbalance has already been referred to briefly: 
namely, the emphasis that is being placed on developments and R&D proj-
ects associated with exotic and headline-worthy technology in contrast 
to projects and technology that are less exciting though nonetheless 
critically important. Tracked air-cushion vehicles may be promising and 
even important, but this and similar technology should not be developed 
at the expense of less exciting transport systems or components that can 
be developed more quickly and have a useful payoff. Numerous techno-
logical possibilities may be crying out for exploitation in a transport 
context while many individuals and entities focus their attention many 
decades ahead and continue to develop exotic transportation technologiC',al 
possibilities. Balance is clearly required to assure that on the way to 
the far future the nation does not forego the opportunities for improving 
efficiency and productivity that are available to use in a far shorter 
time. 
The final example of balance with respect to the transport sector con-
cerns the relative emphasis on cost-reducing innovation versus demand-
stimulating innovation. While frequently a single innovation produces 
both cost-reducing and demand-stimulating results (the Boeing 707 was 
an excellent example), it is also true that many innovations convey only 
one of the two benefits. By and large, where there is comprehensive 
regulation in transportation, such as that found in railroading in the 
United States, the emphasis of carriers and suppliers is necessarily on 
cost-reducing innovation. Under such circumstances, other things 
remaining equal, the greatest returns on investment in innovation accrue 
when costs are reduced but rates are not. When a cost-reducing inno-
vation is also demand-stimulating, this situation is substantially 
modified, provided that the demand function is quite elastic and the 
regulatory agency permits the reduced cost to be reflected directly in 
lower rates. But transport regulatory agencies do not often permit cost 
reductions achieved through innovation to be reflected in rate reductions 
in a timely manner, thus placing great stress once more on cost-reducing 
rather than on demand-stimulating innovations. 
If the United States is to breathe life into public policies supporting 
energy conservation, environmental pollution reduction, and other quite 
general objectives, it will be necessary for government, either directly 
or indirectly, to induce technological changes that often are demand-
stimulating even when they are not cost-reducing. For instan~e, govern-
ment may find it desirable to encourage the diversion of passengers and 
freight from one given mode or method of transportation to another. 
Certainly the future will see a change in the balance between cost-
reducing and demand-stimulating innovation, and it will also likely see 
a continual shifting in emphasis between the two forms of innovation as 
a result of changing national policies and priorities. 
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Market Aggregation. Another high-leverage factor is market aggre-
gation, which may be carried out with or without the intercession of 
governmerrt. Basically, market aggregation refers to the willingness and 
ability of buyers (in this case, carriers) to collectively define their 
needs and to pool their purchasing power in order to induce suppliers to 
provide a higher quality or more efficient product or service. 
Market aggregation often requires the intervention of third parties. 
For instance, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) sometimes 
causes member railroads to define their requirements in a uniform manner 
so as to promote the development and implementation of a given technology 
or methodology. The development and introduction of automatic car 
identification (ACI) is a specific example of AAR efforts along these 
lines. Again, while AMTRAK was not explicitly set up to aggregate the 
market for railway passenger equipment, the essential monopolization of 
intercity rail transportation by AMTRAK has led to that aggregation and 
is having a growing effect on the nature and direction of innovation in 
the railway passenger equipment field. 
Still in the context of railroads, it is almost certain that the reorgani-
zation of the Northeast railroads will create a quasi-governmental entity 
(ConRail) that will have substantial market aggregating powers. Such 
power can conceivably extend far beyond the boundaries of ConRail itself. 
ConRail will become the most influential single entity in the railroad 
industry and will be able to influence the demand for railway equipment 
in such a way as to have an impact on all rail carriers. 
Market aggregation is especially difficult in cases where there are sub-
stantial numbers of indepenllent purchasers of infrastructural components 
or equipment. Highway transportation is a case in point. Obviously, 
there is a horde of automobile buyers and the demand for automobiles is 
not significantly aggregated even by the existence of very large auto-
mobile rental companies and by government agencies that purchase signifi-
cant numbers of automotive units. Similarly, there is a sufficient 
number of trucking companies to make market aggregation in any formal 
sense difficult, if not illegal. A market aggregat:Lon effect is achieved, 
however, by the federal government when it imposes ;~tandards upon the 
industry that cause technological innovations of various sorts to be 
emphasized in response to such regulations. Seat belt regulations 
immediately come to mind, as do standards for tires and truck braking 
systems. 
The airlines fall in between the two extremes as far as market aggregation 
is concerned. By and large they are restricted by antitrust 'laws from 
colluding to the point of aggregating the market for aircraft or related 
equipment. On the other hand, the similarities in airline requirements 
induce aircraft manufacturers to se~rve as something of a market aggre-
gating agent for their air carrier customers, albeit informally. Since 
aviation supply is a highly concentrated industry, it is doubtful that 
aggregation of demand could have a very profound effect on the process 
of innovation. 
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Of course, aggregation of demand almost by definition has some impli-
cations for any related process of innovation. Even though collective 
purchasing has the power to induce technological change, it may in other 
circumstances serve to discourage it. Certainly, the close-knit relation-
ship between railroads and some of their suppliers has contributed to 
unnecessarily high concentration ratios in some sectors of the railway 
supply field. Although no formal agreement for collective purchasing 
exists, the relationships between carriers and suppliers are so strongly 
established that they virtually exclude entrance to the field. Obvi-
ously, the competitive pressures that induce innovative changes are 
lacking in this environment. 
An example of how marlr.€t aggregation encouraged beneficial innovation, 
and yet eliminated other innovations, can be found in the trolley 
industry. In 1928, the presidents of most of the streetcar and inter-
urban operating companies met at the "President's Conference Committee" 
(PCC). In order to stave off the onslaught of highway urban transport, 
they agreed upon a standardized trolley vehicle that each would order. 
The standardization of design provided for substantial savings to the 
acquirers since the manufacturers were assured of large production runs 
of the design and were thus able to spread development costs over a 
great number of units. The "PCC car" sported innovations in the control 
system, steering, and trucks; however, few other car designs were pro-
duced for many years and little attempt was made at further basic improve-
ments in trolley car design. The effect of this market aggregation was, 
first, to provide the operating companies with an efficient and dependable 
vehicle at a reasonable cost, but then to stifle innovation as time passed 
and other technological possibilities were not exploited. 
Purchasing Philosophy. Certainly one of the most profoundly effec-
tive factors influencing intercity transport innovation relates to the 
purchasing philosophies and techniques employed by carriers and others 
involved in planning and producing the transportation the market requires. 
One of the philosophies of purchasing relates to market aggregation. Some 
entities involved in producing intercity transportation eschew all formal 
and/or informal means for aggregating the market for the inputs they 
require. Where this is done as a matter of philosophy or policy, obvi-
ously the effects on innovation are potentially substantial. On the 
other hand, many such entities desire to aggregate the market if only 
to assure similar cost structures to those of their competitors. Whether 
or not this motive is one that ought to be encouraged as a matter of 
public policy, it should be recognized that a purchasing philosophy that 
permits market aggregation to the maximum possible extent does not have 
a significantly different impact on the implementation of transportation 
innovations than one with the opposite bias. 
Perhaps the most important single aspect of purchasing relates to the 
means by which transport enterprises acquire infrastructural components 
and equipment. If the purchasing philosophy is largely characterized 
by inertia (such as is generally true in the railroads in the United 
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States), then it is assured that there will be little technological 
change through innovation as the purchasing function concentrates on 
acquiring more of the same products and services from year to year. On 
the other hand, if the purchasing function is carried out pursuant to a 
philosophy that seeks the publication of true performance specifications, 
and if these performance specifications are revised and upgraded peri-
odically to assure that the suppliers must continually reach out to the 
frontiers of technological possibility, then the purchasing function is 
greatly supportive of innovation in the transportation field. Indeed, 
it is to be hoped--even expected--that those in receipt of the increasing 
flow of federal funds into the transportation sector will be required to 
employ true performance specifications. These should include economic 
as well as physical parameters to assure that the greatest value is 
received for every dollar expended on infrastructure and equipment. It 
is difficult to imagine any single change having a more profoundly 
promotive influence on beneficial technological change and innovation 
in intercity transportation than the adoption by transport enterprises 
of a performance-specification approach to purchasing. 
Foreign Technology. Foreign technology represents a particularly 
important potential spur to domestic technological innovation where 
transportation is concerned. The impact of foreign technology on trans-
portation systems in the United States will be felt in several ways. 
First, to the extent that the transportation enterprises are not con-
strained to "buy America," the availability of foreign products embodying 
different and better technology should certainly induce American manu-
facturers to look to their laurels and to produce competitive or superior 
equipment employing more advanced technology than was previously the 
case. 
In addition, the United States has become increasingly concerned with 
its balance of payments position and this could also induce domestic 
producers of transportation equipment to strive to exploit technological 
possibilities to the point where they have the most "exportable" possible 
product to offer in both domestic and overseas markets. The increasing 
inputs of public funds into the transportation field anticipated over 
the next half century will hopefully cause American producers of trans-
portation goods and services to seek to maximize their foreign market 
opportunities. But it is also hoped that the injection of increasing 
public funds will not reduce still further the likelihood that American 
transport enterprises will avail themselves of foreign technology. 
History indicates that the latter is probably a forlorn hope since the 
infusion of public funds usually carries with it, either explicitly or 
implicitly, a number of "buy America" constr.aints. (The recent reaction 
of transportation labor in Pittsburgh to the possible operation of 
Boeing light rail vehicle [LRV] cars, which embody substantial Japanese 
inputs, certainly supports the latter hypothesis.) 
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I , Test Facilities. Coupled with the move toward performance-specification purchasing is the need for sophisticated test facilities to determine whether a supplier has, in fact, met the performance objec-
tive. Certainly, one of the drawbacks of technological innovation in 
the transportation field, particularly where intercity transportation 
is concerned, has been a general lack of many sorts of test facilities. 
Indeed, the Metroliner fiasco is, in part, testimony to what happens 
when a performance specification is developed without the ability to 
determine at an early stage whether or not the equipment involved meets 
the specified standard. 
In this connection it is worth pointing out that the federal government 
has recently emphasized the provision of test facilities in the surface 
transportation field. Unfortunately, the stress has been on quite 
dramatic technology for the most part, and the United States still does 
not possess, for example, a facility capable of testing thoroughly such 
unglamorous equipment as railway freigh~ cars and locomotives under all 
the conditions they will encounter throughout their service lives. 
Whether it is a private sector or a public sector function to provide 
such test facilities, they are clearly needed if the pace and direction 
of innovative activity in intercity transportation is to become what it 
can and should be. 
Innovation as a Process. One of the substantial barriers to techno-
logical innovation in every field has proved to be the failure of those 
engaged in it to recognize that innovation is a process. The "better 
mousetrap" theory of enterprise has been thoroughly discredited for a 
long time. A firm can generate the very best of mousetraps in its 
research and development facility and even develop the means for pro-
ducing them economically in quantity. But if they are not marketed 
skillfully against the competition, there will be no substantial inno-
vation resulting from the creation of the better mousetrap. So it is 
essential in all fields of endeavor that those involved in each and 
every phase of the process of innovation must recognize the continuum 
of the process from conception through R&D, production, and finally to 
the marketplace. 
Unless the process nature of this activity is recognized, innovation 
will be slower than it should be--and far more costly. In many 
instances, particularly in fields characterized by a complex production 
function such as transportation, the enterprises involved are not cur-
rently doing as well as they should simply because their managements do 
not recognize the process of innovation for what it is. Education 
related to innovation as a process, therefore, should pay very substan-
tial dividends in terms of easing the path for the implementation of 
new technology where intercity transportation is concerned. A pivotal 
role in this respect can certainly be played by government, and with 
very minor expenditures of public resources. If government s.eizes the 
opportunity available to it to diffuse knowledge and understanding about 
the process of innovation in the transportation field, the innovative 
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performance of intercity carriers will be substantially better in the 
future than if government fails to take advaptage of this opportunity. 
J 
Innovative Propensities. In large measure, the degree of innovative 
activity and results in the U.S. will be determined by a subtle factor 
sometimes referred to as the propensity to innova~e. If society in 
general and transport-sector entrepreneurs (public and-private) do not 
embrace technological innovation as a favored means to achieve the ends 
they seek, the likelihood of there being significant technological 
change in intercity transp0r-tation in the next 25 to 50 years is rela-
tively small. Current widespread public disenchantment with technology 
would seem to suggest difficulties in the years to come. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the public in general and 
transport entrepreneurs in particular, as well as public officials con-
cerned with transportation, can turn their backs on reality and history. 
After all, most of what is "good" about the public and private intercity 
transport network of the U.S. stems importantly from an evergreen techno-
logical base. Despite recent events, it is anticipated that, especially 
in a public service sector such as transportation, the propensity to 
innovate will once more become great. It is expected to first become 
apparent among operators; then among suppliers of hardware, software, 
and capital; and finally to be reflected in government policies. 
Expectations for the Future 
It is difficult to project the net effect of the various influences that 
will play on the process of innovation in the transportation field over 
the next 25 to 50 years. Only very general expectations can be advanced. 
Perhaps most important among these is that in the n.ext 25 years, there 
will be no significant constraints to transport innovation as a result 
of a lack of technological possibilities. The constraints effective 
over the next 25 years are largely expected to be institutional and to 
relate to definitions and assumptions of responsibilities by various 
parties to the process of innovation in the complex transportation 
sector. 
Between the years 2000 and 2025, it is quite likely that technological 
possibilities will be in short supply unless, at some point between now 
and the year 2000, substantial R&D activities are undertaken which will 
restock the vast inventory of technological possibilities presently in 
hand. These will be virtually del>leted if any significant amount of 
technological innovation is introduced in intercity transportation over 
the next 25 years. 
The implications ot thp ~oove observations are generally quite obvious. 
In the near term, those involved with sponsoring research and develop-
ment and those concerned with the implementation of R&D results should 
stress the institutional and "technology delivery" aspects of the 
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process of innovation in the transportation sector. Purely R&D projects 
should be specifically targeted to achieve a given result that by itself 
is deemed desirable based on quite precise calculations of the associated 
benefits and costs. 
As the next quarter century unfolds, provided the technological possi-
bilities now in the inventory are being exploited effectively and 
rapidly, it will be necessary once more to generate R&D results, some 
of which should certainly be on a speculative basis. In this manner, 
before the inventory of technological possibilities is substantially 
depleted it will be replenished as a result of the R&D activities under-
taken beginning perhaps in about 1985 or 1990. If all goes well, by the 
turn of the century, it will probably be prudent for the United States 
once more to have a massive transportation-oriented R&D program which 
looks to the midterm and far future and which is speculative and hopeful 
at the same time. 
Specific Innovation Scenarios. In order to determine the potential 
effect of various constraints upon intercity transportation, it is 
necessary first to postulate a social and economic climate for the 
country. The two crucial independent variables that influence this 
national climate are: 
• The locus of regulation* 
• The balance between competition and economies of scale favored 
by national policy 
An additional variable, which is interrelated to these two, is repre-
sented by the underlying social climate and will be referred to here 
simply as "social awareness." A set of scenarios has been developed 
below to represent the extremes of each of these variables. The effects 
of the various constraints will be examined in the context of each 
sceriario. 
The Zocus of reguZation refers to the sources from which the planning, 
funding, and implementation of regulation emanate. This locus can be 
either highly centralized on one extreme or highly decentralized on the 
other. Centralized regulatory authority tends to produce consistent and 
definitive regulation; however, it also tends to lack broad-based, multi-
faceted appeal mechanisms. Decentraliz~d regulation is apt to produce 
overlapping and layering of regulati.ons, wtih great opportunities for 
judicial appeal and high potential for conflicting regulations. Such 
regulation also presents significartt bar!iers to innovation because it 
*The present discussion should be read in the context of the companion 
paper, IX in this volume, which elaborates upon the concept of "locus 
of regulation." 
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makes the general environment anything but uniform and consumes great 
resources in pursuing decisions and awaiting policy formulation. 
There is always a balance struck in the transportation industry between 
emphasis on competition and emphasis on benefiting from economies of 
scale. (The latter generally leads to oligopoly and monopoly.) A 
highly competitive transportation environment tends to produce smaller 
companies and usually results in lower real profits to the firm. Under 
these conditions, it is sometimes possible, however, for an extremely 
efficient company to evolve and be highly profitable. On the other 
hand, where realization of economies of scale is encouraged, the general 
result is a concentration of power in a few firms with the potential for 
the gathering of monopoly profits, unless there are other, offsetting 
regulatory constraints. 
For present purposes, social awareness is characterized by the degree to 
which noneconomic issues such as concern for the environment, the inter-
ests of special interest groups, social equity, safety" and security are 
recognized and function as important constraints in the implementation 
process. 
Eight scenarios result from the various possible combinations of the 
extremes of the three relevant variables: regulatory locus, competitive 
environment, and social awareness. The impact on economic and noneconomic 
forces affecting the implementation of a transportation system will be 
discussed for each scenario. Two scenarios, however, those combining 
monopoly and high social awareness, represent unlikely sets of condi-
tions--unless, of course, nationalization is an admitted possibility. 
It should be recognized that small perturbations in the overall national 
climate can produce substantial changes in one or more of the variables. 
Also, the situations analyzed in each of these scenarios represent ex-
tremes of behavior in light of the variables reviewed. Any movement away 
from the extremes of these variables will tend to produce a more moderate 
result. 
A. Decentralized Regulatory Authority, Competitive Environ-
ment, and High Social Awareness. Under this scenario, the implementa-
tion of "grass roots" transportation systems is unlikely to succeed. 
The economic constraint. on implementation will be severe due to the 
highly competitive environment that will result in low profit margins. 
The noneconomic constraints will present even more severe obstacles. 
Small, highly vocal, special interest groups will have virtual veto 
authority over new transportation projects. The regulatory lag* induced 
by the decentralized locus of regulatory authority and attendant uncer-
tainties will tend to encourage firms with venture capital that would 
normally be used for transportation projects to look elsewhere. 
*Regulatory lag refers to the time lag from conception of a project until 
all of its regulatory requirements are fulfilled and the project completed. 
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There will be some opportunity for incremental growth of the existing 
transportation infrastructure, particularly where it can be demonstrated 
that greater social benefits will be obtained through this incremental 
growth than through the creation of a new infrastructure elsewhere. 
However, the relative freedom of entry and exit impl:i.ed by the competi-
tive orientation of regulatory planning would tend to encourage entre-
preneurial activity. The diffused locus of regulatory authority will 
produce a situation whereby the delivery of governmental assistance to 
transportation firms will be difficult. The decentralization of regu-
lation and, hence, planning will tend to divert funds away from sub-
stantial projects and into limited scope projects. Under these con-
straints, technological advancement will be low, as firms will be unwill-
ing to invest due to the uncertainty of reward. 
The implication.s for the nation as a whole are that significant large-
scale intercity transportation projects will not be undertaken either 
by private enterprise or by government. Rather, transportation under-
takings will take the form of incremental growth and improvement in 
existing facilities. From the standpoint of the firms, entrepreneurial 
activity in transportation will be confined to smaller firms and will be 
limited to projects not requiring extensive capital commitments on their 
part. There could be some emphasis on government-funded demonstration 
projects, but those would l~Ot likely be exploited by the private sector. 
Furthermore, there will be many opportunities for abuse by government 
officials and by small entrepreneurs. In general, this scenario pro-
duces a national transportation system that would be only a small 
improvement over what exists today. Nationalization would be an unlikely 
result of this scenario. 
B. Decentralized Regulatory Authority, Monopolistic Environ-
ment, and High Social Awareness. This scenario contains a certain incon-
sistency because the variables are not independent. It is unlikely that 
with decentralized regulation and high social awareness that a high degree 
of monopoly power concentrated in private enterprise would be allowed to 
exist. Movement in the direction of such a scenario, however, would have 
the following implications. The likelihood of entrepreneurial behavior 
on the part of large firms would be increased under these conditions. 
Some firms would be willing to pay the price in terms of regulatory lag 
and meeting the peripheral regulatory constraints in exchange for the 
potential for very high or monopoly profits. Also, the potential for 
new technological development would be enhanced through this same mecha-
nism. Ho~''.:!ver, the mechanism for government funds delivery would con-
tinue to be fragmented, and as a result, technology and entrepreneurial 
activity would have to rely largely on private enterprise rather than 
governmental impetus. 
The national transportation system that would evolve from this scenario 
would include privately financed incremental growth on existing systems 
combined with a few major projects funded through private investments. 
Some of these major projects would undoubtedly represent "grass roots" 
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technological development with some funding through government agencies. 
In this scenario, the potential for abuse by large firms and by govern-
ment is significant. Some transport nationalization would be possible 
when the perceived social good outweighs regulatory/planning problems. 
C. Decentra~ized Regulation, Competitive Environment, and 
Low Social Awareness. Under this set of conditions, government policy 
would undoubtedly be oriented toward preservation of competition under 
an "anti-bigness" banner. The regulatory authority would still tend to 
produce an extensive regulatory lag, although this lag would probably 
not be aggravated by the overlapping regulations from other fringe regu-
latory areas. Entrepreneurial activity and technology delivery will be 
limited to smaller firms with a resulting incremental, rather than 
quantum, growth. 
Without a centralized locus of regulatory planning, there will be little 
federal involvement in the growth of transportation infrastructure for 
guided surface vehicles. This will be left largely in the hands of 
private enterprise and entrepreneurs. Technological developments would 
tend to be slow. Firms would lack the size and resources necessary to 
embark on massive R&D efforts. The potential for abuse by government 
and by small entrepreneurial firms is high. There would be little 
potential for monopoly abuse, however. Nationalization would not be a 
likely outgrowth of this scenario. 
D. Decentralized Regulation, Monopolistic Environment, and 
Low Social Awareness. These conditions would tend to promote large 
monopolistic firms that would take advantage of the fragmentation of 
governmental regulation and the lack of limiting constraints from public 
interest advocates. The rate of technology delivery would probably be 
fairly high as firms recognize how to cope with the various levels of 
regulatory authority and use it to their advantage while continuing to 
reap high or even monopoly profits. Decentralization of regulatory 
authority will likely enhance the ability of the firms to reap such 
monopoly profits. Entrepreneurial (i.e., motivative) activity would 
probably be restricted to large firms, as only they would have the 
financial resources to support ventures of sufficient magnitude to reap 
the necessary economies of scale. The source of funding for entrepre-
neurial activity and technology delivery programs would be the large 
firms. The regulatory and planning agencies in the public sector would 
likely not have funding available to support innovative prospects of 
this type. . 
The transportation network that would evolve from this scenario would 
consist of a relatively small number of large multimodal firms controlling 
large geographic or economic areas of the transportation market. These 
firms would have the power to introduce new technology and to undertake 
large-scale projects, but whether they would have the incentive is dif-
ficult to predict. The multiplicity of regulatory authorities would 
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probably not produce strong pressures for developments in the public 
interest; consequently, there would be a. tendency to retain the status 
quo technologically and otherwise. There would be extreme potential for 
abuse of monopoly power under this scenario, since regulatory authorities 
probably would be unable to or would lack the will to cope with the large 
firms. Nationalization would not be likely under this scenario; however, 
large nationalized firms created before this stage would do extremely 
well. 
E. Centralized Regulation, Competitive Environment, and 
Great Social Awareness. Under such conditions, the transportation net-
work would involve a fairly large number of small firms competing in the 
marketplace under a well-defined set of ground rules. The focus for 
developing technological possibilities and for promoting innovative 
activity would rest with the government which, through a strong centra-
lized planning and funding agency, would attempt to mandate the most 
socially acceptable transportation networks. This would include con-
siderations of convenience, environmental protection, public safety, and 
perhaps even some cost criteria. Under these circumstances social objec-
tives would tend to take precedence over economic efficiency. Marginal 
firms would be kept afloat through subsidies of various types, and tech-
nology delivery would be greatly conditioned by government attitudes and 
policies. This scenario could support large-scale transportation 
development programs through massive federal involvement; in fact, 
emphasis would probably be on these at the expense of incremental growth 
scenarios. Nationalization would not be likely; however, subsidization 
of small, marginal firms to promote competition would be commonplace. 
F. Centralized Regulatory Authority, Monopolistic Environ-
ment, and Great Social Awareness. Under this admittedly unlikely 
scenario~ government would be the prime locus of entrepreneurial 
activity. However, technology delivery would be through subsidies/ 
grants to large monopolistic enterprises which would each control great 
portions of the transportation industry. Monopoly firms with their 
ability to command large portions of the market would reap the available 
economies of scale and, therefore, have the capability of producing a 
relatively efficient transportation system provided the impetus were 
present. If these economies were passed on to their customers in the 
form of lower prices, if there were enlightened economic regulation 
through a strong centralized regulatory authority, and if a high degree 
of social consciousness existed, then an efficient, responsive trans-
portation network, from the standpoint of social results and 'economic 
cost, would probably be produced. (Unfortunately, there is little 
encouragement from history that this combination of conditions is likely 
to be realized.) 
G. Centralized Regulatory Authority, Competitive Environment, 
and Low Social Awareness. Here, the emphasis is on economic constraints 
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with an avowed government policy to encourage small firms. The locus of 
entrepreneurial activity would be the small firm, and the locus of tech-
nology delivery would be the federal government. Technological emphasis 
would be primarily on cost reduction or market extension. Economic con-
straints would tend to limit entrepreneurial activity. It is unlikely 
that large-scale "grass roots" programs for social purposes would be 
embarked upon. Of course, some small firms would be able to compete 
more effectively than others as they take advantage of the available 
technology to reduce their operating costs and improve profits. There 
would probably not be much potential for great abuse of the public 
interest under these constraints. It is also unlikely that the federal 
government would be deeply involved in subsidization. There would 
probably be a large number of turnovers among the small firms; therefore, 
entry/exit requirements would have to be fairly liberal. 
H. Centralized Regulatory Authority, Monopolistic Environ-
ment, and Low Social Awareness. Under this set of conditions, large 
firms would be allowed to develop monopoly power over vast geographic or 
market segments of the transportation industry. Their principal con-
straint would be through economic regulation by the centralized regula-
tory authority. These firms would function much the way electrical 
utilities do today. There would be some research performed by the 
government, particularly in cost-reducing techniques. It is unlikely 
that the large firms would undertake significant research or innovations 
on their own as economic regulation and their monopoly power would 
ensure a satisfactory financial return; moreover, there would be little 
internal pressure to develop cost-reducing innovations. This scenario 
would undoubtedly produce the most status quo of transportation systems. 
Transport growth would undoubtedly take place only to serve established 
economic needs and demands, never to promote them. It is unlikely that 
the government would mandate cross-subsidization of marginal services 
in order to fulfill social purposes. 
. Concluding Remarks Concerning Scenarios. It should be clearly 
understood that the above scenarios have been drawn in terms of the 
extremes of the three underlying variables. None is intended to be 
descriptive or prescriptive of a future state of affairs in the U.S. 
The nature of governance in America tends to preclude extremes of the 
types described. The device has been used as a means for contrasting 
probable impacts of differences in those key forces that determine the 
economic and social context within which transportation investment 
decisions are made (or not made). 
The current situation in United States transportation involves a mix of 
decentralized and centralized regulation, relatively high social aware-
ness, and a somewhat mixed bag of competitive environments varying from 
virtual monopoly in certain parts of the railroad industry to a highly 
competitive environment (e.g., as exists in the barge and motor carrier 
industries). Scenario A comes closest to describing present conditions. 
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The current direction of movement is toward more centralization of regu-
lation, increased social awareness, and a more competitive environment, 
i.e., toward Scenario E. 
As long as economic recovery appears to be just around the corner and 
no major perturbation occurs in the economic climate, the regulatory, 
social and competitive factors will probably continue to move in their 
recent directions. The next economic decline, however, will undoubtedly 
cause sectors to change again, perhaps to an opposite position. It is 
conceivable that the next pendulum swing could move the transportation 
environment toward more decentralized regulation (probably with central 
policy control), lessened social awareness (and activism), and a more 
monopoly-oriented environment. This climate would be similar to that 
presented in Scenario C. 
In the context of transportation system innovation and implementation, 
under present conditions it is likely that: 
• There is relatively little incentive for private sector firms 
to undertake large or high-risk investments to develop inno-
vative transportation systems. 
• There will be a growing and vocal anti-automobile~ pro-mass-
transit constituency calling for increased government inter-
vention and control. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
There is, however, very little real weakening in the basic 
strength and dominance of the private passenger car. 
While there have been a number of highly visible government 
demonstration projects, these do not appear to have catalyzed 
any significant new or greatly enlarged private sector com-
mitment to transportation, either urban or intercity, pas-
senger or freight. 
The enormous sunk cost of existing transportation systems in 
both vehicles and infrastructure will act as a large inertial 
component so that any significant near-term technological 
changes will be incremental in nature. 
The accumulated body of rules, procedures, standards, and 
established practice also tends to function as a conservative 
elE';ment to slow the rate of change, and the pace of innovation. 
There is increasing resistance on a number of different socially 
oriented fronts which will effectively continue to combine to 
forestall, block, or otherwise thwart large-scale public invest-
ment projects relative to intercity transport. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the congressional politics of transportation expen-
diture. It concludes that congressional behavior in the field of trans-
portation has been crisis-oriented and pressure-responsive. 
More importantly, it concludes that this pattern of behavior serves to 
limit the policy and technology options that are admissible candidates 
for federal funding. It argues that the recurrent political motifs of 
congressional behavior can be used as evaluation criteria to compare 
the "political viability" and consequent implementability of transpor-
tation improvements requiring federal funds. 
Congressional support for transportation expenditures has historically 
occurred: 
1. When public investment delivers benefits--jobs and service--
is a significant fraction of the nation's congressional 
districts. 
2. When spending proposals balance the interests of urban~ 
suburban~ and rural constituencies and reflect the changing 
balance of power between rural and metropolitan areas. 
3. When operating assistance is necessary to sustain existing 
service. De nouveau operating subsidies are contrary to 
congressional predilection. 
4. When expenditure levels can be established incrementally and 
system development accomplished in evolutionary stages. 
5. When expenditures reinforce the partnership between the public 
and private sectors. 
The pattern of congressional behavior suggests the outlines of a "politi-
cal viability and admissability" test for use in evaluating research and 
development (R&D) priorities. The test is stated as a series of questions: 
1. Can the system eventually operate at or near a profit? 
2. Is the technology adaptable to both large- and small-city 
market? Urban and suburban? 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Are front-end costs sufficiently large that rural/metropolitan 
consensus is necessary for expenditure approval? 
Can the system be implemented and operated in phased segments? 
Would the system pose a significant competitive threat to 
other transport modes--particularly those in private ownership? 
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These questions provide politically seasoned evaluation criteria against 
which next generation technologies can be assessed, but they should not 
be used rigorously as "necessary and sufficient conditions" of congres-
sional support. Rather, the criteria should be used to aompare the 
political viability of competing policy and technology options. The 
issue paper applies the criteria to an assessment of the "political 
acceptability" of high-speed ground transportation (HSGT), airport expan-
sion, and increased bus service. 
HSGT would require substantial operating assistance to compete with air 
trarlsportation. As a result, it seems likely to meet with congressional 
reluctance to approve de nouveau operating subsidies. Its immense front-
end construction costs should provoke considerable resistance from rural 
interests and fiscal conservatives. The infrequency of proposed stations 
for corridor service may undercut support within megalopolitan corridors 
where substantial right-of-way condemnation and community disruption 
would be inevitable. In short, HSGT lacks a needed urban/suburban/rural 
consensus for major congressional expenditures. Additionally, only one 
or two corridors have the necessary traffic densities to justify the 
front-end capital investment, and HSGT market penetration in those corri-
dors would be viewed as a significant threat to private airline profit-
ability. And HSGT's need for "whole system" implementation (including 
new guideways and right-of-way) runs counter to the congressional pen-
chant for incremental funding of evolutionary technologies. 
In contrast, airport and bus fleet expansion are incremental strategies 
with substantial flexibility of application. They are prone to evo-
lutionary development in terms of both funding level and phased imple-
mentation. Both air and bus vehicle technologies are amenable to market 
dHferentiation strategies for both large and small markets and high-
and low-density routes. 
Judged against the criterion of congressional salability, evolutionary 
technological and operational improvements in intercity bus and air 
transportation offer R&D opportunities that are significantly superior 
to those of HSGT. 
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Introduction 
IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF 
TRANSPORTATION EXPENDITURE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
David W. Jones, Jr. 
James F. Miller, Jr. 
Stanford University 
This issue paper explores the congressional politics of federal expendi-
ture for transport infrastructure and operations. Three case histories 
of congressional decision-making--the highway trust fund, tnass transit 
operating assistance, and the formation of AMTRAK--are presented in an 
effort to generate hypotheses about the likelihood of federal assistance 
for next-generation ground transport systems. 
The hypotheses are stated as generalizations about recurrent patterns of 
political behavior that seem to describe the preconditions of congres-
sional support for the large-scale investment that would be required to 
implement high-speed ground transportation. 
The three case studies are narrative in format and are presented in two 
case histories in the appendixes. The authors' hypotheses about the 
dynamics of the appropriations process follow. These hypotheses are 
then related to the likelihood of congressional appropriations for next-
generation passenger rail services in the Boston-Washington and San 
Francisco-San Diego corridors. 
The Political Economy of Federal Transport Policy 
Congressional support for transportation has emerged and evolved in a 
manner that must be described as incremental, remedial, and piecemeal. 
The appropriations process does not seem to have been guided by "compre-
hensive, coordinated, and continuous" planning or by coherent national 
policy objectives. Instead, congressional policy-making has been reac-
tive. It conforms to the crisis-oriented, pressure-responsive model of 
political decision-making that political pluralists have dubbed "the 
science of muddling through." 
The zig-zag path of national transportation policy does, howeyer, display 
certain recurrent political motifs. It seems reasonable to expect that 
the structural and behavioral dynamics of the congressional appropriations 
process will continue--se1ect-committee budgeteering and the dismantling 
of the seniority system notwithstanding. 
The case histories offered in the appendix suggest the following hy-
potheses about congressional expenditure for transportation: 
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Substantial federal investment in transport infrastructure is 
unlikely unless project implementation delivers benefits--jobs and 
service--to a significant fraction of the nation's congressional 
districts. Proponents of the Highway Trust Fund were able to argue 
that the Interstate System "touches or crosses 406 of the 435 Con-
gressional Districts." Proponents of mass transit operating 
assistance were able to demonstrate that publicly owned transit was 
receiving local subsidy in more than 235 congressional districts 
(in most cases from onerous property taxes). The AMTRAK concept 
captured support by adding routes in the Southwest and Pacific 
Northwest. AMTRAK proponents argued that the legislations would 
guarantee train service for 90% of the 122 million people in cities 
of 50,000 or more. 
2. Federal transport spending is conditioned by the balance of power 
between urban, suburban, and rural constituencies. "Probably the 
most significant trend apparent (in federal transport appropriations) 
is the shift of expenditures from 56.4 percent rural areas in 1957 
to 57.2 percent SMSA in 1971" (DOT-p. vii). This shift in expendi-
ture reflects the urbanization of American society during the 1950s 
and 1960s; it does not mean that expenditures in rural areas 
declined but rather that the rural sha~e of federal spending 
declined reZative to metropolitan areas. The case studies indicate 
that rural interests must still be satisfied or neutralized to win 
approval for major expenditures. 
To avoid threatening rural interests, proponents of Highway Trust 
Fund diversion explicitly limited discretionary funds to those on 
the Federal Aid U~ban System. The Highway Trust Fund itself can 
be viewed as an urban buy-in to a Federal Aid Highway Program that 
had previously been rural in emphasis: vehicle miles logged by 
intraurban commuters were used, in effect, to "cross-subsidize" the 
construction of the intercity links of the Interstate System. 
The approval of mass transit operating assistance reflects a similar 
balancing of urban, suburban, and rural interests. Subsidy pro-
ponents sacrificed an incentive-based allocation formula (8 cents 
per passenger) to win support from West Coast congIessmen. The 
National Mass Transportation Assistance Act, as finally approved, 
delivers operating assistance on the basis of population and popu-
lation density rather than transit output. The approved strategy 
spreads subsidy benefits to suburban and small urban areas. Oper-
ating subsidy proponents saw suburban and small-city support as 
crucial ingredients in legislative approval. 
The National Jou~Z reported their success this way: 
"All other major urban development programs have run 
afoul of racial and social controversies--low-income 
housing, for example, which is viewed by suburban 
politicians as a threat to social harmony, not as an 
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economic blessing. These (other) programs have a 
confined center-city constituency, and thus are fated 
to grow slowly, if at all. 
"But mass transit is attractive to entire metropolitan 
areas. Suburban residents want money spent on transit 
to improve commuter service, and downtown business 
interests regard mass transit systems as the catalyst 
needed to trigger economic revival in the urban 
centers." 
The congressional debate over AMTRAK reflects a similar balancing 
process with high-density routes, in effect, subsidizing small-city 
service. 
3. Operating subsidies have not resulted from a congressional incli-
nation to view transportation as a "central merit good" or from a 
desire to capture external social and environmental benefits that 
cannot be priced through fares. Rather, operating subsidies have 
resulted from the need to "bail out ll and sustain services that were 
once profitable. Opponents of operating assistance--the Nixonian 
Office of Management and Budget (01ffi), nonurban Republicans, many 
transportation economists--argued that operating assistance is "a 
bottomless pit" and "a subsidy for inefficiency." New Jersey 
Senator Harrison Williams was apparently more persuasive: 
"All of these arguments have truth in them; none are 
(sic) red herrings, least of all the bottomless pit 
argument. But none of them accept my first conclusion--
that we have to keep mass transit goi.ng, that we can't 
have it go down, and then farther down, and then 
eventually out. 
"We can't let anyone exploit some disincentive argu-
ment, no matter how worthy, to defeat the ultimate 
objective--the preservation and improvement of mass 
transit." 
The same argument prevailed in the formation of AMTRAK: Congress 
swallowed hard and accepted subsidy as the prlce that must be paid 
to prevent discontinued service. 
Congressional reluctance to approve operating assistance--and to 
even use the language of "subsidy"--argues powerfully that oper-
ating assistance is politically viable only when well-established 
services with nationwide benefit zones fail the farebox test after 
a history of profitability. De nouveau operating subsidies seem 
unlikely at best. 
Congressional resistance to operating subsidies is only partially 
attributable to its predilection for econoflic efficiency and 
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pay-as-you-go user financing. It is also rooted in a tradition of 
public-works expenditure that has emphasized capital grants to 
"build solutions." Capital grants have congressional appeal for a 
number of reasons: they involve one-time expenditures; they create 
jobs and enhance "community pride"; they can be manipulated to fit 
macroeconomic strategies for economic stimulation; they minimize 
the "locked-in" budget requirements of operating agencies like the 
Department of Defense; they are consistent with the "Old Federalif.~m" 
of categorical expenditure. 
Congress establishes expenditure levels incrementally--a practice 
that discourages "whole system" or "next generation': solutions that 
are not amenable to phased implementation or evolutionary develop-
ment. 
Senator Williams described his strategy for winning approval for 
transit operating subsidies in terms of tactical incrementalism: 
"We figured our strategy in 1972 would be to open the door with a 
soft one, some kind of strategy that would look like a backward 
step but really wouldn't be." The NationaZ JournaZ commented that 
"the approach is designed to promote the appearance that the oper-
ating subsidies do not constitute a new program." 
The Northeast Corridor metroliner and turbo-train are "solutions" 
in the evolutionary tradition and AMTRAK appropriations have dis-
played a similar pattern of gradual commitment: from $100 million 
in loan guarantees in 1971 to $150 million in 1972, and $400 mil-
lion in 1974. AMTRAK capitalization was initiated with at least 
faint hope that a onE-time infusion of funds would restore the 
service to profitability. Funding levels have continued to 
increase despite the evaporation of those hopes. 
The Interstate Highway System represents Congress' closest approxi-
mation' of a "whole-system" approach to transportation development. 
President Eisenhower called the Tru3t Fund a "'grand plan' for the 
rebuilding of our obsolete road and street system • . • over a 
l3-year period." But even the Highway Trust Fund should be viewed 
as an incremental financing strategy--despite its ambitious objec-
tive and its substantial size. 
In approving the Trust Fund, Congress rejected bond financing of 
the Interstate System--the "whole system" solution. Instead, it 
opted for pay-as-you-go user financing from gas ta~ revenues. 
Travel--some considerable portion induced by freeway ava'ilability 
and suburbanization--financed interstate construction at a rate 
that increased from $1.0 billion in 1957 to $2.2 billion by 1960. 
Froll: 1965 to 1975, federal Trust Fund outlays increased from 
$4.0 0illion to $4.6 billion. 
Congr£~ssional appropriations for transportation have reinforced 
the partnership between the public and private sectors with highway 
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spending leading to domino-like expenditures to preserve passenger 
rail and mass transit. 
There is no indication that federal expenditures were intended to 
create competition between publicly and privately operated trans-
portation; and considerable evidence from the Trust Fund diversion 
case exists to show that private sector resistance to overt compe-
tition--for extra funds or passenger revenues--might well be suffi-
cient to deter public intervention. 
The Implications of Congressional Behavior 
The patterns of congressional behavior sketched above provide a test 
which can be applied to the likelihood of large-scale investment in 
next generation techn910gies such as high-speed ground transportation. 
That test can be stated as a series of questions: 
1. Can the system eventually operate at or near a profit? 
2. Is the technology adaptable to both large- and small-city 
markets? Urban and suburban? 
3. Are front-end costs sufficiently large that rural/metropolitan 
political consensus is necessary for expenditure approval? 
4. Can the system be implemented and operated in phased segments? 
5. Would the system pose a significant competitive threat to 
transport modes--particular1y those in private ownership? 
These questions provide politically seasoned evaluation criteria against 
which next generation technologies can be assessed. They are obviously 
not 'so rigorous as to merit description as "necessary and sufficient 
conditions of transport development." Nor does a technology's failure 
to "pass" any given question indicate that it should be disqualified 
from serious consideration as a candidate for future implementation. 
They do, however, begin to provide a reasonable handle on the comparativ(~ 
likelihood of congressional appropriation for the implementation of vari-
ous candidate technologies. 
Applying these criteria comparatively to assess the political viability 
of federal spending for high-speed ground transportation (HSGT), air-
port expansion and increased bus service seems to produce fairly conclu-
sive results. 
High-Speed Ground Transportation. Current estimates indicate that 
HSGT would probably require substantial operating assistance to offer 
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fares that are competitive with air transportation. The case histories 
indicate congressional reluctance to approve de nouveau operating sub-
sidies. 
f 
Cost-per-mile estimates for HSGT construction on the order of $10 million 
per mile suggest tha't the system will involve immense front-end costs. 
These costs seem sufficiently substantial to provoke considerable resis-
tance from rural transportation interests and fiscal conservatives. At 
the same time, the infrequency of stations proposed for corridor service 
may deprive the system of consensus support even within megalopolitan' 
corridors where substantial right-of-way condemnation and community 
disruption would be inevitable. As a hub-to-hub fixed-guideway system 
it seems unlikely the HSGT can develop the urban/suburban/rural consensus 
which seems to be necessary for major congressional expenditures. 
The system also has the liability of narrow application. Traffic densi-
ties on the order of 20 million passengers per year appear necessary to 
justify the front-end capital investment. Population densities necessary 
to support this kind of traffic volume are limited to one or perhaps two 
corridors on the continent. A system achieving a market penetration of 
20 million passengers per year would most probably 'be viewed as a sig-
nificant threat to private airline profitability in those corridors--a 
justification for private investment but a considerable liability for 
public capitalization. 
"Whole-system" imp1ementa:tion (including new guideways and right-of-way) 
seems to be required for HSGT--another significant liability given the 
congressional penchant for incremental funding of evolutionary tech-
nologies. It seems doubtful that Congress would appropriate the front 
money to build a system that will remain inoperationa1 through the 
multiyear construction effort probably necessary to link major city-
pairs. 
Bus and Conventional Air. In contrast, airport and bus fleet 
expansion are incremental strategies with substantial flexibility of 
application. They are prone to evolutionary development in terms of 
both funding level and phased implementation. Both air and bus vehicle 
technologies are amenable to market differentiation strategies that suit 
them to both large and small markets and to high- and low-density routes. 
Judged against the criterion of congressional salability, evoluti.onary 
technological and operational improvements in intercity bus and air 
transportiition offer research and technology (R&T) deve10pmen,t ·oppor-
tunities that are significantly superior to those of high-speed ground 
transportation. 
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Appendix A 
CASE HISTORY NO.1: HIGHWAY AND TRANSIT FINANCE 
The Highway Program 
Federal spending for highway construction began with and has retained 
strong rural support in Congress. The first federal aid for roads in 
1916 was stimulated by a coalition of farmers, state legislators, and 
railroads interested in getting produce to rail heads. Urban areas were 
specifically excluded from the legislation. Federal aid to urban areas 
was added gradually but haphazardly before World War II. The Federal 
Aid Highway Act of 1944, which called for large-scale postwar investment 
in the neglected highway system, provided regular federal aid for urban 
roads for the first time, along with larger amounts for rural primary 
and secondary highways. The Act also approved the concept of the Inter-
state System, but rural legislators wary of any drain on funds for pri-
mary and secondary roads prevented appropriations for the System. 
Little progress was made on the Interstate until the loose alliance of 
interests that had grown up around federal support for the ABC system--
the automobile, petroleum, trucking and contracting industries, real 
estate interests, and state and federal highway officials--began pressing 
in the early 1950s for funding of the System. President Eisenhower, 
intrigued by the possibilities of the network for aiding national defense, 
lent active support and set up an advisory committee headed by Retired 
General Lucius Clay. The committee recommended that the federal highway 
program be administered by a Federal Highway Corporation empowered to 
issue bonds to finance construction of the Interstate. 
There was little congressional opposition to the Interstate concept. 
The System offered clear benefits--convenience, safety, and stimulus to 
the ,economy--and threatened no apparent harm. State governors were 
enthusiastic about a new infusion of federal money with a 10% matching 
requirement. Though the System was originally cotLceived and still pre-
sented as a network of long-haul linkages of cities that would not 
actually penetrate urban areas, in its final form the proposal called 
for urban construction, and mayors and other urban interests supported 
it. The social and environmental impact of urban highway construction--
air pollution, neighborhood disruption, etc.--were not yet salient 
issues and were not raised in the congressional debate. 
Congress reflected this unanimity. Along with benefits on a national 
scale, the Interstate would provide jobs and transportation capacity in 
nearly every congressional district in the country. Rural and urban 
representatives alike saw constituency appeal in the program. 
The only sticky point was financing the new system. Congressional con-
serfatives objected to the advisory committee's proposal for issuance 
of bonds as fiscally unsound. After considerable discussion, the Highway 
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Trust Fund emerged as a compromise. Revenues from taxes on gasoline and 
sale of trucks, use of highways by heavy vehicles, and tires and other 
items would go into a special fund earmarked for construction of the 
Interstate and, to the extent money was left over, the ABC system. This 
pay-as-you-go, user financing arrangement had already been used success-
fully at the state level by highway departments to insulate their fund-
ing and insure its continuity. The adoption of Trust Fund financing 
mollified conservatives and won support from highway interests, who 
applauded its exemption from the yearly appropriations struggle, its 
open-endedness, and its status as a federal "promise" to build highways. 
Though the point was raised that a disproportionately large share of the 
Fund's income would be generated by urban commuters making local trips, 
the urban contingent in Congress did not object as rural legislators 
would later object to paying urban transit costs. 
After its inception in 1956, the Fund acquired a nearly sacrosanct status 
in Congress. The complex of interests with a stake in the highway pro-
gram occupies a large and central place in the nation's economy, and has 
been estimated to employ one in every five of its workers. Construction, 
paving, petroleum, and auto interests, allied with state and federal 
highway officials in an array of trade associations, "user" groups, and 
informal associations, created a vocal, well-financed, and relatively 
coherent lobby whose influence rivaled that of the defense lobby. The 
highway lobby courted key members of the House and Senate Public Works 
Committees and their Roads Subcommittees, which have jurisdiction over 
the federal highway program, receiving overwhelming support from these 
rural-dominated committees. The road program assumed a preferred status 
in the Congress; completion of the Interstate was a "national commitment" 
and the Trust Fund was to be prese~~ed against any nonhighway use. At 
the height of its strength, this combination of highway interests and 
congressional support could twice force President Johnson to back down 
from deferring expenditure of a fraction of the total 1967 and 1968 
highway funds, measures badly needed to cool inflation. 
Thus insulated, the federal highway program grew. From an initial 
mileage of 37,600 and cost estimate of $27 billion, the Interstate has 
been repeatedly expanded and refunded. The completed System will 
exceed 42,500 miles, $100 billion, and its completion date has been 
extended past 1980. 
The Transit Program 
Urban mass transit declined precipitously during the 1950s and 1960s--a 
casualty of auto-mobility, suburbanization, the highway program, and 
local political fragmentation. Despite increasing frequent bankruptcy 
among privately owned transit properties, there was little effort to 
involve the federal government in the transit problem during the 1950s. 
Many urban interests were still focused on highway development, which 
already had federal support, and the failure of privately owned transit 
companies was only beginning to foist responsibility for urban 
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transportation on local governments. Many conunuter rail lines were in 
financial trouble, but the railroads pressed only ~or approval to dis-
continue conunute runs. 
In 1958, Congress responded to the railroad pressure by amending the 
Interstate Commerce Act to allow the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
permit quick discontinuances that would otherwise take years to get from 
reluctant state regulatory agencies. The result was a sharp increase in 
abandonment of unprofitable runs, and many large cities lost or felt 
threatened with the loss of commuter service. 
Several Eastern city mayors and railroads tested congressional interest 
in commute transit but got little response. Urban problems had not yet 
been established as a legitimate subject for congressional concern, and 
urban transportation problems were viewed as a local problem. If transit 
operations failed, the solution was better management at the local level; 
federal rescue was inappropriate. The initial effort to get federal 
help, however, did serve to attract local interest in the problem, and 
a loose coalition of urban Democrats, downtown economic interests, news-
papers, labor groups, conunuter railroads, and transit operators began to 
form around the problem. 
In 1960, Senator Harrison Williams, a freshman New Jersey Democrat and 
early urbanist, took up the urban transit cause. Williams broadened 
the transit aid program pushed by the nascent transit coalition from a 
reaction to the loss of commuter service to a response to all urban 
transit problems. Presentation of the program as an urban rather than 
a transportation measure allowed Williams to cultivate it in the Com-
mitee on Banking and Currency--which had jurisdiction over the sketchy 
federal urban programs and of which Williams was a member--rather than 
sending it through the more hostile Commerce Committee. Congressional 
support for the program was still inadequate, however, and an effort in 
1960 to get federal loans and demonstration grants failed. 
Though President Kennedy saw the need for a federal role in urban prob-
lems and campaigned on the issue, he offered no support for Williams' 
next legislative attempt in 1961--again calling for federal loans and 
demonstration grants. Congress was still not prepared to pass transit 
aid legislation as an independent package, and the loan and demonstra-
tion grant measure was eventually passed as part of the omnibus housing 
a(:t of 1961. The Housing and Home Finance Agency, the federal govern-
ment's closest approximation of an urban affairs agency, was given 
control of the program. It had authority to loan $17.5 million for mass 
transit projects where repayment was reasonably certain. It could grant 
$25 million for demonstration projects where upgraded transit systems 
could attract ridership from the automobile. 
Williams' next step was to get outright capital improvement grants for 
transit systems. President Kennedy finally endorsed federal aid in the 
form of capital grants in 1962. But opposition from rural conservatives 
and the failure of the protransit forces to enlist the full support of 
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labor and mount a forceful campaign for the legislation stalled capital 
grant legislation in 1962. 
Williams tried again in 1963 and got Senate approval but had to bottle 
up the bill--seen as a big city Democratic measure--in a House committee 
to avoid the wrath of Southern conservatives at President Johnbon's civil 
rights programs. In 1964, a new pressure group representing central-city 
interests, the transit industry, and the railroads managed to win labor 
fully to its side by promising a job protection clause in the legisla-
tion. Labor endorsement brought administration support, and the transit 
forces risked a floor vote for the stalled legislation. An unusual 
departure of Northern urban Republicans from the party line on transit 
was sufficient to offset the loss of conservative Southern Democrats, 
and the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 was enacted. The measure 
continued the existing loan and demonstration grant programs and added 
capital grants. Funding was authorized at $150 million per year for 
three years. 
As federal intervention in urban problems gained legitimacy and a new 
cabinet level department was formed to deal with those problems, Congress 
accepted the legitimacy of transit's claim to capital assistance and 
began to address the scale on which it would be granted. Federal sub-
sidies to pay for transit systems' operating losses, however, had not 
been established as legitimate. Federal money could be used to renovate 
existing systems and build new ones, but they still had to pay for them-
selves or recover operating deficits from local taxes. 
In 1966, Senator Williams introduced amendments to the 1964 Act to add 
new training, planning, and research programs and to increase the level 
of funding to $225 million per year. A move to include money for oper-
ating subsidies was cut in committee. The new programs survived, but 
conservatives managed to keep spending in the final legislation at the 
1964 level for the ensuing three years. Federal aid to urban transpor-
tation had gained a foothold in Congress in the space of a decade, but 
the size of the federal effort was dwarfed by the massive federal com-
mitment to highway construction. 
Competition Between Highways and Urban Transit 
During the 1960s, the adverse impacts of highway construction became 
increasingly apparent in urban areas. Widespread resistance from an 
array of urban intereSts stalled construction in many cities. 
During the same period, urban transit systems fell into accelerated 
declines. Inflation forced many private operators with the vicious 
cycle of rising fares, declining patronage, and abandoned routes. The 
burden of operating deteriorating systems fell to underfinanced city 
governments in more and more cities. 
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These developments lent new force to the persistent but unpopular view 
that federal aid for urban transportation was badly imbalanced in favor 
of highway construction at the expense of mass transit. Thus, as the 
1960s wore on, it became impossible to deal with federal aid to each of 
the modes independently of aid to the other; support for one progral!l 
necessarily implied some kind of position on the other. For those who 
favored greater balance and more local discretions, several alternatives 
were possible. The most extreme was to eliminate the Highway Trust Fund 
entirely and subject the federal highway program to the regular budgetary 
process. A less drastic alternative was to leave the Fund in existence 
but divert some of its money to highway and nonhighway mass transit pur-
poses. A third alternative was to support creation of a separate urban 
transit trust fund or a single fund from which both highway and mass 
transit programs could be financed at local discretion. A final option 
was to minimize the interaction between highway and transit programming 
by increasing federal appropriations for urban transit while leaving the 
highway program untouched. The politics of the federal highway and 
urban transit programs during the recent past should be understood as 
competition a~ong these options. 
Williams' efforts to assist urban transit lost momentum during the second 
half of the 1960s. Transit forces were still unable to mount a broad-
based and sustained lobbying effort. The victories of the early 19608 
had been due in large part to the pressure exerted by a few eastern 
railroads, and the legislation was seen as benefiting a few large cities--
Chicago, Boston, New York, and Phi1ade1phia--whose commuter services were 
threatened with collapse. Urban transit assistance became part of the 
Great Society program during President Johnson's tenure and met the same 
resistance as other parts of that program from Republicans and conserva-
tive Democrats. The Housing and Home Finance Agency gave urban transit 
low priority and put up little resistance when the Urban Mass Transpor-
tation Administration was transferred from HUD to the Department of 
Transportation. 
But new support from President Nixon and his Secretary of Transportation, 
John Volpe, made urban mass transportation problems a priority item for 
the new administration. With seeming support from the administration 
and at the urging of transit supports in DOT, Volpe began touting the 
idea of a separate mass transportation trust fund in 1969, and Senator 
, Williams and House transit advocates introduced legislation to create 
such a fund, to be supported by an excise tax on new cars. But Nixon, 
whose budget office and economic advisors convinced him that trust funds 
hindered their fiscal flexibility, rejected the trust fund idea, and 
introduced a $10 billion, 12-year program of capital grants to mass 
transit. 
At the same time, changing circumstances and renewed effort gave the 
transit forces greater clout. The failure of bus and rail transit 
systems in rapidly growing cities in the South and Southwest, and the 
desire of those cities to build transit systems to their suburbs brought 
Republicans and Southerners into what had traditionally been an urban, 
IV-19 
'~~~~----~~~~I--.r~r~-·· 
r 
Democratic coalition. With leadership from the National League of 
Cities-U.S. Conference of Mayors, other groups--1abor unions, manufac-
turing interests, officials of small and medium-sized cities, and the 
transit trade associations--were brought together in a coherent, effec-
tive lobbying effort. 
The transit coalition bargained with highway advocates, trading pledges 
of neutrality. Highway interests agreed not to oppose new UMTA author-
izations in exchange for a pledge that transit advocates would not 
oppose extension of the Highway Trust Fund. 
In 1970, the transit advocates were able to use their new-found influ-
ence to pass legislation authorizing DOT to distribute capital grants 
totaling $3.1 billion. Cities planning capital projects had complained 
that the uncertainty created by annual grants was hindering efforts to 
get local and state matching money. The new legislation authorized 
long-term contracts between grant recipients and UMTA, providing greater 
certainty that federal funding would continue for the duration of transit 
development projects. 
During 1970, highway interests succeeded in extending the Trust Fund 
through 1977, but were forced by pressure from the White House and urban 
antihighway groups to make funds available for highway safety. 
Thus, events in 1970 established the tactical 
balanced federal transportation expenditure: 
Trust Fund diversion and extended pressure to 
for UMTA capital grants. 
pattern for advocates of 
half-hearted efforts at 
increase appropriations 
Support for diversion came from the Nbwn administration, which had 
repeatedly urged that the urban lPortion of the federal highway program 
and the urban transit program be merged in a unified fund. The second 
major source of support for diversion was the array of urban and environ-
mentalist groups--joined in the Highw8lY Action Coa1ition--whose main con-
cern was with the adverse impacts urban highways on neighborhoods and 
air quality. 
While the- transit lobby was split on the issue of diversion, at least 
some elements of it--particu1ar1y bus transit interests--were cool to 
diverson and clearly preferred to avoid confrontation with highway sup-
porters by increasing transit funding from the general fund. Bus com-
panies contented that even if diversion from the, Trust Fund were success-
ful, there would not be enough money in the Fund to satisfy transit 
needs, but a successful diversion might weaken support for a further 
effort to increase direct aid to transit from the general fund. They 
have also feared that a unified Fund would spell the end of the Urban 
Mass Transit Administration, which administers direct aid to urban 
transit, allowing highwaymen to capture control of transit spending 
levels. 
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In its 1972 review of highway spending, the Senate Public Works Com-
mittee--long a bastion of support for the Highway Trust Fund--responded 
to pressure for diversion by reporting out a bill that allowed diversion 
of Fund money for highway-related mass transit. In 1970, Congress had 
added the Urban System to the federal aid program establishing a cate-
gory of urban highways separate from the urban segments of the Inter-
state System. 
The 1972 bill made an eightfold increase in the money available for the 
Urban System from the Fund--to $800 million--and allowed $300 million 
of that to be spent for highway-related bus transit. An effort in com-
mittee to allow diversion for rail mass transit failed narrowly. Similar 
efforts on the Senate floor and in the House failed. The conference ver-
sion of the bill did not reach the floor at the end of the 1972 session, 
leaving the states strapped for funds and the stage set for a renewed 
diversion fight in 1973. 
Returning to the legislation in 1973, the Senate Public Works Committee 
again rejected amendments to a new highway bill that would have allowed 
diversion of urban highway funds fur rail mass transit. When the bill 
reached the floor, Senator Williams, who had developed a new transit 
bill designed to provide increased capital grant money and operating 
subsidies for existing systems, succeeded in getting the transit provi-
sions attached to the highway bill by a vote of 59 to 36. The measure 
provided $3 billion in new capital grant authority through 1977 and 
$400 million per year in operating subsidies. The measure, which author-
ized appropriations from the general fund only, was endorsed by Senator 
Jennings Randolph, Chairman of the Public Works Committee and a key pro-
tector of the Highway Trust Fund. Some objection to operating subsidies 
was voiced, but debate on the measure was limited. 
An amendment offered by diversion forces allowing cities to decide 
whether to use up to $2.3 billion in urban highway funds for mass transit 
failed, 70 to 23. But a less drastic diversion amendment, allowing 
cities to use the $850 million per year devoted to the Urban System for 
mass transit purposes, passed, 49 to 44. Debate on these diversion 
measures reflected strong opposition from supporters of the Highway 
Trust Fund and fear on the part of Senators from rural states that diver-
sion would sap funding for rural road-building. Diversion supporters met 
these arguments with assurances that Trust money for the Interstate and 
other rural highway programs would not be touched. Some diversion from 
the Interstate was in fact allowed in the Senate bill--where an urban 
portion of the System was stalled by community opposition and found 
unnecessary to the network--but that provision does not seem to have 
influenced the debate on the bill. 
The House was less sympathetic to diversion. An amendment in the Public 
Works Committee to allow diversion similar to that in the Senate bill 
failed, 29 to 8. The committee version of the bill did not allow 
operating subsidies, but did provide $1 billion per year for capital 
grants from the general fund. And, in an effort to contain the argument 
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of diversion supporters that cities should have the choice whether to 
spend federal money on highways or transit, the committee bill allowed 
cities to return Trust Fund money to the Fund and apply for sim,ilar 
amounts for transit from the general fund. On the floor, another attempt 
to permit diversion of Trust Fund money for transit purposes failed, 215 
to 190. 
Debate in the House focused on the diversion issue. Supporters of diver-
sion recited the transportation troubles of the cities and argued that 
the current energy shortage and new federal air pollution requirements 
were imperative for cities to reduce automotive traffic and develop mass 
transit. Opponents of diversion argued for direct aid to urban transit 
from the general fund, saying that diversion of Trust Fund money would 
be inadequate to meet transit needs while damaging the highway program. 
Rural representatives feared loss of money for nonurban road programs 
and claimed that the Trust Fund was not large enough to even meet highway 
needs in the future. They also objected to use of taxes paid by highway 
users to finance urban transit. Diversion advocates emphasized that the 
Interstate and other rural road programs would not suffer and that urban 
representatives had frequently supported subsidies to rural interests in 
the past. Opponents also argued repeatedly that diversion would "breach 
faith" and violate a commitment to highway users made when the Trust 
Fund was formed. 
Behind the diversion forces in Congress lay an increasingly active lobby-
ing effort by the Highway Action Coalition, an alliance of antihighway 
environmental and community groups. The transit lobby supported efforts 
in both houses to increase direct aid to transit from the general fund, 
but remained split on the diversion issue and did not actively support 
tt1e attempts at diversion made during consideration of the 1973 highway 
bill. 
At the same time, state governors began pressing more actively for 
greater flexibility in spending feder.al money for urban areas. As diver-
sion neared feasibility, a conflict developed between big city mayors and 
governors over the degree of control states would exercise over expendi-
ture of federal money on urban areas. Both the Senate and House versions 
of the 1973 highway legislation allowed specific percentages of a state's 
,~ederal money to go straight to large urban areas, a major departure from 
lexisting law. Governors resisted this encroachment on their control over 
highway funds and, for the same reasons, tended to support new transit 
funding in the form of diversion of Trust Fund money, which would still 
come through state government, rather than direct aid to the cities from 
the general fund. 
In conference, the central issue was again diversion. An attempt to add 
an operating subsidies provision to the House measure had failed on the 
floor, and the operating subsidies provided for in the Senate version of 
the legislation were dropped. The Nixon Administration vigorously 
opposed subsidies and threatened a veto. The conferees agreed to provide 
$3 billion of new capital grant money from the general fund for the 
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transit aid program, and to allow transfers of money from cancelled 
Interstate segments to mass transit projects, but a deadlock developed 
over diversion. Senate conferees insisted on their position, and a 
compromise finally emerged that allowed a phased transition to diver-
sion. At first, Trust Fund money rejected by cities would have to be 
replaced by general fund money for transit. Then Fund money would 
become available for bus transit, and finally urban highway system money 
from the Fund could be used directly for rail transit. 
Frustrated in his attempt to add operating subsidies to the 1973 highway 
legislation, Senator lVilliams, along with Democratic Representative 
Joseph Minish of New Jersey, moved a two-year $800 million subsidy bill 
through the Banking and Currency Committees and got floor approval for 
two somewhat different versions in 1974. 
At the same time, the Nixon Administration reversed its opposition to 
operating subsidies, partly in response to the new energy crisis induced 
by the Arab oil embargo following the October War in 1973. 
Within the Administration, Transportation Secretary John Volpe seems to 
have been the most influential advocate of transit operating subsidies. 
The NationaZ JournaZ described his conversion to an advocate of transit 
operating subsidies: 
IlIlIn November [1971], Volpe's department circulated a draft 
of a report to Congress on the feasibility of operating 
subsidies. The verdict was a brusque 'no'." 
The attitude of the department has turned around since 
then. 
"Reman [William J. Ronan, Chairman of the New York Metro-
politan Transit Authority] went right to work on Volpe 
while that report was in draft state." Transit Lobbyist 
Fred Burke said, "and by the time the final report was 
submitted Ronan had gotten all the teeth pulled. 
"Ronan got Volpe to order a review of it, by using the 
political argument that he represented the loyal 
Republican Governor from the second biggest state~ that 
he had a serious problem, and that he was being forced 
to work with a Democratic Senator because he couldn't 
get a sympathetic hearing from his own Administration." . 
In January, Ronan persuaded Volpe to meet with subsidy 
lobbyists. Ronan, Pritchard [of the Conference of 
Mayors], and Gunther [of the National League of Cities] 
won him over. 
As Burke relates the story: "First, Pritchard hit him 
hard with the argument that a subsidy based on 
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ridership would reward the productive and penalize the 
inefficient. 
"Then Ronan hit: him hard with the argument about how 
seve~~ the need was at the local level, and then 
Gunther warned him that the case was so desperate that 
the 10ca1s--mayors and transit officials--were working 
the Hill so hard fer relief that the issue was probably 
out of political control already," 
From that point on, Volpe became a re.luctant champion 
of operating subsidies and ordered a high-level task 
force within the department to come up with various 
formulas for administering a subsidy program. 
Thus the Administration opposition was scattered. Even 
though the Office of Management and Budget remained 
hostile, the solid front was broken and the transit 
coalition had won over an influential, if reluctant, 
champion. III! 
.. _-- "-'''r~ 
In search of a strong domestic policy to offset the Watergate scandal, 
the Nixon Adtninistration proposed a Unified Transportation Assistance 
Program (UTAP), a six-year, $16 billion revenue-sharing measure that 
would have combined federal spending for urban highways and mass transit 
under a single fund in 1977. By including highway provisions in the 
proposal but not altering the use of the Highway Trust Fund for rural 
or Interstate construction, the Administration insured that the proposal 
would be referred to the Public Works Committees instead of the urban-
dominated and tr,'lIlsit-oriented Banking and Currency Committees. The 
Administration saw the chance to seize the transit issue for its own. 
It wanted to avoid any reshaping of its proposals into big city subsidy 
measures in the Banking Committees--even if that meant submitting its 
diversion proposals to the ministrations of the Public Works Corr~ittees. 
The Administration got promises to speed the measure through, and it ~las 
introduced with the support of key highway supporters from both Public 
Works Conunittees. At the same time, a rules technicality was used to 
bottle up the Williams-Minish subsidy bill in conferenc2. 
These machinations precipitated a major jurisdictional dispute between 
the Public Works Committees. For the second year, transportation 
legislation contained major elements dealing with both highway and non-
highway urban transit, and neither set of committees had clea! juris-
diction. Which committees prevailed made an important difference. The 
Senate committees differed sharply on diversion--Banking and Currency 
voted' 12 to 3 in favor, and Public Works hild voted 6 to 8 against it in 
the 1973 highway legislation. A similar difference in diversion had 
divided the House Committees: 27 to 10 in favor on Banking and Currency 
and 27 to 7 agains t on Pub lie Works in 1973. toli thin the House Public 
Works Committee, there was a split among Democrats between urban repre·· 
s~ntatives who support diversion and directtt'8.nsit aid. Rural member;) 
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opposed diversion and remained co~j~ted to highway-only programming. 
Republican members opposed diversichi' almost unanimously. Neither Public 
Works Committee opposed direct aid to transit, so long as it did not go 
to a small number of the largest cities. 
Consistent with these inclina'tions, the House Public Works Committee 
reworked the Administration's UTAP proposal considerably, omitting any 
provision for the highway program (and thereby the ostensible ground of 
the committee's jurisdiction) aqd increasing general fund grants for 
transit from $9.5 billion to $20 billion. As this proposal was readied, 
the Williams··Minish bill finally emerged from conference, but was 
promptly recommitted by the House, which was preparing to review the 
Public Works program. 
Both the Williams-Minish and the House Public Works bill encountered 
strong opposition from rural and some smaller urban legislators on the 
ground that allocation formulas in the measures were designed primarily 
to aid a few big cities, particularly New York. These opponents, along 
with conservatives,!: wondered whether the cities had made sufficient 
effort to help themselves through local taxes, bonding schemes, and 
efficient transit management. Operating subsidies, they argued, would 
promote ineffective management and create an open-ended federal commit-
ment to prop up failing systems. They also argued that transit operating 
unions would capture the subsidies in wage increases. The level of 
spending in the Public Works legislation was also attacked as inflation-
ary and certain to bring a presidential veto. 
Supporters of the transit measures argued elaborately that the cities 
were bearing their share, that cities other than the few largest ones 
would benefit from the bills, and that the Public Works legislation 
provided extensive benefits to rural areas as well. A concerted effort 
was made to present the transit problem as a national concern, and the 
House bill renamed the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, the 
Federal Mass Transportation Administration. 
The House measure passed, 324 to 92, but only after amendments were 
added decreasing the amount of federal operating subsidy provided, 
spreading coverage of the bill to more and smaller cities and cutting 
the spending level from $20 billion to $11 billion. 
, . 
Senator Williams, however, promptly stopped the House bill in the Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee. As the ensuing deadlock continued, 
pressure from big city mayors bu~lt up on Congress and the Administration. 
In this urgent atmosphere, Willi~ms negotiated with the Ford ~dminis­
tration, newly won over to support of operating subsidies. Ford's 
change of mind reflected increasing DOT c/ .. lcern that cities eager for 
federal aapital grants were over-investing in new, capital~intensive 
projects instead of trying to run existing systems more efficiently. 
Ope.rating subsidies would restore balance. 
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The measure that emerged from the negotiations provided $7.8 billion for 
capital grants and $3.6 billion,for either capital grants or operating 
subsidies for a six-year period. No new provision was included for the 
highway program. Williams had the conference approve the measure under 
the same number as his two-year operating subsidy bill had borne, and 
got Senate approval first, an unusual move designed to pressure the 
House to pass the bill. Amid complaints from the House Public Works 
Committee, the House approved the legislation. 
The Future of the Transit and Highway Programs 
New consideration of the Highway Trust Fund is due this year, and transit 
forces have made it clear that the compromise transit measure passed last 
year contains too little coherent federal transit policy and too little 
funding to satisfy them. President Ford earlY,this year proposed a plan 
to divert half of the gas tax revenues to the general fund with per-
mission for the states to similarly divert state revenues, and to limit 
spending from the Trust Fund to the Interstate System alone after 1977. 
Funds impounded from the Trust Fund in order to fight inflation over the 
past several years uould also be released into the general fund. 
The recent battles over federal transit money indicate that, while the 
cause of urban mass transit has gained significant ground and highway 
supporters in Congress have had to retreat slightly on the diversion 
issue, the highway advocates remain powerful in Congress. Though only 
a few cities have made use of the diversion provisions of the 1972 high-
way legislation, it seems likely that efforts to make major diversions 
from the Trust Fund will continue. The feasibility of abolishing the 
Fund altogether has also increased somewhat, and Senators Edward Kennedy 
and Lowell Weicker have introduced a bill to do away with the Fund in . 
September 1976. It seems more likely that Trust Fund supporters will be 
able to divide the transit faction by supporting direct aid from the 
general fund and to play on rural fear of losing rural highway money. 
This seems likely to maintain at least the Interstate and probably the 
entire nonurban elements of the Fund intact, at least until the Inter-
state is "completed" sometime after 1980. Direct aid to urban transit, 
in the form of capital grants and operating subsidies, will almost cer-
tainly increase. Ultimately, it seems l1kely that the levels of funding 
for highways and urban transit will be brou~ht into more approximate 
balance,and that the funding mechanisms used for the programs will be 
gradually combined or at least made more nearly similar. Whether this 
will mean a unified trust fund remains difficult to predict: the trust 
fund mechanism retains great appeal tor legislative branch bu't is 
opposed by executive branch budgeters as too inflexible. 
Though this general result seems to follow from the trends shown by 
recent events, these trends could be slowed or bent by jurisdictional 
developments in Congress. In 1975, the House Public Works Committee 
assumed jurisdiction over highway and urban transit legislation. This 
seems likely to mean that continued direct aid to urban transit will 
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have to be purchased with moderation on the diversion issue, an approach 
that Senator Williams has used in the past. And this promises in turn 
that the Highway Trust Fund, slightly modified for urban programs, will 
remain reasonably intact for some time to come. 
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Appendix B 
CASE HISTORY NO.2: THE FORMATION OF AMTRAK 
The Decline of Rail Passenger Service 
Rail passenger travel in the United States peaked in years following 
World War II and then declined drastically. Travel by motor vehicle 
and airplane increased dramatically during the same period. The rail 
share of paid intercity passenger traffic declined from 72.9% in 1946 
to 15% in 1970, and only 1.5% of all intercity travelers used rail in 
1970. Railroad management has attributed the decline to federal highway 
funding, outdated union work rules, and federal regulatory practices. 
As p'atronage declined and operating losses increased, railroads lost 
interest in passenger service and pressed for abandonments. Industry 
critics charge that railroads let service deteriorate and actively 
discouraged passengers to bolster their case for abandonment. 
In 1958, Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act to give the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC) the power to allow discontinuance of 
unprofitable passenger runs. In the decade following that amendment, 
the ICC proved amenable to discontinuance, allowing 416 of the 1,448 
intercity runs existing in 1958 to cease. State agencies let a slightly 
larger number of intrastate trains stop running, leaving 576 trains in 
operation in late 1968. Of those, few were profitable. On most, rider-
ship and revenues continued to drop and service to deteriorate. 
Early Federal Activity 
Northeast Corridor Transportation Project. The decline of rail 
passenger service was felt acutely in the densely populated "northeast 
corridor" between Boston and Washington, D.C. In 1962, Senator Claiborne 
Pe1l (Democrat--Rhode Island) introduced legislation to create an eight-
state regional transportation authority to help upgrade rail service for 
the area and pressed President Kennedy for support. The legislation 
failed in 1962 and in subsequent sessions, but a task force appointed 
by Kennedy recommended a study of the corridor's transportation needs. 
In 1963, Congress appropriated funds for the study, and the following 
year the program became the Northeast Corridor Transportation Project 
(NECTP) and was lodged in the Department of Commerce. 
The Office of High-Speed Ground Transportation. In his 1965 State 
of the Union Message, President Johnson asked for $20 million to study 
high-speed transportation between Boston and Washington, D.C. This 
expanded into a proposal for $90 million to be spent over three years to: 
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• Research new modes of 
high-speed ground transportation. 
• Demonstrate projects designed to test the attractiveness 
of improved, high-speed conventional rail travel between 
Boston, New York City, and Washington. 
• Accumulate transportation statistics. 
About one-third of the funds were·to be spent on the cooperative demon-
stration projects in which private railroads would test new rolling stock 
on improved roadbeds. The rest of the money was earmarked for research 
on more exotic modes. The NECTP indicated that approval of the New York 
City-to-Washington demonstration project was contingent on the willingness 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad to spend at least as much as the government 
on new equipment, an assurance the railroad soon gave. 
The measure, linked to President Johnson's Great Society program, was 
adopted by Congress late in 1965 with no significant opposition. The 
bill's congressional supporters cited the need to bring federal research 
and development spending for rail transportation into balance with that 
for air, water, and highway modes and emphasized that the new project 
was not intended to commit the government" to subsidizing rail travel. 
The stated purpose was to measure the ability of improved conventional 
rail systems to lure passengers away from increasingly congested airlines 
and highways, not a test of potential profitability. 
The Office of High-Speed Ground Transportation was formed in the Commerce 
Department to conduct the research and demonstration programs and to 
continue the NECTP. The Pennsylvania Railroad began roadbed improvement 
and procurement of new equipment in preparation for the federal demon-
stration grant, and United Aircraft Corporation was awarded a contract 
for new turbine-powered equipment to be operated between Boston and New 
York City on the New York, New Haven & Hartford tracks. In 1967, the 
Office of High-Speed Ground Transportation was moved to the new Depart-
ment" of Transportation (DOT). 
In 1968, despite delays in starting the New York-to-Washington service 
because of late deliveries and technical problems, a two-year $37.4 mil-
lion extension of the 1965 legislation passed without opposition. In 
an economy move, the House Appropriations Committee had allowed only 
$52 million of the $90 million authorized for the program to be spent. 
The impounded funds were those for new ground-transit modes; the Boston-
to-Washington demonstration projects continued untouched. The new 
authorization in 1968 was designed to allow spending up to the $90 mil-
lion level and completion of both the original research and demonstration 
projects. 
In January of 1969, the newly consolidated Penn Central Railroad began 
operating the New York-to-Washington Metroliner after spending over 
$30 million on track improvements and new equipment. The company 
exp.ected to spend $20 million more before qualifying forl:j:.$12 million 
federal grant covering a two-year demonstration period. j:1:iespite minor {{ 
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problems, the new service began to attract new passengers to the run, 
and new trains were steadily added to the run. 
In April, the Penn Central began operating a Turbotrain between Boston 
and New York, using equipment leased by the Department of Transportation 
from United Aircraft. The new train cut 35 minutes from a run that took 
conventional trains more than four hours. 
Prelude to AMTRAK. During 1968, applications to the ICC for dis-
continuance of passenger trains rose sharply. The ICC came under 
increasing pressure from railroads that wanted to discontinue passenger 
service--and from Congress and advocates of improved passenger service, 
who wanted the Commission to stiffen its stand on discontinuances and 
force railroads to improve the quality of their service. The ICC had 
maintained consistently that it would need new legislation to police the 
quality of passenger service, but the issue was forced in early 1968 
when an ICC hearing examiner ruled that the Commission already had the 
power it needed to enforce quality standards. In June of 1968, the 
Commission asked for a Department of Transportation study of the rail 
passenger problem and for emergency legislation stiffening the ICC's 
ability to halt the deterioration in service. The ICGattacked railroad 
accounting procedures that, it claimed, allowed the roads to overstate 
their losses from passenger operations. 
Senate and House committees held hearings on a bill authorizing a DOT 
study and imposing a moratorium on discontinuances until new rail pas-
senger policy was set, but no floor action was taken on the legislation. 
Senator Warren Magnuson, Democrat of Washington and head of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, asked the ICC to make a new study of rail passenger 
losses, and the Commission agreed. 
The study, released in July of 1969, concluded that eight railroads 
carrying 40% of the nation's noncommuter passengers during 1968 lost 
$118 million in the operation of passenger services. The loss figure 
for all railroads carrying passengers approximated $170 million. The 
study claimed that the rail passenger system was in danger of collapsing 
without federal action. The ICC renewed its request for a major DOT 
study of the rail passenger problem and for interim authority to halt 
the deterioration of service. Pressure to do something about the problem 
increased in Congress, and Senator Vance Hartke (Democrat--Indiana), 
Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Surface 
Transportation, promised hearings to consider the ICC request and 
legislation designed to rescue passenger service. 
Before hearings could be held, the ICC overruled its hearing examiner's 
finding, and stated that the Commission lacked the authority to enforce 
quality standards on rail passenger service. 
The 1969 Senate hearings, and later ones in the House, were held in an 
atmosphere of renewed urgency. The ICC once again pressed for a study 
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and a moratorium on discontinuances, saying it was premature to take 
any action beyond that. Many individual railroads--particularly Western 
railroads with very long-haul runs--still wanted to drop their passenger 
service entirely. But others--like the Penn Central with shorter runs 
in more densely populated corridors--did not. The industry trade associ-
ation, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), switched its pro-
discontinuance stand early in 1969 to favor federal subsidies to make up 
the operating losses suffered under ICC continuance orders, and it pressed 
this position at the House and Senate hearings. Passenger bus interests 
attacked subsidy proposals, claiming they would discriminate unfairly in 
favor of the less efficient railroads. The National Association of Rail-
road Passengers (NARP), a small but vigorous passenger lobbying group 
assembled by a Chicago attorney, urged subsidies of $200 million per year 
for four years. The Federal Railroad Administration, speaking for DOT, 
claimed that only short-haul service in highly populated areas was 
salvageable, and urged Congress to wait for the administration to 
develop,. a plan for selective abandonment and assistance. 
As the year closed, DOT had yet to make its proposal, but it was said 
to be leaning toward allowing a semipublic corporation to run rail 
passenger service instead of outright subsidies or matching grants from 
a trust fund in the manner of the federal highway and airport programs. 
The Senate subcommittee had developed a subsidy approach, but held off 
in anticipation of an administration proposal promised by the new year. 
Formation of AMTRAK--1970 to 1971. Early in 1970, Transportation 
Secretary John Volpe proposed a plan for ~ semipublic corporation--to 
be known as Railpax--that would contract with railroads for passenger 
service on a national network of routes chosen by DOT. Federal assis-
tance--loqn'guarantees and direct grants--would be given to the corpo-
ration to finance the contracts. High White House officials and the 
Bureau of the Budget vetoed the plan, however, to Volpe's surprise. The 
ICC also objected to the plan, and a general administration reluctance 
to rescue passenger service was reported. DOT officials asked for more 
time from the Senate Commerce Committee and continued to voice admini-
stration objections to outright subsidies. Subsidies, it was contended, 
would involve the federal government too deeply in rail operations 
without getting the railroads' passenger operations back "on their own 
feet." 
After repeated administration delays and renewed petitions to discontinue 
passenger trains, the Senate Commerce Committee acted unilaterally. The 
Committee had worked up its own version of the semipublic corporation 
plan and was reported to favor it over direct subsidies. Instead the 
Committee approved legislation calling for $435 million in direct federal 
aid over four years. The measure authorized DOT to designate a national 
rail passenger network and pay up to 80% of the losses of railroads 
operating trains in the network. The bill also created a $195 million 
fund for government purchase and rehabilitation of equipment, the 
purchased equipment to be leased to railroads on the system. 
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Discontinuance procedures would be eased for lines outside the system 
and stiffened for those within. DOT was also given authority to enforce 
quality standards for lines in the new network. 
The Committee's move brought quick action from the Nixon Administration. 
Administration representatives, key Senate Republicans (some opposed to 
subsidies), and Commerce Committee members arranged to substitute a semi-
public corporation plan for the Committee's subsidy bill on the Senate 
floor. The new plan allowed railroads to free themselves of their 
passenger operations by paying the new corporation to take over the 
services. Railroads that d.id not join the new plan could not discontinue 
service until 1975. The corporation would contract with roads that 
joined to provide passenger service along a designated national network. 
The measure authorized $40 million of direct aid to the corporation, 
$60 million in loan guarantees for equipment purchase and track repair, 
and $75 million in loan guarantees to back borrowing by railroads to 
buy into the corporation. The measure also required the corporation to 
add routes requested by state or local authorities if they were willing 
to share the operating losses of the run on a 50-50 basis with the corpo-
ration. 
The measure had near unanimous support in the Senate. Labor groups, AAR, 
NARP, the ICC, and DOT all favored the measure. Though the new plan 
favored short-haul runs somewhat more than the ori;ginal DOT proposal, 
there was some co,!~ern that profitable short-haul.lCuns--such as the 
Metroliner was proving to be--would end up subsidizing unprofitable long-
haul runs. But a measure introduced by Senator Pell designed to separate 
operation of long- and short-haul runs found little support and was with-
drawn. The corporation plan was presented as a means of getting rail 
passenger service back ~n its feet, and DOT predicted the corporation 
would show a modest profit within five years. With little debate and 
some relief at not having to authorize large direct subsidies, the 
measure was passed, 78 to 3. 
The House acted to increase authorizations to $100 million for loan 
guarantees for operations and $200 million for loan guarantees to back 
borrowing to buy into the system. The House version would allow the 
corporation to discontinue unprofitable trains in the network in 1973--
two years earlier than the Senate bill. The House increased the share 
of operating losses state or local bodies would have to match from one-
half to two-thirds. The measure passed the House with little debate and 
was approved by the Senate. Transportation Secretary Volpe had to muster 
a last minute show of force when the Council of Economic Advi!3ers, the 
Budget Bureau, and White House staffers again balked at the plan, but 
President Nixon signed the law late in 1970. 
In November of 1970, Volpe announced preliminary plans for the national 
rail network that would be operated by the new corporation. By then 
only'3~6 passenger trains were still operating, and the plan called for 
trimnr:(,ngthat to 150. Volpe was constrained by the relatively limited 
original irinding-vrLn-e-program,·· the profitability criterion, and the 
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intervention of the Budget office. He claimed that the network would 
still provide 90% of the 122 million people in cities of 50,000 or more 
with train service, but entire areas and some large cities were left 
unserved by the plan, and several major long-haul routes were omitted. 
There was immediate criticism of the network proposal from many of the 
corporation's original supporters. The ICC and NARP both attacked the 
plan as inadequate and proposed extensive revisions. Congressmen and 
Senators from areas omitted from the plan, including Senator Magnuson, 
pressed for inclusion of service in their areas. The role of the Office 
of Mana,gement and Budget (OMB) and some railroads interested in keepillg 
their runs out of the system were attacked. Unions, despite labor pro-
tective clauses in the original legislation, expressed fear that the 
drastic cuts in service would threaten thousands ,of jobs. 
In March of 1971, DOT revised their plan to add New Orleans-Los Angeles 
and Seattle-San Diego routes to the original system and increase the 
number of trains to 164 daily. The plan left six states unserved and 
provided no service to Cleveland, once a major rail center. Despite 
industry concerns that the venture was underfunded, Volpe predicted that 
it would be profitabfe within three years and could then expand to meet 
demand for more passenger service. 
Rather than mollifying critics, the revised plan created new resistance. 
Both union groups and NARP filed federal court actions to prevent startup 
of the corporation, now called AMTRAK, in May of 1971. Key congres-
sional supporters of the original legislation, led by Senator Mike 
Mansfield and Chairman Har1ey,-S,taggers of the House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee, /iidunted an effort to delay the program until 
it could be expanded. Hearings were held in both Houses, and Mansfield, 
with support from Chairman Magnuson, sought approval in t:he Senate 
Commerce Committee of legislation to delay start-up. The committee 
rejected the move, however, and a unanimous consent reques,t to get the 
measure to the Senate floor failed. At the same time, both the union 
and 'passenger group suits were rejected in federal court, and AMTRAK 
began operations on schedule. 
High-Speed Ground Transportation--1970 to the Present. After their 
first year in operation, both the Boston-tp··New York and New York-to-
Washington demonstration trains were viewed as successfuL The Metro-
liner had carried more than a million passengers by March of 1970 and 
had reversed the decline in passenger traffic between New York and 
Washington, D.C. After more delay due to technical difficu1t-ies, the 
Penn Central began receiving $12.9 million f'rom the government under a 
two-year demonstration program intended to test the market performance 
of the Metro1iner. And early in 1971, DOT signed a $3.8 million contract 
with United Aircraft to continue Penn Central's Turbotrain for two more 
years, fulfilling a campaign promise President Nixon had made to Con-
necticut voters in 1970. 
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During 1970, Congress considered a request for $21.7 million to continue 
the work of the Office of High-Speed Ground Transportation for another 
year. In addition to work on the demonstration projects, the agency had 
conducted research on new technology--linear induction motors, tracked 
air cushion vehicles, tube vehicles, andSTOL and VTOL--which it wanted 
to continue, and had completed the Northeast Corridor study in draft 
version that it wanted to refine. The measure went through Congress 
easily. Mention was made in floor statements of the visible success of 
the program and its relatively small cost (about $78 million so far). 
Bus, road building, and air transport groups, surveyed at the time, felt 
no threat fr.om the program, although coastal airl:J.~)es had begun to feel 
the impact of the Metroliner and were objecting independently to further 
support for the project. 
Late in 1971, DOT released the final report on Northeast Corridor trans-
portation. In what was regarded as a major shift of governmental 
priorities, the study claimed that improved conventional rail systems 
offered the only hope of meeting the area's intercity transportation 
p''coblems in the coming decade. Transportation Secretary Volpe emphasized 
that the plan would not cause much disruption since it would only improve 
existing facilities, but warned the use of new modes in the future might 
have considerable environmental impact. 
At the same time, renewal of the federal high-speed ground transportation 
program was again before Congress. Backers of the program, concerned 
that it had to return to Congress every year or two for deferral of its 
termination date and an increase in authorizations, sought to make the 
project continuous by removing the termination date and lifting the 
limitation on appropriations. The measure passed the Senate with no 
opposition late in the year. Early in 1972, the,House passed a bill 
that removed the termination date of the project, but specifically 
authorized $315.2 million for the following three years. The House 
measure also authorized new research into door-to-door transportation 
services and extended the repayment period of loans owed by the project. 
A conference adopted the House measure with few changes. 
Late in 1972,DOT announced that it would urge Congress to spend $700 
million to implement the recommendations ot the Northeast Corridor 
report. At the same time, Senator Hartke 'and Senator Lowell Weicker, a 
Connecticut Republican, announced that they would introduce $5.5 billion 
legislation the following year to improve conventional rail travel in 
the Corridor by 1976 and then construct a new 400-mile-per-hour system 
during the following decade. 
Hartke and Weicker eventually introduced only the first half of their 
plan, and the concept behind both that plan and the DOT proposal ulti-
mately emerged as part of the 1973 Regional Rail Reorganization Act. 
The accelerating failure of passenger lines in the late 1960s fore-
shadowed a more serious problem with the nation's rail freight system. 
In 1970, after attempts to get emergency federal aid failed,the Penn 
Central filed for bankruptcy and was followed in the next few years by 
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other major railroads in the Northeast and Midwest. After extensive 
controversy, Congress created the U.S. Railway Association, charging it 
. to draft a plan for operating bankrupt railroads under a new, semipublic, 
for-profit corporation, to be called ConRail. One goal of the reorgani-
zation, according to the Act, was to be the improvement of passenger 
service in the Northeast Corridor. The Act orders a study of the equip-
ment and property AMTRAK would have to purchase or lease from ConRail 
to improve service in the corridor. AMTRAK is required to carry out 
this plan and may borrow from ConRail, with a federal repayment guarantee, 
to do it. The legislation contemplates that the program will become 
profitable. (Expenditure of $700 million over five years will be needed 
to carry out the improvements.) 
AMTRAK~-197l to the Present. By late 1971, less than six months 
after its formation, AMTRAK had exhausted its original $40 million grant 
and was projecting a fiscal 1972 loss of $150 million--$50 million 
greater than predicted. Secretary Volpe asked Congress for $170 million 
to cover the period until June 1973, when AMTRAK could begin cutting 
unprofitable routes from its network. 
" 
Congressional reaction to the request and to AMTRAK's first six months 
of performance was vehement. The congressional Conunerce Conunittees that 
had supported the AMTRAK plan were disappointed with the corporation's 
performance but reluctantly supported Volpe's request. Routes had been 
added to the rail network to satisfy key congressmen--including Mansfield, 
Staggers, and Magnuson--but complaints of incomplete service persisted. 
The Senate Commerce Conunittee, and Senator Hartke in particular, were 
angered by the performance of AMTRAK's management, claiming that it was 
under-aggressive and over-salaried. ·Critics also said the corporation 
had been too passive in its negotiations with the railroads. AMTRAK 
contracts with the railroads for provision of passenger service required 
automatic payment, leaving AMTRAK without leverage to force the roads 
to improve tbe quality of service or the reliability of schedules. 
This criticism was echoed by the National Association of Railroad 
Passengers, which charged that the railroads were intent on sabotaging 
the new corporation in order to be free of passenger operations for 
good. The.railroads, it was said, were overstating losses, giving bad 
service, and purposely delaying passenger, in favor of freight, trains. 
Administration critics leaked rumors that the Nixon Administration, 
which had never strongly favored federal support for rail passenger 
service, intended to give the corporation minimal funding through the 
1972 election, then let it die. Both AMTRAK and DOT officials, it was 
charged, were being p1;evented from requesting more than $170 million 
by the White House ) 
The ICC agreed, with the corporation's supporters who claimed it needed, 
if anything, more money. Bus transport spokesmen opposed any new 
funding for the project, contending the government was conunitting 
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itself to a billion dollar subsidy program in the future. LaI;:n:: groups 
resisted congressional suggestions that AMTRAK take over a(:tl.lal oper-
ation of the trains, claiming that would destroy seniority rights of 
trainmen who lose passenger jobs and want to be placed in freight jobs. 
In March of 1972, the House passed 312 to 63, a bill giving AMT.RAK the 
requested $170 million, and requiring it to give annual performance 
reports to Congress. 
Senator Weicker successfully pressed the Senate Commerce Committee to 
add $250 million to the $170 million request, and Senator Pe11 won 
amendment on the Senate floor, adding $150 million worth of loans and 
loan guarantees for roads in 15 designated urban corridors. The measure, 
totaling $570 million in all, passed 73 to 7. 
A conference committee cut the Pe11 amendment from the b:i.ll entirely and 
reduced the general authorization for AMTRAK in the Senate bill from 
$420 million to $325 mi11ion--$225 million in direct grants and $100 
million of loan guarantees. 
Many of the same criticisms leveled against AMTRAK in 1972 were renewed 
in 1973. The corporation was still providing sometimes inadequate 
service over a skeletal network and still functioned largely as a conduit 
for federal funds to railroads that were reluctant participants in the 
scheme. The corporation amassed the feared $150 million deficit in 
Fiscal 1972. 
Early in 1973, AMTRAK, under pressure from OMB and DOT, petitioned to 
discontinue 3 of its 21 passenger routes and asked less than $100 
million from Congress for the coming fiscal year. 
Support for AMTRAK--and ire at the interference of OMB--had grown in 
Congress, however, and pressure was exerted to force AMTRAK to withdraw 
its discontinuance petition. In June, the Senate passed, with no debate, 
an authorization of $185 million in grants and an increase of $250 
million in loan guarantees. In September, the House passed a grant of 
$107.3 million and new loan guarantees of $50 million. The House 
measure also included a provision prohibiting AMTRAK from submitting 
budget requests to DOT and OMB before Congress. The bill also required 
consumer representation on the corporation's board, and gave AMTRAK 
more leverage over the quality of the service it purchased. 
A conference committee came up with a compromise bill containing $154.3 
million in grants and raising the loan guarantee level by $250 million. 
The grant figure represented the $107.3 million the House originally 
passed, plus $47 million of the previous year's grant authorization that 
had not been appropriated. The conference bill also moved the time when 
AMTRAK could disc()ntinue parts of its service to mid-1974, eliminated 
OMB and DOT revi£lws from the AMTRAK budget process, ordered the corpo-
ration to begin {.dding experimental routes to its system, and gave the 
ICC power to rev:iew the quality of passenger service provided through 
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the corporation. The measure passed both Houses easily and President 
Nixon, feeling pressure from Watergate and the sharpening energy crisis, 
signed the bill in November of 1973. 
Though AMTRAK's Fiscal 1973 deficit was again close to $150 million, the 
corpora~ion could claim increased ridership and increased revenues, 
bolstered by gas shortages. The energy crisis was also reported to have 
changed the Administration's posture toward AMTRAK. It asked $140 million 
for Fiscal 1975 with no resistance from OMB. AMTRAK itself requested 
$200 million. 
In July of 1974, the House passed 317 to 67, a measure to grant the 
corporation $200 million and increase its loan guarantee authorization 
by $400 million. There was still considerable concern in the House with 
extending the AMTRAK network and displeasure with the performance of the 
railroads under the plan, but the=e was increasing support for keeping 
AMTRAK in business and testimony arguing the legitimacy of continuing 
federal subsidy as a nec.essary national service. One month later, the 
Senate passed 75 to 31, a measure calling for the same money amounts. 
A conference committee reported a bill prohibiting discontinuances of 
any ,routes until mid-1975 and requiring addition of at least one experi-
mental run per year. Priority was given to states not already served 
by the network. The Legislation also" mandated AMTRAK to assume its (i'~ 
equipment maintenance and to provide service to £tny local or state bod:), 
providing two-thirds of the requested line's losses. It also authorized" 
a feasibility study of high-spee!:1:::eround transportation on the West 
Coast. President Ford signed ~the bill in;October of 1974. 
Despite increases in ridership and passenger re,jenues, AMTRAK's Fiscal 
1974 deficit ap~+oached $200 million, due to sharply rising costs. The 
Administration i'equested new funding for the corporation until 1977 in 
the form of direct grants only, an implicit acknowledgment of AMTRAK's 
inability to turn a profit in the foreseeable future. The corporation 
had already run up a federally guaranteed debt of $860 million, and 
there is little prospect of its being repaid. Thus, the federal guarantee 
is little more than a deferred subsidy. Debate on the measure in the 
House showed that there was still dissatisfaction among congressmen who 
were being asked to approve substantial and rising federal expenditures 
for a rail network that did not serve their districts. At the same 
time, floor statements revealed sentiment for removing the influence of 
congressional politics from the route selection process and letting 
AMTRAK concentrate on the more efficient runs' in its network, amove 
that would reduce the corporation's operating losses. In April, the 
House passed 280 ,to 63, a $1.12 billion authorization for direct grants 
to AMTRAK through October of 1977 and a prohibition of discontinuances 
through March of that year. 
Thus debate over AMTRAK since its inception has centered on a tension 
between the insistence that it eventually operate independent of federal 
support, and the idea that national rail passenger transportation is a 
merit good government owes to the public. There has been a steady trend 
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in the public discussion of the program away from the former idea and 
toward the latter, but Congress has yet to explicitly decide the issue. 
AMTRAK's estimated deficits for Fiscal 1975 through 1977 are estimated 
at over $300 million each year, so it seems likely that the decision 
whether to subsidize passenger service indefinitely could be made by 
default--the unfortunate but inevitable consequence of preventing the 
service from complete collapse. But a criterion of profitability dies 
hard. It underlies the congressional plan to reorganize the rail 
freight system, it still appears in debate over the passenger system, 
and it is still part of the system's basic legislation. 
As the feasibility of the profit goal declines and congressional insis-
tance on new service grows, it seems likely that appropriations will 
continue and mount without explicit acknowledgment that AMTRAK--or its 
successors--will require permanent operating assistance. 
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V. MACROECONOMIC ISSUES THROUGH THE YEAR 2000 
by 
R. U. Ayres 
International Research and Technology Corporation 
r 
ABSTRACT 
Key parameters that will affect the state of the u.S. economy through 
the year 2000 are described. 
There has been a capital shortfall and U.S. underinvestment in new plant 
and equipment during the past decade spawned by the increasing needs of 
capital intensive industries (especially energy conversion) and declin-
ing corporate earnings (a prime source of investment capital). Amelio-
rating this problem is a possible reduction of capital needs in other 
capital-consuming areas (e.g., schools); also, anticipated future demand 
for electric power is probably overstated. Remedies for the capital 
shortage include tax reforms (e.g., affecting corporate incomes) and 
government direct investment. Public hostility to business makes the 
latter option more likely. 
The decline of the "work ethic" and increased interest in "quality of 
life" at the expense of economic reward have contributed to the current 
economic slowdown. The principal constraint on growth over the next 
decades is, however, likely to be economic policy and not--as in the 
past--the ability and willingness of workers to accept and assimilate 
new production methods. The technological base for a rapid acceleration 
of productivity is available in the immediate future; for example, the 
application of computers to automation of physical production processes 
is still in its infancy. 
The inverse interrelationship of inflation and unemployment is a conse-
quence of the capacity limitations of both industry and labor. At a 
certain level of demand, unused capacity is exhausted in certain 
"bc;>ttleneck" sectors which are often artificially constrained by industry 
or (usually) union monopoly power. Organized labor has reaped virtually 
all the benefits of rising productivity, and labor costs have outpaced 
productivity in some sectors. Rampant inflation affects disorganized 
consumers (e.g., the poor and elderly), and capital, which is eroded 
because of accelerated depreciation due to rising replacement costs. 
Control of inflation depends on future cooperation of labor unions. 
Institutional rigidities distort the free market mechanism for resource 
allocation. Labor union monopoly power often prevents technolpgical 
progress in the short-term interest of union members. Intervention of 
the courts into substantive policy-making areas tends to decrease the 
flexibility of the social system as a whole. Another rigidity factor 
is the growth and proliferation of independent regulatory agencies. 
The main impact of regulation on intercity transportation (ICT) is to 
ensure the delivery of services to localities where demand would not 
otherwise justify such services, with increased costs to all use,rs, 
particularly larger cities. If regulation in the interests of small.,! 
cities and rural areas were ended, their economir,' .. fldvantages vis .... a-vis 
larger cities would disappear. '. 
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The ongoing shift from extraction and manufacturing to the service sec-
tors is most clearly seen in the declining relative importance of farming 
and "blue collar" jobs. An important subsidiary trend is the shift from 
certain services purchased directly from central suppliers toward ser-
vices provided by privately owned equipment (e.g., the shifts from rental 
housing to private housing, from public transport to private cars, from 
conunercial laundries to home washing machines), resulting in part from 
tax advantages (e.g., interest deductions and depreciation) ~ccruing to 
"owners" of equipment providing a service, but not to renters of equip-
ment or purchasers of the service itself. Tax law changes could affect 
the trend. A key related trend has been the rapid expansion over the 
past 30 years of industrial manufacturing of equipment that is substi-
tuting for formerly purchased services (i.e., single-family houses, 
cars, appliances); most of these markets are nearing saturation, except 
for communications and leisure/recreational markets, the latter continu-
ing to increase as a factor in ICT demand. 
Depletion of nonrenewable mineral resources can be alleviated by 
recycling, stockpiling, and substitution. The U.S. will, of course, 
be heavily dependent on foreign sources of fossil hydrocarbons for at 
least 10 to 15 years, despite accelerated exploration for, and use of, 
coal. The era of "cheap" energy is over, and future declines in energy 
prices (e.g., due to OPEC's collapse) will be temporary. 
The impact of permanently higher intercity transportation energy costs 
is clear. "Energy intensive" modes (aviation and private autos) will 
suffer increased costs vis-a-vis their competitors (rail and bus). 
Increased c't,sts, of course, affect profits, prices, and levels of 
service and demand. 
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Summary 
In this paper, an attempt is made to establish the key parameters that 
will affect the state of the U.S. economy in the year 2000. A systematic 
review of the generally accepted "driving forces" of the economy is fol-
lowed by a discussion of several important issues which have generated 
controversy in recent years. Each section concludes with a discussion 
of some of the implications for intercity transportation. 
The first three sections are concerned with the general (cyclic) char-
acter of the economy and the factors affecting production and consump-
tion, respectively. This general analysis is followed by discussions 
of six specific issues which arise in connection with any attempt to 
forecast the long-range future of the U.S. economy. 
The first issue discussed in detail is that of capital requirements 
vis-a-vis availability. Arguments pro and con are presented. The 
shortage thesis is supported by evidence of significant underinvestment 
by the U.S. over the past decade or more, coupled with evidence of 
increasing needs from capital intensive industries (especially energy 
conversion) and declining corporate earnings--the ultimate source of 
most investment capital. Ameliorating the situation somewhat may be a 
reduction in anticipated capital requirements for some other capita1-
consuming areas such as schools. Also, anticipated future demand for 
electric power, for instance, has probably been overstated because it 
is extrapolated from an historical trend of declining real energy costs. 
Future options for increasing capital availability include changing the 
tax laws, e.g., on corporate incomes, and direct investment by govern-
ment. In view of the current public hostility toward business, the 
latter outcome seems more probable. 
Productivity and technological change are discussed next. The issue 
here is whether U.S. productivity growth in "real" terms can continue 
at, or near, historical rates (2.1% pe.r year per worker between 1950 
and 1970) or whether a major shift is in the offing. A slowdown is 
rather widely expected, arising from a variety of sociological factors 
such as the declining "work ethic" and increased interest in '''qua1ity 
of life" at the expense of more conventional forms of economic reward. 
Evidence of changing social patterns is easily cited: rising crime 
statistics, drug abuse, the spread of the "counter-culture," absenteeism, 
wildcat strikes, etc. However, a deeper examination suggests that part 
of the social malaise that is widely cited as a precursor of the "end 
of growth" is probably symptomatic, instead, of a breakdown in the 
societal mechanisms of defense against change. The mechanisms which 
V-7 
/ 
1 
.1 
1 j 
r 
r 
i 
" 
'., 
. -----~I~---' 
1 
. ""r~ .. w. ; 4"'!:---l~ 
l . . ...... I : l 
promote rapid social change--notab1y the electronic media--are of recent 
origin, and the application of electronic computers (for instance) to 
automation of physical production processes is still in its relative 
infancy. Thus, the technological basis of a rapid acceleration of pro-
ductivity appears to be available now or in the immediate future. The 
principal constraint on growth for the next several decades is likely to 
be economic policy and not--as in the past--the ability and willingness 
of the labor force to accept,and assimilate new methods of production. 
The third issue discus,sed is inflation and unemployment. The immediate 
connection between the! two phenomena arises because both industry and 
labor have capacity limitations. As demand rises beyond a certain 
point, unused capacity begins to be exhatisted in certain "bottleneck" 
sectors--which are often artificially constrained by industry or (usu-
ally) union monopoly power. Indeed, organized labor has secured f,or 
labor--as opposed to consumers--virtual1y all the benefits of rising 
productivity. In fact, labor 'costs have recently risen faster than pro-
ductivity in some sectors. The prospects for controlling this infla-
tionary pressure depend on the future role of labor unions in the U.S. 
The adverse consequences of continuing inflation (should it be impossible 
to restrict or eliminate monopoly power) are felt by disorganized con-
sumers--especia11y those who are not "producers," such as the poor and 
e1der1y--and by capital. The problem is that capital tends to be eroded 
by inflation'because real depreciation is accelerated (due to higher 
replacement costs) whereas corporate earnings often do not keep pace--
and the public is usually angry if they do. 
A fourth issue that is examined is the question of institutional rigidi-
ties and resulting distortions of the free market mechanism for allo-
cation of resources. On the national scene, the biggest single problem 
is the monopoly power of labor unions, which are frequently able to 
prevent technological progress in the short-term interest of their 
membership. Another key factor in the picture is the trend toward 
decisive intervention by the courts in the process of lawmaking. This 
tends to decrease the flexibility of the societal system, as a whole 
(notwithstanding the fact that "activist" courts began to intervene in 
the process of law-making because of unresponsiveness on the part of 
legislative bodies). Another key factor is the growth and proliferation 
of independent regulatory agencies. These bodies, too, effec.tively 
create law, although they are less immune from ultimate legislative 
review than the courts. Their future rule is currently being examined, 
after several decades of uninterrupted expansion. 
The main overall effect of regulation on intercity transportation is to 
ensure that services are made available to many locations where demand 
would not otherwise justify such service. This policy has obviously 
increased costs to all users, particularly the larger cities. If regu-
lation in the interests of small cities and rural areas were ended, 
their economic advantages vis-a-vis larger cities would largely disap-
pear. 
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The fifth issue that is discussed in detail is the ongoing shift from 
extraction and manufacturing to the service sectors. This shift is 
most clearly documented in the declining relative importance of farming 
and "blue collar" jobs. However, there are less obvious trends wl1ich 
are no less significant. One important historical trend has been a 
shift away from some categories of services purchased direct from a 
central supplier, toward services provided by privately owned equipment. 
Thus ~ental housing has declined in favor of private housing, public 
transportation has declined in favor of private cars, commercial 
laundries have been largely replaced by privately owned washing machines, 
and commercial theaters have declined in favor of home entertainment 
(TV). 
One reason for these substitutions is undoubtedly that tax advantages 
(especially interest deductions and depreciation) are available to those 
who "own" equipment that provides a service but not to those who merely 
rent the equipm~nt or purchase the service itself. Changes in tax laws 
could affect these trends. Another key point, however, is that manu-
facturing the equipment that is used to substitute for formerly pur-
chased services, has been a major area of industrial expansion in the 
last 30 years (single-family houses, cars, appliances). Many of these 
markets now appear to be approaching saturation. Communications, home 
electronics, and leisure/recreational markets are the chief exceptions. 
Undoubtedly leisure and recreational activities will continue to increase 
as a factor in demand for intercity transportation. 
The final issue discussed in the paper is resource availability for the 
U.S. over the next 30 years. It is concluded that nonrenewable mineral 
resources are not likely to pose an insurmountable problem, due to the 
range of possibilities of recycling, stockpiling, and substitution. 
With respect to fossil hydrocarbons, of course, a problem obviously 
exists, and the U.S. will certainly be heavily dependent on foreign 
sources for at least 10 to 15 years, notwithstanding accelerated 
exploration for, and use of, coal. The consequence is almost certain 
to be permanently higher prices, and the era of "cheap" energy which 
the U.S. has enjoyed for several decades is probably over. If energy 
prices do drop sharply in the future, due to unforeseen political 
events (e.g., collapse of OPEC), the lower prices would be only tempo-
rary. 
The impact of permanently higher energy costs on intercity transpor-
tation is clear in general terms: "energy intensive" modes (such as 
aviation and private autos) will suffer increased costs vis-a-vis their 
competitors (rail, bus). These increased costs will, of course, affect 
profits, prices, and levels of service and demand. 
The Production/Consumption Duality 
From the point of view of materials and energy, the economy is a system 
of transformations that convert raw materials and natural resources 
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(both renewable and nonrenewable) into "final" goods and services. This 
transformation is unidirectional: crude materials and energy are 
extracted, refined, processed, recombined in ne~ forms, fabricated, and 
assembled into articles of commerce or "infrastructure." Value is added 
at each stage by human labor and the'application of knowledge (tech-
nology). Ultimately, the manufactured products wear out or cease to be 
useful for some reason or other and become waste flows, returning to 
the environment. However, while materials are not physically lost from 
the universe--nor is energy--their form is irreversibly changed to some 
extent, and waste materials are intrinsically less recoverable (hence 
valuable) than the natural raw materials from which they were derived. 
Physicists call this gradual qualitative deterioration or aging process 
"increasing entropy." 
However, classifical economic theory considers the economy to be a kind 
of perfect ageless machine. In this view, there is a cyclic relation-
shop between produation or supply on the one hand and aonsumption or 
demand on the other. The "wor:king fluid" of this machine is money, 
and money (like materials or energy) is subject to an accounting identity 
which is equivalent to a kinq of conservation principle: for any non-
governmental economic entity!~ such as a household or firm, money inflows 
(income) must always be exactly balanced by outflows (expenditures) plus 
any changes in stock (savings or reserves). Governments, of course, can 
create new money by various mechanisms which complicate the picture, but 
this can be neglected for the moment. 
The key point to be emphasized, fl~r the moment, is the closed "cyclic" 
nature of the economic system: gross national product (GNP) is defined 
as the sum of all outputs by all producers (sellers) in the economy. 
But it is also (by virtue of the accounting identity) equal to the sum 
of all expenditures by all consumers (buyers) in the econ'olIlY. Thus 
gross national product is necessarily equal to gross national expendi-
ture. 
A duality also exists between "costs" on the one hand and "prices" on 
the other. The cost of producing a given bill of goods (including 
services) consists of payments for purchased materials, capital equip-
ment, interest and dividends on borrowed or invested money, taxes, and 
wages. Payments for purchased materials and capital equipment are, in 
turn, attributable to the same elements, in various proportions. 
Ultimately, all payments for products and services can be attributed to 
wages, rents, or other types of income to individuals. 
Income, in turn, is allocated to savings (ultimately invested by 
financial institutions), taxes (government income), and private final 
consumption. The other categories of final consumption are government 
(public) consumption and investment (both private and public). Invest-
ment differs from consumption in that it is intended to increase the 
production of other goods and services. In practice, a further reason 
for distinguishing between consumption and investment goods is that 
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investment goods (except private housing, which could also very well be 
regarded as a form of investment) are also longer lasting on the average. 
Consumption and investment expenditures for goods and services, in turn, 
provide the revenues (income) for producers. Revellue is, of course, the 
product of quantity times price, so prices are "costs" for consumers 
just as wages are "costs" for producers. This is the reason that raising 
wa.ges without increasing production ultimately increases price levels. 
The total quantity of goods and services produced (rather than their 
money value) is the true measure of economic performance. A major pre-
occupation of economists for the last two centuries has been to identify 
the critical driving forces--or constraints--on economic growth. At one 
time, there were serious doctrinal divergencies bewteen neo-c1assica1, 
Marxist, and Keynesian formulations., but these arguments have been 
greatly muted* since the various theories ,were first put into clearly 
defined mathematical form and, especia11y,\ since the advent of serious 
large-scale statistical model-building in the 1930s. Today most of the 
so-called econometric "growth" models share a number of common features, 
though they differ in many details. They agree, in effect, that the 
overall driving force of the economy is aggregate demand, subject to the 
constraints of available labor and capital equipment. A soluble system 
of equations can be constructed from a suitable set of empirically 
derived relationships between consumption, investment, incomes, and 
prices, with suitable allowance for time lags. However, the correlations 
between variables become weaker as the time lags become longer; and in 
the long run, a system of econometric equations, alone, leads to an 
indeterminate future (Le., all forecasting relationships have very low 
confidence levels). 
The usual procedure to cope with this difficulty is to specify a qumber 
of'''exogenous'' variab1es--such as population, labor force, and pro-
ductivity--whose growth is taken to be determined outside the model. 
In addition, it is enormously helpful to introduce structural relation-
ships that can also be counted on to change slowly, if at all, over the 
time span of the projection. 
The duality between supp1y/derrand, production/consumption, or between 
purchases and sales provides a basis for just such a set of structural 
equations. These are the input-output equations which simply restate 
the accounting identities between monetary income and expenditure on a 
sector-by-sector basis. These equatiol'!'"', can also be generalized to 
reflect materiaZs and energy accounting-'identities. Most long-range 
economic forecasting models utilize a set of exogenous projections 
derived from other sources (or other models) and an input-output 
module to ensure that the stable balance of flows between production and 
consumption activities is maintained. 
*The arguments persist in the area of economic policy, however. 
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Factors Affecting Supply (Production) 
Figure V-l displays, in the form of a "contextual map," the key relation-
ships between factors of production,and gross domestic product (GPD).* 
Monetary flows, other physical flows such as population or construction, 
and regulatory influences (both direct and indirect) are illustrated. 
The basic theme of Figure V-l is ,that production (GDP) is a function of 
two major factors, labor supply and capital stock. Each of these, in 
turn, h~s a physical and a nonphysical element. 
\ 
The physical component of labor supply is people. The potential labor 
supply is not the total population, of course, since young children, 
elderly or incapacitated persons, students, soldiers and mothers with 
young children would be excluded. Some categories (such as students or 
military) are excluded by virtue of being otherwise fully occupied. 
Young children and elderly people are generally excluded by arbitrary 
age categories, as determined by law, employer policy, or by union con-
tract. The period between entering and leaving the labor pool has pro-
gressively shortened over the years, with almost universal retirement 
by age 65 and "early retirement" options available to more and more 
people. 
The size of the population and its growth rate are primary determinants 
of the size of the potential labor ·force. Growth rate is important 
because it fixes the fraction of the population that is in a dependent 
status and consequently not part of the potenti.a1 labor pool. A slow-
growing population has fewer children per adult, hence fewer adults 
required for child care than a fast-growing population. Differences 
can be quite significant. In 1971, only 42% of the U.S. population 
belonged to the labor force, but this will rise to 45% if the population 
follows the "D" Series and in the event of the "F" Series, as shown in 
Table V-I. Based on recent declines in the birth rate, the "F" Series 
is considered more likely. This means smaller families and more workers 
per .unemp1oyedchi1d.** 
Within these fixed age boundaries, however, there remains a sizable 
"gray area" with regard to the potential availability of mothers of 
young children and of various categories of handicapped persons. Women 
are having fewer children, and social attitudes towards women with 
children working outside the home have been liberalizing as more women 
*GDP is similar to the more familiar GNP, except that it inc~udes 
foreign-owned output within the national borders and excZudes the out-
put of subsidiaries or activities abroad owned by domestic concerns. 
**Of course the number of older and retired workers per active worker 
will increase; the number of retired persons per child below employ-
ment age will change most dramatically of all. Implications are 
discussed later. 
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take up careers. Increasing efforts are likely to be made to assist 
mentally retarded, blind, deaf, or partial.ly crippled individuals to 
find useful work. Thus, a larger percentC!.ge of the "potential" labor 
supply between school and rctir~:,"<mt ages will be participating in the 
future. 
The nonphysical component of the labor supply is its "quality." This 
is partly a matter of adequate physical health--now essentially assured 
for most persons in the working population in the U.S. and other 
developed countries--partly a matter of basic education plus special.ized 
skills, and partly a matter of attitudes on work. Health and education 
are largely resultants of public sector activities. (The schools are 
the biggest single user of tax dollars in the U.S.) Even attitudes on 
work are heavily affected by the external (i.e., school) environment, 
though parents are probably still the dominant influence. Thus, the 
quality of the U.S. labor force in the future is highly dependent on the 
effectiveness of public policy in these areas. 
Technology clearly has some influence on the "quality" of lab,or.* Tech-
nology which simplifies certain activities--thereby making them easier 
to grasp--will have a beneficial effect. For instance, the slide rule, 
and more recently, the pocket calculator, have unquestionably increased 
the number of people who can deal with elementary mathematical problems 
*To this extent it can be said to be "embodied" in the labor. 
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in a practical- context. Similarly, the electric typewriter has 
undoubtedly simplified the process of learning to type, etc. The 
major justification for Henry Ford's innovation of the "production 
line" was to permit sem~~skilled workers to accomplish tasks that had 
formerly required highl,.~' skilled and experienced craftsmen. Thus, 
Ford was actually abl~ to train new workers "on the job" and, conse-
quently, to expand production rapidly. 
The second factor of production indicateq in Figure'; V-I is capital 
stock. In the example given above, Ford's technology also pepZaced 
human labor with that of a machine. The machine represents capital, 
and the technology is also, to an extent, embodied in the capital 
equipment. Capital equipment is itself the product of labor, tech-
nology, and capital. In principle, then, one might treat capital as 
a derivative quantity (rather than a basic one) and eliminate it, thus 
regarding capital as "congealed" labor and technology, as in the 
Marxist labor theory of value. But it is equally reasonable to regard 
products intended for consumption in this way, and the labor theory of 
value smudges over the critical difference between capital goods and 
consumption goods, namely, that the former produce mope goods and the 
latter do not. Further, capital stock--like labor--has a qualitative 
aspect as well as a quantitative one. Embodied technology is the 
"quality" of capital. 
Although some economists have engaged in controversy as to whether 
technology "should" be regarded as embodied in labor or in capital, it 
seems unnecessary to pose such a question. In specific circumstances 
one or the other statement might be true, but neither is true under all 
circumstances. Furthermore, technology--including the technological 
component of capital--cannot be simply regarded as a "form" of accumu-
lated labor. While some kinds of human knowledge do require much labor 
(or analysis) to acquire--e.g., detailed measurements of properties of 
materials, etc.--the synthetic content of technology is simply not 
measurable in terms of "man-hours" of inputs. Critical insight might 
occur in ten seconds or ten years or ten centuries, and technology is, 
if anything, the result of an accumulation of many insights into the 
relationships between the characteristics of materials and the forces 
of nature. Thus, it is most realistic to regard technology as an inde-
pendent factor of productivity. 
As,.noted, there are situations where technological changes :i~nfluence 
the pattern of consumption, hence of production, without being embodied 
~n either labor or (',apital. Product (:esign is an obvious cas.e in point. 
Design improvements resulting from new' technology may make it possible 
to fly a plane faster, to useless fuel, or both. These changes will 
increase the quality of service rendered to the final consumer. They 
will also certainly increase the share of airlines in the t.otal trans-
portation market (at the expense of other modes). 
Let us now regress one step further :i.n the chain of causality and ask 
the question: What further factors CEln be expected to influence 
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(japita~ investment in quantitative terms? And what factors will. affect 
teahnology in its triple role as determinant of quality of labor, quality 
of ca,pital, and quality of product and/or service? These topics are 
disc~sed in later sections. 
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Factors Affecting Demand (Expenditure) 
Figure V-2 displays, again in the form of a contextual map, key relation-
ships between elements of demand. As before, monetary flows, physical 
flows, direct regulatory influences, and sociological or other influences 
are illustrated. The purpose of the chart is to display some critical 
interactions and relationships. 
One of the important "feedback loops" in the chart connects private pur-
chases of durable and nondurable goods and services to investment in 
nonhousing capital stock. Simply, the greater the demand for such goods 
and services, the greater the required output of the industry, and the 
greater the resulting capital investment. 
Another, less well-known feedback loop is the connection between the 
stoak of consumer ,durable goods such as housing or cars, and the con-
sumption of goods and services needed for operation and maintenance pur-
poses. For instance, cars and car owners require gasoline, tires, bat-
teries, spare parts, and highway maintenance not to mention insurance, 
motel accommodatiolls, bridge/tunnel tolls, traffic police, etc. Thus, 
current saZes of all these goods or services will tend to depend upon 
the current stoak of passenger cars (other factors remaining equal). 
Similarly, houses and their owners demand furniture and furnishings, 
appliances, paint, hardware and cutlery, heating fuel, electricity, 
water and sewage service, lawn and garden care equipment, etc. 
For expenditures on housing and durable goods per se, another factor 
must be considered. Demand can be subdivided into repZaaement and 
additions to stoak. Generally speaking, different economic factors come 
into play in the two cases. Replacement demand is determined by the 
size of the existing stock, and the rate of depreciation, which is a 
complex function of "intrinsic" depreciation rates,repair/renovation 
costs, and demand for second-hand units. For housing, depreciation of 
structures is often offset by appreciation of underlying land values 
(e.g., in growing suburbs). Less commonly, land values may depreciate 
sharply due to shifts in local racial balance, removal of desirable 
amenities, or location in the areas of "undesirable" activities (e.g., 
prisons, waste processing sites, industries generating heavy vehicular 
traffic, etc.). 
Demand for addition to a "stock" of durables, on the other hand, is 
typically triggered by increases in population, or income per capita, 
as well as "consumer confidence." During times of economic expansion 
and optimism, people are more likely to go into debt to purchase durable 
goods (on credit); conversely, during recessions or periods of 
V-l6 
<J 
j 
, 
t 
<) 
r----- .~~_~"' .. 
~:::::..'":!~.:.~.,:!':~~.~" 
i 
I ~ ~ 
'1, 
I ~~ 
~ 
~ I 
I 
'~~ .' .... ~~ 'i ~
'lJjf 
ii' 
~o ~~ 
:1 
~~ 5; 
'f 
t-' 
....... 
" ( 
, 
, 
\\ 
f\ J. t, 
i. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
~~it·, 
.-.- . .!:!:~~~~.-.-.- . 
. -.-.~~.-.-. 
. ~~r·p~s.,~ ..... '.J 
KEY 
~ flow 0' money 
direc:I'ttulatlOn 
OlN' lorms. of inlluence 
Figure V-2. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF EXPENDITURE (in equilibrium) 
~~~~~ .... *.~.r .. ~._t~~~j~fs_.~ww.~~ •• n~·~i~~~C .... ~ ... ] •••• t.,~t'~""~-------" ~ .: .... '-;:;..l;i>$fo~idI~NI bIt • ., .."'_ ,.. 
.~.T.~ ._---
" 
-.-.~ 
<J 
j 
~ 
1 , 
! 
1 
u <~ 
- ~ - - .. 
------.... <~~.I.r.n;.-.~ 
r -~T'~'-~-
' 
--' j 
- I 
'l~ 
uncertainty, there is a greater tendency to liquidate debt and build up 
cash reserves or savings. Unemployment is a reasonably good surrogate 
variable for consumer confidence; when unemployment is high, confidence 
is likely to be low, and vice versa. 
It follows from the above, that recovery from a slump tends to be "self-
'propelled" (during the earlier stages, at least) as increasing prosperity 
leads to increasing demand which, in turn, cranks up the economic machine 
to a higher level of activity. 
However, there is an upper limit (already noted) imposed by the fixed 
available supply of labor and capital goods. As the existing capacity 
to produce goods and services is approached, spot shortages--bottle~ 
necks--begin to develop here and there. As capacity utilization in-
creases further, the competition for labor and goods becomes more in-
tense, resulting in bidding up of wages and prices of certain commodi-
ties. As these price rises are propagated through the economic system 
to final goods and services, they soak up consumer buying power and 
begin to "damp" the expansiona:ry impulse initiated by increased demand. 
ThUB, the boom ends. 
The economic deceleration process is also self enhancing, at first, as 
decreased consumption results in decreased production, followed by lay-
offs, idle capacity, and unemployment. The sequence of "boom," followed 
by "bust" is the so-called business cycle. The basic principle of 
Keynesian economic policy is to curb these disruptive oscillations by 
introducing expansionary influences (e.g., deficit spending) during 
recessions, while deliberately deflating booms by cutting back on govern-
ment spending and raising taxes or interest rates. The art of fiscal and 
monetary intervention is optimistically known as "fine tuning" the 
economy. In practice, however, it is politically more difficult to 
exercise fiscal or monetary restraint than it is to promote expansion. 
Moreover, the econometric "growth" models which were supposed to provide 
precise guidance as to timing and magnitude of the appropriate stimuli 
have been proven by recent events to be much less reliable than had 
been supposed. Hence, it is not likely that economic growth in the U.S. 
can be sustained on a steady basis over the next two decades, without 
sharp corrections from time to time. 
Indeed, many economists fear that cyclic ups and downs may be magnified 
in the next two decades due to the increasing integration of the world 
economy. In previous business downturns, there has been a "phase-
mismatch" which sometimes enabled countries to cushion the impact of 
falling domestic demand by increasing exports, and conversely', to in-
crease imports during times of excess domestic demand to reduce the 
inflationary effect. One of the major world economic problems for the 
next three decades is the lack of an adequate international mechanism 
for economic management, particularly of the world monetary system. It 
is not clear at present how this problem can be resolved, if at all. 
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Capital Requirements/Availability 
One of the major questions troubling economists, currently, is whether 
the u.s. is facing a capital shortage of major proportions. Among 
those who "view with alarm" are Secretary of the Treasury Simon; James 
Needham, the Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange; Henry Wa11ich of 
the Feder~l Research Board; and R. H. Jones, the Chairman of General 
Electric Company. Some points worth considering in relation to this 
topic include the fact that the u.S. has invested a smaller proportion 
of its GNP in new plant and equipment (from 1960 to 1973) than any other 
major industrial country--on1y 13.6% as compared to 29% for Japan and 
20% for West Germany.* As a result, the U.S. capital stock is aging 
and obsolescent. Major industries such as steel and automobile manu-
facturing must invest enormous sums in the immediate future to upgrade 
their production facilities and reduce unit costs in order to meet 
foreign competition. Many industries will also require significant new 
investment in pollution abatement facilities during the next decade. 
This "catch up" requirement coincides in time with the very large 
anticipated new capital requirements for coal gasification, nuclear 
power plants, urban mass transit, and other technologies that are more 
capital-intensive than their predecessors. As will be noted in a later 
section, the quality of ores now mined has sharply declined in the past 
few decades, requiring corresponqingly increased materials handling, 
waste disposal, and energy inputs:> for processing the ore. 
Recent inflation has aggravated the undercapita1ization problem by 
increasing the cost of replacement and hence the effective rate of 
depreciation; cash flow generated by allowable depreciation is unchanged 
and hence ilJ.creasing1y inadequate. Inflation also creates spurious 
"inventory profits"which add to apparent earnings and, consequently, 
are taxed. Since the inventory and capital equipment must later be 
replaced at higher prices, the taxation of inventory profits is effec-
tively a tax on working capital. 
The problem can be viewed, too, in terms of the drying-up of traditional 
sources of funds for investment in productive capacity. The generally 
poor performance of the stock market since the early 1960s has diverted 
new investment funds from equity issues into fixed income securities. 
Some of these debt instruments represent investment, but government debt 
accounts for much of this. There is an increasingly popular theory that 
funding of government securities effectively "crowds out" the private 
sector in competition of funds. Declining equity share prices also 
represent a decrease in liquid assets (which can be used as s~curity for 
bank loans, for instance). The wave of conglomerate mergers in the late 
1960s resulted, in many cases, from artificial "pumping up" of apparent 
earnings by essentially unproductive gimmicks such as changes in 
*H. L. Leib1ing, J. Jaakson, u.S. Department of Treasury (Washington 
Post, April 7, 1975). 
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accounting methods, "spinning off" of real estate assets, reducing 
contributions to pension plans (by "assuming" more favorable earnings 
fLom existing funds), etc. These reported "earnings" were taxed at 
current rates, thus effectively draining off potential assets (or, 
equivalently, creating future liabilities). Now the adverse effects of 
these manipulations are being felt in terms of excessively low pricel 
earnings ratios and resulting inability of corporations to find equity 
capital. 
, An excessive amount of money in the U.S. has also been invested in land 
sp~~ulation, by individuals and by institutions, due to favorable tax 
tr~iatment. Profits from rising land prices do not represent "real" 
economic growth, however, but essentially detract from it by diverting 
capital funds away from productive purposes. (The same can be said for 
other "exotic" investments, e.g., gold, works-of-art, etc.) It should 
be noted, incidentally, that the U.S. is unique among developed countries 
in encouraging land speculation by permitting virtually uncontrolled real 
estate development--much of which consists of nothing more than sub-
dividing large pieces of land into small parcels for resale to the public. 
This, too, has diverted funds away from productive investments. 
There are arguments against the "shortage" hypothesis that deserve con-
sideration. One key point is that some of the projections assume new 
capital requirements (to provide substitutes for costly Arab oil) will 
be superimposed on capital requirements for electric power generation 
based on pre-1973 projections of electricity consumption. Since the 
price of oil has risen so sharply, electricity prices have also shot up 
and demand is sharply down. Based on pre-1973 prices and trends, 
electricity consumption was expected to double each decade, for an eight-
fold increase between 1970 and 2000. Capital requirements would increase 
as much--or more--since nuclear power plants require more capital per 
unit of capacity than conventional (steam) plants. 
On deeper analysis, however, demand for electric power--like other goods 
and services--is clearly a function of population growth, income, price, 
and other factors. Past demand growth is partly due to growing personal 
income, partly due to increasing population--the post-\-1orld War II "baby 
boom"--and partly-due to the declining price of energy (in real terms) 
from 1950 to 1970. The large bulge in single-family housing.construc-
tion is also a major factor. The relative importance of these factors 
can be estimated by multiple-regression analysis of demand statistics. 
Assuming merely that population growth continues along the present track 
(Census "F" series), and that the "real" cost of electricity rises at 
3.3% per year, the total demand for electricity would increas'eby only 
about 31% between 1970 and 2000 (see Table V-2). Thus, the capital not 
needed to build electric-power-generating facilities would be available 
for coal gasification or shale oil recovery. 
Slower population growth also implies less need for schools, another 
major user of capital in the last two decades. School populations are 
.. 
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Table V-2 
U.S. ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION PROJECTIONS, VARIOUS CASES (1014 kwh) 
Year 
Assumptions 1970 1980 1990 2000 
11. Simple e2ctrapolation of past demand (7.35%/yr) 1.53 3.05 6.10 12.20 
2. Real costs decrease 24% from 
1970 to 1980, 12% per decade 
1980-2000 1.53 3.05 5.66 9.89 
Population 
continues to 1 3• Real costs remain constant increase at 1970-2000 1.53 2.54 3.56 4.56 
1.1% per year 
(Census "D" 1 4 • Real costs increase 19% Series) 1970-1990; constant there-
after 1.53 2.38 3.01 3.45· 
5. Real costs increase 3.3% per 
year; double by 2000 1.53 2.07 2.11 2.01 
Fertility remains ~ See 114 above 1.53 2.37 2.95 3.29 at zero and popu-lation growth 7. See 115 above 1.53 2.05 2.07 1.91 ceases by 2035 
Sources: IRT-331-R, "Economic and Ecological Consequences of Changing Patterns of 
Energy Production and Utilization: Overview," December 31, 1973. 
Data taken from D. Chapman, T. Tyrrell, and T. Mount, Environment, 
Vol. 15, No.8, October 19]3. 
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now peaking and beginning to decline; hence much less new construction 
will be needed in the future than in the recent past. 
Similarly, while urban mass transportation and railroads are expected 
to absorb a good deal of capital over the next two or three decades, 
this would largely be in place of highways. The national highway, 
system is in much better shape than rail-based systems, and additions 
to it will be limited and selective. Despite fanatic defense of the 
"highway trust fund" in Congress, the handwriting is on the wall: the 
fund will soon either become a general transportation trust fund or 
disappear altogether. 
Finally, slower population growth, smaller families, high land costs, 
and high energy costs will probably put a permanent end to the suburban 
growth boom. Multiple-family dwelling units and higher density land 
use will be the prevailing rule. This trend will result in substantial 
capital savings per net new housing unit, especially in terms of roads 
and utility services. The spread of population to the suburbs diverted 
immense amounts of capital into duplicating (at low density) facilities 
that already existed in the higher-density central cities. For the 
rest of the century, however, the rate of building of new public facili-
ties of many kinds can be cut back substantially without penalty. This 
will free capital for investments that have been neglected in the recent 
past, such as water and waste treatment. 
The major factors affecting capital availability are graphically dis-
played i~ Figure V-1. They are, primarily, elements of government 
policy and public attitudes: 
~ Monetary policy 
• Development policy 
• Fiscal policy 
• Public attitudes toward business, as translated through the 
political process into regulatory policy 
• Public attitudes to private spending, saving, and borrowing 
The impacts of monetary and fiscal policy are probably the most potent. 
Monetary policy determines interest rates and the lending power of banks 
(through control of reserve requirements). Fiscal policy determines the 
relative attracti"leness of various means of financing. The "cost" of 
capital to business is dividend and interest payments. CorpoFatf'. pro-
fits (from which dividends are paid) have dropped by 50% from 1966 to 
1974 in real terms, while interest payments have risen even ~ore 
sharply as both the quantity of corporate debt, and interest rates, 
have risen. Current tax policy permits interest payments,but not 
dividends, to be deducted from taxable income--though both are payments 
for the use of money. Hence, a corporation must pay about $1 in taxes 
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for each.$l paid in dividends. 
it pays to borrow, even at high 
be put to good use. 
Thus for corporations--like homeowners--
interest rates, as long as the money can 
Of course the emphasis on borrowing--as opposed to issuing new equity 
shares--eventually creates its own risks and limits. ~any banks were 
facing severe liquidity problems a year ago because of potentially bad 
debts; some debts were written off, and many repayment schedules were 
stretched out as the only alternative to bankruptcy. The capability of 
commercial banks to provide needed new capital is clearly limited, but 
changes in the existing tax laws may be required before the equity 
capital market can be expected to supply any significant amount of 
investment funds. 
Public attitudes to business are highly relevant, here. At present, 
there is little public understanding or sympathy for the role of profits 
and dividends in generating capital funds for economic growth. Indeed, 
public attitudes toward business have been increasingly negative over 
the past decade or more, for a variety of reasons. Evidence of increased 
"social consciousness" on the part of business leaders would undoubtedly 
do much to help, but better understanding of basic economic issues on 
the part of the general public is of paramount importance. If present 
trends continue, the public--as represented by its legislators--wUl 
continue to pile regulations and penalties on business, while criticizing 
"excessive" profits without understanding that profits are needed to pay 
dividends, whic.h are, in effect, the "cost" of equity capital, which is 
the base of the pyramid. Without an equity base for security, debt 
capital is not available. Under these circumstances, the only viable 
alternative source of capital funds is direct government investment. 
Increasing government i.ntervention in the capital markets, as Zender 
and ultimately, perhaps, owner of industry is therefore a not unlikely 
eventuality for the U.S.--despite current reflexive rhetoric denouncing 
socialism. 
With regard to intercity transportation, it is clear that a capital 
shortage would operate primarily to retard the development of high-speed 
rail links--which would require substantial rebuilding of existing 
lines--and favor modes utilizing the Interstate System of highways, 
which is already largely in place. 
Productivity and Technology 
The root causes of productivity growth--apartfrom obvious quantitative 
inputs noted already--are not well understood at present. There is 
fairly wide agreement among economists that the rate of growth is likely 
to decline, rather than increase, in the next quarter century. Reasons 
frequently cited include allegedly deteriorating work habits (over-
education?), shifting social values that emphasize distributive justice 
or "quality of life" more than wealth or standard of living as tradi-
tionally measured, and declining relative importance of the extractive 
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and manufacturing sectors where physical measures of output are easily 
monitored vis-a-vis "service" sectors whose outputs are difficult to 
measure. It is difficult to determine the educational product generated 
by a given educational system; hence, the output tends to be measured 
simply in terms of the inputs (costs, number of teachers per student, 
etc.). The same problem clearly applies in many other service areas, 
• such as health, law enforcement, and general government. Real produc-
tivity may be increasing or decreasing in these sectors, but it is 
evidently not measured adequately. 
Less familiar arguments on productivity growth in the future can also 
be cited. One interesting argument is based on the notion that produc-
tivity growth is the ultimate measure of a society's ability to absorb 
social and technological change. Output per unit of input cannot 
increase unless the method of production, i.e. the technology, is 
altered in some way. Secular education has social functions above and 
beyond the inculcation of job skills; it imparts some degree of under-
standing of the relationships between historical past and actual 
present, between one culture and others. It sensitizes people to the 
existence of possible alternatives and to the fact that societal changes 
can and do occur and may be beneficial, and it provides a necessary 
antidote to the fear of change which characterizes most human conditions 
and cultures. 
The dramatic productivity increases in Europe and the u.S. in the 18th 
and 19th centuries were undoubtedly made possible by the combination of 
urbanization and general education of the population. Without these 
sociological factors, machinery alone would have had little impact 
because people brought up in "traditional" peasant or village cultures 
are generally antagonistic to machines and mechanization--and, indeed, 
to. any kind of innovation. 
Institutions in the modern world are, also, often resistant to change 
and.the increasing concentration of industry is widely regarded as 
being antithetical to rapid innovation. However, it would be unduly 
pessimistic to assume that productivity growth will slow down based on 
this factor by itself. Innovation, itself, has become institutionalized 
to a significant degree. For instance, most large firms have evolved a 
"new product cycle" which begins in the corporate R&D laboratories and 
ends with coordinated manufacturing and marketing. A steady flow of 
new products is needed to replace existing products that gradually 
become obsolete and to engender expansion. Insofar as firms (and 
governments) are organized around the goal of internal growth and expan-
sion, they are ~nevitably concerned with promoting innovation both 
internally and in the marketplace. 
As noted already, the educational system supports this societal incli-
nation toward "growth" by teaching people to expect change and even 
glorifying technological and socioeconomic progress. The communications 
media are potent tools of education and indoctrination, especially 
television, which has proven to be highly effective for purposes of 
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advertising. A new product, service, or technique can be introduced 
nearly instantaneously to virtually the whole population in a techno-
logically sophisticated Western country--whereas new ideas percolate 
very slowly in a village-oriented society such as India. In these terms, 
modern technology has done much to increase the rate at which still 
newer technology can be absorbed; i.e., the rate at which the society 
itself can be changed. 
Indeed, the true potential of electronics and telecommunications tech-
nology for upgrading education and diffusing knowledge have only begun 
to be realized even in the u.s. Similarly, the potential for computer 
control of productive processes and automation of factories is only now'-
beginning to have a major impact in most industries. Computerization 
to date has primarily affected accounting, information processing and 
scientific/engineering activities. The large-scale use of computers to 
control physicaZ production will probably begin in the 1980s. 
Notwithstanding the negative social factors, such as job dissatisfaction, 
social malaise, and the decline of the work ethic--elsewhere cited as 
reasons for assuming an economic slowdown--the technological factors 
suggest just the opposite conclusion: when the current economic re-
adjustments and shakeouts have run their course, the possibility exists 
for an even more dramatic period of economic growth than the 1950 to 
1970 epoch. If this does not occur, it will be for reasons of a 
political and macroeconomic nature--notably, the extent to which the 
growing conflict between unemployment and inflation is managed over the 
next two decades (this is discussed next). 
It is worth noting that the same technological factors which appear to 
be ready to produce a major increase in productivity on the national 
scene, are also applicable to intercity transportation modes in partic-
ular. For instance, major improvements in air traffic control appear 
to be forthcoming in the next decade, and automated baggage handling, 
train control, track monitoring, loading/unloading, and rail car 
switching are also technologically possible. The major impediment to 
implementation (apart from the problem of capital availability) is the 
likelihood of union resistance. 
Unemployment vs Inflation 
The greatest puzzle confronting macroeconomists and economic policy-
makers today is the nature of the relationship between unemployment and 
inflation. That a close relationship exists was suggested by the English 
economist A. W. Phillips.* Phillips postulated a fixed relationship 
*A. W. Phillips, "The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of 
Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kindgom, 1861-1957," 
Economica, November 1958, pp. 283-299. 
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illustrated in Figure V-3 expressing the observed tendency of infla-
tionary pr!i!ssures to rise .,as unemployment decreases. 
In recent years, it has become evident that the notion of a fixed rela-
tionship is inadequate. Crudely, the equilibrium value of unemployment 
corresponding to a given level of inflation appears to have been rising. 
Or, putting it another way, the "equilibrium" level of inflation for a 
given level of unemployment has been increasing. 
The connection between the two phenomena is, in simple terms, a conse-
quence of the nonhomogeneity of the labor market. As the economy as a 
whole approaches full capacity, some industrial sectors and some occu-
pational specialties reach and exceed nominal capacity before others. 
At this point, prices and wages begin to rise under the pressure of 
demand because some marginal users of the product or service that is in 
short supply must be knocked out of the "queue." The marginal users 
will turn to less satisfactory substitutes (thus propagating the excess 
demand to other sectors), while the successful bidders will pay more, 
and--in a tight market--pass the higher wages and prices they pay to 
their own custome~s. Since the extra payment did not actually purchase 
more goods, but merely served as a "rationing" device, the net result 
is an increment of wage/price inflation. As more and more sectors or 
specialties reach the point of full capaciity, of course, the greater 
the inflationary impulse. 
An important complicating factor in the picture is that certain sp~cia1-
ized sectors have achieved legalized monopoly status which permits them 
to artifica11y restrict supply and force up prices (or wages) to high 
levels. Craft unions and certain professions (e.g., doctors) are the 
most noteworthy examples in the u.S. 
Why should the balance between unemployment and inflation shift markedly 
over time? An institutional answer might be that the economy is growing 
more complex and more rigid, and the elasticities of substitution between 
commodities, between occupational specialties or even between capital 
and labor (in the short run) are becoming progressively reduced. Union 
strength, concentrfotion of industry, and government regulation all may 
contribute to this inelasticity. Marxist economists find an explanation 
in the growth of capital investment per worker which, they argue, leads 
inevitably to a falling real rate of return on capital investment. This 
follows from the Marxist doctrine that capital was created by workers' 
"surplus" labor, where ~orkers are entitled to appropriate all produc-
tivity gains to themselves as higher wages. 
One need not accept the Marxist labor thei'liry of value to accept. the 
historical fact that returns on capital investment have in fact been 
falling sharply for most of the decade since 1965 J~ee Figure V-4). 
During this period, workers have consistently. received wage gains 
greater than the increase in real product±vity, resulting in a declining 
share for investors. Yet real average. wages did not increase during 
most of this decade and are now actually below the 1965 level, as shown 
in Figure V~5. Thus workers J.ri,the aggregate gained nothing by 
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increasing wages at the expense of profits, because economic growth 
suffered. The necessary function of the recession--(or "crisis of 
capitalism" in the Marxists' view)--is evidently to purge the economy 
of accumulated imbalanc,es and, especially, to weaken the resistance of 
organized labor to innovations that will increase the productivity of, 
and return on, eXisting capital(i.e., achieve greater potential output 
from the same physical plant and a smaller labor force). When this 
occurs, the necessary conditions for a ne~ long-term capital spending 
boom would presumably reC!lr, since aggregate demand could then be 
safely pumped up by government spending without immediate risk of 
encountering capacity limits in either labor or capital. 
A key question for the future is the extent to which organized labor 
will continue to be able to preempt ali'productivity gains--and more--
thus creating short-term inflationary pressures while simultaneously 
undermining the basis for long-term productivity increases. The answer 
to this question depends on the next set of issues, namely the role of 
institutions in U.S. society. 
Institutional Rigidities and Market Distortions 
All of the factors that directly affect economic growth and change are 
likely to be significantly influenced by changing political, legal, 
regulatory, and "structural" conditions. Only a few specific topics 
can be touched on lightly in a paper of this scope. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion of inflation, it is clear that 
organized labor has achieved monopoly power in certain sectors (espe-
Cially craft unions) which contributes to inflationary pressures. In-
deed, all unions are monopolistic to some degree, and most unions use 
their power to artifically restrain competition (e.g., for jobs) and to 
restrict technological innovation. tn some instances--for example, the 
pri~ters union in New York City, the longshoremen, seamen, and railway 
unions throughout the U.S.--union resistance to change has had disastrous 
consequences for the industry. In other cases, such as the coal miners, 
unions have been more amenable to permitting technological progress. 
The power of uniolls to r,estrict supply and hold back innovation depends 
ultimately upon their legal status and internal organization, as well 
as the attitudes of society toward organized labor. As long as they are 
permitted by society to do so, of course, unions are able to cut off 
critical inputs or services to back up their demands. In the, U.S., 
union power is significantly limited, due mainly to the Taft-Hartley 
law. But under the "interstate" provision of the Constitution, this 
law does not apply--for instance, to municipal unions (e.g., in New 
York City). More fundamentally, union monopoly power depends on being 
exempt from application of antitrust laws. This exemption could be 
removed legislatively or--conceivably--by constitutional challenge in 
the courts. In recent months, the Supreme Court has already 
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significantly reduced the scope for exercise of union power through 
secondary boycotts and other devices. 
A second broad trend that has taken shape in recent years is the ten-
dency of the judicial and regulatory systems to take over significant 
legal functions that would once have been considered to be in the legis-
lative domain. Courts increasingly intervene in areas of substantive 
policy-making from pollution abatement and land use to school financing 
and pupil allocation. This has happened as a consequence of the 
inability or unwillingness of elected legislative bodies to deal with 
problem areas where existing law failed to satisfy constitutional 
requirements. 
However, "law" that is made by the court is virtually impossible to 
change, except by a higher court, after a lengthy review process. Long-
range unintended side-effects may be quite serious in some cases. One 
consequence of the court-imposed school desegregation process within 
cities is that local neighborhood high schools have become citywide in 
coverage. Court decisions predicated on constitutional guarantees of 
equal treatment have imposed (or might impose) onerous financial require-
ments such as duplicate classroom facilities for Spanish-language stu-
dents. The "track" system in the District of Columbia, which segregated 
students by ability, was abolished by court decision--and most white 
parents withdrew their children from the public schools or moved com-
pletely outside the boundaries of the District. To give examples from 
another field, courts have repeatedly struck down local attempts to 
legislatively control the direction of economic and land use development 
at the local level. Long-term consequences of these particular decisions 
are perhaps only marginally relevant here. More important, however, is 
the long-term trend toward increasing interference by the courts in 
formerly legislative matters. This will inevitably increase the rigidity 
of the societal structure--which is ironical, in view of the fact that 
court intervention has frequently occurred because of unresponsiveness 
on the part of the legislative branch of government to needed changes. 
Another marked trend is the accumulation of power by so-called "inde-
pendent. regulatory agencies II such as the Federal Reserve Board, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC), the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). These 
agencies and their state counterparts determine interest rates and 
reserve requirements for banks, allocate routes and fix rates for trans-
port companies, allocate territories for radio and TV stations, fix 
rates and territories for electric and gas utilities, fix telephone 
rates, fix wellhead prices for natural gas and petroleum, fix priorities 
for allocation of energy fuels among users, fix allowable emissions, 
formulate rules governing public disclosure of financial information 
and sale of securities, govern forms of advertising, govern terms of 
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competition among regulated utilities, impose safety requirements for 
nuclear power plants, etc. Obviously large sectors of the economy are 
no longer operating in a free-market environment, either domestically 
or internationally. 
Specific examples have been cited in the press tending to sugge~t that 
all of this "defensive" regulation is extremely costly to the economy 
by restricting competition and prohibiting changes that would increase 
output. For instance, railroads and airlines have been restrained from 
offering the cheapest possible service in some instances, while being 
forced to provide money-losing services in other cases. 
Regulation, taken as a whole, tends to slow down the rate of techno-
logical innovation in a regulated industry. It also tends to force 
some users to subsidize others. For instance, smaller towns and cities 
get more airline and rail service than in economically justified, at 
the expense of all other users--especially the larger cities. Similarly, 
suburban and rural homeowners normally receive electricity, gas, water, 
sewage, and telephone service below actual cost--whereas central-city 
users pay extra--due to "uniform pricing" policies imposed by regulatory 
agencies. On the other hand, regulation forces all users of automobiles 
to pay for extra emissions control equipment (and fuel) due to the air 
pollution problems of certain geographical regions and congested central 
cities. 
Taken as a whole, economic regulation is a subtle--almost invisible--
way of redistributing income. But "winners" from one type of regulation 
may be "losers" in another: the redistribution effects of all regulatory 
activities are probably fairly neutral for most of the population. 
Losses to the whole economy due to inefficiencies created by regulation 
would be a more serious matter, but the magnitude of such losses are 
not known except in very narrow cases. The rapid growth of economic 
regulation over the past half-century suggests, however, that more 
regulation is a strong possibility for the future. Price controls, wage 
controls, and rent controls are the most likely, and the allocational 
inefficiencies and economic "drag" that would be introduced thereby 
would indeed be far more severe than anything we have so far experienced 
in the u.S. As soon as government steps in to hold down prices in one 
sector (such as housing) by regulation alone, profits fall and that 
sector becomes unattractive to private investors. Thus, the government 
also immediately becomes the only possible source of capital funds to 
increase the supply of housing; the supply of publicly financed units 
lags behind demand; and allocation of the limited supply becomes a prob-
lem. Since market price is no longer a factor, other criteria must be 
used--such as political favoritism, under-the-table payments, or waiting 
lists. 
With regard to intercity transportation specifically, the adverse impact 
of railway unions on productivity has already been noted. All intercity 
common carriers are highly unionized and subject to the possibility of 
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crippling strikes and work rules. In contrast, the impact of possible 
intervention by the courts on intercity transport has been relatively 
mild so far. The effect of regulation by the ICC and CAB has, however, 
been extremely important. Competition between modes or routes has been 
minimized, and the watchword has been "service." All regulated modes 
have, consequently, been forced to provide services to many locations 
and sectors whose real needs would not justify it on an economic basis. 
The cumulative impact of regulation has been to raise costs of trans-
portation for all users--especia11y in the large cities--whi1e sub-
stantially redistribut~_ng income in favor of smaller towns and rural 
areas. If the regu1atorJ- agencies were significantly dismantled, this 
bias toward decentral~zcition would be ended. 
,Changing Patterns of Demand 
It is often remarked that the U.S. economy is shifting from a manufac-
turing base to a "service" base, with emphasis on the public sector. 
While this is crudely true, the real picture is considerably more com-
plex. A division of total national income by industry group since 1929, 
is displayed in Figure V-6. The relative importance of the sectors was 
obviously severely distorted by the depression--when manufacturing 
activity dropped much more sharply than other sectors of the economy--
and by World War II. If the 15 years between 1930 and 1945 are omitted, 
long-term trends are much clearer. 
Three trends are particularly marked: (1) extractive activity (farming 
and mining) declined sharply as a percentage of the national economy; 
(2) "communications, finance, insurance, business services and general 
government" rose very sharply; and (3) transportation, utilities, 
retail and wholesale trade, government enterprises, real estate, and 
households also declined significantly. The latter is perhaps surpris-
ing, at first sight, but one of the major factors accounting for it is 
the decline in energy costs. There has also been a shift after World 
War II away from purchased transportation to privateZy owned transpor-
tation (i.e., automobiles) which increases the output of the auto 
industry at the expense of railroads, for instance. Similarly, the 
sharp growth of individual home ownership (as opposed to rental housing) 
has greatly benefited the construction industry. Finally, the general 
increase in personal mobi1ity--due to widespread car ownership--has 
reduced the need for neighborhood shops and the relative importance of 
retail trade. Similarly, the spread of labor-saving appliances has 
decreased the importance of household services: washing machines have 
affected commercial laundries, home TV has replaced both live' and 
motion picture theaters, etc. 
From now until the year 2000, however, some of these historical trends 
may again reverse themselves. First, the extractive industries will 
certainly increase in relative importance due to higher energy and food 
prices. The U. S. will become increasingly important as a food exporter 
to the rest of the world, and accelerated coal and oil shale development 
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will take up the slack from declining oil and gas output. Second, the 
shift from purchased services (in housing and transportation) to services 
provided by manufactured products is largely complete. New growth in 
housing, cars, and appliances will be less and less important. Most 
sales will be replacements. The only real consumer growth areas are 
health, entertainment, and recreation. In all three areas, there are 
still large potential markets for manufactured products from home video-
tapes to campers and boats, but network services (such as the telephone 
system and large time-shared computer systems) will be an integral part 
of these markets. Hence, the relative importance of manufacturing and 
construction is likely to decline significantly as compared to the 
communications and tertiary services sectors. 
Further, it is important to bear in mind that the substitution of serv-
ices provided by privately owned homes, vehicles, appliances, etc., for 
purchased services is partly attributable to tax advantages. The tax 
benefits of private home ownership are well-known. But some of these 
benefits--especially the deduction for interest costs--are also applic-
able to other areas. In general, income tax laws currently favor 
private purchase of durable (i.e., capital) goods rather than rental 
from an operator. Of course, these laws are subject to possible change. 
The slowdown in population growth, mentioned elsewhere, will also have 
a major impact. The U.S. will become a much "older" society by the 
year 2000 as a result of population growth slowdown. This will almost 
certainly have major sociological impacts, such as increased emphasis 
on health care vis-a-vis education, reduced levels of crime and drug 
bause, more multiple dwellings, revival of the central city as a resi-
dential location vis-a-vis low density suburbs, etc. 
An obvious and important trend of the last several decades, which is 
likely to continue, is the growth of public sector spending at the 
expense of private consumption. During the 1950s and early 1960s much 
of this increase was accounted for by growth in local government services 
due, to rapid suburban development, especially schools. Rapid increases 
in social service spending, especially social security, medicare, 
"medicaid," and various types of welfare have been the major factor in 
the past decade. These latter categories can be expected to continue 
to grow rapidly as the U.S. population grows older. 
With regard to intercity transportation, the increasing importance of 
leisure time and recreational activities is obviously an important 
factor. Many intercity auto trips are. essentially recreational. In-
deed, a growing segment of the population"~a.t both ends of the age 
spectrum--is more or less "footloose," with no fixed permanent place of 
residence. These people have organized their lives for maximum mobil-
ity, based on private vehicles (mobile homes, campers, etc.) which 
double as part-time residences. This trend. will doubtless incre<~s,~ if 
personal incomes continue to rise--unless fuel becomes unreasonably 
expensive. People who are committed to specific locations, of course, 
may also utilize recreational vehicles. But, having limited time for 
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personal travel, they are more likely to favor speed so as to minimize 
time en route to a destination. This is the basis for the private (non-
business) use of air transportation and it, too, will increase as long 
as incomes rise. 
The Problem of Resource Availability 
The recent controversy on adequacy of available resources and possible 
"limits to growth" is merely the most recent episode in a continuing 
debate. The neo-Ma1thusian view is, in brief: We live on a finite 
earth on which there exists a "limited stockpile" of nonrenewable 
natural resources. While only a fraction of the potentially accessible 
resources have been uncovered by geological exploration, eventually all 
deposits of minerals or fossil fuels will be found and "used up." An 
exponential rate of population and economic growth (such as we are cur-
rently experiencing) greatly accelerates this approaching time of 
scarcity, as suggested by Table V-3 which follows. The reaction of 
many conventionally schooled resource economists to this proposition is 
essentially one of deja vu. They see the questions being raised today 
by the Club of Rome, and various environmenta1ists--as well as a number 
of mineral resource producers--as being repetitions of naive arguments 
tha t should long ago have been laid to res t • 
There are two basic objections to the neo-Ma1thusian position: 
1. Technological and economic progress will enable us to recover 
minerals from ores of ever-decreasing quality and more remote 
10cations--not excluding the ocean floors, or even the moon--
resulting in a steady growth of "available reserves" as de-
fined by the usual economic criteria. In brief, as one source 
of supply is exhausted a substitute usually becomes available. 
This has been occurring, at least in recent decades, as shown 
in Table V-4. Superficially, at least, Table V-4 seems to 
contradict Table V-3. 
2. To the extent that supply is inelastic in the short run, and 
temporary imbalances occur between supply and demand, the 
problem will simply be resolvEd en the demand side by a price 
adjustment. In particular, if "shortages" occur, the resulting 
price increases will result in automatic decreases in demand 
for the material, and substitution of alternatives. 
In the last 20 years, the u.S. has also become far more depenaent on 
imported metal ores (except copper and lead), and this general trend 
will continue, as shown in Table v-So By the end of the century, the 
u.S. is expected to import most of its mineral requirements except for 
phosphorus and sulfur, according to the u.S. Department of Interior. 
This dependence on foreign sources could lead to increased u.S. vulner-
ability to cartelization and price manipulation in the interests of the 
exporting countries. 
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Table V-3 
LIMITED STOCKPILE VIEWPOINT: 
CALCULATED TIME TO EXHAUSTION, BASED ON "PRESENT KNOWN RESERVES" 
Number of Years Usage Number of Years to 
TJ) Exhaustion, Rate of Exhaustion, Allowing 
at Current Level Growth Exponential Growth at 
of Consumption (%/year) Current Rates 
Resource (years) 1960-68) (years) 
Aluminum 175 8.1% 34 
(Bauxite) 
Chromium 560 3.2 92 
Coal 900 0.7 595 
Cobalt 155 4.6 45 
Copper 40 3.3 25 
Gold 17 2.5 14 
Iron 400 3.8 73 
Lead 15 2.9 12 
Manganese 180 4.5 49 
Mercury 13 -0.3 13 
Molybdenum 100 8.1 27 
Natural Gas 35 11.2 14 
Nickel 140 8.7 30 
Petroleum 70 10.3 20 
Platinum 20 8.5 12 
Silver 20 1.8 17 
Tin 25 4.2 17 
Tungsten 40 0.5 36 
Zinc 18 6.2 16 
Source: D. Meadows, et al., Limits to Growth, Potomac Associates. 
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Table V-4 
"EXPANDING BUCKET" VIEWPOINT 
INCREASES IN KNOWN RESERVES, WORLD 
Resource 1956 1960 1970 
Chromium, 106 short tons 200 775 
6 Copper, 10 short tons 100 170 307.9 
Lead, 106 short tons 40.5 48.8 95 
Mercury, 106 flasks 0.6 2.0 3.2 
Platinum, 10 6 Troy ounces 25 25 424 
Tin, 106 long tons a 5 5 6.5 
6 a Zinc, 10 short tons 70+ 67 90 
a. Free World only. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minera! Facts and Problems. 
Another perspective on what has happened during the last century may be 
helpful in evaluating this threat. Figure V-7 shows the relative 
economic effort (fraction of GNP) needed to obtain nonrenewable raw 
materials for the U.S. economy since 1900. 
These trends clearly indicate that, despite rapidly rising per capita 
consumption, measured in physical quantities (pounds), and notwith-
standing that the quality of ore actually being mined at the time has 
decreased significantly in the last 20 years alone,* the fraction of 
our total national income needed to acquire nonrenewable resouraes of 
all types has nevertheless showed a steady--indeed, dramatia--dealine. 
*From 1950 to 1970, U.S. ore grades mined have declined 12% for alumi-
num, 50% for antimony, 33% for copper, 3-1/2% for f1uorin~, 47% for 
mercury, 12% for molybdenum, 63% for thorium, 35% for tungsten, 33% 
for vanadium, and 29% for zinc. The discover)': of new deposits of lead 
and silver have resulted in ore grade increases for these two of 80% 
and 8% respectively. 
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Table V-5 
U.S. DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL 
RAW MATERIALS WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2000 
Percent Iml20rted 
Raw Material 1950 1970 1985 2000 
Aluminum 64% 85% 96% 98% 
Chromium n.a. 100 100 100 
Copper 31 0 34 56 
Iron 8 30 55 67 
Lead 39 31 62 67 
Manganese 88 95 100 100 
Nickel 94 90 88 89 
Phosphorus 8 0 0 2 
Potassium 14 42 47 61 
Sulfur 2 0 28 52a 
Tin 77 n.a. 100 100 
Tungsten n. a. 50 87 97 
Zinc 38 59 72 84 
a. Not taking into account the possible availability 
of secondary sulfur from pollution abatement ef-
forts. 
Source: U. S. Department of the Interior. 
A geochemical perspective on the resource picture is interesting in this 
connection. As of the late 19th Century, all metals in large-scale use 
except iron--namely, lead, zinc, tin, mercury, copper, and silver--had 
the common characteristic that they tend to occur in rather concentrated 
deposits, mainly as sulfides. The pure metal can be recovered by a 
simple roasting process in the presence of air (the sulfur being sepa-
rated and discharged to the atmosphere as sulfur dioxide). Areas 
around such smelters tend to be among the most persistent reminders of 
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man's carelessness with the natural environment. In retrospect, however, 
it is cZeaP that these metaZs were extensiveZy utiZized ZargeZy because 
they were easy to Zocate and easy to extract from naturaZ sources, and 
not because of "uniqueZy" vaZuabZe properties. 
The 20th Century has seen two marked technological shifts. One is the 
rapidly increasing use of light elements, starting with aluminum. More 
recently, magnesium, titanium and beryllium, boron and silicon have 
found significant applications. From a resource availability stand-
point, this is noteworthy for two reasons: (1) the elements in question 
(plus iron) are all far more abundant than the heavier metals; and (2) 
they are much harder to reduce to pure form being found as oxides, 
silicates, a1uminates, and so forth. Practical metallurgical processes 
almost exclusively rely on electrolysis which is inherently much less 
polluting than sulfide roasting (but obviously requires more energy). 
The .second major technological development of the 20th Century is the 
development of carbon-based polymers. First came polymers derived from 
cellulose (notably rayon). In the last three decades, these have be~n 
followed by po1yamides (e.g., nylon), polyesters (e.g., dacron), 
acrylics, and vinyls (e.g., polyethylene, polypropylene, polyvinyl 
chloride, polystyrene, plexiglass, and synthetic rubber). Synthetic 
fibers already account for 36% of total worldwide fiber consumption (up 
from 3% in 1930). Consumption of plastics itlready exceeds consumption 
of steel by volume; though only one-seventh the density of steel, rela-
tive growth rates are such that output of plastics is expected to exceed 
steel output even on a weight basis within a few years. 
Synthetic fibers and plastics are currently derived mainly from natural 
(fossil) hydrocarbons. Use of fossil hydrocarbons for these materials 
is nevertheless quite small compared to their use as fuel. If there is 
a hydrocarbon scarcity problem, it is only due to the demand for the 
latter purpose. (Incidentally, conversion of hydrocarbons to polymeric 
form still leaves most of the energy content intact. Thus, waste 
plastics can be used for fuel after their' value as materials per se is 
exhausted.) 
At least ten elements currently derived from air, sea water, sand, lime-
stone, or gypsum have an effectively infinite resource base at constant 
costs. If costs are allowed to rise modestly--assuming new technology--
above present levels, to permit exploitation of somewhat lower grade 
(but more widely available) resource basis, a further 12 elements also 
join the list: iron, aluminum, magnesium, sodium, potassium, lithium, 
calcium, carbon, silicon, and boron are included. It would appear that 
we are experiencing a slow but pronounced trend toward the us~ of 
lighter materials, which happen to be much less scarce than the impor-
tant metals of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. 
For the reasons noted above (and others), a severe shortage in the 
supply of metallic ores seems unlikely to occur. The range of possible 
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defense mechanisms, from stockpiling, to recycling, to technological 
substitution is too formidable.* 
Unfortunately, as yet there has been no major substitution of nuclear, 
solar, or other nonfossil sources of energy. and the Project Indepen-
dence report makes it clear that the U.s. will necessarily continue to 
be heavily dependent on fossil fuels for most of the next 30 years. 
The cartelization of the world's major oil exporters has led to sharply 
higher prices for all fossil fuels and a corresponding increase in the 
share of GDP needed to acquire energy. It has also resulted in intensi-
fied worldwide exploration for new sources of petroleum and gas, and 
intensified development of technologies for coal liquefaction and/or 
gasification. These responses will eventually put a ceiling on energy 
costs. Whether costs drop dramatically after 1980 depends on whether 
the OPEC cartel is able to continue to control prices .in the more com-
petitive excess-supply situation likely to prevail then. But such a 
decline could hardly be expected to last for more than a few years. 
It is worth pointing out that even if all fossil fuel costs double, on 
the average, the u.s. would be in roughly the same situation as regards 
economic effort to acquire energy resources as it was in 1940 when the 
country was entirely self-sufficient in this respect. Thus, the 
national impact would clearly be tolerable, though hardly "painless." 
The impact on certain specific industries--or specific intercity trans-
portation modes--can be much more severe, of course. Both aviation and 
private automobiles have "grown up" in an era of declining energy costs 
and both will be adversely affected vis-a-vis their competitors (rail, 
bus) in a different environment. On the other hand, energy costs are 
only one of many competitive factors; labor and capital costs are 
others, as noted already. 
Conclusion 
Several key parameters have been isolated and identified as shaping the 
u.s. economic picture over the next 30 years: a continuing capital 
shortfall, the uncertain future of productivity, unemployment and infla-
tion (and the organized labor monopoly), institutional rigidities, the 
economic shift to service sectors, and resource availability (parti-
cularlyenergy). The impact of these parameters on ICT are, and will 
continue to be, manifold in areas such as the following: availability 
of investment capital, possibilities for technologica1 innovatior., 
demand for services, costs of services (including anergy costs), and 
delivery and distribution of services among localities. 
*R. Ayres, A. Shapanka, D. Robertson, "Critical Materials: A Problem 
Assessment," IRT-348-R, May 1974. 
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VI. FINANCIAL ISSUES IMPACTING INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION 
by 
J. P. Price and R. W. Luce 
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ABSTRACT 
Investment decision-making criteria used by financial managers in the 
transportation industry depend upon who owns the enterprise. Finance, 
investment, and production objectives of a private institution often 
differ from those of public ones. Because transportation provides 
vital public service, private sector decision-making processes may not 
meet public policy goals. Though the federal government uses its own 
surrogate for a return on investment (ROI) decision-making mechanism, 
it does not attempt to maximize bookkeeping profits, since it must in-
clude in its evaluation of "returns" the improvtd welfare of the gen-
eral public, quality and quantity of service, and other nonmonetary 
contributions to social "profits." 
Recent studies project a serious capital shortfall over the next 5 to 
25 years, slowing the nation's real economic growth, reducing the rate 
of improvement in labor productivity, and hurting the capital-intensive 
industries. This situation has contributed to a doubling of the corpo-
rate debt-to-tota1-asset ratio over the past two decades, and to the 
use of short-term debt--with rising interest rates--in lieu of long-
term debt. Greater portions of internally generated and long-term cor-
porate funds are, consequently, diverted to satisfy short-term d~bt, 
creating an additional drag on the rates of capital formation and in-
vestment. 
The accelerating pace of change in the economic institutions affecting 
businesses (e.g., double-digit inflation, recession, and the ever-
changing phases and freeze of price controls) has made the future in-
creasingly uncertain. Investors require higher ROIs to compensate for 
the added risk. 
The projected capital shortfall will heighten pressures for a federal, 
direct capital allocation program, which generates several questions: 
(1) are the direct economic controls of the government's economic man-
agers sophisticated enough to replace the allocation function of the 
market with direct controls? (2) will political pressures distort the 
economic planning process? (3) who will receive and who will supply 
the funds? and (4) how will capital rationing affect the investable 
funds supply? 
Institutionalization of capital markets portends a/clash between large 
financial institutions and the government over t~ansportation· policy. 
Large financial institutions, because of their huge supplies of in-
vestable funds--often held in trust for corporate pension and profit-
sharing plans and therefore dubject to legal and financial investment 
constraints--prefer to invest in large-size companies. The resulting 
decline in speculative investments in smaller, often more innovati.ve 
companies may significantly undermine the private sector. 
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Federal tax policies strongly influence the levels of capital internally 
generated by a firm. Proposed tax reforms--for example, a reduced cor-
porate tax rate, acceleration of the capital asset depreciation rate, 
or the full or partial removal of the double taxation of corporate 
dividends--would improve the attractiveness of equity financing rela-
tive to debt financing, especially for major sectors of the transpor-
tation industry. 
Transportation is, both operationally and financially, a highly 
leveraged business. A high portion of total operating costs are fixed. 
A large portion of total capitalization is provided by debt instruments; 
interest and rents must be satisfied before net income accrues. Small 
changes in total revenues (changing patronage or load factors) there-
fore, significantly affect net income. 
Intercity transportation (ICT) is particularly vulnerable to a capital 
shortfall. Its future success heavily depends on investor confidence. 
Long-term investments in transport properties are unattractive because 
the creditor has no immediate power of repossession. Low price/earning 
ratios, prohibitively high costs of equity financing, and rising energy 
costs (a major operating expense), all have an impact on the ability of 
highly leveraged carriers to attract investment capital. (The amount 
of compensation received by creditors of the Northeastern rail bank-
rupts will set an important precedent.) 
A key issue is whether the federal government's role should be one of 
regulation or ownership. Government ownership has been appropriate for 
those parts of transport process which do not attract private invest-
ments, e.g., highway, waterway, airport, and bridge infrastructures 
(and probably railway rights-of-way and structures). Direct (e.g., 
local service air carriers) and indirect (e.g., the structure of high-
way user fees) subsidies have been used to avoid direct government 
ownership. Capital subsidies and grants have been provided to rapid 
transit systems, railroads, and AMTRAK for equipment modernization. 
Other techniques to attract investable funds include debt guarantees, 
subsidization of debt service, special tax credits, interest tax exemp-
tions, and interest expense sharing. Intracorporate cross-subsidies 
are also a method to induce a desirable service. 
An accounting system, capable of functioning as a management informa-
tion system, is needed to accurately reflect the actual service life of 
transportation assets. Intelligent investment decisions by transporta-
tion managers and investors depend upon an understanding of hoth the 
enterprises' performance and infrastructure depreciation costs. 
Matching fund programs have been used to delegate many public sector 
investment, planning, and implementation dec.isions to state, regional, 
and local levels. Outright grants often, however, generate biases in 
favor of capital-intensive solutions and in the cost/benefit ratios of 
projects; they also reduce nonhardware innovations in institutional 
practices and marketing. 
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VI. FINANCIAL ISSUES IMPACTING INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION 
J. P. Price and R. W. Luce 
Gellman Research Associates, Inc. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify and assess the significant 
financial factors, frequently interrelated and highly complex, that are 
likely to influence the direction of development of intercity transpor-
tation. The paper considers macroeconomic issues affecting the na-
tional financial community and specifically applies these issues to the 
transportation sector. 
National Economic and Financial Factors 
Investment Criteria. The investment decision-making criteria used 
by financial managers in the transportation industry, identical with 
those of their counterparts in other industries, are fundamentally 
shaped by the ownership of the enterprise; th!2refore, finances, invest-
ment, and production objectives of a privately owned, profit-maximizing 
firm will often differ from those of the publicly owned institution. 
In the private sector: 
"The corporate firm confronts, in fact, a trilogy of opti-
mization decision problems. These relate to the mutually 
dependent areas of production, investment, and finance. 
In short, the production problem is concerned with de-
fining the optimum level and mix of product outputs and 
the optimum combination of input factors of production. 
The investment problem is concerned with the optimum 
combination of real and monetary assets in which the 
firm should invest in order to establish and maintain 
the productive process necessary to produce the optimum 
output with the optimum combination of factor inputs. 
The finance problem is concerned with the optimum com-
bination of sources of money capital with which to fi-
nance th" r,tim~m asset investments. n* 
When evaluating a prospective asset acquisition, the decision-makers 
will measure the rate of return on investment (ROI), a calculation 
performed in several similar ways embodying varying levels of. sophisti-
cation all of which are designed to measure the flow of revenue gener-
ated by a new asset. The expenses required to operate the asset (if 
any) are deducted against the revenue. The net amount, or "cash flow," 
*Vickers, Douglas, "The Cost of Capital and the Structure of the Firm," 
The J ourna~ of Finance, 1971. 
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Adequacy of National Level of Capital Formation. Improvements in 
labor productivity necessary to maintain real economic growth require 
substantial new capital investment. Probably the most important fi-
nancial issue facing the economy today and determining its future di-
rection is whether the level of capital investment over the next 25 to 
50 years will be adequate to maintain the nation's historic economic 
growth rate. 
Most of the recent studies of investment demand and supply in the 
economy have projected serious shortfalls over the next 5 to 25 years. 
One of the best known of these studies, published by the New York Stock 
Exchange in September 1974, has projected that the supply of investable 
funds will fall approximately $650 billion short of investment needs 
over the I. xt ten years. This represents a shortfall of almost 15% of 
overall projected investment needs of $4.5 trillion, that would have 
major negative implications for the nation's economic future; it would 
slow real economic growth, reduce the rate of improvement in labor 
productivity, and put capital-intensive industries at a severe disad-
vantage. 
A significant factor in the projected substantial shortfall in invest-
ment funds over the next decade is the sharp decline in the portion of 
capital outlays financed through internally generated funds (retained 
earnings ~nd depreciation charges). In 1967, over 65% of private capi-
tal out1ay.s were financed by internally generated funds. By 1974, that 
percentage had dropped to 38.5%. The two major reasons for the decline 
are the rapid rise in capital outlays, due partially to increases in 
the cost of capital goods, and declining levels of profits (measured 
in real dollars) in most sectors of the economy. Whether the portion 
of capital funds internally generated will improve in the future is a 
major issue affecting the overall level of capital formation itself. 
The resulting need on the part of corporations to finance externally a 
larger portion of their capital needs has put a substantial strain on 
their financial condition. Partly because of a corporation's frequently 
easier access to debt capital markets and because of the structural in-
centives to finance with debt, a large portion of additional financing 
needs have been met by the issuance of debt instruments. (Over the 
last decade, only 18.7% of new financing was common stock with an ad-
ditional 8.2% being met by fixed income securities convertible into 
common stock.) Because of heavy reliance on debt, in two decades the 
debt-to-tota1-asset ratio of corporations has more than doubled, from 
21% in 1955 'to 47% in 1974. At the same time, interest charge coverage 
has fallen from 27 times in 1952 to just 6 times in 1974. A substan-
tial portion of corporations have had such debt-heavy balance sheets 
that significant financial risk extends past equity holders to credi·-
tors. 
During the poor capital market conditions of the past few years, cor-
porations have been not only forced to substitute debt for equity, but 
also frequently to use short-term debt in lieu of long-term debt. The 
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risks associated with relying heavily on short-term loans to finance 
current assets were brought vividly into perspective when short-term 
interest rates rose to previously unthought of levels during 1973 to 
1974. It is now likely that corporations will use a portion of inter-
nally generated funds and long-term funds to pay down short-term debt. 
This use of investment funds would drain a meaningful portion away from 
capital investment, creating another drag on the level of capital for-
mation. Since the banking system was also strained severely in 1973 
to 1974, the banks will not be immediately anxious to relend a meaning-
ful portion of these loan repayments. This action will also lead to 
the siphoning off of funds for new capital investment. 
Impact of Government Economic Policies. The demand curve for 
investable funds is highly dependent on corporations' and other in-
vesting enterprises' views of the future "profitabi1it.y" of the numer-
ous proposed investment projects.* 
Over the past few decades, the accelerating pace of change in the eco-
nomic institutions affecting business has made the projection of future 
economic prospects increasingly uncertain. As a result, investments 
appear riskier, and investors require a higher rate of return to com-
pensate for the added risk. An important issue affecting the level of 
capital formation is whether government policy has helped to allay this 
problem by being long-term oriented and consistent in its policy, or 
whether it has exacerbated the problems by frequently altering short-
term policies. An example of the latter policy problem has been the 
nation's experience with price controls; the frequently changing phases 
and freezes hampered businesses' abilities to forecast, thereby under-
mining confidence in making major investments. Business concern about 
the possible reimposition of price controls may be one factor in the 
downward rigidity in the prices of many goods during the past year 
despite massive inventory overhangs. 
The nation's economic experience during the first half of the 1970s, 
with double-digit inflation overlapping the nation's worst recession 
since the 1930s, has created a debate as to what the government's 
econon.i .. c stabilization philosophy should be. Should it continue to 
attempt to offset cyclical fluctuations in the private sector of the 
economy or should it accept the more modest goal of merely dampening 
the economic cycle by pursuing constant monetary and fiscal policies? 
*"Profitabi1ity" is used here advisedly since the attractiveness of a 
project from the investor's viewpoint is likely to be based on more 
factors than simply profits. 
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Allocation of the Supply of Capital. If the projected sizable 
shortfall in investable funds develops, pressure will grow for some 
form of federally controlled system of allocating capital, and if a 
direct capital rationi~g program is chosen, the government's long-term 
economic planning role will have been substantially expanded. 
The liberal argument in favor of capital allocation is that investable 
funds are not in short supply, but instead are being used inefficiently 
on such things as an overabundance of shopping centers and vacation 
homes. The conservation argument is that the free flow of money is at 
the very foundation of the free enterprise system and cannot be altered 
without severely damaging the whole system. 
Put in less ideological terms, the issue of direct capital allocation 
raises several questions. First, are the tools of economic management 
sophisticated enough to replace the allocation function of the market-
place with direct controls? Second~ is the nation's political decision-
making process more sensitive to long-term economic forces or short-
term political pressures? Third, how would the advent of capital 
rationing affect the supply of investable funds? In other words, would 
potential investor confidence in the economic future be negatively af-
fected to the extent that the total level of available investable funds 
would be reduced? 
One issue not mentioned in the above discussion is the balance between 
consumption-oriented and investment-oriented expenditures in the 
government budget. While historically the overall impact of the federal 
budget has been consumption inducing, a greater portion of government 
expenditures could be investment-inducing in the future. Such a change 
would give the government a greater role in direct capital allocation 
since capital projects within the budget would be funded using the 
government's ease of access to the capital markets. This trend might 
be increasingly used by the transportation sector to finance its invest-
ments. 
The trend toward institutionalization of capital markets also affects 
the allocation of investable funds. Currently, over 60% of the volume 
of stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange is accounted for by 
financial institutions; households continue to be net sellers of cornmon 
stock at a rate of over $6 billion annually. Increased institutional-
ization concentrates the influence over investment decisions by a small 
group of large financial institutions; correspondingly, the potential 
for institutional clashes with the government over transportation 
policy will increase. 
There are several implications of this trend for the allocation of 
investable funds. Because of the huge number of dollars controlled by 
a financial institution, the size of an investment in a particular 
security is frequently constrained by market factors, as well as by 
regulations of the SEC and other agencies. An institution does not 
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want to own such a large percentage of a security that it would sub-
stantially upset market equilibrium by attempts to sell its block. As 
a result, institutions prefer to invest in large-size companies with 
broad-based issues on the tnarket. 
Also, a substantial portion of funds invested by financial institutions 
is held under trust or fiduciary arrangements, primarily in corporate 
pension and profit-sharing trusts and subject to a growing' body of 
legal restrictions as to how these monies can be invested. Most states 
have a list of acceptable securities, again populated primarily by 
large, well-established companies. The recent pension reform act 
tightens the "prudent man" restrictions. The trade-off between the 
safety of an investment and its potential return has been skewed toward 
a greater emphasis on safety. This combination of factors tends to in-
crease the competitive disadvantage of smaller, more speculative invest-
ments and may significantly dampen the innovation and dynamism of the 
private sector; smaller, more speculative companies often are the 
source of innovative ideas, and their added competition spurs innova-
tion by more firmly established corporations. 
Government Tax Policies. Government business taxation policies 
play an influential role in determining the amount of capital corpora-
tions can generate internally. Currently, a tax reform to enhance the 
level of capital formation is in the initial stages of consideration 
by Congress. The outcome of these considerations is likely to have an 
important impact on the level of capital formation over the next sev-
eral decades. A reduction in the corporate tax rate would increase 
after-tax profitability, not only improving the anticipated return from 
investment opportunities but also improving the level of internally 
generated investable funds. 
Changes in taxation would improve the attractiveness of equity fi-
nancing relative to debt financing. At the present time, corporate 
dividends are taxed twice, first as corpo!ate profit and second as 
income to shareholders. Since the cost of other forms of financing, 
debt, or leasing for example, are expenses in determining taxable 
income, an artificial disincentive to the use of equity capital exists. 
Among the taxation changes being contemplated is full or partial re-
moval of this double taxation, as in the tax revision recently sug-
gested by Treasury Secretary Simon. These changes might reopen equity 
financing for major sectors of the transportation industry. 
The modification of other business taxes would also affect the level 
of capital formation and influence the relative attractiveness of dif-
ferent types of investments. For example, the acceleration of the tax 
rate of depreciation for capital assets would improve the anticipated 
cash flow stream and the ability of firms to generate capital inter-
nally. A lowering of capital gains tax rates would increase the rela-
tive attractiveness of equities. 
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The exemption from federal income taxation of a fixed amount of income 
received by individuals from savings accounts has also been considered. 
It is not clear whether such a change would only divert a larger amount 
of existing savings to the banking system or whether it would actually 
stimulate additional savings and, therefore, the supply of investable 
funds. 
In each of these proposed tax changes, there are two separate issues: 
What will be the effect of the changes on the level of capital forma-
tion? What will be their effect on the allocation of investable funds 
between competitive uses? 
Financing of Transportation 
The preceding portion of this paper addressed financial issues affect-
ing the entire economic community. Given the transportation sector's 
central place in the economy, these issues all have important implica-
tions to transportation. The remainder of this paper will focus upon 
those financial issues more specific to transportation. This section 
identifies reasons for public involvement. 
Operating Leverage. Transportation is a highly leveraged business 
because, relative to most industries, a high portion of total costs are 
fixed costs--unavoidable expenses of operation which do not vary with 
output. Depreciation on equipment and infrastructure are significant 
fixed costs. Other operating costs which do not vary significantly 
with patronage are sales costs and some costs of maintenance, rentals, 
overhead, etc. Operating margins and profits are extremely volatile; 
a small percentage change in total revenues or total costs will have a 
very significant effect on net income. 
Leverage causes volatile profits because slight changes in patronage 
will have dramatic effects on profits. Once the transport vehicle is 
committed to operate, one additional passenger on a flight, in a bus, 
or on a train adds revenues which are almost pure profits, since oper-
ating expenses increase only minimally. Operating leverage is particu-
larly pronounced in the case of airlines and passenger railroads whose 
management focuses heavily--sometimes myopically--on load factors, 
which measure the percentage of capacity producing revenues. A slight 
change in load factors means millions of dollars in revenues for most 
airlines; a year well in the black turns to deep red with a drop in 
load factor from say, 54% to 48%. 
One of the overriding economic issues bas been, then, the search 
for techniques to assuage the risks inherent in the leveraged nature 
of the transport business. 
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Financial Leverage. Transportation companies (especially air-
lines) are also characterized by substantial financial leverage, which 
is similar to operating leverage in that a small percentage change in 
revenue will have marked effects on a net income. Financial leverage 
is wholly attributable to having a large proportion of total capital-
ization in the form of debt instruments whose interest and rental pay-
ments must be satisfied before net income accrues to pay the stock-
holders. 
Debt financing is attractive to most transportation companies because 
it is the logical means of financing the fixed infrastructure and 
equipment, because the cost is low relative to equity, and because 
the debt instrument--Iease, bonds, convertibles, mortgages, conditional 
sales contracts, equipment trust certificates--can be matched to the 
service life and cash flows of the investment. Long-term bonds and 
mortgages are of limited use since they are needed to finance long-
lived infrastructure such as rights-of-way. A few railroads still 
acquire fixed infrastructure, but on the whole, most are reluctant to 
tie up funds for 50 years. The airlines, bus companies, and private 
autos have these facilities financed by the government so they do not 
need the highly secured long-term securities. One of the key issues 
which will be discussed subsequently is why the government has inter-
ceded to provide the financing for the fixed infrastructure. 
Most transportation enterprises focus their financing on investments 
with service lives less than 20 years. The obvious investment is 
equipment: aircraft, buses, cars, rolling stock, cargo-handling equip-
ment. Some very specialized financial instruments--equipment trust 
certificates, conditional sales contracts and leases--have been devel-
oped in order to maximize the security held by the supplier of funds. 
These devices allow title to remain with the lessor or a trustee. In 
the event of default, the collateral (equipment) can be repossessed and 
sold to other transportation companies in need of this equipment. The 
security of these financial instruments has enabled weak firms, inca-
pable of any other form of financing, to acquire new equipment. In 
addition, tax benefits accruing to the creditors are shared with the 
debtor. 
Another form of debt financing used widely in this industry are leases 
of buildings and other facilities, which shield the balance sheets of 
the transportation companies from the massive debt-like obligations 
implicit in intrastructure such as the airport-airways system. Air-
lines do not report obligations to rent airport terminal facilities 
as liabilities on their balance sheets; however, these commitments are 
a noticeable proportion of total fixed charges. Even though the users 
of transportation terminals are conventionally regarded as "tenants" 
of the facility, the whole reason for transportation terminals is to 
serve as an interface between several modes. Terminals are built at 
the behest of the transport companies, and they a.re paid out of charges 
assessed against the users. In effect, the government has gone into 
the business of owning and operating terminals, and the carriers pay 
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for them via user charges--space rentals, user fees (e.g., landing 
fees), ancillary rentals, taxes, etc.--which are a technique to fi-
nance highly capital-intensive sectors of the companies' infra-
structure. 
r 
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Investor Confidence in Intercity Transportation Financing. Tra-
ditionally, the private sector has played a major financial role in the 
capitalization of the United States intercity transportation networks, 
and it is likely that any shortfall in the level of investable funds 
will hit this financing particularly hard. Generally, intercity trans-
portation is more capital intensive than the rest of the economy. The 
heavy capital outlay needed to increase capacity to meet demand growth 
or to incorporate technological advances in order to reduce expenses 
and increase profitability will be particularly vulnerable to a capital 
shortfall. 
An important issue in this industry is the security of mortgages and 
long-term debt instruments which are meaningful to creditors when ef-
fective liens can be enforced against the enterprise's properties. 
These liens often cannot be enforced without a determination that the 
public is not harmed, because these properties are devoted to providing 
services which are vital to the public interest. Thus, long-term in-
vestments in transport properties are not attractive to holders of debt 
because the lien does not provide the lender with the power to repos-
sess the properties quickly. 
The future success of intercity transportation in attracting capital 
heavily depends upon the future level of investor confidence. To a 
great extent the outcome of the current Northeast rail situation will 
have a fundamental influence on investor confidence in transportation 
debt instruments. Even though railroad bankruptcies are not unusual, 
the experience of the Penn Central and other bankrupt Northeast rail-
roads is quite unique. Previously, bankruptcies were traceable to an 
inability to meet high levels of fixed charges; railroads still 
achieved operating profits and could be successfully reorganized by 
restructuring their capital structure, in order to reduce the debt 
burden hanging over the enterprise. Unlike past situations, the Penn 
Central has not earned positive cash flows; a reorganization on an 
income basis is, therefore, impossible. If this situation existed in 
a manufacturing firm, the trustees would take action to liquidate the 
firm by selling its assets as quickly as possible to minimize the 
erosion of the company's assets. In the case of the Penn Central, its 
social value as part of the economic infrastructure is so great that 
cessation of rail service would be an in.tolerable hardship upon the 
public interest; as a result, a collision between creditors' interest 
and the public interest existed and continues to exist. 
In early 1974, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (RRR Act) 
was enacted to avert this collision. The RRR Act provides for federal 
government financing to rehabilitate the infrastructure and equipment 
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of the bankrupts. The properties are to be "transferred" to a new 
company, the Consolidated Rail Corporation (ConRail). 
r 
Compensation received by the creditors of the bankrupts for the trans-
ferring of ConRail's properties will have a crucial influence on future 
railroad financing and other transportation financing. If the credi-
tors are dissatisfied, investor confidenc~ in all transportqt~on in-/ 
dustries may be undermined. 
Equity is another means of raising capital where success is dependent 
upon investor confidence. It is normally the highest cost form of fi-
nancing and is only feasible when a transportation company has a high 
price/earnings ratio. The price/earnings ration accorded a stock is 
dependent upon the risk investors perceive and their confidence in 
future earnings prospects. 
Because of the risk concomitant with the leveraged condition of many 
transportation companies, the price/earnings ratios are generally low, 
and the cost of equity financing is prohibitively high. Investors also 
base their decisions on future earnings prospects, which have been op-
t:i.mistic in the case of airlines. Investors have accorded impressive 
price/earnings multiples to the airlines because of their dramatic 
historical growth performance. As a result, airlines have been able 
to raise funds through equity financing. However, in the last five 
years the growth in airline traffic has been slow and unpredictable. 
The glamour in this industry has waned, and the price/earnings of many 
airlines' stocks have been reduced. New vibrance and growth must be 
restored to the industry before it is able to raise funds with equi-
ties. 
Energy supplies are a critical factor that will play an increasingly 
important role in the vitality of this industry, and therefore, the 
ability of transportation companies to attract investment capital. For 
many transportation carriers, energy expenses are a major component of 
total operating expenses. Because of the leveraged nature of the busi-
ness, changes in the price of fuel or electricity have major implica-
tions on operating expenses and profit margins. Furthermore, the pat-
ronage of each mode is decidedly affected in several ways by this 
phenomenon. One effect--with detrimental implications--is the added 
volatility and uncertainty in the performance prospects of the carriers 
due to the unknowns of energy prices. Some transportation enterprises 
are affected quite severely by increases in fuel prices (e.g., Trans 
World Airlines). Fuel inflation can wipe out profit margins, precipi-
tate fare increases, and lower load factors. The differential magni-
tude of these impacts, as compared to the original fuel price rise, is 
serious enough that managements are desperately seeking out techniques 
that will decrease vulnerability to inflation. Therefore, attractive 
investments are ones which increase fuel consumption efficiency. In 
addi'tion, funds are safer in proj ects that will not be obsolescent if 
fuel prices increase further. 
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Public Sector Involvement 
In theoretical terms, the government assumes an active role when the 
objectives of private sector firms are not in consonance with public 
objectives. It is vitally concerned because transportation provides 
substantial benefits to the public in general, to wit, ubiquity of 
facilities, availability of common-carrier services, national defense 
needs, efficiency of resource allocation, and unification of the soci-
ety and economy. In addition to providing many "spillover" or external 
benefits, this industry is a natural concern of the public--economists 
call it a public good--and the public po:' icy objective is to ensure 
that the service levels of the industry me~t the public need. 
Historical Development of Government Involvement. Federal govern-
ment authority to intercede in transportation flows from the constitu-
tional power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. The century-
old Interstate Commerce Act is the milestone marking the assertion of 
federal authority in transportation. Section 77 was added to the 
Bankruptcy Act to deal exclusively with railroad bankruptcies; the 
Civil Aeronautics Board was established to regulate airlines; AMTRAK 
was created to finance and provide intercity rail passenger service; 
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act was enacted to reorganize the 
Northeast railroads. 
The states made their imprint on intercity transportation by playing a 
major role in the establishment of canals and turnpikes in the first 
half of the 19th Century. Pennsylvania financed and constructed its 
turnpike--one of the first modern highways in North America. The Bay 
Area Rapid Transit District was established to finance and operate a 
metropolitan rail rapid transit system. The Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey owns and operates the major New York City area airports 
and bus terminals. 
In general, methods of public intercession into transportation may 
involve one or another of the following items: 
• Ownership 
• Financing 
• Subsidization 
• Taxation 
• Regulation 
• Competition 
• Input supplies 
• Research and develo~ment 
Public vs Private Ownership. A latent, but fundamental, issue 
regarding the governmental role in transportation is whether or not 
direct public ownership, operation, and financing are necessary as in 
the current process of reorganization of the Northeast railroads. One 
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approach is that the problem-is best solved via massive federal funding 
to purchase, rehabilitate, and operate most of the bankrupt lines. An 
alternative is that the solvent members of the industry possess the fi-
nancial clout and have the responsibility to assume the burden of re-
organizing the Northeast railroads. Of course, federal involvement is 
unavoidably necessary for rehabilitation, but is it necessary that the 
federal government purchase the properties, too? Must the public sec-
tor assume all the responsibility for the reorganization? 
If the private sector can operete the enterprise with the proper in-
centives and can provide an acceptable quality and quantity of service, 
then why should the government expend funds to do what private enter-
prise can do? Is a superior choice that which minimizes the government 
role and leaves the industry in private hands? Certainly, the powers 
of regulation, taxation, and financing give the government the ability 
to shape solutions to many problems, resorting to nationalization as a 
last choice .. 
In addition to its application to rail reorganization, this issue has 
arisen in the airline industry in the past and will again. For example, 
the United States' representatives in international air commerce could 
very easily be candidates for nationalization. Do viable private sec--
tor alternatives exist? 
To try to resolve this issue one must be cognizant of the broader con-
cept of the transportation network as a public asset. Transportation 
systems, especially the fixed infrastructure, provide very great bene-
fits to the general public some of which are availability of regularly 
scheduled common-carrier service, dependability, low cost, and the 
value of a good transportation system as a catalyst to commerce. Be-
cause of the public interest, the government must take an active role 
in the industry, and government ownership is particularly relevant to 
parts of the transport process which are not attractive as private 
enterprise investments. One such component is the infrastructure. The 
fixed plant and structures required to enable vehiculaL operations 
usually are extremely capital intensive. Furthermore, the capacity for 
output of the infrastructure facilities is such that they are naturally 
monopolistic. Thus, high output at low average costs is often in the 
public intep~st, but may not be attractive to a private operator. Con-
sequently, tfle highway, waterway, airport-airways, and bridge infra-
structures which serve private enterprise carriers are government-owned, 
and one of the key issues for the future is whether this concept can be 
extended to railroad rights-of-way and structures. 
Subsidization. An issue emanating from the public-versus-private-
ownership debate is that of subsidization, which is often used as a 
technique to avoid a total financial takeover by the public. The gov-
ernment has the power to mandate transfer payments from one sector of 
an industry or the economy to another. Revenue from taxes or borrowing 
can be assigned to finance continued or improved transportation 
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services, lower fares, rehabilitation, or R&D. Direct and indirect 
subsidies exist i.n all modes. Direct subsidies are received by local 
air service carriers with the rationale that their services on low-
density routes are in the public interest. Indirect subsidies are pay-
ments which do not r~flect real costs as in the highway system, in 
which operators of heavy vehicles may pay fees which are less than the 
investment and maintenance required to bring highway facilities up to 
required standards. 
Cross-subsidization is a key public policy issue. Unlike the above 
cases where a subsidy is transacted between two parties (e.g., contract, 
user charge), cross-subsidies occur on an intracorporate level. For 
example, United Airlines undoubtedly cross-subsidizes its Salt Lake 
City-Ely-Elko-Reno-San Francisco service out of its overall profits. 
Economists traditionally bristle at the concept of cross-subsidization 
since it automatically implies that total corporate output and effi-
ciency are distorted by unprofitable activities. In contrast, public 
policymakers embrace the concept as a way to induce firms to provide 
a socially desirable service in exchange for a reward elsewhere. Thus, 
through incentives and regulation, the common carriers can earn total 
profits which are fair, and yet provide services to the public which 
would not other-xrise be available in a laissez-faire environment. The 
basic issue is whether the sacrifice in economic efficiency is worth 
the enhancement in the well-being of society. 
In some areas of transport, private enterprise is almost completely 
incapable of providing acceptable service levels. For example, metro-
politan rail transportation receives massive federal-state-local as-
sistance. Because losses are being fully borne in the public sector, 
virtually all capital needs are financed by the public. Thus, capital 
subsidies and grants are provided to rapid transit systems, railroads, 
and AMTRAK for equipment modernizations. 
In quasi-public sectors of transport in which a modicum of private 
enterprise motivations still exist, guarantees of debts may be suf-
ficient inducements to elicit investments in some assets. In the 
future, tRe federal government may be increasingly called upon to 
guarantee the debt needed to finance R&D in new aircraft technology, 
acquisition of new aircraft, purchase of buses for light-density 
routes, etc. As an alternative to guarantees, the government could 
subsidize the debt service on worthwhile capital investments. Special 
tax credits, exemptions from taxation on interest, and' outright sharing 
of interest expenses are several techniques by which investable funds 
might be attracted. 
Asset Life Problem. Because of high interest rates, managers of 
private enterprises and their investors are not able to commit fi-
nancial resources to investments in assets with service lives extending 
much beyond 20 years. At 6%, the present value of a stream of $100 per 
year from 1990 to 2010 is $480. If the discount rate more realistically 
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reflects the cost of private sector funds, say 10%, then the value of 
the flow is only $180. The time horizon for investments in railroad 
roadbeds and electrification, highways, bridges, tunnels, and airport 
facilities extends 20 to 50 years or more into the future. In private 
industry, it is irrational to invest in long-term projects such as 
rights-of-way uh1ess acceptable profits can be earned within 10 to 15 
years. Therefore, the government must provide the long-range risk 
sharing which is required to implement these investments. 
The most attractive investments are those whose risk-return character-
istics promise profits in the near future. Thus, the concentration of 
private investment activity into equipment is obvious. Equipment, 
unlike fixed infrastructure, usually has a service life of 5 to 15 
years. For example, most airframes purchased new are depreciated over 
a 12- to 15-year life. Thus, private investors can be attracted to 
investments with forecastab1e cash flows extending into the IIreasonab1e" 
future. 
The most obvious technique of government assumption of these responsi-
bilities is outright ownership. The airport-airways system is owned 
by the government, and it is operated by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tra.tion and various public airport operating authorities. In the 
future, the federal government is slated to acquire Penn Central's 
Northeast Corridor passenger route from Boston to Washington. A govern-
ment agency, probably AMTRAK, will maintain and operate the facilities. 
More public ownership of the fixed plant is certainly expected in the 
coming decades. 
Related to the issue of service life, the choice of an accounting sys-
tem for the enterprise is an important financial issue. A subtle, but 
very critical problem in transportation is the misstatement of service 
life of an asset. Whether the enterprise is public or private, the 
assets should be depreciated in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP). Too often, accounting systems do not pro-
vide for depreciation of the facilities at rates reflecting real con-
ditions. One finds airports earning purely illusory profits on facili-
ties which, because of technological developments, were prematurely 
obsolete long before the revenue bonds which financed them were retired. 
The ICC uniform system of accounts for railroads does not even depreci-
ate roadway, ties, rail, and other structures! Railroad managements 
and investors have no way of determining wear and tear; to make intel-
ligent investment decisions, they must understand the depreciation 
costs of their infrastructure. Frutherrnore, investors--whetlier private 
or government--must be informed of the performance of the enterprise. 
Information must be understandable and reflect, as best as possible, 
actual conditions. An accounting system which does not accurately re-
flect the actual service life of the assets cannot function as a man-
agement information system. 
VI-20 
Qt, ......... 
1 
1 
1 
j 
1 
1 
I 
.j 
1 j 
1 
J 
1 
I 
1 
1 
.1 
. ~ 
l,: .. >: .. 1 ~"
User Charges. User charges are used to raise revenues to pay for 
the operations and debt service of government-owned facilities. Be-
cause many transportation assets owned by the government has user 
charges, this form of revenue collection is, in and of itself, a fi-
nancial issue. 
Because most assets having user charges are complex capital-intensive 
facilities, the problem of equitable distribution of the burden arises; 
that is, which users will pay what portion (if any) of the operating 
and capital costs? The airport-airways system is shared by commercial, 
general, and military aviation users. The railroads' users are freight 
traffic, commuter, and intercity passenger traffic. The obvious con-
troversy is: by what methodology shall common, or "joint," costs of 
the facility be apportioned among the users. 
Several key issues are germane. Which costs are common? What is an 
avoidable cost? Who is the primary user? What is the index of ap-
portionment? Should ability to pay be a consideration? Should the 
user charges be an instrument of public policy? Should incentives be 
included? Should congestion be a factor in pricing? 
In practice, user charges are usually collected by a system of fees, 
charges, tolls, licenses, taxes, rentals, etc., the aims being to col-
lect revenues to meet the financial needs of the facility and to dis-
tribute the burden in a fair manner. Probably, the key issue associ-
ated with this concept is: should these charges be used as a means of 
furthering public policy objectives? A subsidiary issue is the need to 
develop policies with respect to the external cosf;s associated with the 
operation of the enterprise. An example of external costs is the noise 
and air pollution generated by users of airports. As the public role 
in. transport expands, policymakers will be under increasing pressure to 
"internalize" such costs. Thus, they will have to develop techniques 
for assessing users for these external costs, and then this compensa-
tion will have to be transferred to those upon whom these costs have 
been imposed. 
User charges can be assessed so that they subsidize implicitly some 
or all users. For example, when common costs are borne by only some of 
the users, the others receive the benefits of being treated as a by-
product; that is, they pay incremental costs only (which are lower); 
thus, a cross-subsidy exists. Another form of subsidy is the airport 
authority which earns profits from airport operations which are used to 
pay for unrelated projects of the owning authority. In the opposite 
case (e.g., AMTRAK), user charges may not be sufficient to pay all 
operating and capital costs; the public policy determination is made 
that the service or facility is socially desirable and that the general 
public benefits from making up the deficit. 
Financing by the Federal Government. As in the past, future pub-
lic sector financing of transportation will be largely borne by the 
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federal government because it is the only sizable institution with the 
statutory authority to finance commitments of these magnitudes, the 
power to raise capital, and the ability to take a broad view transcend-
ing political subdivisions. Of course, the federal government has 
shortcomings too. For example, though it can take a broad geographical 
view of transport needs, its political policymakers do not receive any 
benefits from analyzing all public-investment requirements in a long-
term context; Congress and the administration look for immediate re-
sults, and transportation policy priorities shift with each Congress. 
Thus, rational long-term transportation planning is impeded by vacil-
lating political conditions. 
One principal issue underlies the concepts of user charges, subsidies, 
and outright ownership. In essence, the federal government as provider 
of funds must make a policy judgment as to what sectors of the populace 
and industry shall receive financial assistance. Furthermore, the 
federal government must raise these funds in some way; therefore, it 
must set a policy for distribution of the burden. For example, sub-
sidization of local air service reflects a policy to use federal funds 
to benefit small communities that would not otherwise receive service. 
State and local policy participation is minimal. In this case, the 
federal government has interceded in matters that largely impact a 
particular locality or region. 
A thorny issue is policy manipulation by federal agencies aL the local 
level. Clearly, subsidization of local air service is an assertion of 
federal influence over regional matters, and of course, this can be 
justified on the grounds of the federal mandate to improve transporta-
tion as empowered by the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. 
In order to avoid excessive intrusion on state and local affairs, how-
ever, the federal government leaves many public sector investment de-
cisions to officials at the state-Iocal-regional levels. Very simply, 
federal authorities delegate their power through matching funds pro-
grams; federal financing in available, but planning and implementation 
are carried out at lower levels of government. 
This delegation of authority via the matching funds mechanism does have 
some serious flaws. Outright grants of so-called matching funds distort 
the investment process. First, they bias the cost/benefit ratios of 
projects since the cost to the local government is perceived as its 
share of the budget only. Many a public investment undoubtedly gener-
ates less benefits than the sum of all the contributed costs, yet pro-
duces for the local government a very attractive return on its 
investment. There is bias in favor of capital-intensive solutions to 
needs. The excessive reliance on capital is due to the federal fi-
nancing of fixed assets only, without funding for maintenance and op-
erating expenses. Fixed assets are made cheaper relative to variable 
inputs. Thus, the local government will select projects that make use 
of this fixed-asset assistance in order to minimize its own total 
obligations of capital and operating expenses. 
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Another bias caused by matching funds is the absence of incentive to 
implement innovations in institutional practices and marketing. Since 
federal assistance is limited to asset acquisition (i.e., hardware), 
most projects deemphasize innovations in procedures, operations, ser-
vice levels, and pricing (i.e., software). 
Indeed, a critical issue is whether the federal government should use 
its resources to finance technological innovations. Often improvements 
in transportation are contingent upon achievement of technological 
breakthroughs. However, as the magnitude of these R&D efforts increase, 
the private sector becomes increasingly reluctant to assume the sub-
stantial front-end financial commitment. One observes an increasing 
requirement for public sector assistance in financing the research and 
development of airframes and turbine engines. The concept of federal 
assistance for innovations, software, technological changes, and mar-
keting is an issue that is likely to become increaSingly visible in the 
future. 
Principal Questions of Future Policy 
The nature and extent of public sector financing of intercity trans-
portation will be one of the principal issues during the coming decade. 
Demands upon the government for infrastructure financing, operating 
subsidies, and outright ownership will increase. Will the government 
respond with an expansion of its ownership? Or will it seek out in-
novative inducements and regulatory policies designed to preserve 
private enterprise as the principal source of transport services? i~at 
role will the government assume in the rationing of funds or control 
of investments in the event of serious shortfalls in investable funds? 
Is nationalization preferred over elaborate schemes of subsidy aimed 
at the private sector? Is cross-subsidization an acceptable technique 
for advancing public policy? Should user charges be assessed as a 
technique of furthering public policy? 
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VII. THE COST-REVENUE SQUEEZE IN HIGHWAY FIN~~CE 
by 
David W. Jones, Jr. 
University of California, Berkeley 
~ .. . LL 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the troubled future of highway finance and iden-
tifies a number of factors that seem likely to aggravate the cost-
revenue squeeze facing highway construction agencies. 
The increasing fuel efficiency of private automobiles and the declining 
growth rate of vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) both suggest that a fixed-
rate gallonage tax on gasoline (a primary revenue source) will be un-
able to keep pace with inflationary increases in the cost of highway 
construction and maintenance. 
Inefficiencies in highway resource allocations will aggravate the squeeze. 
These inefficiencies include formula allocation, patronage-related 
problems, and political gamesmanship in project selection and program-
ming. These factors will limit the ability of highway planners to match 
dollars and "needs." 
Replacing the gasoline tax will be a major policy issue in highway 
finance, as will the dollar magnitude of revenues needed. Because 
maintenance costs are outpacing revenue growth, substantial pressures 
exist to relax federal restrictions on the use of federal funds for 
maintenance purposes; relaxation of these strictures would be likely to 
pinch construction programs further. If Congress approves a Unified 
Transportation Fund with local discretion in the use of some gas tax 
funds between modes and between capital and operating expenses, the 
fiscal woes of urban transit could spillover and constrict the reve-
nues available for new highway construction. 
Congress will be unable and unwilling to restore the highway construc-
tion program to its "place in the sun." Restoration of the Highway 
Trust Fund's 1965 buying power would require an additional 4.5¢ in 
federal gas taxes and an average 8¢ increase in state levies. New 
funding is likely to be approved at a level sufficient to achieve a 
gradual, rather than precipitous transition in program content and 
level; Congress also seems likely to approve a revenue-sharing feature 
in new legislation, give priority to completion of the Interstate, and 
curtail the proliferation of highway program categories. 
The most wrenching problem of revenue constriction appears to be making 
the institutional transition from the administration of a large-scale 
construction program to the orderly and efficient management of mainte-
nance and rehabilitation of operations. Service deficiencies are also 
likely. They will appear gradually as problems of urban area capacity 
and intercity route maintenance and rehabilitation. 
Large-scale capital improvements will, inevitably, be postponed. 
Technologies such as electrified highways, which improve service quality 
but impose cost penalties, seem unlikely to be implemented in this 
fiscal setting. 
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In short, the successful transition from project engineering to sys-
tem management i.s offlrime concern as a result of the cos t- revenue 
squeeze in highway finance. 
VII-4 
n 
i 
; 
j 
1 
1 
1 
.~ 
1 
I 
1 
J 
J 
f 
! , 
i 
'~ 
[ 
i 
LJ'· II '~~ *'. , , .,._ .. ,'",,, ....• 
VII. THE COST-REVENUE SQUEEZE IN HIGHWAY FINANCE 
Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT .... VII-3 
Introduction . . . . . . . VII-7 
Recent Trends in Highway Finance . . . . . . VII-7 
The Gloomy Future of Highway Finance VII-8 
The Implications of a Contracting Construction Budget VII-16 
VII-5 
I 
r -~I "" ----[ 'f 
t 
l 
r 
f 
~~'-::fI~~«<eJ.f~~'<-~~~if:,?~~~ ~~~~.~.~""?-~~~~:<:-:;'''"r~~·-~·,: :!'>~ ,t -.-~.""-''''''"-~'4 ' -·}!('->·"""·· .. " .. ~t " 
~' t.ft ~ '* ~"." -- ~~,:.....:..~:..,......., .......... ~,,~~.~ . 
VII. THE COST-REVENUE SQUEEZE IN HIGHWAY FINANCE 
D. W. Jones, Jr. 
University of California, Berkeley 
Introduction 
This paper discusses the troubled future of highway finance and iden-
tifies a number of factors that seem likely to aggravate the cost-
revenue squeeze facing highway construction agencies. 
Tne increasing fuel efficiency of private automobiles and the declining 
growth rate of vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) both suggest that a fixed-
rate gallonage tax on gasoline will be unable to keep up with inflation-
paced increases in the cost of highway construction and maintenance. 
Replacing the gasoline tax will be a major policy issue in highway 
finance. 
So will the dollar magnitude of highway taxes. This paper argues that 
Congress will be unable and unwilling to restore the highway construc-
tion program to its "place in the sun." (Restoring the Trust Fund's 
1965 buying power would require an additional 4.5¢ in federal gas taxes 
and an average 8¢ in state levies.) This argues that highway agencies 
should view their primary planning task as the orderly management of 
institutional transition. Rehabilitation, maintenance, and operations 
will assume increasing importance, while the construction function 
contracts. 
The research agenda appropriate to this transition era would be keyed 
to the efficient management of maintenance and rehabilitation functions. 
It will be extremely difficult for bureaucracies designed to execute 
the expansion of capital facilities to make this transition while 
retaining the qualified personnel they have recruited in the past. 
Technologies such as electrified highways, which improve service quality 
but impose cost penal "ties, seem unlikely to be implemented in this 
fiscal setting. This argues that the R&D premium should be placed on 
cost-saving techniques rather than service-enhancing technologies. 
Recent-Trends in Highway Finance 
The predominant source of revenues for highway construction and mainte-
nance is the gallonage tax on gasoline. The gas tax--levied by both 
federal and state governments--is assessed on a per-gallon basis which 
increases with fuel consumption but not inflation. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, VMT, fuel consumption, and inflation in-
creased at approximately the same rate, permitting a vigorous program 
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of highway construction funded by a 4¢ federal fuel tax and state gas 
taxes averaging 7¢. 
Since the mid-1960s, construction costs have far out-paced the growth 
in highway revenues, although this trend was somewhat disguised by the 
d',,~clining fuel economy of the automobiles marketed between 1965 and 
L~74. In that ten-year period, the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) Construction Cost Index increased 111 points, or the equivalent 
of an additional 4.5¢ in federal gasoline taxes and an additional 8¢ 
in state levies. 
Table VII-1 shows the escalation of a 7¢ state gasoline tax that would 
have been necessary to keep pace with various cost indices during the 
past decade. During the period actual gas tax rates remained stable 
with the exception of l¢ increases in a handful of states. Much of 
the increment in gas tax revenues from increased VMT was required to 
offset the increasing cost of highway maintenance and rehabilitation. 
This has led highway agencies to argue that current tax levels are 
inadequate even for the near future and that "the nation's non-
Interstate street and highway network is wearing out twice as fast as 
it is being replaced. "* 
The Gloomy Future of Highway Finance 
While it is unlikely that construction costs will continue to escalate 
at their recent rate, a number of factors are likely to aggravate the 
cost-revenue squeeze which is battering the construction program of 
highway agencies across the country. 
:Fuel-Efficient Vehicles. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
of 1975 mandates substantial fuel-economy improvements for 1985 cars. 
The federal legislation calls for 1985 models to achieve an average of 
27.5 miles per gallon on a sales-weighted basis. If highway taxes 
remain pegged to gallonage, the implication is stable or declining 
revenues through 1990. Using FHWA estimates of the fuel consumption of 
the 1990 vehicle fleet, one must conclude that each 1990 VMT will gen-
erate approximately 0.5¢ in highway tax revenues compared to today's 
O.8¢ (assuming a constant gallonage tax). 
Table VII-2 shows the calculations behind the FHWA's "no-growth" sce-
nario for gasoline consumption. The scenario assumes that the 1990 
vehicle fleet obtains an average fue~ efficiency of 20.4 miles per 
gallon and that VMT grows at an annual compound rate of 2.2%. 
:lq11inois Department of Transportation, proposal for a "Surface 
Transportation Act of 1975," undated monograph. 
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Table VII-2. 
ESTIMATED 'VEHICLES, TRAVEL, A1~D GASOLINE CONSUMPTION 
Numu(r of 
Year and Automobiles 
Automobile Size (millions) 
1972 
Standard 
Compact 
Economy 
Total 
1980 
Standard 
Compact 
Economy 
Total 
1985 
Standard 
Compact 
Economy 
Total 
1990 
Standard 
Compact 
Economy 
Total 
1990/1972 
Growth Increments 
63.0 
22.0 
11.9 
96.9 
57.1 
30.9 
39,5 
117.5 
36.8 
40.2 
50.4 
127.4 
21.8 
40.7 
73.8 
136.3 
+40.7% 
a. 2.2% compounded annually. 
Total 
Vehicle-Miles 
Annual Miles (billions of 
per Vehicle automobiles) 
10,370 
10,000 
9,500 
10,184 
9,700 
10,100 
9,700 
9,800 
10,950 
10,600 
10,000 
10,460 
11,700 
11,100 
10,650 
10,950 
+7.5% 
653..3 
220.0 
113.1 
986.4 
554.1 
312.1 
286.2 
1,152.4 
403.1 
426.1 
504.0 
1,333.2 
255.1 
451.8 
786.4 
1,493.3 
+51.4%a 
Source: FHWA, "Highway Travel Forecasts," November 1974. 
Miles per 
Gallon 
12.0 
16.0 
22.0 
13.49 
13.1 
17.0 
23.0 
15.8 
14.5 
17.5 
24.0 
18.2 
16.0 
18.0 
24.5 
20.4 
+51.7% 
Total Gasoline 
Consumption 
(billions of 
gallons) 
54.3 
13.7 
5.1 
73.1 
42.3 
18.4 
12.4 
73.1 
27.8 
24.3 
21.0 
73.1 
15.9 
25.1 
32.1 
73.1 
0.0% 
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Increasing the assumed VMT growth rate to 2.9% produces a 1990 fuel-
consumption level that is only 10.0% greater than that of 1972. Reduc-
ing the assumed VMT growth rate to 1.9% produces a 1990 gasoline con-
sumption estimate that is 7.3% Zower than occurred in 1972. 
Increasing Maintenance Costs. During the past decade, maintenance 
costs have escalated at a compound annual growth rate approximating 
5.2%. It seems likely that this rate will continue, outpacing future 
revenue growth. The factors which are driving the cost of maintenance 
upwards include: aging roads, streets, and structures; increased road-
way mileage; increasing vehicular travel; increased level of effort 
represented by policies toward lighting, snow removal, beautification, 
and environmental mitigation.* Economies can be achieved in the latter 
areas and, over the short term, through deferred maintenance. 
There is already substantial pressure to relax congressional restric--
tions on the use of federal funds for maintenance purposes. The re-
laxation of statutory restrictions would be likely to pinch construc-
tion programs even further. 
Table VII-3 shows the escalation of operation and maintenance costs and 
their claim on state and local program budgets. 
Declining Rates of VMT Growth. In the past decade, the annual 
growth rate of VMT has hovered between 4% and 5%. The FHWA predicts 
that this growth rate will level to a compound growth rate of 2.5% for 
the period 1970 to 1990. The reduced growth rate projection is the 
result of "the saturation of motor vehicle ownership, and possible re-
duction in long trips due to lower speed limits and higher fuel 
prices."** Reduced population growth also contributes to the reduced 
growth rate of VMT late in the projection period. 
While fuel-efficient vehicles may counterbalance the effect of higher 
fuel prices, it seems likely that the growth rate of VMT--and therefore 
gas taxes--wil1 fall behind both historical levels and escalation rates 
of construction and maintenance costs. 
Modal Competition and Gas Tax Diversion. The 1973 Highway Act 
permits the diversion of High Trust Fund dollars from urban Interstate 
and "D" System routes for transit capital purposes. To date, diversion 
~"Dean L. Morgan, "Nationwide Costs of Highway Maintenance and Opera-
tions," Highway Users Federation Monograph, January 1975. 
**Federa1 Highway Administration, Office of Highway Planning, "Highway 
Travel Forecasts," November 1974. 
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Table VII-3 
TRENDS IN HIGHWAY, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATING COSTS 
Year/Jurisdiction 
1965 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1966 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1967 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1968 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1969 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
Maintenance & 
Operations 
Expenditures 
(millions of 
dollars) 
1,337 
1,080 
854 
18 
3,289 
1,433 
1,138 
893 
52 
3,516 
1,546 
1,205 
970 
50 
3,771 
1,624 
1,272 
1,066 
42 
4,004 
1,759 
1,392 
1,136 
43 
4,330 
VII-12 
Total Highway 
Disbursements 
(millions of 
dollars) 
9,814 
2,020 
2,160 
249 
14,243 
10,765 
2,170 
2,405 
358 
15,698 
11,338 
2,317 
2,645 
369 
16,669 
12,303 
2,465 
2,843 
372 
17,983 
12,630 
2,664 
3,127 
353 
18,774 
Maintenance 
% of Total 
Disbursements 
13.6 
53.5 
39.5 
7.2 
23.1 
13.3 
52.5 
37.1 
14.5 
22.4 
13.6 
52.0 
36.7 
13.6 
22.6 
13.2 
51. 6 
37.5 
11.3 
22.3 
13.9 
52.3 
36.3 
12.2 
23.1 
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Table VII-3 (Cont.) 
TRENDS IN HIGHWAY, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATING COSTS 
Year/Jurisdiction 
1970 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1971 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1972 
State 
County & Township 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1973 
State 
County & Townshipa 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
1974 
State 
County & Townshipb 
Municipal 
Federal 
Total 
a. Preliminary 
b. Estimate 
Maintenance & 
Operations 
Expenditures 
(millions of 
dollars) 
1,967 
1,463 
1,240 
50 
4,720 
2,140 
1,566 
1,352 
63 
5,121 
2,281 
1,655 
1,435 
49 
5,420 
2,534 
1,740 
1,528 
51 
5,853 
2,719 
1,825 
1,616 
50 
6,210 
Total Highway 
Disbursements 
(millions of 
dollars) 
14,100 
2,864 
3,440 
431 
20,835 
15,246 
3,055 
3,683 
496 
22,480 
15,548 
3,250 
3,900 
528 
23,226 
15,356 
3,450 
4,137 
577 
23,520 
16,289 
3,650 
4,342 
556 
24,837 
. r--- br" 
J 
Maintenance 
% of Total 
Disbursements 
14.0 
51.1 
36.0 
11.6 
22.7 
14.0 
51.3 
36.7 
12.7 
22.8 
14.7 
50.9 
36.8 
9.3 
23.3 
16.5 
50.4 
36.9 
8.8 
24.9 
16.7 
50.0 
37.2 
9.0 
25.0 
Source: Highway Statistics - Summary to 1965. Table HP-202, pgs. 76-77. 
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l has been extremely limited due, in part, to the capital-only restric-tion on substitution. 
The 95th Congress will consider a number of proposals for a Unified 
Transportation Fund. The common characteristic of many of these pro-
posals is their endorsement of local discretion in the use of some gas 
tax funds between modes and between capital and operating expenses. 
If gas taxes are made available for transit operating purposes--even in 
a limited fashion--the financial position and political appe31 of urban 
transit will become additional determinants of the dollars available 
for highway construction. 
Even without further "trust busting," the financial position of urban 
transit has to be considered a factor that will influence the public 
funds available for highway improvements. Competition between cabinet-
level domestic programs is fierce and imposes a de facto political 
ceiling on the revenues that Congress will spend for anyone program 
function. Over the past decade, transportation's share of the budget 
has increased in absolute terms but declined relative to other domestic 
programs. Thus, when considering total expenditures for transportation, 
the share claimed by urban transit and AMTRAK are highly relevant to 
future highway authorizations. 
Transit must be viewed as a source of continuing fiscal instability 
in the total transportation finance picture because the rate of esca-
lation of transit operating costs exceeds the growth rate of almost 
every public tax source. Although operating deficit estimates are 
notoriously flimsy, it seems probable that the five-year unfunded op-
erating deficit of urban transit will exceed $4 billion dU1-ing the 
1976 to 1980 period (if fares and public subsidy are held con2t-ant). '1~ 
Thus, in terms of shares of the transportation "pie," it seems likely 
that the financial woes of urban transit will spillover and constrict 
the revenues available for new highway construction. 
Institutional Inertia and Structurally Imbedded Inefficiencies. 
The structure of highway financing mechanisms and the behavior of high-
way programming bureaucracies has introduced al10cative inefficiencies 
that have diminished the effective buying power of highway funds. 
These will be difficult to change and will probably continue to impose 
some misfit between dollars and deficiencies. Formula allocation is 
one source of dollar/deficiency disjunction. The programs o~ state 
'1~Rough estimate 'based on data in D. W. Jones, "Transit Operating As-
sistance," California Department of Transportation monograph, August 
1975; Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, "Maintaining Mobility," 
September 1975; "APTA Transit Facts," American Public Transit 
Association, 1975. 
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highway departments continue to be distorted by the 90 to 10 matching 
rate of the Interstate program and the consequent scramble to maximize 
federal funds. Similarly, a strong case can be made that both state 
and federal funding formulas are creating an overcapitalized but under-
maintained system of rural roads. 
Another source of inefficient resource allocation is political games-
manship in project selection and programming. Similarly, the patronage 
function of some highway departments will make it difficult to trim 
maintenance costs and achieve other program economies. 
In combination~ these factors are cumulating toward a cost-revenue 
squeeze of substantial and enduring proportions. 
Highway professionals have already responded to the first signs of 
cost-revenue crisis with layoffs and urgent rEquests for new tax au-
thority. The House Public Works Committee has promised to develop a 
comprehensive, long-range bill during the 9Sth Congress. 
It seems unlikely that Congress will be able to unravel the problems of 
surface transport finance in a single session because it will be chart-
ing new and unfamiliar ground: 
• 
• 
• 
A transportation system that i.s primarily characterized by 
problems of mai.ntenance and operation rather than connec-
tivity deficiencies. 
A transportation finance problem that no longer fits the 
administratively simple exigency of a gallonage tax on 
gasoline. 
An allocation problem which is confounded by modal rivalries 
and turf fights among state, local, and regional bureaucra-
cies. 
• A program area--transportation--that has declined from 
"motherhood-and-the-flag" status to one among many domestic 
programs. 
Despite the complexity of the issues, Congress is likely to take some 
action, and it may be useful to speculate on its general shape and form. 
Based on a review of legislative proposals being developed at both the 
federal and state levels, it seems likely that the "next generation" 
of transportation legislati.on will do the following: 
• Provide some additional revenue. Frequently discussed 
revenue sources include an indexed or per centum tax on 
gasoline and a waybill tax on freight. 
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Include a "revenue sharing" feature. Most proposals provide 
for the subvention of some fraction of the HighVlay Trust Fund 
to localities--either states, regions, or municipalities--
for discretionary expenditure between modes and between 
operating and capital costs. 
• Give priority to completion of the Interstate and curtail the 
proliferation of highway program categories. Most proposals 
involve five or six program categories which keep intact the 
Interstate, Primary, and Secondary road programs in an effort 
to strike a balance between rural and metropolitan interests. 
Clearly the most difficult challenges for legislative craftsmanship are 
posed by the declining viability of the gallonage tax as a revenue 
source and the difficulty of evaluating and monitoring benefits derived 
from highway maintenance and rehabilitation. The extent of discretion 
between modes, between cost categories, and the location of discretion-
ary authority will also complicate the congressional politics of the 
next-generation transportation fund. 
The complexity of these issues and the magnitude of operating and main-
tenance costs suggest that Congress cannot restore the highway con-
struction program to its "place in the sun." But it also seems unlikely 
that Congress will allow the highway program to be precipitously dis-
mantled by the cost and revenue trends discussed above. It seems 
reasonable to expect enough funding to achieve a gradual, rather than 
precipitous, transition in program content and level. This outcome 
seems more likely than either hefty new taxes or "benign neglect." 
The Implications of a Contracting Construction Budget 
The more wrenching impacts of revenue constriction appear to be bound 
up in the problem of institutional transition rather than service 
deficiency. 
TI1e bureaucracies which conduct highway research, planning, and pro-
gramming have been staffed and structured to execute and administer a 
large-scale construction program. They are largely ill-equipped and 
unmotivated to perceive "needs" and "deficiencies" in terms of the 
less-than-glamorous activities of maintenance, rehabilitation, and 
operational efficiency. The highway bureaucracy was created to "build" 
solutions, not to manage operations and maintenance activities. 
Thus, the process of institutional transition will be particularly 
painful: professional advan.cement has traditionally been keyed to 
accomplishments in project development; funding mechanisms and budget-
ing methods have developed in a project, rather than program, context; 
the highway professional's claim to political influence and public 
funds has been built on the ability to deliver projects that stimulate 
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local economic growth; and, most fundamentally, the maintenance and 
rehabilitation functions are perceived as banal, humdrum, and command-
ing little political support.* 
Revenue constriction witt produce service deficiences--again, not pre-
cipitously, but gradually. These are most likely to take the form of 
aggravated capacity deficiencies in urban areas and maintenance defi-
ciencies on intercity routes. Gap-filling projects will slip and 
deiiciencies in safety will accumulate.** The magnitude of these ser-
vice deficiencies will depend only in part on the absolute magnitude 
of available revenues. Expenditure flexibility--both de jure and de 
facto--will be a very important factor in determining the buying power 
of available funds. Program categories, formula minimums, and the in-
formal fair-share politics of the highway budgeting process will 
probably exaggerate the effects of revenue constriction on the quality 
of service. This again is a problem of institutional evolution. 
Revenue constriction will inevitably mean the postponement of large-
scale capital improvements. Technologies such as electrified highways 
and high-speed ground transportation which involve service improvement 
but cost penalties will be deferred or discarded. They represent an 
R&D agenda appropriate to an era of expansion--not contraction. The 
same logic suggests that a declining rate of innovation and capital 
development will make it difficult to attract and retain qualified 
professional personnel. 
Thus, it appears that the most significant implication of constricted 
construction budgets is a problem in staffing and management--a problem 
that is bound up in making a successful transition from project engi-
neering to system management. Guiding this transition and maturing 
and legitimizing the techniques of syst.em management appear to be the 
highest priorities of highway research. 
*A substantial misperception; in actuality, system operation requires 
far more complicated and dynamic modeling and control capabilities 
than construction engineering. 
**A judgment call based on a critical reading of the 1972 National 
Transportation Needs Study and recent interviews with state planning 
officials in California, IllinoiS, and Massachusetts. 
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This paper traces trends in costs and revenues for intercity rail and 
air transport and translates these trends into implications on the 
sources of capital for these industries and on related technology, 
service levels, and market shares. 
The most fundamental shift in intercity transport during the next 50 
years will be a decline in the growth rate of air transport. By 1969, 
a full-fledged "recession" in air travel was apparent. Trends in costs, 
however, did not decelerate as quickly as revenues, thereby seriously 
hurting profits. The problem of the air transport industry is not so 
much the ability to raise capital, as it is the ability to maintain a 
viable level of operations to ensure long-run solvency and investor 
confidence. 
The airlines' traditional major sources of capital which are affected 
by the industry's viability are the following: public financing (the 
largest source of funding), institutional investors, mortgages, com-
mercial loans, convertible bondholders, income bonds, hedge funds, 
financial intermediaries, equities, and accounts payable. 
The airlines are not projected to become destabilized and enter into 
wholesale bankruptcies. The narrowing of the gap between revenues and 
costs is expected to be halted. 
Two techniques exist to rectify air transport's plight. The first is 
the "bailout": fare increases; route swaps; mergers; direct subsidies, 
e.g., local service airline-type subsidies; indirect subsidies, e.g., 
noncompensatory landing fees; regulatory protection; and government 
purchases of securities. 
The second solution is to increase the productivity of the airlines. 
Increasing productivity has been the railroads' problem since modal 
competition affected their monopoly. For the railroads in the past, and 
the airlines in the future, the bad years al:e those in which wage rates 
climb faster than productivity increases. 
The glamour years of the 1960s are over for the airlines. The next 50 
years do not promise lucrative or dramatic innovations. The most obvious 
focal point of innovative activities is the landside portion of the air 
travel production function: maintenance perfo~mance through improved 
management (better inventory, station location, and superviso'ry tech-
niques);. and better trained mechanics; further automation of ticketing, 
reservations, passenger information systems; aircraft servicing; and 
cargo handling. 
Air travel is expected to remain an income elastic product (at least for 
pleasure travel, the fastest growing portion of the air market); but 
growth rates will not parallel those of the 1960s. Improved airline 
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productivity will come from tightened managerial controls over expendi-
tures and performance. The technology of the future will be less exotic 
and more o"riented toward labor-saving innovations on the lands ide. "No 
frills" services can also be expected. 
AMTRAK's future is unlike that of the airlines, because this rail pas-
senger carrier receives virtually all of its direct funding from the 
public sector. AMTRAK's public funding is deemed worthwhile, since the 
service provides important benefits to nonusers. Its long-haul services 
are justified because of the need for common-carrier transport to cities 
without air service. And political pressures for continuation of these 
services exist in spite of massive operating deficits. 
As for Northeast Corridor services, the density of rail travel is pro-
jected to increase rapidly in terms of both absolute passenger-miles 
and market shares, as a result of a federal policy commitment to upgrade 
the frequency, speed, reliability, and comfort of rail travel in the 
Boston-Washington corridor. 
The principal use of federal AMTRAK funds during the next 50 years will 
be to finance high-performance equipment, with some investment being 
channeled toward modernization of facilities. 
Probably the biggest area of controversy during the next 50 years will 
be in the context of maintenance and control over the right-of-way. 
Already, AMTRAK is moving toward the takeover of the Penn Central's main 
Boston-Washington line. In corridors where passenger operations are 
secondary to freight usage, A}tTRAK will continually be conflicting with 
the freight operators over operating speed limits, slow orders, delays, 
and ride characteristics. The freight railroads have no profit motive 
for maintaining roadbeds at levels commensurate with AMTRAK's goals of 
high-speed, high-quality service. 
Several potential solutions for the conflict are the following: nation-
alization of the freight rail system; renegotiation of the user charges 
paid by AMTRAK to the freight railroads; AMTRAK funding of new equipment 
technologies not required as high standards of roadbed conditions to 
permit high-speed operations; or AMTRAK acquiescence by operating at low-
speed or discontinuing services. 
So long as rail passenger services are deemed in the public interest, 
funds will be available for equipment, infrastructure, information 
systems, maintenance, and terminals. The future of intercity passenger 
technology, service qualities, and market share is inextricably bound 
up in the federal commitment to fund AMTRAK. 
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VIII. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CAPITAL FUNDS 
SOURCES AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES IN 
RAIL AND AIR PASSENGER TRANSPORT 
J. P. Price 
Gellman Research Associates, Inc. 
Technological charlges in intercity rail and air transport are expected 
to be heavily influenced by the sources of capital that will fund each 
mode. The principal issue facing the airlines is whether they can 
successfully introduce technological innovations to the Zandside portion 
of their production function. They must halt the cost growths which are 
outstripping increases in patronage and revenues. Otherwise, the trends 
of the last five years may continue. These trends are inherently 
unstable. The industry cannot remain solvent and retain investor confi-
dence. 
Railroad intercity passenger transport is entirely different; here, new 
technology is virtually exclusively dependent on fiscal support of 
AMTRAK from the public sector. 
This paper traces trends in costs and revenues for carriers in these two 
modes. It translates these trends into implications on the sources of 
capital for the industry. In other words, will capital remain available? 
In turn, the discussion identifies probable changes in the cost and 
revenue trends which must be made in order to meet industry goals. 
Implications on technology, service levels, and market shares are sug-
gested. 
Common-Carrier Air Transport 
During the next 50 years, perhaps the most fundamental shift in inter-
city transportation that will occur will be a decline in the growth rate 
of air transport. The last 25 years has witnessed the emergence of air 
travel from a relative novelty to a virtual way of life for large sec-
tors of the American population. In 1955, the number of passengers 
equaled 34.5 million. By 1974, the number had quadrupled to 148 million. 
On Wall Street, air transport was the Cinderella of the 1960s, the period 
in which its most dramatic and robust growth'">c-urred. Tab1~ VlII-1 
depicts the a.nnua1 rates of growth of available seat-miles and revenue 
passenger-miles from 1955 through 1968 for domestic trunk carriers. The 
table also extrapolates these growth rates from present day (1974 base 
year) levels into the year 2000. 
In 1968, any continuation of past trends meant a rosy future. However, 
by the late 1960s, the first cloud began to appear on the horizon of the 
industry's unbounded ;rates of growth. By 1969, a fu11-f1edg€!d "recession" 
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in air travel had set in. When the bubble burst, the rate of growth in 
air travel declined dramatically from the 11% range down to around 4%. 
Table VIII-2 shows the rates of growth for capacity and patronage during 
the period 1969 to 1974. 
Table VIII-1 
GROWTH IN AIR TRAFFIC 
Pre-1968 
1955-1968 
Annual Growth 
Rates 
1974 Base Traffic 
(in millions) 
Year 2000 Traffic 
(in millions) 
Available 
Seat-Miles 
12% 
211 
4,220 
Revenue 
Passenger-Miles 
11% 
117 
1,755 
Source: Moody's Transportation ManuaZ, 1975, p. a60. 
1969-1974 
Annual Growth 
Rates 
Table VIII-2 
GROWTH IN AIR TRAFFIC 
Post-1968 
Available 
Seat-Miles 
2% 
1974 Base Traffic 
(in millions) 211 
Year 2000 Traffic 
(in millions) 359 
Revenue 
Passenger-Miles 
4% 
117 
326 
Source: Moody's Tl'ansportation ManuaZ, 1975, p. a60. 
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The comparisons of Tables VIlI-1 anll")VIII-2 are startling, to say the 
least. The rate of growth after 1968 slacked off so significantly that 
the revenue passenger-mile level by the year 2000 would be only one-fifth 
the amount it would be at if the pre-1968 growth rates continued. 
The implications of this "correction" are very forceful. For example, 
in 1968--at the zenith of the high-growth era--a major trunk airline 
made a rather extensive forecast for planning purposes of its capacity 
as it would be in 1976. Based upon a 1967 index of 100, available seat-
miles were forecast to be 300 in 1976 and 450 by 1980. In actuality, 
the 1976 figure was only 150. The carrier had projected massive invest-
ments in jumbo jets and SST aircraft. The amount of jumbo jets was well 
below projections, and no supersonic aircraft were purchased. 
n 
These statistics illustrate the fact that the air transport industry h~" 
been smacked hard by ~ downward revision of historical growth rates. 
This corrective tre:ld change has also brought to light several phenomena 
previously unapparent. The trends in costs did not decelerate as quickly 
as revenues. The last six years have not been good ones for the airlines, 
which have not been able to halt the growth in costs as fast as was neces-
sary to maintain healthy profit levels. Flying operations--the principal 
category of actual transportation expenses--when measured in cents per 
revenue passenger-mile, has climbed from l.66¢- in 1969 to 2.43¢- in 1974. 
The airlines opted to raise fares which drove the average revenue per 
passenger-mile up from a 20-year plateau (in the 5.5¢- range) to the 
unprecedented high of 7.24¢-. During that period, the domestic trunk 
carriers' net income never attained the acceptable goals set by the Civil 
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Since the slowed growth set in, the profitability of ~he industry has 
been below the levels required to remain solvent. Carriers have been 
forced to ground aircraft, furlough employees, endure protracted strikes, 
and scramble for ways to increase the output of their stock of assets. 
These events portend the trends of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Essentially, the gap between revenues and costs is dangerously narrowing. 
The question arises as to how long cash flows can continue below accept-
abl~ levels. The industry must generate sufficient cash flows so as to 
remain solvent and maintain the confidence of its investors. Air trans-
port, like most sectors of transportation, is not so much constrained by 
a need to raise capital from the;;private sector, as it is by maintaining 
the friendly backing of investors. The transportation industry stands 
out from most industries in this respect because, even bankrupt companies 
like the Penn Central are able to obtaint,}uipment financing secured by 
equipment.trust certificates, leases, or conditional sales agreements. 
In other words, some sources of capital are open to the weakest of air-
lines. However, such companies cannot remain solvent forever if they 
do not earn positive cash flows. Thus, the problem is not so much the 
ability to raise capital, as it is one of maintaining a viable level of 
operations needed to remain solvent in the long run. 
VIII-9 
"I i 
I 
.' 
" 
! 
1 
! 
I 
l 
r 
I 
t 
I 
I· 
f. 
I, , 
',' 'J 
-~~I~~· 
_._ .. _ J 
Impact ail Traditional Fund Sources. If, indeed, the airlines were 
not able to remain viable in the long run and were forced to restructure 
their financing, what would be the changes in the sources of funding? 
The following discussion lists each of the airline's major sources of 
capital and sets forth the probable impact on each due to a precipitous 
plunge in the viability of this industry. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Public Financing--Probably the mode's largest single source of 
funding is the supplying of the airport-airways system by 
various levels of government. No matter what maladies may 
impact the common carriers, as long as air transport is deemed 
to be in the public interest, then public sector funding will 
be made available for fixed infrastructure. However, if the 
industry falters, its ability to generate sufficient user fees 
to amortize these expenses may be jeopardized. 
Institutional Investors--A downturn in the viability of the 
airlines could very seriously impair access to the institu-
tional (insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds) 
sources. These investors are usually oriented toward low-risk 
securities such as long-term debts, secured (mortgaged) debts, 
and other issues having dependable yields and a low probability 
of default. These investors typically supply funds for long-
run operatihg needs, nonaircraft equipment, and buildings. A 
threat to solvency would heavily cut into these funds. 
Mortgages--Mortgages are not extensively used in air transport 
financings except when a loan is secured by a lien on assets 
of the company. If an air carrier encounters financial trouble, 
creditor demands for collateralization of loans will increase. 
The loan with a mortgage may become more commonplace. (Of 
course, many of the weaker airlines have already pledged most 
of their assets as collateral on various loans.) 
Commercial Loans--Commercial banks provide airlines with 
working capital loans which are often the most junior debts 
on the balance sheet. When the financial strength of the 
carrier declines, the access to this capital source evaporates. 
Thus, one observes the tremendous difficulty encountezed by 
weak car:riers, such as Pan Am, in thei,r attempts to rollover 
short-term obligations. When collateral is exhausted, this 
source of funds will no longer be available if the industry 
cannot maintain an ongoing viability. 
Convertible Bondholders--This source of funds is usually pro-
vided by an investor willing to assume higher levels of risk 
in anticipation of a prospect of appreciation in the firm's 
equities. Conve'rtibles have been a popular instrument df 
financing among the airlines in the past. If the highly 
leveraged condition of the industry continues in the future, 
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it is likely that this financial technique will be continued, 
as long as the tax laws allow deduction of interest expenses. 
Income Bond--This financial instrument, commonplace in railroad 
reorganizations, may emerge in the airline industry as a high-
risk form of debt. Of course, the issuance of income bonds 
would probably emerge from some sort of financial restructuring 
of a weak company. 
Hedge Funds--This source of financing is used to acquire equip-
ment and then lease, or otherwise convey (~to the carrier. 
The hedge fund is set up primarily to capitalize upon tax 
incentives to purchase transportation equipment and then to 
rent it out and take an accelerated depreciation deduction 
available under the Internal Revenue Code. The hedge fund will 
probably continue to be useful for airlines as long as their 
income tax liabilities are not sufficient to utilize the full 
amount of depreciation expenses that would accrue if they 
owned and financed their fleets. 
Financial Intermediaries--For the airlines this source of 
capital is the critical one. The airlines finance large por-
tions of their equipment through leases, equipment trust cer-
tificates, and conditional sales contracts which are largely 
financed by insurance companies, bank trust funds, or leasing 
companies. These intermediaries are willing to provide capital 
to this industry, even in spite of financial adversities, as 
long as the equipment is adequate collateral for the loan. 
Thus, this important source of capital will remain open, 
albeit the cost of capital will probably rise, as long as some 
of the creditors are able to maintain control over the equip-
ment in the event of default. (An important issue that will 
arise during the next 50 years is whether the creditors can, 
in fact, foreclose on these assets in the event of default. 
Mortgagees of railroad lines have been effectively thwarted in 
their ability to foreclose, and as a result, mortgage funds 
for railroads have effectively dried up. In airline bankrupt-
cies, the treatment of creditors' rights versus the need for 
public transportation will be of critical importance.) 
Equities--During the high-flying years on Wall Street, the 
airlines were able to float common and preferred stocks, con~ 
vertibles, and warrants. These higher-risk securities were 
readily accepted because of the expectation for continued 
buoyant profit growth. However, the latter quarter of this 
century will have to witness a profit revitalization, if the 
equity markets are to be reopened. in any substantive way. 
Accounts Payable--Most corporations use accounts payable as a 
"float." to help generate cash. This technique will remain 
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available to airlines, but as their financial standing deteri-
orates, the ability to float payables becomes impaired. 
Increasing Productivity. The airlines are not projected to become 
destabilized and enter into wholesale bankruptcies. The narrowing of 
the gap between revenues and costs is expected to be halted. There are 
two ways to correct these trends. The first technique is popularly 
known as the "bailout" which may consist of fare increases, route swaps, 
mergers, direct subsidies (e.g., local service airline-type subsidies), 
indirect subsidies (e.g., noncompensatory landing fees), regulatory pro-
tections, or government purchases of securities. 
The other strategy designed to stave off insolvency is aimed at increasing 
the productivity of the airline production function. In practical terms, 
each unit of labor and capital would be expected to produce more revenue 
passenger-miles. The increasing of productivity has been the problem 
facing the railroads ever since intermodal competition cut into their 
monopoly position. The railroads have been forced to invest heavily in 
capital in order to increase the productivity of labor at a rate fast 
enough to exceed periodic wage increases. Historically, productivity of 
railroad labor has outstripped trends, in wage costs thanks to heavy in-
vestment in capital. However, for the railroads in the past, and the 
airlines in the future,the bad years are the years in which wage rates 
climb faster than increases in productivity. 
One reason why the airlines were the glamour industry of the 1960s was 
that the introduction of turbine-powered aircraft had a twofold benefit. 
The first was that this technological innovation dramatically increased 
the productivity of both labor and capital. Second, jets were a demand-
stimulating service innovation. The next 50 years do not promise techno-
logical innovations as lucrative or dramatic as the new aircraft develop-
ments of the 19608. If the airlines are to increase productivity, they 
must look to more mundane opportunities to innovate. 
The most obvious focal point of innovative activities is the lands ide 
portion of the air travel production function. This round of innovations 
will not be concentrate.d on high technology, but rather will be composed 
of managerial controls, some new technology, plus better training of 
labor. For example, maintenance performance will be improved through 
management--inventory control, better location of stations, and more 
efficient supervisory technio.ues. In regard to technology, maintenance 
expenses will be lowered through less "downtime" in aircraft. Labor 
productivity will be increased if the skills of the mechanics' can be 
refined even further and if the amount of man-hours required to perform 
a given task is decreased through innovations such as modularization. 
On. the landside, increased productivity will come. through further auto-
mation of ticketing, reservations, passenger information systems, 
servicing of aircraft, and cargo handling. Several of these lands ide 
components of the production function are ripe for technological 
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innovations. For instance, baggage handling still utilizes 1940s tech-
nology. Several notable innovations have been introduced for sorting 
and distributing baggage. Frankfurt Airport (Germany) has instituted 
an advanced computerized sorting system. An American corporation, 
Docutel, has thus far not succeeded in establishing its technology of 
baggage sorting; but its experiences indicate the activity in the 
innovation process for this technology. 
Implications for the Future. The rates of growth of patronage are 
likely to exceed national averages in other sectors of the economy simply 
because air tra,rel is expected to remain an income elastic product (at 
least for pleasure travel which is the fastest growing portion of the 
air market). But these growth rates will not be like the 1960s; thus, 
improved airline productivity will come from increased managerial aware-
ness of the expenditures required to produce a given service. 
Tightened managerial controls over performance will probably precipitate 
a complete reevaluation of technology policy. In the past, technological 
innovations on both the airs ide and landside of the production function 
have been welcomed as tools to stimulate demand and to increase the 
smoothness of the production process. However, numerous innovations 
probably could not stand on their own when subjected to a rigorous rate 
of return analysis. For example~ intra-ai.rport transit systems and 
terminal building designs may be reevaluated with more thorough scruti-
nization of the contribution made by each component of the system. For 
example, does an airport people-mover system increase demand for air 
travel or decrease the cost of air travel sufficiently to offset ,the 
system's investment? In the past, this sort of question has not 'been 
asked, but airlines will increasingly make such inquiries in the future, 
because on the margin, the airline will bear the incremental expenditure 
in'airport facilities. In summary, the technology of the future wi'll be 
less exotic, it will be more oriented toward labor-saving innovations on 
the landside. 
Closely related to these trends is the likelihood that service levels 
also will reflect this trend away from the exotic and toward the cost 
effective. "No frills" services may become a channel through which the 
older less revolutionary technologies will be utilized to provide lower 
cost air services to patrons not interested in the quickest most con-
venient service package. 
AMTRAK 
The future for AMTRAK is not expected to parallel that of the airlines 
because the rail passenger carrier receives virtually all of its direct 
funding from the public sector. As is thoroughly documented in one of 
this report's issue papers, "Financial Issues Impacting Intercity Trans-
portation;" the investment criteria employed by the government are 
entirely different from private sector goals and results. The public 
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secto.r position as financier of AMTRAK is chiefly explained by past 
trends in costs and revenues which had no prospect for self-sustaining 
services (i.e., revenues exceed long-run marginal costs). 
However, similar to the airlines., the public sector role in intercity 
rail passenger transport is deemed a worthwhile allocation of public 
funds, because AMTRAK provides a service with important benefits accruing 
to nonusers. Its long-haul services are justified because of the need 
for common-carrier transport to cities which do not receive air service. 
Furthermore, there are substantial political pressures to continue these 
services in spite of massive operating deficits. 
Northeast Corridor services consist of an entirely different set of 
social costs and benefits. Here, the density of rail travel is projected 
to increase rapidly in terms of both absolute passenger-miles and market 
shares. This increase will come about as a result of a federal policy 
commitment to upgrade the frequency, speed, reliability, and comfort of 
rail travel in the Boston-Washington corridor. Furthermore, the federal 
government perceives that a multibillion dollar investment in rail is 
preferable to alternative investments in interstate highways or short-
haul air transport. Thus, profitability is not a prerequisite to invest-
ment in AMTRAK. Rather, the overall social costs and benefits associated 
with AMTRAK services has led the federal government to authorize funds 
for upgrading this service. 
The principal purpose for use of the federal funds will be to finance new 
rounds of equipment during the next 50 years. Presently, AMTRAK is in 
the process of purchasing a new fleet of "Amcoaches ll for use in both 
long-haul and Northeast Corridor marKets. However, management is looking 
further into the future at French and British prototypes of equipment 
technologies such as British Rail's Advanced Passenger Train. AHTRAK's 
principal direction of investment policy will be in high-performance 
equipment.; however, some investment will be channeled toward modernized 
facilities for maintaining the equipment. Furthermore, AMTRAK has been 
rapidly moving toward parity with the airlines iri, ticketing, passenger 
information systems, and reservations. In order to improve the quality 
of service, AMTRAK may also begin to consider innovating in the tra-
ditional method of station design and baggage handling. 
Probably the biggest- area of controversy during the next 50 years will 
be in the context of maintenance and control over the right-of:"'way. 
Already, AMTRAK is moving toward the takeover of the Penn Central Trans-
portation Company's mainline from Washington to Boston. AMTRAK feels 
that absolute control over this infrastructure is needed to implement a 
total program of upgraded service. However, in corridors in which pas-
senger operations are basically a secondary user of the right-of-way, 
AMTRAK will be continually conflicting with the freight operators. The 
conflicts will be over oper:ating speed limi,ts, slow orders, delays, and 
ride characteristics, The freight railroads do not have any profit-
oriented reason to maintain the roadbed at a level commensur:ate with the 
goals of AMTRAK. Therefore, the conflict will be over AMTRAK's aspiration 
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for high-speed, high-quality service versus the freight operator's desire 
to extract the most cost-effective movement of ton-miles over the roadbed. 
There are several resolves to this conflict. One is the potential nation-
alization of the freight rail system which could come about as a result of 
the inability of the freight railroads to revitalize their presently poor 
financial footing. Another resolve could come about through arenegoti-
ation of the user charges paid by AMTRAK for operating the train over the 
freight railroad's tracks. Third, AMTRAK could channel funds into the 
development of new equipment technologies which would not require as high 
standards of roadbed conditions to permit high-speed operations. The 
fourth possible solution to the conflict would be AMTRAK acquiescence in 
its goals for high-speed services; this withdrawal could come about in 
the form of low-speed or discontinued services. 
Aside from the conflicts over joint freight-passenger use of right-of-
way, the principal issues of financing rail passenger services relate to 
the public sector's recognition that passenger service is, in fact, in 
the public interest. To the extent that this determination is made, 
funds will be available for equipment, infrastructure, information 
systems, maintenance, and terminals. 
There are some interesting implications that are likely to emerge from 
these trends in AMTRAK's future. Long-haul passenger services could 
very easily be discontinued if the battle with the freight carriers 
cannot be resolved at a level requiring a reasonable expenditure of 
federal funds. Eventually, the mood of Congress may turn against rail 
passenger services and may permit the long-haul trains to be abandoned 
as they almost were before the establishment of the AMTRAK legislation. 
" 
However, if AMTRAK, with congressional backing, decides to strive in 
earnest to revitalize long-haul passenger services, then extensive 
research into technologies of long-haul passenger, trains may be con-
ducted. AMTRAK may experiment with new generations of auto-train-type 
equipment and services, American versions of overnight European trains, 
and demand-stimulating innovations designed to differentiate rail from 
competing modes. In summary, the possibility of research into inno-
vations in long-haul technologies will be almost purely a function of 
AMTRAK's commitment to the future of long-haul trains. 
With respect to the Northeast Corridor, AMTRAK has already demonstrated 
its financial connnitment to improvement of this facility. However, the 
levels of service will be closely tied to the quantity of funds committed 
for improvement of the infrastructure. In the long run, Amtrak may 
search for innovations in equipment so that high-speed services can be 
introduced without expensive investment, in roadbed. 
In summary, the future of intercity passenger technology, service quali-
ties, and market share wilL be inex:tricably bound up in the seriousness 
of the federal commitment to fund AMTRAK. 
VIII-I5 
,I 
" 
-... '. 
~.~ .. :.""-~" .... '",u.....",,","::".k.:.' _.~'~ .. !,,:"':""",,-: _., •. ',~\i.'~'~""""._ ~J __ _ "_~~~~~! ___ ':':"';l..,~,-.o::.\.,\. '::, __ ... ,,·l .... , .... ~i •• ~ •• ·,;~ • .i"' ;-
J 
1 
I 
I 
J j 
1 
j 
I 
I 
1 
~ 
., j 
1 
j 
i 
1 
" 
,1 
l 
I 
1 
1 ~ 
1 
1 
I 
i 
! 
t: 
~! 
, ' 
.. 
f.' 
, 
,. 
v, 
r 
. ' , . 
I' 
, , 
! • 
! : 
l . W_ .. 
IX. ISSUES IN REGULATION OF INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION 
by 
J. J. Grocki, J. P. Price, and R .• P. Wharf 
Gellman Research Associates', Inc. 
".f: 
~"; 
; 
J 
'j 
l 
1 
1 
'i 
"oj 
! 
i , 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
i j 
.1 
1 
1 
.~ 
1 
i 
l 
J 
i 
,.\ 
I 
1 
! j 
I 
! 
I 
! 
I 
I 
! 
I 
f 
I 
I 
I 
f· 
I 
l' I 
I~ 
I 
'.j' .... 
f 
\ 
I 
L .... 
, 
i 
., 
i 
~-[- .. - ... - '.~ ._- --- '--' .--.-~~~, 
J .--~[ .J. - . ..:-~, 
ABSTRACT 
Naturally, monopolistic industries (public utilities, some transportation, 
common carrier communications) require economic regulation to ensure out-
put increases toward socially optimum levels. The most common regulation 
is an established maximum rate of return on capital. 
Regulation tends to be legalistically precedent-oriented and backward-
looking when unprecedented economic and technological changes occur. 
Transportation regulation is often regarded as oppressive, complex, and 
all-pervasive and pressures are developing for "deregulation" or "regu.,.. 
latory reform." 
Regulation has helped in the development and control of transportation 
infrastructure and in the operation and organization of transportation 
,firms. It inhibits or spurs market entry and exit, technological inno-
vation, program implementation speeds, and financial viability of trans-
port systems. 
Three general dimensions of regulation are "coverage, II "specificity," 
and "locus." 
The degree of regulation coverage varies both between and within trans-
port modes, but theJ:rend is toward broader ceverage. Control of entry / 
exit, one of the sd~'ongest mechanisms to manipulate transportation mar-
kets, is crucial to the emergence of new intercity transportation (ICT) 
modes and carriers. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and, to a lesser 
extent, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) appear willing to per-
mit cessation of service to unprofitable markets. 
The ICC is permitting railroads to own other modes: air freight, 
barges, trucking, and pipelines. Horizontal integration across modes 
.permits cross-subsidization and smooths cyclical fluctuations. Over the 
next'25 years, ICT industry control will be concentrated in fewer com-
panies. Railroads will own inland waterway operators, and airlines will 
own and operate truck lines. 
Many transportation companies resemble well-diversified holding com-
panies because of vertical integration and conglomeration. Railroads 
have been sharply criticized for "dis investing" in the transportation 
industry. More stringent regulation of entry/exit and financial con-
straints may result in firms locked into low rates of return, unable to 
attract adequate private capital, and ultimately caught in the downward 
spiral towards nationalization. 
Reformers advocate more generalized, nonspecific regulation to reduce 
regulatory interference with day-to-day management decisions; CAB and 
ICC're~ulatory staffs, h~wever, are pushing for more specific regulations. 
. . ' ~ IX-3 
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The economic and social costs and benefits of specific regulatory prac-
tices should be included/in an evaluation of regulations. 
Transport regulations flowing from consumer legislation (environmental 
protection, public safety, health) are often unenforceable because of 
lack of budgetary or technical means of monitoring; these regulations 
will either be consolidated, adequately funded, or allowed to lapse. 
The current locus of transportation regulation is the layered decentral-
ized system. The tremendous overlap of authority existing both between 
and within different levels of government produces layers of redundant 
and conflicting regulations. Strong pressures within the federal gov-
ernment exist for greater centralization of authority, which might lead 
to insensitivity to local problems; conversely, a powerful force opposing 
centralization is the widespread mistrust of bigness in institutions, 
which ma.y contribute to a continuation of the present fragmented system. 
Over the next 25 to 50 years, more than one swing back-and-forth bet~een 
a centralized locus and a decentralized one is possible, depending on 
the number of economic recessions and booms. 
Fragmented, decentralized authority, although providing maximum exposure 
of issues (economic, social, safety, etc.), allows special interest 
groups to utilize the numerous appeal and review mechanisms to generate 
"regulatory lag." A centralized locus would shorten the appeal process, 
reduce lag, and facilitate technological innovations, although perhaps 
restricting exposure of some issues. Current trends portend expanded 
appellate mechanisms, but a swing in the other direction may follow a 
change in the political/social/economic climate. 
The ICC has been accu~ed of stifling innovation and preserving the 
status quo; the CAB is regarded as a promoter of new technologies. A 
multimodal regulator may be better suited to the needs of a large con-
sumer or geographic constituency; a collection of single mode regulators 
might generate greater intermodal interface problems. 
Useless transport industry accounting syste:;::s upon which regulators must 
rely should be replaced with a uniform accounting system that follows 
gen.erally accepted accounting principles and provides performance data 
for cross-modal comparisons. 
The abhorred concept of nationalization would simplify the regulatory 
process through centralized implementation of objectives and removal of 
overlap and layering. By 1990to 1995, transport bankruptcies' will 
engender either nationalized or quasi-nationalized freight transpor-
tation, and nationalized and private comr>anies will compete for the same 
markets. Purely private enterprise solutions are reliable only for the 
short run. Rapidity of nationalization hinges on federal initiatives, 
interim successes, a~d a favorable political/economic climate. 
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Taxation, a powerful policy tool, should be used more vigorously as an 
alternative to nationalization by creating progressive/regressive sub-
sidies to aid/hinder development of different modes. 
C~gulatory policies here and abroad affect availability of foreign tech-
nO~ogy for the transportation industry. As regulations approach global 
un~lformity, technology transfers between nations will increase. 
'\ 
It 'is ,unlikely that any revolutionary regulation approach will materi-
alizesoon. Reform will be shaped by the cyclical swings of the econ-
omy. R~versals will affect the trade-offs between competition and 
• \1 f 1 econom1e:f 0 sca e. 
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IX. ISSUES IN REGULATION OF INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION 
Introduction 
J. J. Grocki, J. P. Price, and R. P. Whorf 
Gellman Research Associates, Inc. 
J 
Control of the marketplace by government regulation through laws, tr,xa-
tion, and incentives has been a fact of economic life for many yeanl. 
Inscriptions on clay tell of King Urkagina, of Lagash on the banks of 
the Euphrates, who set forth prices and wages for goods and services 
around 2425 B.C. A thousand years later, the rulers of Babylon were 
fixing interest rates, requiring contracts, and trying civil cases of 
economic disputes. In 301 A. D., the J~mperor Diocletian issued his Edict 
on Price. The Edict set v)ages and prices to be paid for the production 
of commodities and required that producers sell' certain minimum amounts 
of food, hardware, and fuel to the cities of the Roman Empire. Penalties 
for not complying with the Edict included castration, crucifixion, and 
slavery. 
While governments have always manifested a disposition to impose controls 
on the governed, t.:he need for explicit economic regulation is attributable 
to the naturally monopolistic character of certain industries. That is, a 
natural monopoly exists when there are such economies of scale in the 
production of goods or services that the existence of additional com-
peting enterprises would considerably increase the cost to the society 
within a geographic area. Cost curves of natural monopolies are down-
ward-sloping, which means that an unregulated private enterprise manager 
will seek to restrict production in order to reap monopolistic profits. 
However, since private and social average costs decline with increased 
output, the regulator's objective is to ensure that industry output is 
increased toward the level of the social optimum. Natural monopoly 
charClcteristics prevail in the public utility, transportation and common 
carrier communications industries. When such industries are not under 
public or government ownership, regulation is required to prevent the 
monopoly from producing too few units of output and charging excessive 
prices. Regulation protects the monopoly, but it imposes a set of regu-
latory constraints. The most common constraint is an extablished maxi-
mum rate of r.eturn on invested capital. This and other characteristics 
of economic regulation are the subject of this paper. 
In addition to economic regulation of specific industries, the,re has 
accrued an additional and increasing body of regulation and govern-
ment controls, generally not industry-specific, but instituted to pro-
tect public health and safety or otherwise protect the consuming public. 
Sint~'regulation is legislatively mandated and has the force of law, its 
implementation and exercise have been couched in legal terms. Regula-
tory commissions have been predominantly staffed by lawyers, and com-
mission deliberations and rule-makings have generally been adversary 
proceedings with great attention paid to due process, procedural matters, 
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rules of evidence, and burdens of proof. With this orientation, the 
exercise of regulation tends to be precedent-oriented and backward-
looking even in the face of unprecedented changes i~ economic institu-
tions and technological developments. Established regulatory bodies 
are viewed as inhibitors of change rather than promoters of change; 
they are'more rigid than flexible. 
The magnitude and scope of regulation of the marketplace has waxed and 
waned over the years. Today we are faced with the apparent paradox of 
regulation being regarded in some circles as so oppressive, complex, 
and all-pervasive that additional regulations are required to provide 
some degree of freedom from regulation. This is especially true in the 
transportation industries which seem to suffer from an abundance of 
regulations, imposed from a variety of directions and embodying va.rying 
digrees of enforceability and rationality. Current government pressures 
exist for "deregulation" and "regulatory reform" within the transporta-
tion sector. At the same time, in other sectors of the same government, 
regulations are being ena'cted to ensure that the transportation indus-
tries will increase their safety standards and decrease pollution. In 
the process, the gov~rnment hopes not to undermine fatally the finan-
ciaL position of the industries' owners. 
,,' 
Regulation has p1ay~d, and will continue to play, an important role in\, 
both the development and control of transportation infrastructure and ' 
in the operation and organization of firms providing transportation 
services in the United States and neighboring countries. Regulation 
can act as a barrier or a spur to such important factors as: market 
entry and exit, technological innovation, speed c£ implementation of 
programs, and financial viability of transportation systems. 
Briefly, some of the forces for change that are discernible, over and 
above the need for continuing su:['vei11ance to prevent abuses of eco-
npmic power (actual and potential) and ensure the "safe-guarding of the 
public interest, II are: 
• 
• 
• 
Concern about inflation and the inflationary impact of much 
governmental regu1a:tion.* 
Concern about recession and the perceived need to change or 
relax regulato~'y constraints as an economic stimulant. 
The cumulative effects of environmental externalities, e.g., 
air and water pollution, and the need to supplement or correct 
for inadequate marketplace incentives. 
*M. L. Weidenbaum, Government Mandated Prices'Increases, A Neglected 
Aspect of InfZation O-lashington, D~ C., American Enterprise Institute 
, for Public Policy Research, 1975). ' 
1 ' 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Actual or imminent financial collapse of major firms in 
regulated industries. 
Change in the transportation mix, due either to changes in 
demand or technological innovations,* which create a need for 
some form of regulatory accommodation. 
Changes in social values, perceptions, and mores which either 
call for or provide support for legislative initiatives, new 
interpretations of regulatory mandates, and extensions or 
reevaluations of governmental interventions in private sector 
enterprises.** 
The mere accretion over time of the regula.tory corpus dicta 
(rules, codes, standards, administrative practices and proce-
dures, legalisms, vested interests, protectionisms, subsidies, 
cross-subsidies, rates, tariffs, conflicts, exceptions, and 
miscellaneous paraphernalia and accoutrements) leads inevi-
tably to periodic need for housecleaning, rationalization, and 
an unfettering of regulated firms from the accumulated over-
burdert. 
The propensity of firms under economic regulation to use their 
protected monopoly position to invoke regulatory procedures, 
to control information, and to otherwi~e act in such as way as 
to preempt or discourage competition tends to create a need 
for continuing adaptive regulatory response, particularly 
within the adversary relationship of government and industry. 
• Given the propensity of government to invoke rationing to meet 
scarcity and an impending shortfall in capital resources, there 
may be efforts to ration capital or control investments in 
various sectors through selectbreincentives and disincentives. 
<:>,\ 
This paper assesses the curr.ent regulatory "climate" in the United States, 
particularly as related to intercity transportation. It also presents 
an interpretation of the future of significant regulatory .issues and their 
probable impacts on intercity transportation over the next 25 and 50 years. 
.. / 
*A~ J. Gelll,nan, "Surface Freight Transportation," 
. in Regulated Industries, edited by W. C. Capron 
Brookings Institution,1971). 
Technological Change 
(Washington, D. C. : 
**See the companion issue paper on "Social Impacts on Intercity Trans-
portation." 
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Relevant Issues 
The format of this paper is an issue-by-issue treatment of relevant 
regulatory issues and their impact on intercity transportation. Where 
appropriate, the relationship between different specific issues will be 
discussed. Three general dimensions of regulation can be defined 
heuristically to focus discussion: "coverage," "specificity," and 
"locus." Specific issues within each of these categories are discussed 
individually; those issues which do not fit into a specific category 
or which overlap two or more categories are treated separately. 
r Coverage of Regulation. By "coverage" is meant the extent to which 
a given regulation or regulatory scheme applies to the commodities to 
be transported and the modes for their transportation. On one extreme 
of'the coverage spectrum would be regulation which encompasses all modes; 
on the other extreme would be regulations which relate to a specific 
commodity in a specific transportation mode. A regulation which requires 
that all transportation companies must file a certain type of tax return 
represents a broad coverage regulation. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission regulation of grain rates in unit trains represents a narrow 
regulation. 
Currently, the degree of coverage of regulation varies substantially 
from mode to mode and within individual modes and commodities. For 
example, grain rates are regulated in rail transport but not usually 
regulated in motor carrier or water transport. 
The general thrust in regulatory coverage in recent years has been 
toward broader coverage, particularly the recent movement toward, and 
discussion of, "reregulation" of the surface modes. This movement has 
as 'one of its premises a "zone of reasonableness" approach to rate-
making which would allow the carriers to adjust rates within specified 
ranges rather than use the single rate. as currently in effect. 
',; " 
Entry/Exit. Regulations exist to prevent destructive compe-
tition and gain the cost advantages possible through .economies of /:,fc::nle 
and natural monopolies. Currently, control of entry/exit is one'6f t1i~, 
strongest mechanisms used by regulatory authorities to manipulate tran~-
.' /. portation markets. Although the exercise of this regulatory authority'·. 
varies by mode, commodity, and location (and the authority may be 
federal, state, or local), the control over entry/exit in the transpor-
tation sector is all-pervasive. (See Table IX-I.) There does not 
appear, over the short run, to be any relaxation in this form of regu-
lation; in fact, if government. funding becomes a more important part in 
the financing of transportation systems, this control;;niechanism will be 
strengthened. 
In the case of large-scale intercity transportation investment, it is 
unlikely that significant numbers of new modes or carriers could 
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Table IX-1 
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE DOMESTIC SURFACE CARRIERS BY TYPE AND MODE 
1970 
Type of Regulation 
Rates 
Entry or exit through car-
rier expansion or con-
traction 
Entry through merger or 
acquisition, same mode 
Entry through merger or 
acquisition, other mode 
Overall quantity of service 
Quality of service, includ-
ing route 
Limitations on commodity 
and direction-of-traffic 
Rail 
Full 
Full 
Full 
Partial 
None 
None 
None 
Modes 
Highway Water Pipeline 
Partia1a Partia1b Partia1c 
Full Full None 
Full Full None 
Noned Noned Noned 
None None None 
Full None None 
Full None None 
a. The degree of rate regulation is largely a function of the form of 
of carrier organization. Common carrier rates are regulated the 
'most; agriculturally exempt and "private" carrier rates (or internal 
prices) are not regulated. Contract carriers fall in between. 
b. This is similar to highway regulation, except that exemptions are 
granted for other reasons besides the agricultural commodities 
provision. 
c. Rates are regulated on a rate-of-return basis; hence, individual 
rates are the object of very little regulatory concern. 
d. There is no explicit prohibition. Entry is subject to ultimate 
interpretation by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts. 
Source: A. J. Gellman, "Surface Freight Transportation," TeahnoZogiaaZ 
Change in ReguZated Industries" edited by W. C. Capron (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1971). . 
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emerge without some form of government funding, particularly for the 
construction of infrastructure, and without some form of government con-
trol over entry/exit. There appears to be an increasing willingness of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board and, to a lesser degree, the ICC to permit 
cessation of service to unprofitable markets, and disregard anything 
other than strong opposition ~rom the communities affected. The ces-
sation of air carrier service is very much simpler than rail abandonments. 
Industry Integration and Diversification. There are two forms 
of integration in the tl::ansportation industry: 
1. Horizontal Integration--When carriers expand markets 
by acquisition of competition in the same mode, or 
when more than one mode comes under a single owner-
ship, e.g., an airline, a railroad, and a trucking 
company. 
2. Vertical Integration--Whereby a carrier acquires 
control of its suppliers or customers, or a non-
transportation firm acquires control of a carrier, 
e.g., a railroad owning a railroad brake equipment 
manufacturer or a steel company owning a railroad. 
While both horizontal and vertical integration are normally part of a 
firm's interest in diversification, they have more direct competitive 
implications than the case of a transport carrier diversifying into 
nonrelated . industries, i. e., forming a conglomerate enterprise. There 
are, however, important public policy implications associated with a 
transportation firm's investing in nontransport-re1ated industries when 
such investment threatens the financial viability of the transportation 
company. Conf1omerate diversification will be discussed under vertical 
integration. 
Horizontal Integration. Historically, the ownership of car-
riers in different modes by a single operating company brought on many 
abuses which resulted in the current restrictive regulations. Railroads 
were particularly notorious in acquiring water carriers and using their 
monopoly. power to force business off the water and onto the rails. 
The ownership of mu1timoda1 carriers by a single controlling entity is 
currehtly being acknowledged de facto if not de jure. The ICC has per-
mitted railroads to acquire air freight forwarding companies, 'barge 
lines:, and tr,ucking subsidiaries (through the guise of piggyback). Pipe-
line companies-are also owned by railroads. No corporate entity has yet 
been able to assume a major role in more than one mode, and it is probably 
unlikely over the short term that this will happen. However, some of the 
joint-ownership concepts, under consideration as part of the currently 
proposed "deregulation" legislation, would permit the creation of trans-
portation holding companies which could evolve into fully integrated 
(full-service) transportation companies. The potential economic and 
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service benefits of joint ownership have to be weighed against the 
potential for abuse which would be possible under such ownership. Hori-
zontal integration across modes offers the carrier an opportunity for 
cross-subsidization of modes in order to smooth the cyclical fluctuations 
of traffic. The concept of cross-subsidization within a given mode 
;.(particularly railroads) is widely accepted in current regulatory phi-
!i1osophy and practice. Railroads carrying certain articles of freight 
'<'at or below marginal cost in certain markets in exchange for the priv-
ilege of hauling other freight at relatively high profit is a well-
established part of railroad regulatory history. The rationale is that 
overall viability of the transport firm is strengthened if it is allowed 
to use "value of servic,e" pricing of its product. Conceivably, cross-
subsidization could be extended to allow intermodal expansion by various 
carriers. 
If present regulatory trends continue, it would appear that control of 
the transportation industry will be concentrated in increasingly fewer 
companies. It is unlikely that in 15 to 25 years there will be signif-
icant railroad ownership of air carriers or vice versa; however, it can 
be expected that railroads will own inland waterway operators and that 
airlines will own and operate truck lines. 
Vertical Integration and Conglomerates. The concept of transpor-
tation companies owning their own suppliers and/or customers has existed 
for a long time. Traditionally, railroads have supplied internally many 
of their own cars and locomotives. Yet, railroads have been consolidated 
into even bigger vertically integrated enterprises, as well; for example, 
the Ford Motor Company acquired the Detroit, Toledo and Ironton Railroad. 
Ford even ventured into aircraft manufacturing and civilian aviation. 
While the Interstate Commerce Act effectively broke up large transpor-
tationholding companies, many of today's transportation companies 
closely resemble a well-diversified holding company. This subject has 
become increasingly controversial particularly in the railroad industry 
where diversification is blamed, at least in part, for the demise of the 
Penn Central. Railroads have ,been sharply criticized for "disinvesting" 
in the transportation industry; i.e., they have channeled investable cash 
flows from railroad operations into nonrail-related investments such as 
real estate, oil wells, pipelines, coal mines, etc. Defending these 
diversifications, executives state their primary obligation is to earn 
maximum return for stockholders, and if diversifying into transportation 
activities stabilizes income and produces higher profits, then these 
investments are justified. The opposing argument is that "disinvestment" 
is contrary to the public interest because it weakens the viability of 
essential transportation services. It is not unlikely, therefore, that 
regulation of the types of investments which transportation companies 
can make, particularly in nontransportation industries, will be added to 
the specific powers of the government. 
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Such regulation would further tighten the entry/exit and financial con-
straints on the transportation industry. It could lead to the creation 
of transportation companies locked into low rates of return, unable to 
attract adequate capital from private-sector investors, and ultimately 
caught in the downward spiral toward nationalization. This spiral was 
visible in the 1950s and 1960s when the railroads could not earn profits 
from passenger services. Therefore, without any aid forthcoming, they 
assiduously sought to withdraw all passenger-related investments. They 
provided the bare minimum of acceptable services. By 1971, intercity 
passenger services were nationalized via the Amtrak mechanism. Most 
railroads have been unable to raise new equity or long-term debt capital 
for several decades. Investment in fixed plant has been appallingly low. 
The claim of management is that under current conditions, it is impos-
sible to commit long-term funds to investment projects having such low 
profit prospects. 
This same spiral exists elsewhere in transport. The airlines may be in 
an early stage of decline. The industry as a whole--not just the weak. 
companies--has encountered discernible resistance to new financings. 
Uncertainties of fuel prices, regulatory policy, and traffic growth have 
scared investors away from the industry. Certainly, one of the regula-
tory issues in the future will be constraint upon the regulators to keep 
the industry profitable enough so that it can raise investment capital. 
Specificity of Regulation. "Specificity" means the degree to which 
regulation is applied to the direct operating parameters of the regu-
lated entity. A relatively nonspecific form of regulation is represented 
by rate-of-return regulation. A regulation which dictates the amount of 
tire wear fora tractor trailer to be legally operated on the highway is 
highly specific. The types of regulations usually brought to bear by the 
arms of government, which are "normally" the relevant economic regulating 
agencies, are relatively nonspecific. The ICC's regulation of pipeline 
involves simple rate-of-return regulation. Its regulation of railroads, 
trucks, and buses is basically rate~oriented. Approvals by the CAB or 
ICC of across-the-board rate increases represent a highly generalized 
form of control. 
It is important to note that many regulations imposed on transportation 
industries are from agencies which are not specificaUy charged with 
regulation of these industries. Nonindustry-specific regulations tend to 
be highly.detailed. The source of these regulations is often an agency 
which is charged with general responsibility in another area such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Transportation Safety 
Board, or the Occupational Safety and Health Admonistration (OSHA). 
Currently, these "fringe" agencies have broad powers to enforce com-
pliance on the part of regulated firms as part of their general mandate . 
. . In the short term, pressures for reform will undoubtedly establish new 
regulators with fringe powers. However, as the impact of the fringe 
regulations is more strongly felt, counter pressure will accumulate for 
establishment of a centralized regulatory authority. At the very least, 
rationalization of conflicting regulations and their economic impact is 
reqUired. 
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A serious short-term consequence of this trend to a multiplicity of 
fringe regulations is that the proliferation of overlapping and con-
flicting regulations will make it extremely difficult to nucleate large 
scale developments of new or novel systems or programs in a regulated 
industry. The various special interest groups will have such power 
(because of the variety of regulatory mandates and appeal mechanisms to 
be complied with) that "regulatory lag"* will grow to untenable propor-
tions. There are several examples of the impact of regulatory lag as a 
retardant of technological innovation. A good case in point is the long 
delay in the introduction of the Southern Railroad's "Big John" hopper 
cars.** 
Advocates of regulatory reform support more generalized and nonspecific 
regulation because they feel that regulatory authorities are unneces-
sarily interfering in the sphere of day-to-day management decisions. In 
contrast, the "internal" thrust within the regulatory commissions is 
generally in the opposite direction. An examination of a staff study by 
the CAB's Bureau of Operating Rights indicates that its internal thinking 
is toward more specific control. In their report: "The Domestic Route 
System: Analysis and Policy Recommendations,"*** the thrust of the dis-
cussion is that the CAB will expand its authority over the regulated 
airlines by enforcing standards of acceptable qualities and quantities 
of service in specific city-pair markets. 
The CAB plans to monitor a carrier's performance in specific city-pairs, 
and it plans to intercede in those markets in which the quality of ser-
vice is deemed unacceptable. The CAB prefers to use this power to en-
courage the airlines to "rationalize" their route systems by withdrawing 
from the markets which are not profitable. This policy reflects the 
belief that specific regulation of individual market situations can 
improve the industry's economic well-being better than generalized regu-
lation. 
A not unexpected characteristic of this proposed extension of regulatory 
'control by the CAB is the apparent preoccupation with procedural matters. 
For example, the report allocates 25 pages to describe "Regulatory 
Policies for the Future"; more than half of that effort is devoted to a 
description of the legal procedures for implementing the policy. Eco-
nomi($, on the other hand, receives only minimal treatment within the 
25 pages. 
The ICC made remarks similar to those of the CAB staff. ICC's general 
counsel, Fritz Kahn, has lashed out at shipper- and US DOT-supported 
*By "regulatory lag" is meant the time which is lost betweeri. the con-
ceptionor proposal of a program and its implementation due to the 
necessity for compliance with regulations and regulatory procedures. 
MeSee for example, A. J. Gellman, op. cit. 
***U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Regulatory Policies for the Fut~e 
(Bureau of Operating Rights Staff Study), October 1974. 
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efforts to lessen the Commission's zone of influence. Railway Age* 
chara.cterized Kahn as calling "for more rather than less regulation." 
Kahn's and CAB's remarks'are diametrically opposed to popular and Con-
gressional attitudesf Transportation improvement bills before Congress 
clearly indicate thatt a move toward less regulation is under serious 
consideration. 
In contrast with the regulatory commissions, DOT's stance on most prob-
lems is relatively nonspecific. DOT's apparent objective is to ensure 
viable service from optimally sized firms serving a competitive market-
place. Secretary Coleman's expressed opinion on rail industry struc-
ture is that the industry would be more viable if concentrated into a 
small number of large, efficient transcontinental carriers. The approach 
of DOT is to catalyze mergers which would bring about industry rational-
ization. 
_Cost/Ben~fits of R~gulation. Important factors which should 
be included in anyevaluatio!l,. of a regulation are the costs and benefits 
attributable to the specific regulatory practice. The costs of regu-
lation can be measured as the sum of the expenditures (both economic arid 
social) associated with maintainitl.g,pcrlicing, enforcing, and monitoring 
the regulation, which should include the additional costs imposed on the 
regulated firms and their customers for compliance. The benefits of . 
regulation may be reduced costs, improved service, greater'safety, and 
greater reliability and/or protection from the monopoly power inherent 
in the iritlustrieswhich are regulated. 
Presently, no formal cost/benefit accounting exists in tp.e regulatory 
process. In fact, few attempts are made to measure the direct or in-:. 
direct costs required by a given regulation. As the socioeconomic 
planning tools become increasingly accura.te, the regulators will have 
more reasqn to rely upon them. 
Unenforceable Regulation. Most legislation generally identi-
fied with the consumer movement in the United States (concerning envi-
ronmental protection, public safety, health, equal opportunity, inter 
alia) impinges upon the transportation industry in what were described 
previously as "fringe"or nonindustry-specific regulations. Some of 
this fringe legislation and regulation falls into an unenforceable 
category since the budgetary or technical means for its enforcement are 
not available. It is virtually impossible,for example, or at; least 
very costly, to ascertain at all times whether a diesel locomotive 
pulling a train exceeds the federal emission standard. Assuming the 
1cRailway Age, June 9, 1975. 
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consumer movement retains its momentum, the expectation is that these 
fringe regulations will either be consolidated into a package of en-
forceable regulations coupled with the necessary financial and staff 
support to ensure enforcement, or be allowed to lapse or continue un-
enforced. To aid in enforcement one can also imagine vigilante-type 
"inspectors" and "enforcers." 
Locus of Control. The "locus" of a regulation refers to the sources 
from which regulatory authority emanates and is implemented. On one ex-
treme is decentralized regulatory authority in which federal, state, 
regional, and local institutions each wield some influence over trans-
portation. In contrast to this layering of authority is a hypothetical 
centralized regulatory agency which is a singular central repository of 
authority over all modes and all situations.* In addition, authority 
may be centralized or fragmented within a level of government. The 
current locus of regulation most closely resembles the layered decen-
tralized system. 
Overlap/Layering. Currently, for all modes of transportation 
a tremendous amount of regul~tory authorities exist between, and within, 
different levels of government. Ideally, each regulatory agency should 
not impinge upon another; the regulations of each institution should 
complement the other. However, overlapping responsibilities usually 
produce layers of regulation which are redundant or conflicting. Thus, 
layeringsare the causes of inconsistencies, unnecessary duplications, 
. and regulations which are mu.tually unenforceable. It is not unusual for 
different government programs, each directed toward maximizing a specific 
objective, to result in situations in which the goals of one are in cOn-
flict with the other. A current example is the conflict between the 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) efforts to.reducelIlntor vehicle 
emissions and the Federal Ene'r.~yAdministration's (FEA) techri.iques to 
reduce motor vehicle fuel coristimption. In such situations, re-evaluation 
of national priorities is forced, resulting in pressures in opposite 
directions to relax, suspend, defer, or otherWise ameliorate the regu-
lations of .. one to the benefit of another. 
With respect to intergovernmental layering, strong pressures for greater 
centralization of regulatory a.uthority within the federal government will 
continue at. least in the short run. Centralization can lead to a lack of 
sensitivity to local problems. This is reflected, for example; in the 
*Forexample, as envisioned by U.S. Senate bill S. 1770, "The Rail 
RevitCilization and Energy Conservation Act of 1975," introduced by 
Senator McGovern, Congressional Record, 8857l-S8584, May 19,1975. 
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USRA's* alleged general neglect of the views of many state and local 
governments in preparing its Final System Plan for the reorganization 
of the Northeast railroads under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
of 1973. 
Pre~ently, a powerful force opposing centralization is the widespread 
mistrust of bigness--"big business," "big labor," and big government"--
in many institutions. This sentiment may be partially responsible for 
a movement away from further centralization of regulatory authority 
within the federal government. One result of this movement may be a 
further continuation of today's fragmented regulatory authority. Alter-
natively, these dispersed groupsinight be supervised and controlled by 
a centralized policy-making group designed to ensure that national goals 
are met while granting broad leeway for regional and local applications 
of policy. 
It is virtually impossible to predict at this time how far the pendulum 
of centralization might swing. In a 25-year and 50-year span, more than 
one swing from a centralized locus of regulatory authority to a decen-
tralized one and back again could be encountered. The degree to which 
such swings occur will probably be dependent on the number of times a 
recessionary economy is encountered. As previously discussed, the pro": 
pensity to change the thrust of regulatory direction is usually height-
ened by downturns in economic vitality. 
Appeals. The process of appeal and review has become ,a prin-
cipal characteristic of the machinery of the regulatory process. Frag-
mented regulatory authority creates a wide variety of opportunities to 
impede the process through appeals and reversals. Decentral1.zation mul-
tiplies the appeals process which may possibly produce maximuruexposure 
of .illl issues--economic, social environmental, safety, etc.--before a 
wide variety of regulatory bodies. Unfortunately, this method of broad 
exposure of issues leads to long delays in, or outright denial of, the 
implementation of any given project. Indeed, cumbersome regulatory 
hurdles do function as a barrier to introduction of changes in regulated 
industries. 
A centralized regulatory locus will tend to have a narrower arena of 
appeals which usually at least shortens the time span of the appeal 
process, resulting in a lowering of the barriers to technological inno-
vation due to regulatory lag. Of course, such a process may have the 
disbenefit of restricting exposure of some issues. 
*This case is significant in another respect, since the United States 
Railw~y Association has become the de facto regulator in the North~ 
east rail situation, even though it does not hold general rail reg-
ulatory authority. 
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Current trends portend additional steps in appeal mechanisms above current 
practices. As the process per se increasingly becomes the cause of regu-
latory ineffectiveness, a reaction will undoubtedly occur leading back . 
toward a more centralized, and possibly more restrictive appeal process. 
Approaches which could aid the implementation of large'scale or techno-
logically innovative programs are shifting the burden of proof to the 
protestants to the proposed cha.nges, and allowing implementation to occur 
unless specifically disallowed. 
The course of the appeal process will depend to a large extent upon the 
political/social climate in the. country. Under conditions of high social 
and envirt·h.mental consciousness, a much more time consuming and broad-
based appeal process may be likely. Under conditions favoring monopoly 
power, big business, or strong centralized federal government, the appeal 
process may tend to be shortened and considerably less open. 
Impact of Regulatory Locus on Innovation. The con,cept of an 
ultimate evolution toward a centralized regulatory locus was/introduced 
above. Conceptually, this sort of locus should regulate all 'modes ob-
jectively, but it may not be well suited to the development and intro-
duction of innovative technologies and marketing techniques. 
To understand this problem, one must examine the behavior of regulatory 
agencies today. Regulators have the ability to create a climate condu-
cive to the promotion of the process of innovation. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission has been asbused in many circles of being a signifi-
cant barrier to innovation. Ini, contrast, the Civil Aeronautics Board is 
generally regarded (with some e~\tceptions) as a promoter of technological 
developments in the airline industry. Note that the ICC has responsi-
bility for regulating four modes of transportation, while the CAB regu-
lates only one. Possibly, the ICC's difficulty arises because it must 
not· unfairly regulate one mode to the detriment of another. Therefore, 
it is convenient for the ICC to look toward preserving the status quo. 
The CAB, on the other hand, is statutorily mandated to promote commer-
cial air transport. 
A large, sip.gle, centralized planning locus may compound the problem of 
thwarting creative technologies and ideas which only better a single 
mode. However, if the constituency of the regulatory agency was largely 
consumer- or geographic-oriented, then the notion of "fairness" might 
focus upon overall quality and quantity of all services rather than the 
health of anyone mode or company. In addition, a separate, individual 
agency mandated to regulate and to promote a single mode might very 
likely aggravate a problem that has always plagued this indust'ry--the 
modal interface problem. If each mode was encouraged to maximize it.s 
own internal utility function, the net effect might be a worsening of 
interface bottlenecks and a reduction in the efficiency of the overall 
transport system. 
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Other Regulatory Issue~. Presented below are several issues not 
explicitly covered in prior discllssions and which do not readily fit 
into the coverage, specific_i!:y;' or locus categories. 
Accounting Systems. Economic regulators must rely upon the 
regulated firm to.'provide information measuring financial, operating 
and service conditions, and performance. This information is vital to 
the effectiveness of the regulators. The extent to which the infor-
mation system depicts actual economic performance obviously directly 
determines its worth as a tool of the regulators. In addition, the 
accuracy of information influences the precision and effectiveness of 
regulations. 
Unfortunately, accounting systems are one of the great weaknesses of the 
regulatory agencies. Often these systems rely upon anachronistic prin-
ciples which result in figures which are virtually meaningless as 
decision-making guides. Because regulators, like the ICC, rely upon 
unrealistic accounting systems, managers of transport companies are 
forced to make decisions distorted by this added constraint. 
In the' future, 'the transportation industry needs a uniform system of 
accounting which conforms to generally accepted accounting principles 
and which provides performance data for cross modal comparisons. 
Regulatory Constraints versus Economic Conditions. The pro-
pensity of society as a whole to demand changes in the regulatory pro-
cess appears to be influenced substantially by the economic climate of 
the times. When economic conditions in the country are stable or 
growing, there is less pressure for revision of regulatory institutions 
than in .poor economic times. As economic conditions worsen, society 
generally feels that government has to do something in order to assist 
in turning economic conditions around. One manifestation of this phenom-
enon is the demand to change the di~ection of the regulatory process. 
To a certain degree, this is currently being reflected in the pressures 
for deregulation and reregulation for certain sectors of the transpor-
tation industry. 
Regulatory Lag. There are two types of regulatory lag which 
are important from the transportation industry's point of view. The 
first is the delay caused by the regulatory process itself. As greater 
layering and overlapping occur in the regulatory process, lag ·increases. 
A greater centralization of the locus of regulatory authority will 
probably contribute to a decreasing of regulatory lag. The near-term 
outlook is for a gradually increasing lag time, due to the movemerlt 
toward decentralization and the layering and overlapping of the regula-
tory authorities. This trend is expected to continue until the moves 
toward centralization of regulatory authority and reform efforts grad-
ually reduce the lag time. 
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The second type of regulatory lag is the reaction time of the regulators 
in response to technology. In such a case, there is a lag between the 
initiation of a new technology and the determination by the regulators 
that they should formulate a policy in response to it. The uncertainty 
involved in lags of this type may constitute a substantial barrier to a 
firm's willingness to invest in the development or intrcduction of a 
technology. 
Nationalization. The concept of nationalization (i.e., govern-
ment ownership of one or more modes of transportation) has been regarded 
as abhorent by every administration since that of George VJashington. 
Simple mention of the term seems to galvanize the free-enterprise-oriented 
segments of the nation. The term is frequently used with reference to 
the railroad industry, although it has been mentioned concerning airlines 
and water transportation companies. From the standpoint of regulation, 
nationalization would actually represent avast simplification of the 
regulatory process because a nationalized transportation company has as 
part of its ch~.c'ter an implicit set of government-controlled objectives 
to govern its operations .·Outright ownership would obviate much of the 
overlap and layering which exists within the current regulatory frame-
work . 
Notwithstanding popular opposition to socialism, the expectation is that 
by 1990-1995 bankruptcies of some transportation companies will force an 
enlarged government involvement in transportation to the extent that 
either a nationalized or quasi-nationalized freight transportation and 
passenger transportation system will have evolved.* It is likely that 
nationalized companies will compete with private ones for the same market, 
although making some investments that private enterprise would not make. 
A format for such competition might be that which currently exists in 
Canada, where the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railroads com-
pete. Differences in the geographies of the two countries probably pre-
clude an exact duplication of the Canadian concept within the U.S. 
Before outright nationalization occurs, several interim solutions to 
the bankruptcy problem will probably be tried first. However, in the 
long run none of the solutions designed to rely upon private enterprise 
will meet the national transportation needs. Conceivably, in 25 years 
the rail infrastructure may still be in one of the interim steps be-
tween private enterprise and nationalization. For example, national 
ownership of rail rights-of-way could represent an interim solution 
lasting 20 to 30 years. The rapidity with which nationalization comes 
about will depend in l~:lrge measure upon the federal governmen~' s 
*Of course, public ownership of transportation systems at the local/ 
urban ievel is widespread (even when, operated under contract by a 
private firm), and public ownership of transportation infrastructure 
is similarly widespread, excepting obviously the railroads. 
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perception of its ~ndate, the succe8s or failure of certain intermediate 
events, * and the C~olitical/ economic'; environment exis ting in the country 
during the ini:ervening period. 
Role of Taxation. As an alternative to nationalization, the 
federal government may use taxation as a form of progressive or regres-
sive subsidy to aid or hinder the development of given modal choices. 
Tax incentives represent a powerful tool of public policy. Tax can be 
used to regulate any company. To.date, taxation has not been used 
significantly in the transportation industry as a method to encourage 
or discourage a specific behavior. Tax revenues have been used as a 
technique of financing for infrastructure development and maintenance 
for all modes except, :until recently, rail. 
Foreign Technology. Regulatory policies here and abroad will 
influence the availability of foreign technology for the United States 
transportation industry. For example, an impediment to use of foreign 
railroad cars and systems in the United States are U.s. safety regu-
lations. As .regulations become uniform throughout the world, then 
interchangeability of foreign and United States technologies will 
increase. In contrast, though, regulators are tightening their scruti-
nization of multinational companies' transfers of technologies. Tech-
nology transfer is further affected because surface transportation is 
an instrument of national policy in Europe and Japan. In France, for 
example, the French National Railway is an integral part of the nation's 
social security system, with a resulting adverse impact on efficiency. 
Nationalized airlines overseas also generally serve as instruments of 
national policy. These polil:!ies have direct technological implications; 
for example, note the implicit subsidies to British supplier industries 
in the cases of the Concorde; and the RB-2l1 aircraft engine of Rolls 
Royce. Barring any return to isolationism as a foreign policy, centrali-
zation of regulatory authority combined with the rationalization of 
regulation could produce a climate more conducive to universal technology 
acceptance. 
Hidden Goals of Regulators. It has already been noted that a 
large number of the regulatory agencies are staffed primarily by 
lawyers. Having lawyersr,erform economic regulation is" something like 
haVing open heart surgery performed by a dentist. Unfortunately, the 
legal':"ipproachto problem solving tends to .be backward~looking (with 
reli:111ceupon precedent~for guidance. Too of ten, decisions are strongly 
shaped by what happened'-in the past rath~ . t than by the merits· of the 
economic issues at hand. The net effect is that regulation is generally 
'*Forexample, a nationalized health ca.re scheme, if tried and successful 
could provide impe.tus for further nationalization efforts. 
.:. 
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This work was suppo~ted by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) and the u.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT). 
A management group for the project consists of rep-
resentatives of: 
NASA, Ames Research Center 
NASA, Office of Aeronautics and Space Tech-
nology, Headquarters 
DOT, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Systems Development and Technology 
,DOT, Transportation Systems Center 
The views and conclusions presented in this report 
are those of the staff of the Technology Assessment 
Team and do not necessarily reflect those of NASA or 
DOT. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines some of the probable changes which would follow 
"regulatory reform." In particular, regulatory philosophy and policies 
are considered. 
Deregulation is politically popular because it is hailed as a cure for 
the poor economic performance of the transportation industries during 
the 1970s and because of its apparent return to the basic tenets of free 
enterprise, which allegedly, is the route to efficiency, profitability, 
and high-quality service. However, deregulation is more aptly called 
"regulatory reform" since it should not connote. a return to a laissez 
faire role by the public~sector. 
Proponents of deregulation argue that major policy reforms must be 
carried out in three areas: entry and exit regulation, price competi-
tion, and industry structure. 
Theoretically, entry/exit certification enables regulatory agencies to 
fine tune competition. Proponents of reform claim artificial restric-
tions on entry and exit creates stagnant franchise carriers. In markets 
where unregulated entrants have competed against the CAB-certificated air 
carriers, for example, the quality of service has increased dramatically 
and fares have declined. 
The elimination of price competition induces carriers to compete in 
other ways. The air industry is, for example, notorious for its expen-
sive advertising and alacrity in purchasing the most modern aircraft, 
practices which tend to increase fares and costs • 
. Reform would permit a "zone of freedom" for rates. Competitors would 
be allowed to offer several combinations of service quality and fares 
in order to best meet the demands of various sectors of the travel 
market. 
Virtually all modes providing ;intercity passenger service are character-
ized by some form of monopolistic competition. Reform of industry st.ruc-
ture, when coupled with relaxed restriction on entry and exit and on 
prices, could indeed result in shifts in the number and size of competi-
tors in any given market. The key question will be the level of compe-
tition that will arise among the carriers currently existing and those 
which may emerge or drop out. 
The ICC has shown little enthusiasm for deregulation; the u.S. DOT has 
tended to favor it, at least in part because of the Administ.ration's 
policy of increasing the performance of the public sector. The Admini'-
stration argues that regulatory reform in passenger air travel and rail 
freight can improve quantities and qualities of service and bring about 
lower costs. Opposite argutnents--some well .founded--argue that height-
ened competition will precipitate lower profits or eVE,n bankruptcy. 
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Government's principal means of making reform is its ability to provide 
financial assistance. 
Cross-subsidization is certain to be a major issue during any period of 
regulatory reform. Some economists argue that cross-subsidization and 
pricing discrimination are undesirable because they do not permit the 
market to equate freely supply with demand. However, cross-subsidization 
has long been a tool of public policy because it permits government to 
bring about socially desirable services in exchange for higher rates 
elsewhere. The important issue here involves the policy choice of 
economic efficiency versus social equity. 
In general, regulators either explicitly or implicitly establish a 
reasonable rate of return. They are not averse to some degree of price 
discrimination as long as overall profits are reasonable. Ref,:n:mpto-
ponents, in contrast, would achieve economic efficiency largely through 
marginal cost pricing. 
Reforms would include: multimodal planning, centralized regulatory 
policymaking, centralized congressional oversight, and reduced reliance 
on precedence and legalistic procedures. The creation of a multimodal 
agency responsible for broad oversight of all transport might lead to 
increased horizontal and vertical integration. Consolidation of con-
gressional oversight into centralized committees with responsibility 
over several transport agencies and several modes is a proposed reform 
step. Tariffs, certifications, and other carrier necessities must pass 
the hurdles of numerous steps, decisions, reviews, appeals, and reexami-
nations. Consequently, "regulatory lag" plagues the transportation 
sector. 
As regulatory agencies have matured and ossified, reliance upon legal-
istic procedures has increased. Reduction, if not elimination, of this 
procedural labyrinth would be useful. 
The Justice Department's antitrust division is exerting pressure for 
regulatory reform, as is the Council of Economic Advisors and the Office 
of Management and Budget. Support also comes from academic economists 
and from the consumer movement. Economists and consumer organizations 
do not, however, currently have enough political power. They need sup-
port from passengers and shippers. 
Opposed to reform is the considerable weight of vested interests mostly 
concentrated in the carriers. The airline industry, the trucking indus-
t.ry, the motor bus industry, and organized labor generally oppose 
deregulation. Policies of some federal agencies also conflict with the 
aims of deregulation. 
Public interest considerations must be considered if deregulation 1S to 
succeed, if legal and procedural battles are to be avoided. An ombudsman 
attached to regulatory agencies would be useful. 
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Noneconomic regulation also imposes a series of constraints upon the 
transportation se,ctor. Inevitably, conflicts between transportation 
objectives and noneconomic regulations occur. The Concorde's battle to 
obtain authorization to land at u.s. airports is a prime contemporary 
example. 
Accounting systems promulgated by regulators mandate inefficiency. 
'Reform of accounting requirements should corlcentrate on developing both 
an enterprise information system and a regulatory information system so 
that the federal government can oversee the performance of the industry 
and make intelligent decisions on issues such as the measurement of 
avoidable costs, variable costs, asset base, investment requirements, 
fare and equitable rates of return, and economic profit. Managers and 
regulators alikt:: are not capable of optimizing investment or techno-
logical decisions without a full understanding of the actual productivity 
of the capital stock in place. They do not know each asset's revenue 
contribution or cost burden; and thus, they cannot make informed deci-
sions regarding replacement, innovation, abandonment, and service levels. 
During the next quarter century, regulators will probably be compelled 
to become more cognizant of national economic factors, such as those 
which influence capital formation and supply and demand for investment 
funds. 
A relaxation of certification policy for airlines will likely bring about 
a significant shift in the structure and degree of competition within the 
airline industry, the magnitude depending, in p~rt, upon the extent to 
which cross-subsidization persists. 
If market franchise regulations for intercity bus transportation are 
relaxed, then the marginal cost of entry would decrease, and a large 
number of independent bus operators might be generated. 
Policies on highway user charges might be a product of reform. For 
example, if heavy trucks were made to pay a greater portion of highway 
system costs, their user charges would be revised upward, thereby inducing 
higher truck rates. In addition, if certification requirements for truck 
carriers were relaxed, the efficiency of existing carriers might be 
increa.sed. Relaxation of certification requirements might also, in 
contrast, increase competition, thus forcing rates down to marginal costs 
and possibly driving many operators out of business. 
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X. THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION 
J. P. Price and D. Greenstein 
Gellman Research Associates, Inc. 
What Is Deregulation? 
The concept of deregulation of regulated industries has received great 
attention during the last year or so. Several bills providing for regu-
latory reform are presently awaiting congressional action. The Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) is developing experiments to test deregulation 
in several city-pair markets. Deregulation is politically popular 
because it is hailed as a cure for the poor economic performance of the 
transportation industries during the 1970s. TheSe industries have not 
enjoyed, robust profits, growth, or stable prices. Indeed, several common 
carriers' are in bankruptcy and others have come close. Few people douq.t, 
that the transportation sector has problems. Deregulation is often hair,ed 
as the cure because of its apparent return toward the basic tenets of free 
enterprise market behavior, which allegedly, is the route to efficiency, 
profitability, and high-quality service. 
The term deregulation is probably not the best that could be used. 
Really, deregulation is a catch-all phrase for the reform of processes 
and techniques of regulation. Proponents of deregulation do not, however, 
envision a return to laissez faire economics. In fact, few policymakers 
really consider laissez faire as a feasible or desirable goal for this 
sector. 
The purpose of this issues paper is to examine some of the probable 
changes which would follow "regulatory reform." The paper will look at 
the philosophy, the policies, the issues, and some of the possible 
examples of change that are expected to result from regulatory reform. 
The Market Forces 
Whether the movement is thought of as "deregulation" or "regulatory 
reform" its underlying aim is to "let the market work." One criticism 
is that market activities are severely distorted and hindered by regu-
latory intrusions. As a result, the goals pursued by regulated indus-
tries, in their pursuit of profits, are mutations of those of their 
counterparts in the unregulated sector. "Rational" policies and prac-
tices in a regulated industry are often for~ign to those in the unregu-
lated sector. ' 
Some proponents of regulatory reform assert that if the managers of 
connnon-carrier transportation companies are freed from government 
"shackles" and are permitted to behave in a manner more akin to those 
in the remainder of the economy, the incentives of profit maximization 
would suffice to bring about improved transportation services. Many of 
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the proponents of deregulation are acting out of a desire to see private 
enterprise management techniques prove that they are capable of providing 
an efficient national transportation system. Their notion is that regu-
lation, no matter how well-intentioned, cannot function as efficiently as 
a good unen'cumbered manager. Proponents of this point of view argue that 
major polic~ reforms must be carried out in three areas: 
I 
• Entry/exit regulation 
• Price competition 
• Industry structure 
The certification of common carriers by the regulatory agencies is one 
of the cornerstones of the-regulatory system. Certification provides an 
exclusive or limited number of franchises to serve a city-pair market. 
Obviously, if the supply of such certificates is restricted by the regu-
latory agencies, then the economic power (and value) of holding a cer-
tificate is substantial. Proponents of regulatory reform feel certifi-
cation has not achieved its theoretical purpose of bringing about optimum 
competition. Certification is needed because the natural monopoly char-
acter of the transportation industry means there is a limit on the number 
of firms which can efficiently serve a given market. To exceed this 
number creates competitive pressures that drive prices down below the 
level required to regenerate capital or, worse, cover operating expenses. 
Competition at such levels is often called cut-throat. 
On the other hand, certification is a technique to assure that several 
firms engage in healthy competition. It helps to prevent a single enter-
prise from asserting monopoly powers in a market and thereby restricting 
output and driving up prices. (Of course, some markets are not large 
enough to support more than one carrier; and thus, only one certificate 
is issued thereby legitimizing a monopoly.) Theoretically, entry/exit 
certification enables regulatory agencies to fine tune competition. This 
fine tuning ought to move the market toward an. optimal number of com-
peting firms providing a given quantity and quality of services at the 
lowest possible cost. To date, the performance of the regulators in 
this respect has been poor. Proponents of regulatory reform claim arti-
ficial restrictions on entry and exit lead to a lack of responsiveness 
on the part of the franchised carriers. That is to say, these carriers 
provide quantities and qualities of service inferior to those offered 
in similar markets with greater competition. The well-publicized cases 
of the intrastate airline markets. are the chief ammunition of the critics 
of the performance of these regulatory agencies. In markets where 
unregulated entrants have competed against the CAB-certificated air 
carriers (California and Texas are the best examples), the quality of 
service (e.g., frequency) has increased dramatically and fares have 
declined. 
If deregulation comes about, it is likely that many of the major city-
pair transportation markets in the United States will see less restric-
tions on competition. Total withdrawal of certification requirements 
is remote, but new entrants into these markets should be expected. For 
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instance, if air service between Chicago and New York was deregulated, 
airlines such as Ozark, Continental, and Delta, which are not presently 
permitted to serve this market, might well compete with those carriers 
presently serving it. The present competitors (American, TWA, and 
United) might choose to increase or decrease their quantities (and 
qualities) of service. Overall though, Chicago-New York air service is 
expected to improve. 
The second area in which the relaxation of regulation should lead to 
changes is price competition. The theory of regulation holds that these 
industries are "public goods" and that their rates should be held to low 
levels in order that the public may consume a greater quantity of output. 
Just the reverse, however, appears to be true. Government policy has, 
in fact, established a floor on rates which has evolved into creation 
of an artificially high level of rates. Indeed, this situation is 
doubly bad because the elimination of price competition induces carriers 
to compete in other ways which have the effect of pushing up costs and 
fares. The air travel industry is notorious for its extensive advertising 
and alacrity in pud:hasing the most modern aircraft. Both tendencies are 
traceable to n "rational" objective to differentiate their services from 
those of their competitors. Since regulatory policy prevents one carrier 
from holding back on fares while the others raise theirs, the risks of 
adding new costs are lessened because they are recapturable in the air 
fares. The net, effect of these competitive practices is that the pas-
senger1s price for air travel--air fare, plus other costs--is pushed 
upward. 
A regulating reform will remove some restrictions on price competition 
by permitting establishment of a "zone of freedom" for rates. Competi-
tors would be allowed to offer several combinations of service quality 
and fares in order to best meet the demands of various sectors of the 
travel market. 
The third major focus of this ma-::'ket-oriented philosophy is the structure 
of the transportation industry. ,~Jirt~ally all the modes providing inter-
city passenger service are chara((terized by some form of monopolistic 
competition. * The reformers' theory is that competition should be 
encouraged by stimulating the competitive environment of the transpor-
tation industry. In other words, more carriers and possibly carriers of 
different sizes should be allowed to compete. The aim is not cut-throat 
competition leading to a collapsed industry, but rather a finely tuned 
market encouraging innovative changes in technology and low fares with 
efficient operations. Reform of industry structure, when coupled with 
relaxed restrictions on entry and exit, and on prices, could 'indeed 
~'(Theone notable exception is AMTRAK, a pure monopolist whose behavior 
is similar to that of the monopolistic competitor anyway, since it 
makes its competitive decisions on the basis of airline and bus 
prices. 
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result in shifts in the number and size of competitors in any given 
market. It is not certain in what direction these shifts would take 
place. For example, depending upon the exact degree of deregulation in 
the airline industry) there might be increased or decreased concentration 
(of ownership) in the industry. A major deregulation would probably lead 
to consolidation into half a dozen or so ~~jor trunk carriers as a result 
of mergers among the smaller airlines. Many smaller airlines simply 
would not be able to withstand competition \from the massive nationwide 
carriers like United. However, if the extent of deregulation were less 
drastic, the most. eff:i.cient carriers--intermediate-sized carriers--might 
well emerge as very strong competitors. * . 
It is not possible to forecast the exact lines upon which industry 
structures would develop in a,climate of substantially relaxed regu-
lation. The key questions will be the degree of monopolistic competition 
that will arise among the carriers currently existing and those which may 
emerge or drop out. The role of the Justice Department will be important 
here. Some reformers call for the Justice Department to take responsi-
bility for industry structure matters (particularly, antitrust matters), 
which historically were given to the regulatory agencies. The theory is 
that the Justice Department is better equipped to consider issues of 
industry structure and that it should make policy for all industries 
rather than leaving this authority to the economic regulatory agencies. 
Another major issue affects market-oriented regulatory reform. Over the 
years, the regulators and the regulated industries have built up close 
ties. The agencies and the carriers have grown interdependent and 
nurture one another. The current moves toward reform in the CAB are 
_practically unprecedented and can. be explained as the policy of a new 
administration supplanting one which was considered to represent 
adequately the public interest. The Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC), on the other hand, has shown little enthusiasm for deregulation 
and such impetus for reform of surface intercity passenger transporta-. 
tion as can be seen has emanated largely from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT), at least in part because of the Administration's 
policy of increasing the performance of the public service sector. The 
Administration would like to see less reliance on government aid--finan-
cial or other--to transportation companies. In the passenger air travel 
and rail freight contexts, the Administration feels regulatory reform 
can improve quantities and qualities of service and bring about lower 
costs. Opposition from within the industry emanates from many sources 
for many reasons. Among those reasons arefears--some of them well-
founded--that heightened competition will precipitate lower profits or 
even bankruptcy. Others oppose the relaxation because they liave carved 
out a lucrative niche in the marketplace which could be disturbed by 
government-mandated reforms such as decreased certification requirements 
and price competition. 
*By most leading indicators, the.mbst efficient carriers, Braniff, Delta, 
National, and Northwest do belong tb this category. 
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The best incentive to make these reforms palatable in the industry is 
money. The most immediate battleground is the freight railroad and the 
Administration is attempting to reform regulations in this area by 
offering financial assistance to revitalize the industry. Many of the 
new proposals are bitterly opposed by vested interests; but by packaging 
t},.;~ reform with financial assistance, the Administration forces the 
railroads to accept them. For example, the government is providing 
financing for the continuation of branch-line service, for rehabilita-
C;i.on, and for other "uneconomic expenditures" in exchange for an end to 
such collusive practices as rate bureaus. 
In summary, the regulatory reform movement is largely market-oriented. 
It seeks greater incentive for increased price competition and facility 
of entry and exit to bring about better operational performance. The 
government's principal means to make these reforms palatable to the 
industry is its ability to provide financial assistance. 
Pricing Policy. Cross-subsidization is certain to be a major issue 
during the period of regulatory reform. One instance during which it 
occurs is when there is discriminatory pricing between various "products" 
of a producer. In the common-carrier transportation industry, users 
often pay fares that are not proportionate to the marginal costs of the 
service; rates can be relatively high (or low) for various types of 
services on various routes at various times of day, at various times of 
year, or between various commodities. Some economists feel that cross-
subsidization and pricing discrimination are undesirable because they 
do not permit the market to equate supply with demand freely. However, 
cross-subsidization has long been a tool of public policy, because it 
permits the government to bring about socially desirable services in 
exchange for higher rates in other sections of the carriers' operations. 
In the future, the issue will be: should the government continue to 
distort the market mechanism by setting up incentives to produce a par-
ticular service that would not otherwise be produced, or should it make 
direct payments for socially desirable services, or should discontinu-
ance come about? At issue here is an important question of economic 
efficiency versus social equity. 
At present, carriers establish most of their prices at least in part on 
a value-of-service basis. In other words, to the extent allowed by the 
regulators~ they price their services at whatever they perceive the 
market will: bear. The regulators "oversee" the process to try t.oprevent 
excess or c~t7throat competition. In general, the regulators either 
explicitly or fclilplicitly establish a reasonable rate of r~turn for the 
industry and P-'!:"c{ not averse to some degree of price discrimination by 
carriers so long as the carrier's overall profits are reasonable. The 
regulatory reform movement, in contrast, would achieve economic effi-
ciencylargely through marginal cost pricing. If such a policy were 
adopted, generally, many currently legitimate forms of economic dis-
crimination (pricing, market segmentation, certification, pooling) would 
come into question. It does not mean that multi tiered rates will 
X-13 
! i 
., 
; ~ 
I j 
1 
[ 
, 
, 
,l 
" 
I 
I 
·1 
I 
~ ~ 
if 
l:i 
'f! 
,I 
'II 
;1 
, Ii 
l g 
I 
, j 
1 
, I 
; i 
, t 
I 
disappear. On the contrary, marginal cost pr1c1ng might lead to the 
establishment of an even broader variety of qualities of service at 
different prices. Thus, different prices would be'charged, but each 
would be based upon marginal cost. Multitiered rates do exist today in 
air passenger transport, but the marginal cost differentials do not 
convincingly reflect the rate differentials. Freight services, espe-
cially in the surface 11!odes, are particularly noted for value-of-service 
pr1c1ng. Here, a restriction is an unrealistic ICC formula setting a 
"floor" under prices, which is supposed to be equated with variable costs. 
In the long run, the most controversial feature of regulatory reform may 
prove to be the new policy on pricing. 
Procedural Reforms. The regulatory agencies are infamous for the 
elaborate process which has evolved for the handling of a proceeding. 
Tariffs, certifiC'.ations, and other carrier necessities must pass the 
hurdles of numerous steps, decisions, reviews, appeals, and reexami-
nations. These pIiocedures, which are the result of many years of assidu-
ous work by many lawyers, now result in the famous "regulatory lag" which 
plagues the transportation sector. Studies have demonstrated that even 
technological innovations have been delayed or simply not implemented 
because of the procedural hurdles. However, this regulatory lag does 
protectt'he status quo carriers, dulling the propensity to innovate, at 
least whdre demand-stimulating innovation is concerned. 
Regulatory reform should move toward consistent and streamlined govern-
mental planning and control over transportation. These reforms would 
include: 
• Multimodal planning 
• Centralized regulatory policymaking 
• Centralized congressional oversight 
• Reduced reliance on precedents and legalistic procedures. 
A principal problem of the regulated industries, as Congress is appar-
ently aware, is the serious fragmentation of federal responsibility. 
Too many agencies are authorized to supervise various aspects of the 
transportation industries. Authority overlaps, and there are blind 
spots, inconsistencies, and conflicts. In Congress for instance, trans-
port regulation is divided among a great number of subcommittees. In 
several cases, one executive branch agency is overseen by more than one 
congressional subcommittee. The consolidation of congressional oversight 
into centralized committees with responsibility uver several transport 
agencies and several modes is a step for which some reformer.s have 
called, though such a position collide,s head-on with vested political 
footholds. 
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An obviolls proposal is the creation of a f ' mul timodal agency responsible 
for broad oversight of all transport--freight and passenger. Such a 
step might lead to increased integration such as horizontal consoli-
dations across several modes. Vertical integration might also come 
about. Transportation conglomerates might be another outgrowth of a 
multimodal regulatory agency. 
The fourth major reform directly relateld to procedure which is likely 
to emerge in regulatory reformation is a de-emphasis of procedural rules 
and precedent as the framework and guiding lights of regulatory decision-
making. As regulatory agencies have matured and ossified, reliance upon 
legalisti.:: procedures has increased, as an ever larger body of precedents 
is accumulated for procedures, modes of relief, and appeals mechanisms. 
(For more, see issue paper "Impacts of Regulation on Intercity Transpor-
tation.'\~ A fresh start in some areas would greatly reduce, if not 
eliminat~, the procedural labyrinth of the regulatory agencies. If 
these agencies "Tere renewed or replaced, the labyrinth might be elimi-
nated, at least at the beginning. One idea which has received some 
support in Congress is to place a time limit on all regulatory agencies. 
The Federal Energy Administration was established for a limited term. 
If this precedent were ~dopted, a regulatory agency might not become so 
completely bound and thus a burden upon the industry and upon society. 
Principal Proponents of Regulatory Reform 
}fuch of the impetus for deregulation or regulatory reform has recently 
come from the federal government. The Department of Transportation, 
established long after most of the. regulatory agencies, has been seeking 
a greater role in the formulation of transportation policy and in the 
conduct of economic regulation throughout the transportation industry. 
The new Secretary of the Department of Transportation, t-lilliam Coleman, 
with the backing of President Ford, is considered a proponent of regula-
tory reform and .extensive deregulation. 
The Justice Department, particularly its antitrust division, is another 
government agency .exerting pressure for regulatory reform. Arguments 
emanating from the antitrust division suggest that the reasons for. 
exempting the transportation industry from the antitrust laws are no 
longer valid and that airlines, railroads, etc., should be subject to 
the same rules as other sectors of American industry. The Council of 
Economic Advisors and the Office of }fanagement and Budget also add 
iffipetus to the deregulation pressures. In theory, this policy's effect 
i,-ould be heightened competition and bring about a more efficient trans-
port system. 
Outside the federal government, support for deregulation comes from 
academic economists and from the consumer movement. Regulation, it is 
claimed, cos ts billions of dollars every year .andprovides insufficient 
offsetting benefits. Their belief is that the improved efficiency from 
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removal of the regulatory shackles will outweigh the benefits of govern-
ment intercession in the process of transporting people. 
One problem the regulatory reform movement must face is that, except for 
what might be interpreted as an internal power struggle among various 
departments of federal government, it has very little political power. 
Academic economists and Ralph Nader's Aviation Consumer Action Project 
simply do not currently have enough political weight to push reforms 
through Congress. They will need to recruit support from passengers and 
shippers. 
Opposed to the regulatory reform movement is the considerable weight of 
vested interest mostly concentrated in the common carriers. To begin 
with, the regulatory agencies themselves have developed a "mandarin 
system" very different from other institutions in American economic and 
political life. These institutions obviously have. a strong interest in 
bureaucratic self-preservation. For the most part, the transportation 
industry, especially sensitive in difficult economic conditions, opposes 
regulatory reform. This is perhaps least evident in the railroad . 
industry, where such major upheavals as the Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act have overshadowed regulatory reforms. However, the airline industry 
is almost unanimously opposed to the Administration's most recent regu-
latory reform moves, with only United Air Lines, the nation's largest, 
unequivocably supporting deregulation and Braniff, a relatively strong 
intermediate carrier, indicating limited support for regulatory reform. 
Other major carriers, especially TWA, feel that in the current economic 
climate any relaxation of regulatory supervision (or, as they see it, 
protection) would lead to their downfall. The trucking industry and the 
motor bus industry are equally opposed to deregulation in their fields. 
Organized labor also generally opposes relaxation of regulations in the 
transportation industry at the present time. 
Countervailing Forces 
Even though regulatory reform is official Administration policy, the 
specific reforms will not be implemented without opposition. Besides 
the many vested interests that must be overcome, there are federal 
government policies which will conflict with the aims of deregulation. 
The consumer movement could emerge as an opponent of regulat6ry 
efficiency. While consumerism and the public interest are not in con-
flict with regulatory reform per se, the consumer movement has often 
been forced to rely upon the procedural labyrinth of regulatory agenciee, 
in order to obtain objectives which they could not obtain on substantive 
grounds. For example, opponents of the Penn Central's attempt to 
abandon the Harlem Valley line lost a long series of procedural battles 
before the ICC until they brought suit contending that the railroad's 
abandonment petition was deficient in that it lacked an environmental 
impact statement. Although an environmental impact statement had never 
before been required in an abandonment petition, the court held that 
such an analysis would have to be carried out. Although the 
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environmental issues are not the paramount concern of the opponents of 
abandonment, this tactic served to place a major obstacle in the rail-
road's attempt to end that service. This procedural tactic added 
several more years of delay to abandonment. The issue has not been 
decided on substantive grounds but the effect of years of procedural 
wrangling has been to give at least a temporary victory to the opponents 
of abandonment. 
This example demonstrates that adequate voice Ilfor public interest con-
sidei~ations must be included in the reformec:l:regulatory system if it is 
to stIcce,ed. Unless given an adequate voice in the new regulatory environ-
ment, the general public will almost certainly fall back on the same 
tactics which have been successful in the present regulatory environment, 
i.e., legal and procedural battles. In the new regulatory climate, there 
will probably have to be an ombudsman attached to regulatory agencies. 
The principle of the ombudsman has begun to gain acceptance in the United 
States both at the federal and state levels. Planning for the reorgani-
zation of the Northeast railroads was strongly influenced by the Office 
of Public Counsel which was specially set up within the rCCto articulate 
the viewpoint of communities and users of rail services. The public 
counsel concept should be thoroughly examined as part of the regulatory 
reform movement. If the legal and economic interests of the public are 
not adequately represented under any new system, it will be unworkable. 
A related series of constraints is imposed upon the regulated industries 
in the form of noneconomic regulation. There is now a multitude of 
regulatory bodies in the United States with authority over everything 
from factory safety to the type of communications equipment which may be 
used. Such regulatory agencies include the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Energy 
Administration, the Occupational Safety and ~ealth Administration, etc. 
Each of these agencies fills a socially desirable function, but as they 
expand their influence by highly specific regulations, they impose 
requirements on the transportation sector. Inevitably, conflicts between 
transportation objectives and noneconomic regulations must occur. 
The Concorde supersonic aircraft's battle to obtain authorization to 
land at U.s. airports isa classic example of a major confrontation of 
multiple-regulatory intercessions in the transport sector. Involved in 
this proceeding are the following forces: 
• Safety--Should the Federal Aviation Administration make a 
determination as to whether the aircraft is airworthy? Or is 
the certification of the British and French governm'ents suf-
ficient? 
• Environment--Does the National Environmental Policy Act apply 
to international air travel movements into and out of the 
United States? 
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• Foreign Policy--Do the bilateral agreements between the United 
States, France, and Great Britain supersede laws enacted 
subsequent to them? Do the provisions of these treaties 
rightfully influence policies outside of air transport? 
• Economic Viability--Should any federal agency be concerned 
with the economic viability of the Concorde operations? What 
about the energy efficiency of the service? 
Not surprisingly, the nexus of all of these issues is concentrated into 
the seemingly unimportant decision as to whether the aircraft will be 
allowed to land at an airport. Fortunately, the responsibility for 
making this far-reaching decision is not in the hands of a middle-echelon 
FAA bureaucrat. Rather, Secretary of Transportation Coleman is r.esponsi-
ble for making the decision based upon all of the above factors. 
Nevertheless, there are many inefficiencies in this process to which the 
Concorde is subjected. First, the fact that the landmark decision is 
made in the context of the rights to land is absurd. The arguments are 
over whether the Concorde is good or bad for the United States, but 
inappropriately, the forum for resolving the controversy is the FAA 
(issuer of landing rights). The second deficiency of the process is that 
many of the proponents and opponents of the Concorde have strayed afield 
from their areas of expertise. Certainly, comments with respect to other 
fields should be elicited from environmentalists, safety experts, 
meteorologists, and so on. However, they should not misinterpret their 
role--they are needed to provide worthwhile technical inputs, and not 
opinions upon matters such as the economic viability of Air France's 
supersonic air,service. Third, the entire Concorde proceeding has 
incredible implications upon the development of technology. Unfortunately, 
~omment upon the impact of any decision on the process of innovation in 
air transport has been relegated to low-level importance. A remedy to 
this.p:versight would be to compel regulators to incorporate into their 
decisions an assessment of the impact of their policy upon technology. 
(In the Concordecase, the EPA standards to which the innovation is 
subjected are standards which are not even applicable to aircraft built 
before 1969. That is to say, this innovation in its early stages of 
commercial development, is being forced to meet astringent set of 
nonec.onomic criteria to which most aircraft innovations have never before 
been required to comply. Indeed, do such regulations in and of them-
selyes, aetas impediments to technological innovation in air transport?) 
The fourth problem regarding this decision'-making process is the fact 
that Secretary Coleman is not re.al1ytner:epository of all authorities 
with respect to' whether the Concorde can se.LVe therulterican market. The 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey canef£ectively prohibit the 
plane from landing in the New York metropolitan area. The State of New 
York has interceded, and of course, the ubiquitous barrage of laW-Sll,its. 
may very well continue. In summary, the Concorde case illus tra tes.l:he 
inability of the existing regulatory framework to deal with an issue On 
the merits of all factors of importance. It shows that the procedural 
framework for handling such decisions can be prostituted as an effective 
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weapon to impede the introduction of change. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
tha't the awareness of the process of technological innovation is absent 
even in the case of one of the leading technological innovations of the 
decade. 
Some Possible Changes 
'\ 
Whatever one's point of view on regulatory reform, it seems certain'; that 
many of the regulations imposed by the federal agencies have made m~)nage­
ment less efficient. 
Accounting Systems. Among the best examples of government-mandatt~d 
inefficiency are the accounting systems promulgated by the regulatory. 
agencies. Through the years the ICC, for example~ has built up its O~il 
set of accounting principles divergent with those of the Accounting ~, 
Principles Board. Many of these principles are completely different 
from the standard procedures used virtually everywhere else in American 
industry. That is not to say the Accounting Principles Board rules are 
uniformly preferable, but many required practices in the rail industry 
have fallen behind modernizations elsewhere. Managers in regulated 
industries have had to rely upon these anachronistic accounting principles 
to make their decisions. Strange as it may seem, in many cases accounts 
kept under the ICC principles were the only set of accounts available to 
management. It is therefore no wonder that many statistics and decisions 
based on these statistics in the transportation sector seem anomalous. 
One reason that railroads report a seemingly low return on assets is the 
fact that assets are carried on the books at the original cost until they 
are removed and retired (i.e., there is no depreciation allowance for 
fixed assets), 
It seems clear, therefore, that regulatory reform must involve reforms 
in accounting and reporting requirements. The new acconnting system 
will have to serve two very important needs with respect to enlightening 
carriers and their regulators to technology. First, it should not be 
merely a set of balance sheets but an enterprise information system. 
It should function as a managerial information system for the operator. 
Managers need information on replacemertt costs, opportunity costs, 
avoidable costs, cost by city-pair market, service type, and equipment 
type. Second, the accounting sytem should also work as a regulatory 
information system so that the federal government can oversee the 
performance of the industry and make intelligent decisions on issues 
such as the measurement of avoidable costs, variable costs, ,asset base, 
investment requirements, fair and equitable rates of return, and economic 
profit. 
.In effect, the regulatory agencies at least should consider seriously a 
"I'complete refo:rm of their reporting requirements to conform more closely 
"with modern managerial accounting principles. It is important that the 
regulatory authorities act as a stimulus to efficient management 
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d~cision-making. Some of the important issues that ought to be addressed 
in the reform of the accounting system should be the reporting in a 
segregated manner of such illusory profits as inventory profits, profits 
in excess of book value on salvaged or disposed assets, profits due to 
currency fluctuation, etc. The elimination of these extraordinary and 
noneconomic accounting profits helps to make the statement of net income 
much clearer and provides the regulators with a better understanding of 
obsolescence, replacement value of assets, and appropriate rates of 
return. 
The technological implications of accounting reforms are not obvious, 
but they are critical. Managers and regulators alike are not capable 
of optimizing investment or technological decisions without a full 
understanding of the actual productivity of the capital stock in place. 
They do not know what each asset's revenue contribution or cost burden 
is; and thus, they cannot make informed decisions regarding replacement, 
innovation, abandonment, and service levels. 
Economic Planning. During the next quarter of a century, regulators 
will probably be compelled to become more cognizant of national economic 
factors. Because of the anticipated materials shortages and reduced 
supplies of capital funds, the regulators must become more sensitive to 
factors which influence capital formation and supply and demand for 
investment funds in the overall economy. Regulators must employ more 
foresight in identifying bottlenecks in the production function of the 
industry under their regulation. That is to say, better advanced 
planning will be required to procure the funds required to remedy a 
particular problem because delay in raising capital and purchasing new 
assets may be severely prolonged due to the capital formation gap. 
Otherwise, the industry maybe forced to suffer through a period of 
stress due to a severe shortage of a particular asset in its production 
function. These problems will force'the regulators to view broad issues 
of investment policy, private financing, debt/equity ratios, indenture 
agreements, reporting requirements, and other principles of finance. 
In essence, regulators must be tuned into national economic trends which 
are too important to ignore. For example, in the late 1960s when the 
air traffic controllers imposed slowdowns on air travel because of the 
severe demands on their capabilities, the need for improvements in the 
airways system became glaringly obvious. Air traffic control was a 
bottleneck in the air transport production function. Macroeconomics 
comes into consideration because the solution to the airways crisis took 
several years of investment in manpower training and installation of 
electronic equipment. However, if in the future the supply of capital 
for such programs becomes harder to obtain, then the regulators (e.g., 
FAA) must forecast problems like the air traffic control constraint. 
Otherwise, the lag time until the problem is alleviated may be dramatic-
ally stretched out. 
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This need for macroeconomic enlightenment is heightened by several other 
emerging phenomena. One is the requirement for investment expenditures 
on assets which, in reality, do not contribute 'to the profits of the 
firm. Such assets are pollution-abatement eqnipment or sa:fety equipment. 
Obviously,these investments are socially desirable and have been man-
dated by forces external to management. Perhaps it would be appropriate 
for these expenditures to be identified separately. Then, regulatory 
policies regarding rate of return on assets could be segregated across 
the income-producing assets and the nonrevenue-bearing assets to aid in 
the analysis of regulatory decisions aimed at providing a rate-of-return 
on an asset or base of assets. When significant nonrevenue-generating 
assets are added to the asset base of a carrier under rate-of-return 
regulation--the case for most passenger carriers--the regulator must 
make an important policy decision regarding how additional revenues 
will be earned to pay for the investment. ,In most cases, that question 
means where should prices be increased to pay for the asset? 
It is not suggested that the regulators require the management of these 
enterprises to separate the entire company's array of assets into 
income-producing and nonincome-producing (i.e., safety, pollution 
abatement, noise abatement) assets. For adminstrative reasons, 
separate identification for nonincome-producing assets should probably 
not begin until some threshold value is reached in order that the 
accounting problems defeat the whole idea. 
It is likely that sometime during the next ten years several rounds of 
investment in nonrevenue-producing assets will be required in the inter-
city transportation market. One example will be buses which may be 
forced to comply with new safety and pollution requirements. AMTRAK may 
be required to improve the sanitation specifications in equipment. The 
airlines may be required to undergo another retrofit program to reduce 
the noise and/or pollution of their engines. If any of these or similar 
investments amount to a substantial portion of capital asset acquisitions 
in any given year, then the regulator should seriously consider requiring 
the accounting of these purchases to be. separately identified. 
Several Future Cases of Reform 
Airlines. A relaxation of certification policy for airlines will 
very likely bring about significant shifts in the structure and degree 
of competition within the airline industry. The magnitude of these 
changes will depend, in part, upon the extent to which cross"';subsidization 
actually persists. Carriers may simply abandon unprofitable 'markets if 
exit requirements are relaxed. However, if there were also a relaxat'ion 
of price restrictions, a market might be provided with several different 
levels of service qualities. In the recent past, trunk and local service 
air carriers have withdrawn from several dozen light-density markets, 
but th.e abandoning cert,ificated carriers have been responsible for 
insu~.ing continu,e,d service through a third level carrier. When exit 
requir~ments were relaxed, different aircraft and different frequencies 
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were substituted into these markets. In the future, relaxed entry and 
exit requirements might induce the introduction of less technologically 
advanced aircraft into the trunk markets in an attempt to offer a some-
what lower quality of service at a lower price to a latent sector of the 
market seeking price reductions in air service. 
If the air travel market should become segmentized into different levels 
of service, there may be profound implications for airport development. 
Up to now, airport investment has been almost totally determined by the 
expectations of the certificated air carriers. These expectations have 
been based on their ability to induce air travel. which, in turn, is a 
function of the economic prosperity of the nation. Airport development 
is also greatly influenced by technology. In the future, therefore, if 
airlines continue to operate older jet aircraft, the pace of airport 
development will change. Facilities will not become obsblete as rapidly 
as in the past. Thus, if the life of a B-727 or a B-707 is extended and 
if the air carrier is net particularly concerned with elaborate ground 
facilities, then more austere airport facilities will be built or retained 
in service. 
An example of what might happen is shown in the competition between South-
west Airlines (an intrastate air carrier) and the certificated air car-
riers serving the new Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport (DFW). Southwest perceived 
that its .market lay in no-frills, low-cost service with high frequencies 
to major Texas cities. It opted for the less exotic but cheaper and more 
convenient Love Field for its operations, while the certificated carriers 
moved out to the luxurious new DFW 25 miles further away. The lesson 
from Texas seems to be that the relaxation of the regulations against 
competition may bring about several qualities and prices of service along 
with a deceleration of the rush toward new technology. 
Trends toward cost-savings reductions in air transport may result in some 
interesting situations. For one, the existing airport infrastructure 
could become prematurely obsolete in lieu of cheaper facilities. Since 
the airport owners and the airlines often bear joint liabilities on the 
financing of the facilities, the two parties may resolve to perpetuate 
the existing institutions. However, airlines like Southwest or PSA may 
capitalize on the certificated carriers' commitments to the existing 
institutions by heavily marketing a stripped-down, no-frills service. 
Already, others are seeking to provide "skybus" or "sky train" service. 
In exchange for major fare reductions, these services entail few of the 
ancillary amenities available with coach-class service. Success of no-
frills services will force a complete reevaluation of the notion of 
conventional air service: what level of sophistication in aircraft, 
airport design, ticketing, and baggage handling are warranted by market 
demand? 
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Bus Service. The withdrawal of restrictions on entry and exit from 
the intercity bus transportation market could have some interesting and, 
as yet, unpredictable effects. Presently, intercity bus transportation 
is provided by several large carriers along with many regional carriers. 
If market franchise regulations were relaxed to the point that entry and 
exit were virtually unrestricted, then the marginal cost of entry would, 
on the margin, consist of the driver's wage, plus fuel, plus rental of 
bus. 'rhus, one might observe a proliferation of a large number of inde-
pendent bus operators in many cities. A new phenomenon that might also 
follow is the deferral of maintenance of the buses. If an operator were 
locked into a competitive struggle with another company, then deferral 
of maintenance might be his logical way to preserve a positive cash flow. 
Highway User Charges. Still another realm in which relaxation of 
regulations would have profound market effects is highway traffic. If 
policies on user charges were revised, then one might expect various 
segments of highway traffic to rise and fall depending on the directions 
of these changes. For example, if heavy-truck users were made to pay a 
greater proportion of their costs on the highway system, user charges 
would be revised upward thereby inducing higher truck rates. In addition, 
if certification requireme.nts for truck carriers were relaxed, two types 
of changes might occur. There might be an increase in the efficiency of 
existing carriers, since it is alleged that the ICC's circuitous routing 
requirements drive up costs. But, nn the other hand, relaxation of 
certification requirements might also increase competition, thus forcing 
rates down to marginal costs and possibly driving many operators out of 
business. Not knowing the net effects of deregulation means that the 
technological implications are indeterminant. For instance, regulatory 
relaxation could increase or reduce congestion depending upon incentives 
to use other modes, to use efficiently sized vehicles, to schedule move-
ments in off-peaks, and to design more cost-effective equipment. 
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Nineteenth Century rail organization forms have engendered the current 
decline or collapse of numerous private railways. Contemporary organi-
zational and technological innovations borrowed from other intercity 
transportation (ICT) modes and elsewhere can revive the railroads. 
The ICT industry as a whole is in financial distress. Entrenched or-
ganizational cliques are locked into rigid pricing-service schemes. 
Industry-labor institutions form a bilateral monopoly. Restriction of 
competition has led to noncompetitive price-making and cartel formation. 
Artificially high prices have allowed noncartel producers to enter the 
market with a resulting decline in the market share of professional car-
riers and an increase in excess capacity (especially in passenger trans-
port, and more recently, in freight transport). 
The quality of ICT varies generally with proximity to, and availability 
of direct access to, major termini or "nodes", which may be different 
for each type of technology. In the case of urba.n termini, inadequate 
internal urban transport links to access routes of ICT may have detri-
mental effects. 
The development of current ICT is the result of historical accident. 
Locomotion by steam power preceded the inventions of portland cement 
and rubber vulcanization. The inflexibility of rail technology mili-
tated against multiple-user accesa without centralized traffic control. 
Railroad construction required immense capital investments, which led 
to (1) excess capacity, since construction preceded demand; (2) varying 
price policies, depending upon economic viability of the competition; 
and (3) merger-of competitors because of excess overhead. Discrimina-
tory price policies led to the genesis of state and federal railroad 
regulatory commissions. 
During the period between World War I and the 1930s, new competitive 
transport technologies emerged, and regulatory agencies began strin-
gently enforcing "entry contro1." The imposition of 19th Century rail-
way organization on both the railroad industry and new technologies 
stifled innovation. World War II gave the railroads a lease on life, 
but the postwar years witnessed the progressive decline of the,rai1 sys-
tem, an increasing number of rail bankruptcies, and the rise of com-
peting technologies. 
Alternative remedies for the rail crisis are revenue increases and cost 
reductions. Higher prices have, however, driven rail traffic to competi-
tors, and rail-service quality is deteriorating. More plausible solu-
tions are, therefore, to reform labor agreements to reduce train manning 
(and, therefore, labor costs) and to restore track conditions to in-
crease train speeds (and, therefore, labor and capital productivity). 
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Most current policy options, including the sequence of reports mandated 
by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, are limited by 19th Century 
notions of acceptable railway operation; bankrupt railways must be 
treated systematically. 
The United States Railway Association (USRA) Preliminary System Plan to 
reorganize the bankrupt railroads envisions a three-carrier system 
(ConRail, Norfolk and Western, and Chessie). The Railway Services Plan-
ning Office (RSPO) of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) evalua-
tion of the USRA Plan proposes a four-carrier alternative system, some 
of the bankrupts included in ConRail being shifted to a new syst.em, 
MARC-EL (Middle Atlantic Rail Corporation plus the Erie Lackawanna). 
The financial plans for ConRail include massive rehabilitation expen-
ditures, with varying rehabilitation priorities assigned to different 
lines, and a capital structure of debentures, preferred stock, common 
stock, and certificates of value, to be variously held by the govern-
ment or distributed as payment to the bankrupt railroads. 
ICT entry control should be abandoned; free entry makes price control 
unnecessary, opens the industry to innovative entrepreneurs, and in-
creases competition; rail track would become a public turnpike, and 
trackage rights would be available to anyone paying the toll; present 
freight forwarders and leasing companies would form the nucleus of a 
new group of entrepreneurs. No significant capital investments are 
needed due to the existence of ,railroad equipment trusts and the prolif-
eration of privately owned railway cars, which are becoming a more 
attractive investment for private capital. Much of the needed private 
business organization already exists; lease lilanagement companies act as 
brokers between investor-owners of railway cars and user companies. 
Labor supply could be provided by waterfront-type hiring halls like 
tho.se of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union or by 
independent contractors. Railway traffic controllers could be Federal 
Railway Administration employees, independent contractors, or other 
government employees, using two-way radio technologies. Terminals 
could be leased by a local government owner to an entrepreneur-operator 
or to local industry cooperatives; terminal use charges could be billed 
separately to encourage through runs. Bulk shippers would use unit 
trains as part of their industrial processes, and over-the-road common-
carrier truckers would use flat cars for containerized trailer transport. 
The availabj.1ity of federal, modernization and maintenance funds would 
help to spur even solvent roads to abandon 19th Century organization con-
cepts and to uffer trackage rights to others. Main lines would be 
federally fu:aded; other lines would be state or local responsibilities. 
Regulatory agencies have generally misa1located resources in the ICT 
industry, causing higher transportation and consumer costs. The pri-
mary disincentives tb industry innovation are rate-regulation policy 
and the "common-carrier" concept. Rebional regulatory rat,e bureaus 
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catalyze agreement on a common set of rates, and the resultant intra-
modal noncompetitiveness with respect to prices'stifles innovation. 
The statutory, common-carrier concept mandates carrier maintenance of a 
large excess standby capacity, causing excessive overhead costs and 
preventing innovation. Rate flexibility will provide the industry with 
a fair market return a~d periodic profits--the sine qua non of innova-
tion. 
Two overall approaches exist to rectify the problems of ICT. One ap-
proach is to subject all carriers to regulation; the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and railroads 
have all advocated an extension of regulation. The alternative ap-
proach is to eliminate entirely all regulation in the ICT industry; 
the authors advocate this position. In dealings with outside'rs, regu-
latory agencies tend to protect the interests of existing regulated 
carriers rather than to consider future benefits of innovation for the 
shipping and traveling public, and they look for reasons to deny in-
dustry entrance to newcomers. Recent experience has shown that unregu-
lated carriers in competition with regulated ones tend to be more in-
novative and to provide better services at lower rates. Overall de-
regulation should provide a major boost for innovation in the ICT in-
dustry. 
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XI. ORGANIZATIONAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES IN INTERCITY RAIL 
J. P. Carter 
B. Bernhard 
University of California, Berkeley 
Where We Are in Domestic Intercity Transportation 
Intercity transportation (ICT) service lacks the popular visibility of 
urban transport, but it nevertheless suffers from many deficiencies. 
Some of those deficiencies are inherent in the technologies in the 
sometimes requisite transfer between the urban vehicle and the inter-
vention vehicle. Most of the deficiencies we have voluntarily imposed 
on ourselves through the political process. The result has been an 
asymmetric web of restrictions on entry, service, and price. 
We have a number of competing technologies. Except for rail and pipe-
line, the track and controls are publicly provided. Terminals are 
public for sea and air transport, mixed for highway. The vehicles are 
almost always privateiy provided. 
Rails offer an anomaly: track and terminals are privately provided, 
as are freight cars, but passenger cars are publicly provided. Pe-
troleum pipelines are wholly private. A charge is made for the use of 
most publicly owned facilities. Whether that charge is at an appropri-
ate level is the subject of long-standing and often acrimonious debate. 
ICT may be divided into private and public. In this context,public 
refers not to ownership, but to the professional nature, the offering 
of the service. Most ICT is private; that is, persons are transporting 
themselves and/or their property. Professional carriers are for hire; 
they carry for others. 
Private carriage is unregulated, except for safety requirements imposed 
on operators and their vehicles and various taxes. But by unregulated 
is meant that anyone meeting the technical requirements of personal 
competence and vehicular safety, and paying the standard fees, may move 
himself and his property in ICT without further permission. 
Professional carriage is, however, severely restricted. With a few no-
table exceptions, no individual or company may enter the ICT business 
without advance permission. That permission is specific technologically, 
geographically, and in terms of what may be carri.ed. A second important 
restriction is that carriage prices and conditions of service must be 
published and adhered to. Proposed changes must be published in advance 
and may be subject to delays, hearings, and cancellation by the regula-
tory authorities who exist at both federal and state levels. Nor are 
the various technologies of professional ICT subj ect to identical regu-
lations. 
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The private business organizations which constitute the professional 
carriers are typically restricted to a single technology. A few re-
ceive payments specifically identified as subsidies; there remains, 
however, unce'rtainty whether fees, taxes, and prices of most profes-
sional carriers are appropriate. 
Cross subsidization of services provided by a single professional car-
rier is conmon. That is, profits on some segments of professional 
carriage are dissipated by losses on other segments. 
Total ICT has had great growth, principally in the private sector. Re-
strictions of professional carriage have produced a clique of long~ 
established organizations with rigid pricing and service standards. 
Labor relations have come to represent a form of bilateral monopoly. 
By the 1970s, professional ICT is in financial difficulties. All seg-
ments of professional leT show declining earnings. Rail and air trans-
port organizations often show accounting losses, and many rail organi-
cati.ons are bankrupt. 
The restriction of competition by regulation encourages noncompetitive 
price-making •. Pricing seems to approximate the theoretical solution: 
prices are initially set high enough to keep the weakest producer in 
business and all producers have, as a consequence, excess capacity. 
Producers outside the cartel are encouraged to enter under the shelter 
of cartel prices. Translated into the domestic ICT situation: profes-
sional carriers have priced themselves high enough that shippers find 
it worthwhile to develop their own private transportation, and profes-
sional carriage handles a declining share of the market. In passenger 
transport, for example, more than 80% of intercity passenger-miles are 
produced by the private car; freight transport is exhibiting a similar 
tendency. 
The quality of ICT is spotty in a random fashion. ICT can be seen as 
an organization of nodes or major termini which vary by technology. 
Service between nodes is often very good; service radial to the nodes 
is likely to be good. But service between points across the nodal 
radii may be poor to nonexistent. 
For all technologies, the nodes include the major port cities along the 
coasts. For air transport, the other nodes tend to be headquarter 
cities of the trunk lines: Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago, and Minneapolis. 
For rail transport, the nodal points are more diffuse and,typically, 
represent transshipment and/or junction points of the 19th Century. 
Highway transport is usually good along the Interstate system and else-
where if the limited access highway is dominant. In some older parts 
of the country, conven.tional roads and streets were designed long ago; 
in those areas, the Interstates contrast so favorably.with the older 
system (or nonsystems) that they are heavily congested. 
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Travel by air along routes not radial to nodes can be difficult. For 
example, the Official Airline Guide 1 shows no air service at all be-
tween Louisville and Columbus, Ohio. Adequate service to both cities 
is available from Chicago, but use of the radials to and from that city 
more than doubles the travel distance. It is possible to develop con-
necting service via Dayton or Cincinnati. Those connections always in-
volve a change of carrier. No interline fares are available; hence, 
full terminal charges must be paid twice. Rail service takes about 30 
hours and involves inconven.ie.nt arrivals at both the junction point and 
the terminal. But Greyhound has several daily schedules, and the In-
terstate is available for those who would drive. 
Freight movement between Louisville and Columbus is similarly hampered. 
By highway, the interstate is available. Air and water routes are 
lacking. Single-carrier rail service is available by two companies. 
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) reorganization 2 plan would 
have reduced rail service to a single carrier, but the United States 
Railway Association (USRA) Preliminary System Plan 3 (PSP) reversed that 
decision. 
The random monopoly pattern of American ICT means that a situation analo-
gous to that between Louisville and Columbus will frequently prevail, 
largely on a basis of historical accident. 
The quality of ICT would seemingly improve in the larger states. There, 
the absence of federal regulation has made it easier for innovators to 
establish themselves. 
While the line-haul ICT varies from very good to nonexistent, access to 
line-haul termini is part of urban transportation and suffers from all 
its defects. Moreover, internal urban transport needs dominate ICT; 
defects in the access system will not attract the same popular atten-
tion as defects in urban transport. 
At airports, for example, it is easier to add ramp positions and/or 
bring widebodies into service than it is to increase curbside transfer 
length, or even parking facilities. Still more difficult is the in-
crease of access capacity from streets and freeways. The latter dif-
ficulty is compounded by the organizational dichotomy between airport 
and highway management organizations. 
In peak travel periods, lack of linear curbside space for discharging 
and loading, and/or lack of vehicle storage facilities, may bring the 
flow of traffic to an airport to a complete standstill. Subsequent 
radio appeals to travelers to leave their cars at home and to arrive 
by bus will be ineffective, even if heard, since bus movement will also 
be clogged. Moreover, intercity travelers are likely to be burdened 
with luggage and hence to be largely immobilized if the wheels stop 
turning. 
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Our asymmetric web of self-imposed restrictions produces an uneven im-
pact in the various geographical markets for ICT. Broadly, innovators 
are excluded from reT; monopoly and pricing by cartel are encouraged. 
How We Ggt Here 
We reached our present state in ICT not by careful planning but by 
historical accident. Chronometers, rails, and military organizations 
were known at the time steam power was applied to locomotion. The 
telegraph, the vulcanization of rubber, and portland cement remained 
to be invented. 
In the l8tL Century, we knew hm.;r to make smooth lines, the rails, but 
not smooth surfaces, the roads. Rails had industrial uses, especially 
in mines. But surface paving was rough cobblestones in urban areas, 
waterbound macadam in rural. Early steam carriages and locomotives 
were heavy and fragile. Lacking even solid rubber tire, on free-
running surfaces, they shook themselves apart in short order. Primi-
tive rail was, however, smooth. enough to ensure the survival of the 
steam locomotive. During the three or four decades between the appli-
cation of steam power to locomotion and the invention of portland 
cement and vulcanized rubber, the steam railway captured everyone's 
imagination, and railway construction took place of highway con-
struction. 
Early railways were thought to be merely substitutes for highways or 
. .. 
at least turnpikes, and therefore, open to all vehicles willing to pay 
the tolls; but the inflexibility of the flanged wheel or rail to make 
passing maneuvers made it impossible for vehicles of many owners to 
move freely over railways without some fo,rm of centralized traffic 
control. Since the telegraph was an invention contemporaneous with 
cement and rubber,! central traffic control before mid-century required 
the development ot a fixed plan of movement with vehicles adhering to 
timetables and mesting at fixed times at the established turnouts. 
Watches and chronometers had been much earlier inventions. But once a 
vehicle was dispatched, there. was no way to communicate with its opera-
tors. Worse, until the invention of the telegraph, there was not even 
any way to communicate with way stations or other dispatching centers. 
Thus, centralized and advanced planning was necessary, and that plan 
had to be imposed with discipline on the train operators. That re-
quirement of discipline was accepted to mean that only trains of the 
organization could be permitted to operate. The idea of the.railway 
as a form of highway open to all died. 
The railway became the first large-scale civil operating organization. 
Large operating organizations had been military until then. Railways 
borrowed discipline and bureaucracy from that source. 
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The railway also became the first large-scale financial organization 
and the first major user of the corporate form of business organiza-
tion, with its distinguishing characteristic of the limitation of 
liability for the stockholder. 
Railway construction requires, of course, major capital investment. 
Construction has typically been in advance of demand; hence, rail-
ways have been marked by excess capacity. Typically, they were built 
to link major cities by alternative routes; hence, they competed for 
traffic between termini, but enjoyed a monopoly position for traffic 
at intermediate points. Substantially different price policies were 
applied depending on the competitive situation. 
Since railways required so much capital, the construction of competi-
tive railways did not often promise a payoff; when such a railway was 
constructed, it was not uncommon for the two competitors to merge. 
The discriminatory price policies adopted by the railways as a function 
of the competitive situation in each market was considered antisocial. 
In the later decades of the 19th Century, states and then the federal 
government established commissions to regulate and control the prices 
and services of the railways. Railway resistance led to many years of 
court tests and to further legislative action. The emergence of real 
pO!>J'er in the commissions coincided with the invention of the internal 
combustion engine and its application to transportation. Even so, the 
railway technology has shown considerable vitality, and more than half 
a century went by before major segments of the industry became clearly 
nonviable as private business enterprises. 
The railway industry still follows a form of industrial organization 
based on the state of the art, both social and technical, of the early 
19th Century. Its competitors evolved in the 20th Century and not un-
surprisingly, have adopted 20th Century organizational forms. The 
rail industry might be strengthened if it would borrow from those 
forms. 
"What if • • ." 
If the historical sequence of technical inventions had been different, 
our present social organization of transport would be different. Sup-
pose highway technologies had evolved before the application of steam 
power to locomotion, or alternatively, that such an application had 
never occurred. 
Robert Fogel,4 an econometrician, has played with the latter possibility. 
His crystal ball shows a greatly expanded use of internal waterways, but 
no significant difference in the long-term development of the country, 
or the level of its productivity. 
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Smeeth surface highways would prebab1y have been built to' ferm a natiena1 
web; ~n1and waterways 'Jeu1d have been mere fully deve1eped. Some form 
ef railways weu1d, no. deubt, be built for their original purpose: the 
carriage ef heavy cemmodities such as coal and ore. 
Pepu1ation and industrial locations clearly concentrate at transport 
nedes. The nedes, undeubted1y, would have been different, and the 
waterway junctions, and particularly transshipment points, would have 
been mere impertant. Louisville, Cairo, and St. Louis would have be-
ceme relatively mere important; Chicago. and Atlanta less so. The arid 
West weu1d prebab1y have been slower to develop; intercoastal shipping 
service, even without an isthmian canal, would have had greater growth. 
Large cerperatiens weuld have appeared later O.n the social scene. The 
organizatien of water and highway transport would have been much more 
fractionated, much more the province of the individual entrepreneur. 
Highway transport wO.uld resemble the present owner-operator pattern; 
inland water transpert would resemble the European barge operation, 
also individually owned. Pricing would have been competitive, and in-
volved much bargaining and ad hoc negetiation. And finally, without 
the streng menepo1y elements of the railways, there would have been no 
need for the regulatory commissions. 
In summary, the railway technology in the 19th Century required the ap-
p1icatien ef large-scale erganizatiens to transport. If the sequence 
ef inventeries had differed by a few decades, the railway techno1egy 
might have had a less enthusiastic receptien, and menopo1y might be 
less entrenched in our secia1 erganization of transpert. 
The New Techne1egies 
The early 20th Century was a peried of great techne10gical innovation 
in transpert. The internal combustion engine pushed highway transport 
to' the fore; toward the third decade of the century air transport 
emerged as a dynamic industry. 
The period from World War I to the 1930s saw the emergence of new and 
competitive transport technologies, and the strengthening of the regu-
latOry commissions. The most important increment to the strength of 
the ICC was the addition of entry control in 1920. By this time, in-
vestment in: new railreads had ended; but in any case, since the railway 
companies were showing financial weakness, ascribed to too much compe-
titien, additional competition in rail technology was prohibited. 
Awkwardly, since highway development was already making rail branch 
lines redundant, the 1920 law required commission approval not only 
for new lines, but also. for abandonments, a situation the rails were 
to' regret fer more than half a century. 
The 1930s saw the extension of the railroad monopoly philosophy to the 
new transport technologies. The highway system and airspace were 
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ubiquities. Capital requirements for vehicles were small. Possibili-
ties were offered for tailor-made and competitive transport for persons 
and property between virtually all points. Nevertheless, the economic 
model of the railway as a "natural" monopoly was so strongly entrenched 
in our thinking that it was extended uncritically to the newer technol-
ogies. An especially serious limit on innovation in the new technologies 
was the imposition of entry controls, as in railway fashion. Established 
carriers received "grandfather" rights and protection from further com-
petition; newcomers who might have thought of novel ways of conducting 
business were excluded. 
In summary, railroads came in large units. Their competitive behavior 
was considered antisocial. After World War I, entry controls were 
adopted in the hopes of obtaining better utilization of the existing 
plant. In the ~epression of the 1930s, entry controls were extended 
to the 20th Century technologies. Those controls hold innovators out 
of the industry. As outsiders, potential innovators have no voice in 
Congress and remain unrecognized. Only the established industry is 
heard, and the status quo is preserved. 
A Review of Regulation and Its Effects 
As we have seen in the concluding paragraph in the previous section, 
the invariant 19th Century business organization of the rails is en-
couraged by the regulatory structure that gives its attention to those 
established in the industry. Innovators are ineffective outsiders, 
even though their voices may be heard in the analyses of regulation. 
First, consider some past. studies of regulation which have generally 
fol1o~ed 011e of two tracks: the economic aspects of transport regu-
1ation--cartel pricing, umbrella rates, and the resulting misalloca-
tion of resources--or the procedural and organizational problems of 
the regulatory agencies--relations vis-a-vis the industry and the 
public; national transportation policy determination, or lack thereof; 
and problems of imp1ementation.* 
The economically oriented.studies have fairly adequately established 
that regulation has resulted in misallocations of resources in the ICT 
industry, which cost consumers money since costs of transportation are 
higher than in a truly competitive market·. A few studies have attempted 
to measure these costs: airline trunk fares were estimated 20% to 95% 
higher than they should have been in 196.5 and between 45% and 84% higher 
*A bibliography of the major post-World War II studies is given at the 
end of this paper and includes brief descriptions of the major recom-
mendations of each study. 
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in 1972;5 ICC regulation was found to have resulted in average annual 
excess costs from $3.775 billion to $8.790 billion in recent years;6 
another source estimated their costs on freight traffic only at $2 
billion to $5 billion annually. 7 
Most studies have also acknowledged that there are other costs of 
regulation imposed on our society, which elude quantification and are 
of a more psychological or moral nature. What is argued here is that 
regulation eliminates all meaningful incentives to innovate and so 
demoralizes the ICT industry that it tends to fight innovation when-
ever and wherever it occurs. 
This disinterest in innovation, despite a note of concern in past re-
ports on regulation, has been given little explicit ~ecognition, one 
reason being, perhaps, the intangible and immeasurable loss to society 
of uncreated or even unadopted innovations. There are not wholly com-
petitive intercity transport industries in other postindustrial nations 
with which to compare, and there are interactive effects which preclude 
a simple comparison between a small unregulated sector of the industry 
and the regulated sector; such a comparison, if possible, would not be 
simple to evaluate. Innovation can take many forms, and the forms of 
its regulatory frustrations are likewise diverse. 
Consider the source of innovation. Innovation is usually expected to 
come from those within the industry who presumably know the most about 
its needs, who have the most information about the potential payoff of 
innovations and usually are the beneficiaries. Of course, there are 
frequent short~term discentives, such as fixed investments, that might 
discourage some innovations, but if the payoff is significant, there 
will probably be someone willing to adopt an innovation. 
The contention here is that regulation has turned this situation inside 
out in the transportation industry. First, the most effective stimula-
tion for innovation is the clear perception of market forces. Regula-
tory policies and practices have, however, severely distorted the opera-
tion of ICT market forces. Many potential innovators are outsiders. 
They usually do not have as much information as insiders, and so are 
less motivated and fewer in number than in a truly competitive industry; 
but there is minimal incentive for outside innovators, since the indus-
try is usually not interested in purchasing an innovation, because there 
is no incentive to do so. So, the only way to introduce an innovation 
to the industry is for the outside innovator to become a member of the 
industry, which is exactly what the regulatory agencies have.been best 
at discouraging. 
A recent study concluded, not surprisingly, that there is more effec-
tive stimulation for innovation than a clearly perceived market "pUll," 
To be effective, this "pull" must be allowed to be expressed in terms 
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that the private sector can u!3e to determine fairly acctlrate1y the 
risk/payoff potential. A poll conducted as part of the study indicated 
that uncertainty about future rulings and federal regulatory policies 
was a critical factor in evaluation procedures. s While this study 
was not concerned with the traditionally regulated industries" an an-
alogy would seem to be appropriate. 
Congress has never required firm statements of policy either of itself 
or of the regulatory agencies,9 and it is doubtful that regulatory 
agency appointees have the qualifications or interest to establish 
policies. Indeed, it is not always clear that regulatory agencies are 
even aware of the policy implications of many of their decisions. On 
the other lland, it is unrealistic to expect Congress to establish policy 
edicts; there are simply too many diverse interests in Congress. It 
is easier to agree to do something (spend money on a project or program) 
than to agree on why it is being done. The lack of clearly enunciated 
policy maximizes the uncertainty associated with the outcome of any 
regulatory proceeding. 
In regulatory matters, the tendency of the agencies is to move on beaten 
paths. Balancing decision making to avoid the appearance of favoritism 
seems to predominate over maintaining consistent judgment criteria. 
Congress is no more ~onsistent in its reviews of the regulators' activi-
ties. The result is that chance predominates, which hardly reassures 
anyone. 
Inordinate delay characterizes the disposition of proceedings before 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and 
most other regulatory agencies. In the CAB, the average age of dockets 
closed by formal proceedings in 1962 was 32 months. On June 30, 1959, 
of 46LI proceedings then pending, 166 had been so over three years. 
Conte~ted proceedings before the ICC at that time consumed between 18 
and 36 months. IO The Rock Island merger case was before the ICC for 
11 years without a decision. It is doubtful that these averages have 
changed appreciably. Uncertainty increases over time, making a cur-
rent innovation less attractive. In addition, the value of an innova-
tion is considerably reduced if it cannot be made to payoff for three 
years or more. Of course, not all innovations require regulatory pro-
ceedings, but regulatory involvement in the industry is pervasive 
enough that the threat extends to practically all horizons. 
In general, then, the framework of the present regulatory system has 
preserved the status quO. 11 Regulatory decisions are not based on any 
established principles; chance seems to playa great role in agency 
considerations; and excessive delays characterize the performance of 
the agencies, all of which militate against the objective of a dynamic, 
innovative ICT industry. 
Within the rCT industry the disincentives for innovation are most 
closely associated with rate regulations, although the common-carrier 
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concept has some effect also. Regulatory agencies have encouraged the 
for.mation and maintenance of regional rate bureaus. All carriers in 
each mode serving a region are encouraged (coerced? persuaded?) to 
join the bureau and to determine regional rates. The necessity of 
agreement on a common set of rates is undoubtedly a dampening in-
fluence on innovation. 12 In a competitive industry this would be 
known as illegal collusion and price fixing; being that such compe-
tition is destructive. 
Carriers, then, using the rate bureaus, have attempted to devise rates 
that will maximize their profits. Each of these small cartels is, 
however, to some extent in competition. A considerable amount of ad-
versary maneuvering is thus encouraged in the regulatory agency's re-
view of rates. Carriers will attempt, for example~ to minimize the 
information supplied to the agency for fear of its competitive use by 
other carriers. Given their endemic lack of expertise and resources, 
the regulators, not surprisingly, exhibit a willingness to accept a 
passive review function. 13 Lacking adequate information, they reject 
most innovations because of inability to predict impact. It has been 
suggested that perhaps an even more fundamental problem of the regula-
tory process is that it diverts a management's attention from considera-
tion of opportunities to serve transportation needs to the rather paro-
chial concern of how to divide up existing traffic. 14 The systematic 
needs of shippers and travelers, which could offer opportunities for in-
creased profit, are largely ignored. 
The primary goal of the regulatory agency is, then, to maintain the 
balance of power between adversaries by ensuring that rate changes 
do not upset the prevailing market shares of each mode. 15 Any sweep-
ing innovation is probably self-defeating for the carrier, as its 
costs might well bankrupt it before any payoff could be realized. 
Simple cost-saving innovations are an exception, and not surprisingly, 
most have been of this type, for instance, the diesel-electric loco-
motive and automatic crossing gates. I6 
Rate flexibility is necessary to allow the innovative carrier to reap 
some benefit. Regulation, by inhibiting (and practically prohibiting) 
rate flexibility, denies to the ICT industry the temporarily large prof-
its that are the inducement to innovation in a competitive market. Car-
riers have no incentive when they know that they cannot gain anything 
from innovation; this is not a case of holding out for unjustified re-
turns but simply a fair market return when due. The result of this im-
pediment to innovation is that the lCT firms tend to supply transporta-
tion of lower quality and at higher rates than would otherwise be true. I' 
Another factor that contributes to the destruction of incentive within 
the industry is the common-carrier concept. Most regulated carriers 
are common carriers and must transport cargo tendered by shippers so 
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long as it is in the proper form (packaging, etc.). That requires 
maintenance of excess capacity to serve all potential customers. 
The conunon carriers may be the "carrier of last resortH for many ship-
pers or trave1ers. ls Investment in excess capacity adds considerably 
to the cost of adopting any technological innovation, the result being 
that an innovation is not adopted unless the payoff is so great that it 
makes up for its underutilization. In addition, if the carrier is 
financially unstable, additional.required capital may prove an im-
possible burden; the British recognized this some years ago and aban-
doned the standby capacity concept. 
Regulation has created innumerable anomalous situations for carriers 
within the industry. For example, in 1958, unit-train rates (as dis-
tinguished from individual-car rates) for shipping coal to the North-
east would have produced considerable additional profits for the 
railroads, but the divisions were not distributed to net each carrier 
some additional profits. Some might have incurred temporary losses. 
That would not have mattered in a competitive industry, but the po-
tential losers were able to preven.t the adoption of the rates for four 
years, by which time no ra'ilroads were apparently going to come out on 
the short end, and the rates were finally approved. The rate bureau 
system and rate regulation made this situation possible.i 9 
MacCallum has examined a number of proposed multiple-car rate cases. 
The general evidence is that multiple-car shipments cost the railroad 
less than shipments by the traditional unit, the single car. That is 
because the cars can be handled in a block. Thus, fewer switching 
movements are required. The limit of the multiple-car shipment is, 
of course, the unit train. MacCallum estimates that ICC reluctance 
to move away from the traditional single-car load as the pricing unit 
may have cost the railroads $4 million to $18 million in the five years 
1958 to 1962. 20 
The conunon~carrier concept has also contributed to this situation. For 
instance, a regulated motor carrier wished to use a collapsible rubber 
tank, developed to aid in the tr~nsport of dry, flowable commodities, 
which offered the opportunity of increased efficiency, particularly no 
expensive return haul of a bulky empty tank. It was ruled, however, 
that common carriers could take advantage of this innovation only if 
the tanks were filled and then loaded on the truck, a practical impos-
sibility; otherwise they could only be used by nonregulated contract 
carriers. 21 
The piggyback idea has existed since early in the century; however, not 
until 1931 did a railroad attempt to apply it. But, the ICC failed to 
approve the rate application until 1936, at the depth of the Depression, 
at which time the railroads were desperate. 22 There are five different 
rate schedules for piggyback service depending on who solicits the 
traffic, supplies the cars and trailers, and performs the road delivery. 
Rate Plans III and IV are unusual because they are flat rates. (Most 
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transportation rates are of the va1ue-of-service type.) These two 
specja1 rates were developed for freight forwarders; however, the ICC 
made them available to any shipper. Undoubtedly, these rates would 
have attracted considerable new traffic; however, the railroads saw 
them as a dire threat to their complex price discrimination rate sys-
tem; they fought them all the way to the Supreme Court. 23 
There is, then, considerable evidence to support the conclusion that 
federal regulation has aggravated and compounded inherent differences 
between transport modes, denied reasonab1~, rate flexibility to all 
modes, and encouraged the maintenance of eXC0SS capacity. Not sur-
prisingly, the ICT industry is suffering from·an acute case of insti-
tutionalized frustration. What is lacking is the "courage to abandon 
the safety of protection and the privilege of inefficiency,,,2lt or in 
other words, the desire to be innovative. 
If innovation is not to come from within, then how about from without'? 
It is reasonable to expect that "outsiders" could develop innovations 
applicable to the ICT industry, especially given the low rate of in-
ternal innovation. There is a considerable amount of intercity trans-
portation performed by unregulated carriers of' various types. One 
would expect them to be at least moderately innovative, since they are 
subject to competitive forces, and they are innovative. 
The unregulated sector includes no railroads or petroleum pipelines, 
no highway passenger carriers, approximately 60% of the highway freight 
carriage (ton-miles), and about 90% of the inland waterways carriage. 
Intrastate airlines are typically regulated in a lenient fashion by 
their states. Even in the modes where the unregulated sector is large, 
its product mix is fairly severely limited. In inland waterways, the 
mix is limited to three bulk-commodities per "tow," or wet of barges. 
Large volumes of single bulk-commodities are thus required. In high-
way freight, there is a considerable amount of private transportation; 
the shipper owns and operates his own vehicles solely for his own re-
quirements. 
There are the "gray areas," including carriers of commodities, notably 
farm products, that are specifically exempted from regulated common 
carriage and a class known as "contract carriers" whose definition is 
even less clear. Where these unregulated carriers directly compete 
with regulated carriers, they_haVE: clearly been far more innovative; 
they supply better servif',e.F':.at low,ar rates. 25 In fact, they are so 
successful that considerabIe amounts of the most desirable traffic have 
been attracted to private. :ind professional unreguZated carriage, where-
ever it is allowed and, probably, a few cases where it is not. 
Regulated carriers have consequently been left with the less desirable 
traffic, the rates on which have been held low by the regulation, and 
with considerable investment in excess capacity: a misallocation of . 
resources caused by the regulatory system. 26 There are two readily 
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apparent ways of redressing this competitive imbalance: 
carriers to regulation, or entirely eliminate regulation 
industry. 27 
subject all 
of the ICT 
The ICC and CAB have, of course, advocated the extension of their regu-
latory powers, so that all of the disruptive (read innovative) elements 
of the industry can be brought into line. The railroads, with nothing 
to lose and much (perhaps) to gain, also consistently advocated regula-
tory extension, having originally proposed the National Transportation 
Policy statement, which establishes regulation as a national goal, in 
the Transportation Act of 1940.2e 
In their dealings with outsiders, the regulatory agencies favor the 
protection of the existing regulated carriers rather than the future 
of innovation for the shipping and traveling public. 29 For instance, 
the offering of more efficient and faster service, more responsive to 
the needs of shippers, by an outsider desiring to enter the industry is 
considered by the ICC to be irrelevant to its decision. 30 CAB route 
award policy is extremely erratic or nonexistent. Neither efficiency 
or any other argument for certification 31 has been consistently ac-
cepted. It appears that if the agency can find an argument, no matter 
how unreasonable, to deny entrance to the industry to a potential in-
novator, it will be used. 
This control over entry is a very effective barrier to the introduction 
of innovation from outside the industry. It can even impede innovation 
elsewhere in the economy since transportation is an intermediate ser-
vice. For instance, the concentration and freezing of juice from 
Florida oranges offered the potential of great transportation savings: 
elimination of water reduced weight. The growth of this innovative new 
process was, however, severely hampered by the reluctance of the ICC 
to certify new refrigerated-service carriers. 
In-general, the regulatory agency petitioner must be well supplied with 
funds and willing to wager them on his chances of ultimar.ely being suc-
cessful. The result is that small businessmen are practically ex-
cluded,32 and that means many fewer potential innovators. All available 
evidence seems, then, to indicate that regulation has resulted in worse 
conditions with respect to innovation than would otherwise obtain. 33 
Deregulation in varying forms and to varying degrees has been proposed 
in each recent administration. Congress has made no more than nominal 
changes. Meantime, the rail industry is ':!ollapsing. 
The following sections outline the steps by which ConRail will be orga-
nized in 1976, and point out ways by which the bankrupt rail industry, 
and perhaps the whole rail industry, could adapt to 20th Century organi-
zation. 
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Death of the 19th Century Rail System 
The latter half of the 20th Century has seen the decay of the private 
enterprise rail system with its 19th Century form of business organiza-
tion. Labor and material shortages during World War II gave the rails 
a reprieve, but the postwar decades saw the progressive decline and 
collapse of the U.S. rail system. In 1975, the bankrupt railways ex-
tend as far west as Denver. New York, Newark, and Boston, for example, 
are accessible only by bankrupt rail carriers. 
Historical~y, bankrupt railrQads could be reorganized by scaling down 
the capital structure; that is, operating results were positive. The 
rail ba~kruptcies of the 1970s are, however, characterized by negative 
cash flow at the operating level; with present business practices, re-
organization is not possible even if capital charges are reduced to 
zero. Thus, revenue"must be increased and/or costs reduced if the bank-
rupt railways are to survive as private business enterprises. Raising 
revenue is, however, difficult: higher prices are driving traffic to 
the newer competition, and the quality of rail service is deteriorating. 
One key to further cost reductions lies in the restoration of track con-
ditions to a quality that will permit train movements at the speeds 
which were common a generation ago. That would improve the productiv-
ity of both labor and capital. Another key lies in agreements for train 
manning. * The bankrupt railways have, however, been operating with fre-
quent infusions of federal funds; as long as Congress is willing to 
support crews of the present size, the unions have no reason to negoti-
ate for lower manning scales. 
The bankrupt railways have suffered from massive undermaintenance. 
Rails and ties have lives of some two decades. Under generally accept-
able accounting practices, their replacement would be an investment to 
be depreciated over their estimated useful lives. Railways operate 
under ICC rules, however, and ICC accounting provides that rail and tie 
*Present rules require men on each train: engineer and head-end brake-
man on the locomotive and conductor and rear-end brakemen in the ca-
boose. The Florida East Coast, the only railway not a party to the 
union agreement, operates with crews of two men--engineer and conduc-
tor in the locomotive. The rear of the train is marked by a radio 
beacon tuned to a receiver in the locomotive according to the length of 
the train. A change in the distance between rear beacon and locomotive 
receiver notifies the engineer if the train has separated. Extra 
switching movements of the caboose are thus avoided, and yard expense 
is reduced. 
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replacement is an expense. Management thus uses track work as a tax 
haven, performing it in profitable years when tax liabilities threaten 
and deferring it in unprofitable years. Since the bankrupt railroads 
lack profitable years, tracks are rarely maintained. The result is 
slow train speeds. A train crew cannot, for example, make its run from 
terminal to terminal during the maximum period of consecutive work per-
mitted by the liCC. Thus, after 16 hours the train must stop, report, 
and wait 4ntil ,a relief crew is hrought by taxi, which expensively re-
turns the exhausted crew to its base. Cincinnati to Columbus and return 
was, for example, a day's work for a crew. It is nowaday's work for 
three crews. Since there are fixed coefficients between labor and 
capital, the productivity 9f both labor and capital is drastically re-
duced by the poor state of the track. 
The USRA's FinaZ System PZan calls for bringing 6,300 miles of branch 
line up to conditions to sustain 10 mph; 34 that speed is the speed for 
minimum track conditions under Federal Railroad Administration safety 
standards. 35 
The decay of the railway physical plant has reduced the productivity of 
both labor and capital. Slow and unreliable service has alienated ship-
pers. Only the largest shippers have been able to develop their own 
unit trains. Smaller shippers are pushed to develop their own transport 
on the highways, so furthering the decay of the rails. 
Some Current Policy Options 
Outside the United States, rails were developed during the 19th Century 
as private enterprises in some countries and in other countries as 
government undertakings. Sometimes, as in France, arrangements were 
mixed. The government built the lines and then leased them to qualified 
private ertterprises for operation. 
By the late 19th Century, there was a continuing shift throughout the 
world from private enterprise railways to government-owned and -operated 
systems. The mechanism was almost always the same: the private enter-
prise fell into financial difficulties; continuation of the service was 
considered essential. By the end of World War II, the Canadian Pacific 
remained the only significant nongovernment railway outside the U.S. 
Railway systems abroad had been governmentalized before 20th Century 
traffic control techniques were well developed and widely used. Govern-
ments took over the railways with their 19th Century management organi-
zations intact. 
It is only in the u.S. that governmental acquisition of the railways 
has been delayed until the late 20th Century, and hence, that acquisi-
tion is reluctant, tentative, and disguised as an interim arrangement 
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pending the restoration of profitable private enterprises. It is not 
surprising that this reluctant and temporary acquisition is carried 
out according to well-established ideologies. 
This section reviews the present plans and forecasts. Then the next 
section indicates a possible new method of railway organization. The 
latter would be based on the organization of other 20th Century 
transport technologies and would employ 20th Century communication 
methods. The alternative may offer the possibilities of increased 
utilization of the rail technology, decreased governmental subsidy 
requirements, the encouragement of innovation, and the reduction of 
regulation. 
At present, the major bankrupt carriers are the Boston & Main, Penn 
Central, Central of New Jersey, Reading, Lehigh & Hudson River, Erie 
Lackawanna, Lehigh Valley, Ann Arbor, and Chicago Rock Island & 
Pacific. The area served primarily by bankrupts extends along the 
Atlantic Coast from Portland to Norfolk; generally north of the Ohio 
River. The northern edge of this territory includes Montreal, Macki-
naw City, Twin Cities, and Sioux Falls. Denver, Colorado Springs, and 
Tucumcari describe the western border, and Galveston and Memphis the 
southern. * 
It is useful to look at the bankrupts as a system, since only with 
them are significant changes in structure and organization currently 
possible. Present institutional arrangements, as embodied in the 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, look upon the eastern bank-
rupts as a possible system. 
The Penn Central (PC) is the major bankrupt, and in the five years 
since its collapse, there has been time for considerable investiga-
tion and legislation. Initially, it had been supposed that reorgani-
zation could occur in the usual way. Only recently has the need for 
more imaginative treatment become clear. Even so, most solutions are 
still based on the accepted pattern of rail operation during the last 
century and a half. 
The Rock Island (RI) bankruptcy occurred only in 1975, and a different 
treatment is being proposed for it. This line was recognized as a non-
viable independent railway more than 11 years ago;37 plans'were made to 
merge the line into adjacent railroads. Those plans usually involved 
*A study by Altman 36 attempts to forecast bankruptcies, and most of the 
above lines were selected in advance by the model, which also selected 
Western Pacific. While that c.ompany is presently operating at a loss, 
it is still solvent. Should the model be correct, the bankrupt system 
would extend to San Francisco, with a solvent gap between Denver and 
Salt Lake. 
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dismemberment. with RI routes being assigned to a number of carriers. 
The ICC did not act decisively during those 11 years; then the RI col-
lapsed, and the problem is now one of maintaining any service at all 
over its lines. 
In the five years since the Penn Central collapse, Congress has enacted 
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-236, 87 Stat. 
986), but Illinois is westernmost of the states included in the statutory 
definition of the region. Since Illinois is the easternmost state served 
by RI, it is difficult to include the RI in the Act's concerns. 
The underlying ideas of the Act are ascribed to the legal department of 
the Union Pacific Corporation, one of whose major holdings is the Union 
Pacific RailrDad. 38 In its final form, the Act seems to have been drafted 
to obtain as many inputs as possible. A detailed timetable of reports 
was provided, as follows: 
February 1, 1974 
May 2, 1974 
February 26, 1975 
April 27, 1975 
July 25, 1975 
August 25, 1975 
November 9, 1975 
February 27i 1976 
Report by u.S. Department of Transportation, 
Rail Service in the Midwest and Northeast 
Region. 
Evaluation of that DOT report by the newly 
established Railway Services Planning Of-
fice (RSPO) of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. 
USRA Preliminary System Plan (PSP). 
RSPO Evaluation of USRA's PSP based on public 
hearings beginning March 17, 1975. 
USRA Final System Plan (FSP). 
ICC Evaluation of FSP. 
Probable date before which Congress must have 
disapproved FSP. 
ConRail will commence operations. 39 
The USRA Final System Plan became final since Congress did not disap-
prove. (In the event of disapproval, the USRA would have returned to 
square one and prepared a revised final plan in cooperation with the 
DOT and the RSPO of the ICC.) Until ConRail commences operation, the 
USRA can commit federal funds to the support of regional rail lines. 
The Act authorized the USRA to establish a for~profit Consolidated Rail 
Corporation in Philadelphia (ConRail) to take over the operation of the 
bankrupt eastern lines in accordance with the Final Plan. The equity 
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in ConRail is to be held by the estates of the bankrupt lines, put the 
majority of the Board of Directors is to be federally appointed as 
long as the majority of the debt is federally held. Until ConRail 
is established, abandonments are prohibited, but rail service con-
tinuation subsidies are authorized. Employees are protected if the 
operation of the Act deprives them of employment. 
The above sequential reports represented a serious attempt to evaluate 
the rail system and to develop a model of rail operations, but the un-
derlying form of business operation was never questioned, that is, a 
single operating organization. The DOT report quantified the flow of 
traffic, developed its nodular concept of railway operation, and con-
templated the abandonment of a substantial amount of branch line, par-
ticularly in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. A common pattern was that . 
cities were to have one line leading out to a main route, the hypothe-
sis being that traffic carried by rail is not time-essential traffic, 
and that circuitry will not be critical in its retention on the rails. 
USRA Preliminary System Plan. The USRA Preliminary System Plan 
was largely based on reports of private consultants. It proposed 
somewhat less rail line abandonment than did the DOT. 
In the latter stages of the Plan's preparation, the Erie Lackawanna 
(EL) abandoned hope for an income reorganization under Sec. 77 and 
asked for inclusion in the USRA Plan. At that time, USRA could only 
suggest a tentative plan for its inclusion: hope that a solvent road 
would acquire EL e~st of Buffalo. That would offer New York City 
both ConRail and a private-line service. If EL were reacquired by the 
Norfolk and Western (N&W), a solvent line, the latter would be per-
mitted to connect directly with an affiliate, Delaware & Hudson (D&R) , 
which, in turn, connects with the Boston & Maine (B&M) (in Sec. 77, 
bankruptcy). Competitive service could also be provided to Boston. 
In addition, if B&M were successfully reorganized, a private route 
would be available to compete with ConRail. 
The Chessie System, a solvent line operating into Philadelphia over a 
single track, was planned to obtain some of the Reading (RDG) lines 
in southeastern Pennsylvania, but the old B&O route into New York over 
the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey (CNJ) would not be pTe-
served. Finally, CNJ would become part of ConRail and New York City 
would be left with, at best, two carriers. 
If the solvent carriers were unwilling to embroil themselves in the 
East Coast terminal problem, lISRA recommended the formation of two com-
peting government lines: MARC-EL (Middle Atlantic Rail Corporation 
plus the Erie Lackawanna) and ConRail. MARC-EL would consist of the EL 
plus CNJ, RDG, and Lehigh Valley Railroad (LV) lines, which would give 
MARC-EL access to most major terminal cities in northern Delaware, 
eastern Pennsylvania, northern New Jersey, and New York. Competitive 
service to Boston would be maintained over D&H-B&M connections. EL's 
western connections are limited; presently only Cincinnati and Chicago 
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are the major junctions. USRA also contemplates a rationalization of 
routes west of Mansfield, Ohio, and EL and ConRail having trackage 
routes over the better lines to at least Cincinnati, St. Louis, and 
Chicago. 
A number of other alternatives were considered and rejected, the most 
important being a separation of ConRail into east and west (thus mak-
ing a separate company of the complicated eastern terminals) and north 
and south (essentially a demerger of Penn Central into the old New York 
Central and Pennsylvania). Also rejected was the establishment of a 
Consolidated Facilities Corporation (ConFac), which would own the right-
of-way used by ConRail. The ConFac concept was not explored in any de-
tail; USRA stated that too many questions remained to be resolved be-
fore any type of recorunendation could be made. 4o 
In the Northeast Corridor, it was recommended that the present PC line 
between Boston and Washington be acquired by AMTRAK, the National Rail-
road Passenger Corporation, on the supposition that freight traffic 
between Boston and Washington would move via the B&M, D&H, LV, and RDG 
to connect with the Chessie System in Philadelphia. That would sepa-
rate freight and passenger service completely and rid ConRail of some 
of its most difficult terminal operations, although generating cir-
cuitry and some capacity problems. The old B&O line from Philadelphia 
to Washington, formerly double-tracked, has been reduced to single line; 
if competitive western traffic to southern Pennsylvania together with 
all freight traffic between the south and New England were to be routed 
over the old B&O line, then double-track operation would presumably 
have to be restored by private enterprise. 
USRA projects that with two private systems (N&W over EL into New York 
AMTRAK and New England; Chessie into Philadelphia) and passenger traf-
fic in the Northe,ast Corridor shifted to AMTRAK (Le., another govern-
ment budgetary item), ConRail could become profitable by 1978. 
Fishwick's Proposal. The Railway Services Planning Office (RSPO) 
of the ICC (established by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, which 
provided an initial in~ut into usRA planning by commenting briefly on 
the DOT's first study) 1 held hearings in over 20 locations during 
March 1975. Approximately 1,900 witnesses were heard, 42 one of the most 
impressive being John P. Fishwick, President of the N&W, one of the two 
major solvent railroads in the region. Fishwick had been pushing for a 
general solution to the northeastern railroad problem since 1970, but 
he had been unable to make his ideas effective. 43 
Fishwick argued that the USRA's ConRail plan did not provide a private 
sec,tor solution to the northeast rail problem, that USRA' s financial 
projections were tOo optimistic, and that the solvent railroads cannot 
compete with ConRail's governmental financial support and commitment. 
He proposed that the bankrupt lines be divided on an east-west basis, 
which was one of the possibilities considered by USRA. ConFac would 
purchase the eastern lines, east of Harrisburg and Albany, so providing 
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a conventionally reorganized PC with funds to rehabilitate lines west 
of Harrisburg and Albany. ConFac would then sell Dff the passenger 
lines: the Boston-WashingtDn cDrridor to AMTRAK and the commuter 
lines to local transit districts or authDrities, mDst Df which are al-
ready established. The solvent rDads wDuld then be prDvided with ex-
tensive new trackage rights Dver ConFac and PC, and thus access to. 
the eastern terminal cities. 
Since N&W does not presently reach the northeastern cities, Fishwick 
prDpDsed that his rDad be given trackage rights Dver PC from Orrville 
to Harrisburg, and/Dr Dver EL Dr LV east Df Buffalo.. In addition, to 
the Washington-New York range of cities, the plan wDuld provide N&W a 
connection to D&H at Scranton or Wilkes-Barre, and hence access to 
Boston via B&M. Fishwick dDes nDt suggest trackage rights to Boston, 
but N&W already has financial control over D&H. N&W's present eastern 
termini are Buffalo, Connellsville, Hagerstown, and Norfolk. Hagers-
town would be the terminal closest to the proposed ConFac. In summary, 
Fishwick believed that PC could operate profitably west of Albany and 
Harrisburg, and hence could be reorganized on an incDme basis, as evi-
denced by N&W and .Chessie's profitable operation in that same territDry.44 
Fishwick also attacked USRA's financial projections. Government debt 
holding, he argued, will dominate the capital structure into. the 21st 
Century, so leaving the government in contrDl. He did not, in additiDn, 
accept the forecasts of traffic growth, pointing out that PC has had 
none over the last five years, and that the growth in coal traffic, on 
which the USRA projections heavily rely, is not taking place in PC ter-
ritDry, but in the West. Moreover, USRA estimates assume that PC can 
attain the operating ratios of N&W, SDuthern, Chessie, Dr UniDn Pacific, 
which are among the lowest Df themajDr railrDads. Finally, he argues 
that PC's traffic mix and Dperating cDnditiDns are nDt nearly as faVDr-
able as those Df the above four lines, and he dDubts that anything like 
that ratio can be Dbtained with DperatiDns in the NDrtheast megalDpDlis. 
In a publication distributed by the UniDn Pacific RailrDad, the CDnFac 
prDposal was strDngly DPPDsed by the AssDciatiDnDf American RailrDads 
(MR).45 
RSPO Evaluation of the USRAPlan. Given such testimony, it is not 
surprising that the RSPO's evaluatiDn of the USRA Plan was hDstile, 
e.g., "We agree that it was preliminary but we must question whether 
it is a plan."46 
The RSPO evaluation rejects the USRA's three-carrier system (ConRail, 
N&W, and Chessie) in favDr of a four-carrier system. In the latter, 
ConRail would become two by the establishment of MARC-EL, to include 
EL, LV, RDG, CNJ, and Lehigh and Hudson River (L&HR). The other bank:'" 
rupts would go into ConRail. MARC-EL would extend west to. Cleveland, 
althDugh its principal cDnnectiDns wDuld be at Buffalo., served by N&W 
and Canadian lines, as well as a branch Df Chessie. 47 The RSPO also· 
notes that, "The Final System Plan should provide for the joint use of 
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rail facilities wherever this would be feasible and cost-effective.,,1j8 
Thus, RSPO arranged itself on the side of Fishwick for ConFac, opposing 
the AAR lead by the Union Pacific. 
The RSPO recommends, in addition, deferral of any 1ight-density-1ine 
abandonment pending another two years of study and data accumulation, 
relying meantime on the subsidy provided in the Act, which the RSPO 
finds ample. Some lines would then be acquired by ConRail, others 
would be acquired by the states and operated with matching federal sub-
sidies.1j9 The substantial federal expenditures for the RSPO program 
would be offset by an energy tax, 2 cents per gallon of fuel or 0.14 
cents per kilowatt-hour imposed on all domestic transport except buses. 
Despite its support of ConFac, the RSPO proposal was not well received 
in the private enterprise sector. The Wall Street Journal editorialized 
that the ICC plan "is heading towards a fully subsidized inefficient 
Northeast rail system that no doubt would eventually end up with the 
government in control. In the process it would weaken healthy private 
carriers, which no doubt would eventually make them eligible for an 
ICC rescue plan as well. The cut at the electric utilities seems to 
be gratuitous, perhaps with the notion of speeding up their eventual 
collapse. In other words, the ICC has devised an excellent plan for 
killing a number of birds, or a number of private industries, with 
one stone. Few other agencies, even in Washington, could have been so 
skillful. ,,50 
In May 1975, the DOT released the Administration's railroad plan, call-
ing for a very substantial weakening of ICC rate control powers, di-
rect federal lending to the rai1roads,51 activation of the USRA ver-
sion of ConRail on a temporary basis, and finally, a sell-off perhaps 
two years later, of pieces of ConRail to the solvent lines. 52 At the 
same time, the Milwaukee Road, a Western line running from the Ohio 
River to Puget Sound, signed a letter of intent to acquire leased 
lines from the PC as far east as Pittsburg. 53 That company had earlier 
been reported seeking trackage rights into Buffalo, presumably over 
PC. 
USRA Final System Plan. The USRA's Final System Plan presented some 
modifications from the P.SP. Fishwick's testimony before the ICC was es-
sentially ignored, and the N&W participated only mddestly in the FSP. 
N&W is offered trackage rights into Harrisburg from the southwest~ and 
D&H is offered trackage rights into Harrisburg from the northeast, so 
restoring the connection between those two roads which had been lost 
when EL went backrupt at the beginning of the decade. Those rights give 
N&W access to New England via the B&M, but not the access to New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington that Fishwick had proposed. N&W 
would also acquire a link northwest from Cincinnati, so shortening its 
route between the Mississippi and the Chesapeake. 
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The FSP reiterated the proposal that the present main passenger route 
between Boston and Washington be acquired by AMTRAK. ConRail would 
acquire from Chessie its sil1g1e-track line between Philadelphia and 
Baltimore. Only local freight service would then be operated along the 
present passenger route. Chessie, on the other hand, would acquire 
major new routes in the East. From the present system, access to 
Philadelphia and New York would be through Harrisburg over present RDG 
routes, instead of through Baltimore. EL routes would be acquired east 
of Akron, Cleveland, and Buffalo, so giving Chessie routes into major 
upstate New York cities, as well as a more direct route into New York 
City. 
There would be substantial abandonment of PC and LV lines: some routes 
in northern Michigan, most of those in West Virginia and thE3 Delmarva 
Peninsula. The central network has also been considerably thinned. 
The Delmarva service is offered to the Southern Railway (SR). Out-of-
gauge loads would then reach the Delaware, but otherwise this route 
would seem to do little to improve SR's traffic connections. In the 
PSP, Delmarva service was slated for abandonment. 
The major difference between the PSP and the FSP lies in the role of 
the N&W. The PSP hoped that the N&W would reacquire the EL lines from 
Cleveland and Buffalo into New York. EL had been part of the N&W sys-
tem prior to its bankruptcy at the beginning of the 1970s. But N&W 
had taketl over EL only reluctantly, under pressure from the ICC after 
merger with the Wabash and Nickel Plate had been approved. N&W is ap-
parently unwilling to take responsibility for its own terminals in the 
difficult New York and Philadelphia areas. When its suggestions for a 
ConFac east of Harrisburg were not accepted, it preferred to keep out 
of those markets. Thus, there is two-carrier service to the terminal 
area from Boston to Baltimore. ConRail will serve this entire area. 
Boston and Providence will have the B&Mand its connections, principally 
the D&H and, hence, the N&W; the other cities will hive Chessie. 
Financial Plans for ConRail. Given the continuing physical de-
terioration of the Eastern bankrupts, USRA has had to plan for massive 
rehabilitation expenditures, many of the main lines of PC, L&HR, and 
a bit of LV being assigned first priority. First priority rehabi1ita~ 
tion is defined as permitting freight train speeds of 60 mph. Rehabili-
tation is also planned for nine major yards and three industrial yards, 
plus the construction of a new trai1er-on-f1at-car (TOFC) yard. Second 
priority rehabilitation is proposed for other main lines, bringing them 
to standards defined only as "desired." With ConRail, 5,600 miles of 
line will get normal maintenance., but no rehabilitation, thus preserv-
ing those lines at the "desired" level; 6,300 miles will receive interim 
maintenance intended to permit operation at 10 mph; 2,000 miles will re-
ceive no maintenance;5'+ 5,757 miles are recommended for abandonment or 
continuation with local subsidy.55 
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Mainten~nce-of-way expense is forecast at $317 million in 1976, r~s~ng 
to $679 million by 1985,56 based on depreciation accounting, straight-
lining the depreciation on track and equipment assets at 3.33% to 6.67% 
per year. 57 ICC betterment accounting, which essentially treats 
investment as expense, would increase maintenance-of-way expense to 
$449 million in 1976, rising to $1,001 million by 1985. 58 Cash re-
quirements would be invariant regardless of accounting technique, but 
the chosen depreciation method will ~ive higher net income figures, 59 
so creating a deferred tax expense. 6 The higher earnings generated 
by generally accepted accounting principles should, however, result 
in higher market values for the Series B preferred stock and the com-
mon stock, and so minimize the Treasury's liability on the certifi-
cates of va1ue. 61 
The capital structure will consist of debentures and Series A preferred 
stock to be held by the government; Series B preferred stock, common 
stock, and certificates of value will be distributed to the estates of 
the bankrupt railroads as payment. Since the bankrupt railroads have 
no earning power and cannot be reorganized on an income basis, USRA is 
essentially valuing them at salvage value minus the liabilities, such 
as labor agreements, which ConRail will be assuming. A public market 
may develop in the securities distributed to the estates of the bank-
rupts. 
If ConRail does well, the stocks will be valuable and the certificates 
of value less so. If ConRail does badly, these certii:i.cates will in-
crease in value. Their basic redemption value rises at 8% compound 
per annum; redemption will be no later than 1987. Investors who buy 
such, certificates on the open market will be speculating against the 
success of ConRail. 
Hilton 62 and Conant 63 Jo~n Fishwick in doubting ConRail's chances of 
success. Hilton notes the analogy with AMTRAK, and the dominance in 
a quasi.-public corporation of politics over economics. Conant notes 
the failure to abandon enough lightly trafficked lines and to offer 
multicarrier service ov'er single lines through the use of trackage 
rights, a ConFac equivalent. Those doubts are widespread throughout 
the railway industry. At the American Enterprise Institute's con-
ference on }i'ederal Transportation Policy in 1974, similar doubts were 
expressed by Tellison 64 and McAdams. 65 
Perhaps the certificates of value, which represent 8% Treasury debt, 
might maintain market prices close to redemption value. Unfortunately, 
the USRA's ideas for ConRail marketing reflect railroad tradition: 
raise the price and reduce the service. 66 
Thus, at the end of 1975, the FSP was, well on the road ,to becoming ef-
fective. Congress had not objected. After some successful prior 
haggling, Chessie had agreed to take over EL on the same scrap-value 
basis as ConRail is acquiring its properties and subject to the federal 
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assumption of any liabilities which the bankrupt estates might have. 
ConRail had begun to bring together its new management team in 
Philadelphia. 
f 
ConRail represents a conservative 19th Century solution to the Northeast 
railroad problem. No change in industrial organization will take place; 
the 19th Century monopoly concept will be reinforced by the reduction in 
the number of carriers. An opportunity to apply to the railway industry 
a 20th Century industrial organization analogous to that of the other 
transport technologies has been missed. It may not be lost forever if 
the Administration has its way, and the ConRail organization is reviewed 
after a couple of years. But meantime, the vested interests in the 
status quo will be reinforced, and the probability of restructuring must 
be assessed as low. Conservatism, and even nostalgia, predominated and 
at federal expense. 
20th Century Organization Applied to the Rail Technology. It is 
time to consider the alternatives to the 19th Century railway organiza-
tion which are offered by the communication technologies of the 20th 
Century, and which have been adopted by all the other means of trans-
port. This section explains the way in which railways might be or-
ganized as public highways with many carriers using a common track. 67 
That is the pattern of transport by air, highway, and water. The USRA 
has called it ConFac. 
If multiple carriers were possible by all transport technologies, then 
the maintenance of monopolies by the certificate of public convenience 
and necessity would become tautological. It would be apparent that the 
certificate protects only the monopolist, since alternative entry 
would be free in all markets, and all shippers could be served if they 
were willing to pay market prices. A private sector solution could 
emerge. 
Rail technology has been the big stumbling block in most deregulation 
proposals. The political objection to deregulation has been that there 
may be a shipper who has no alternative to rail service; he is then 
gouged in the 19th Century fashion by the rail company; regulation 
prevents such gougings. If there were free entry, however, innovators 
would actively seek the shipper's business. At worst, the shipper 
could lease his own train. Privately owned unit trains serving power 
companies and international grain merchants are a long step in that 
direction. 
Here is one model of how free entry might work in the rail business. 
The track would be a public turnpike. Trackage rights would be avail-
able .to anyone paying the toll. The organization owning and maintain-
ing the track (or contracting for its maintenance) might run trains, but 
other organizations or individuals would also run trains and pay tolls. 
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Obviously, in the present context of bankrupt lines, the solvent con-
necting carriers would initially dominate. (As we have seen, they are 
already laying their plans.) But a group of entrepreneurs could be 
expected to offer rail service soon. Freight forwarders and leasing 
companies would probably form the nucleus of this group. No signifi-
cant capital investment would be required. Railroads already lease 
their motive power largely through equipment trusts. Privately owned 
freight cars are proliferating, partly owned by shippers, as in the 
past, who are not satisfied with the rolling stock offered by the rail-
way company. Increasingly, private raihqay cars are becoming more at-
tractive passive investments offering tax advantages analogous to those 
of real estate holdings. Whereas real estate investments typically 
require a fairly large equity, which often necessitates a limited 
partnership as a common form of organization, a railroad freight car 
requires only a four-figure equity, and hence is within the reach of 
the typical round-lot, common-stock, individual investor. Moreover, 
in 1975 a 10% investment tax credit is available for rail cars. That 
credit does not apply on real estate or common stock investments. 
Much of the private business organization is already in place. Lease 
management companies place the investor-owned rail cars on long-term 
lease with grain companies, electric utilities, or oil companies, and 
contract for their maintenance. 
The technology required to control variously owned trains i,0~nalogous 
to that used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) toc.0ntrol 
aircraft, though considerably simpler, since it is linear rather than 
three dimensional. Control personnel could be employees of the or-
ganization that owned and maintained the right-of-way, of the Federal 
Railway Administration, or of independent contractors. 
Control could be by two-way radio. Expensive line-side signaling is 
rarely necessary with the traffic densities of American railroads. Con-
trol of trains by radio would be much more positive than aircraft. Not 
only is train velocity only a small fraction of that of aircraft, the 
train driver can positively identify his location at any time, and he 
can stop. Radio control of trains seems much safer than that of air-
craft. There is, however, a greater probability that a train will run 
along an occupied track than that two aircraft will attempt to occupy 
the same airspace. 
Those using trackage rights would pay a toll, perhaps based on tonnage 
hauled, or a sliding scale based on gross weights per car, tq provide 
for the additional wear produced by heavy equipment. The toll might 
include traffic control costs and fees for expedited service. Trackage 
rights are a common phenomena in present railway practice. Examples of 
long distances of common track include Southern Pacific and Burlington 
Northern between Klamath Falls and Chemult, and Southern Pacific and 
Western Pacific between Winnemucca and Wells. In some cases two rail-
roads share a single track belonging to one of them. In other cases, 
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each company retains its own tracks with unidirectional operations over 
them. The present structure of intercompany payments for t~ackage rights 
constitutes still another model on which tolls could be based. 
More entrepreneurs and innovative service will mean more trains, and 
hence increased requirements for railroad labor. Railway union mem-
bership has b~en withering from attrition. Twenty years seniurity may 
be required for crew members tl) remain on the assignment board. The 
unions should be delighted with a proposal that may help rescue their 
declining industry. It is only second best to the safe government 
operation offered by ConRail. But ConRail projects only a 3% increase 
in employment over the next decade. 6a 
Provisions for the supply of labor on board trains might be modeled 
after the waterfront hiring halls of the ILWU, or it might be provided 
by independent contractors, much as labor is supplied to some inter-
national or charter airlines. In either case, there would have to be 
certification of competence by an appropriate authority, just as the 
Federal Aviation Administration or the Department of Motor Vehicles now 
test the competence of those using public airspace or highways. A 
union h:iring hall is most probable, since the competitive supply of 
transportation services will probably not engender a competitive sup-
ply of transportation labor. Note, however, that the other more compet-
itive transport technologies do not have industrywide labor organizations, 
and do have a fringe of nonunion producers. 
There are major terminals~-Roseville, Colton, and Barstow--where trains 
are sorted out by long-haul destination, and minor terminals--Bakers-
field, San Bernardino, Watsonville Junction, and Oakland--where cars 
are accumulated from shippers or distributed to consignees. The major 
and minor nodes may be less distinct in ConRail territory. But the 
yards already exist, often occupy~·:l.g too much valuable downtown land. 
For the political organization of yards, one can consider the airports 
and seaport models. Terminals are assets to local economy. They at-
tract labor to operate them and to man the long-distance movements to 
a.nd from the terminals; they imply a break in the. transportation process. 
Such nodes in the transportation process, even freeway interchanges, 
attract industry. While the movement is stopped, there is the tempta-
tion to do something for it or to it, so generating local income. Ter-
m~nals could be owned, for example, by local government agencies, or 
by turnpike landlords. Charges for the use of the terminal could be 
stated and billed separately to encourage through runs. Or terminals 
might be leased to wharves. Common rail facilities in st. Louis, Oak-
land, San Francisco, Stockton, and Washington are already well known, 
anc some operational modeling has been done. 69 
Srr,aller terminals could b~ managed in the same way, with local entrepre-
neurs undertaking the switching movements to deliver and pick up cars 
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at local industries. Local industries might form cooperatives for that 
purpose, if no entrepreneur were available. 
In many cases, rail service would become purely an industrial operation; 
since, for that purpose its technology is still so economical that new 
construction is undertaken. Bulk shippers or consignees of coal, iron 
ore, and grain might simply operate their own unit trains as part of 
their industrial processes, as might automobile manufacturers, who al-
ready use the rails as an extension of their assembly lines. 
Conceivably, over-the-road common-carrier truckers might also employ 
unit trains or trailers on flat cars. That action would require a re-
vision of their contract with the Teamsters, which now provides that 
if a driver is available he must be paid even if TOFC service is sub-
stituted. That revisjon might take the form of using rail-qualified 
Teamsters to man the .truckers' unit trains, or it might follow the 
pattern of the settlement for the handling of containers on the Pacific 
waterfront. In the latter case, the employers made substantial contri-
butions to the union's pension fund, which allowed the union to tie its 
members closer to it, and at the same time encourage a reduction in its 
active membership through early retirement.* 
Rehabilitation of track presents the greatest problem. The USRA esti-
mates that about $3 billion would be necessary to rehabilitate roadway 
and structures of ConRail over the next decade,7o and the RSPO esti-
mates that rehabilitation and modernization of track and equipment of 
all Class I railroads would cost upwards of $7 billion (RSPO, pp. 78 
and 82). An even larger-scale program for which RSPO proposes a two-
cent-per-gallon fuel tax would run to some $12 billion. 71 With Class I 
railways showing a deficit in 1975,72 internally generated funds are 
clearly not available within the industry. Thus, the availability of 
federal modernization and maintenance funds might constitute an incen-
tive even for solvent roads to abandon their 19th Century organization 
and,to ofrer trackage rights to others. 
The organization of highway funding may serve as a model for the develop-
ment of the rails as public highways, i.e., by offering trackage rights 
to all. Main lines can be treated like the interstate system and be 
made eligible for primarily federal funqing. Similarly, other lines 
could be treated like state highways, and light traffic could be largely 
consigned to local rsponsibility. Despite Fishwick' s complaint that 
*Container service is, however, more economical than conventional, 
manual cargo handling by a very large factor of between ten and a hun-
dred. Even if TOFC is more economical than over-the-road trucking; 
the advantage factor of its advantage is unlikely to be nearly as 
large, and of course, this factor quantified the motivation of manage-
ment to compensate the union for changes in the agreed work rules. 
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the USRA Plan does not provide a private-sector solution to the rail 
problem, no completely private-sector solution seems possible; more-
over, with the bankruptcy of the Rock Island and the emergence in 1975 
of lower earnings for the entire railway system, the possibility of 
any private-sector solution seems more distant. 
Imagination is seemingly in short supply. Although we are approaching 
the end of the 20th Century, none of the proposals so far moves far 
enough away from the forms of business and government organization 
created by the rail technology of the early 19th Century. By offering 
trackage rights to new entrepreneurs, innovative forms of business 
organization can be expected to emerge. Young people with new ideas 
can be expected to enter the industry. Private enterprise could be 
expected to thrive as it has within the highway system.* 
Conclusion 
Mechanisms for the use of the rail technolbgy by the general public 
require much more exploration. The underlying concept seems to offer 
possibilities for the revitalization of a long-established form of 
transport. Current plans, on the other hand, risk developing an ex-
pensive venture into nostalgia. The authors plan to develop further 
detail for a model of the rail technology open to common use. 
With all transport technologies open to public use, the need for elab-
orate economic regulations would wither. Deregulation would trigger 
technological and marketing innovations in ICT. 74 Presidential admin-
istrations including the present have consistently pushed in that di-
rection. 75 Unfortunately, inertia is a great force, and the outlook for 
deregulation is not promising. 76 
*USRA's FSP argues that it supports private enterprise,73 but it can 
also be seen as a step toward permanent government control .and the 
further institutionalization of 19th Century monopoly organization. 
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XII. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY INPUTS 
TO INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION TO THE YEAR 2000: 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ENERGY RESOURCES 
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ABSTRACT 
The 1975 to 1985 decade is a critical period in terms of u.S. vulner-
ability to economic interdictions of oil and OPEC-like raw material 
cartels and in terms of the formulation of a national policy on energy 
and resources. 
A continuing rise in the cost of raw materials and energy resources will 
result from two factors: greater demand for scarce resources by more 
and more industrializing countries and the depletion of high-grade 
deposits of certain resources. 
Government action or inaction will determine the nature and extent of 
the impact of resource scarcities. Government can puruse four courses 
of action: rationing and constraint mechanisms; minimal intervention; 
R&D and capital investments to produce substitute materials; and con-
servation and resource reutilization emphasis. A mixed set of strategies 
is, however, virtually inevitable. 
At one extreme of a continuum of policy choices is a "heroic effort" 
scenario, involving a near-term, high-level allocation of both public 
and private capital investment funds to locating and exploiting available 
material and energy supplies. Serious infrastructure bottlenecks·--oil 
refining capacity and the output level of equipment manufacture for 
offshore oil drilling , coal strip mining, and nuclear energy pressure 
vessels--n~ndate, however, additional major infrastructure investments 
and a reallocation of resourceS from other economic sectors. 
At the other extreme of the policy continuum is a "stumble along and 
pray" course of action: low-level R&D investment; inattention to 
infrastructure bottlenecks; and uncontrolled price increases as a 
remedy for resource shortages, along with a government rationing 
mechanism using a nominal degree of equity in scarce resource allo-
cations. 
Regardless of the policy options pursued, a highly probable ir.'Testment 
capital shortage coupled with rising costs of energy and materials 
development will mean stiffer competition among other activities, 
including intercity transportation, for portions of a shrinking invest-
ment capital pool. Generally, the capital shortage will militate 
against radically new ICT technologies which require entirely new infra-
,structures and will generate increased costs of both energy and maj:eria1s 
used in ICT. 
Both scenarios imply en~rgy and resource scarcities at some point and a 
direct impact on leT. In the "heroic effort" scenario, scarcities will 
develop in the relatively near-term because of an allocation of available 
capital resources to R&D and to renewable resources utilization strat-
egies at the expense of funding discovery and development of renewable 
resource supplies (e.g., petroleum); at the very least, greatly increased 
costs would arise from near-term dependence on imported materials and 
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energy resources. "Stumble along and pray" scenario problems jnclude. 
the insufficiency of this course of action to offset domestic energy 
producers' apparent disinvestment strategies or to attract necessary 
capital funding, and the continuing existence of infrastructure bottle-
necks (especially with respect to technological innovations). In the 
absence of a varied policy geared to the e.ntire energy and raw materials 
system (i.e., the entire economy), shortages will reBult, and long-range 
economic impacts will be enormous. 
The "heroic effort" scenario could have additional IC'l' impacts. Fuel 
(especially petrol/?lUm) rationing is one possibility. Availability of 
abundant, relatively cheap, electric power from renewable sources could 
make railroad electrification far more attractive. Pressures for 
increased transport efficiency and optimized operations will probably 
lead to mode restructuring; a lean railroad system and water carriers 
would handle long-haul commodity movement, and highway goods transpor-
tation would be confined to relatively short distances as a feeder 
service for the most efficient: lang·-haul carriers. 
Within the "stumble along and prayll scerl,ario, lCT would have fewer near-
term impacts. Lack of capital funds would make for less upgrading and 
improvement of the existing plant~ but service would continue for some 
time. Materials, especially fuel, shQrtages would have major impacts. 
The national economy might be restructured into regional, G\utonoillOUS 
economies with minimal long-haul transport. 
Substantial ICT costs will probably have several impacts: the demise 
of less essential transportation.; a geographic res tructuring of 
activities to mini!llize ICT costs; increased efficiency of rCT systems; 
and substantial changes in regulacion. 
Personal intercity transportation is in a somewhat different position 
than that of carrier modes. Business travel will c0ntinue unabated, 
regardless of fuel price, so long as fuel is available. Social and 
recreational travel depends, however, on both fuel price and avail-
ability. It is difficult to ascertain, however, the price threshold 
at which personal vehicle recreational travel is significantly affected; 
the "heroic effort" scenario would have neat'-term impacts, and the 
"stumble along and pray" scenario would have significant long-term 
impacts. 
In short, the major impacts of resource and energy factors on ICT, due 
primarily to investment capital shortages, depend on the choice of 
policies pursued by the federal government. The sY$tem is clirrently 
oriented to utilization of nonrenewable resources with little investment 
in R&D or capital plant. At best, only relatively few state-bf-the~art 
improvements can be expected up to the turn of the century. 
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XII. RESOURCE AVAILABILITY INPUTS 
TO INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION TO THE YEAR 2000: 
\HTH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ENERGY RESOURCES 
H. \v. Bruck 
University of California, Berkeley 
The discussion in this paper rt:'sts on t\VO premises. The first of these 
is the usual J",:-C:l':'S ~Yl.l':f':i8 assumption that no major wars or disasters 
on a similar scale will befall. With. the United States and other indus-
trialized countries engaged in a race to provide sophisticated weaponry 
to some less developed countries and \vith the' diffusion and consequently 
increased development of nuclear technology, the assumption appears 
increasingly tenuous. Nonetheless, it is an assumption that must be 
made. 
The second premise is that intercity transportation is the central focus 
of this discussion. Particularly in a discussion of policy alternatives, 
that point of vie\~ should be differentiated from a national perspective. 
\~That is good for intercity transportation may not necessarily be good 
for the nation or a sufficient basis for a national policy. Nonetheless, 
the assumption is a necessary one. 
1975 to 1985: The Critical Years 
In looking ahead to the end of the century, the 1975 to 1985 decade 
seems especially critical. It is during this decade that the United 
States ,\'tll be most vulnerable to the economic interdiction represented 
by the Arab oil embargo. It is during this decade that the formation 
of other OPEC-like cartels controlling the flow of scarce raw materials 
could be most harmful. In short, this decade is, for practical pur-
poses, the make-or-break period during \"hich national policy with respect 
to resources and energy \vill have to be formulated. 
In addition, the coming decade is one during whicp, a continuing rise in 
the cost of r8\\' materials and energy resource3 must be expected. Cost 
increases\"ill result almost inevitably from the operation of two fac-
tors. The first of these is market forces bidding up the price of 
scarce ra\" materials as .more nations industrialize and as, generally, 
levels of living in many parts of the ,,,orld improve. Also, and probably 
.. equally important asa price increasing mechanism, is the likelihood 
that the world will during this decade run out of high-grade deposits 
ofa number of materi~.ls and will have to turn to less desirable sources 
with a consequel1tincrease in the costs of processing and extracting 
needed rna terials. " 
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The u.s. economy will have to adjust to the new price structures and 
will probably require allocation mechanisms that differ rather sharply 
from those that have been dominant in the post-World-War II period. It 
may be appropriate to quote here a recent report of the National Academy 
of Sciences, Mineral, Resources and the Environment: "An enormous amount 
of capital investment will be needed for energy supplies--through 1985, 
about 35 percent of all available investment capital, as compared with 
the current 22 percent--distorting the whole investment picture and 
denying needed capital to other industries, includj,p.g the mineral 
industry." r" 
The Role of Government Policy 
Many other reasons could be brought forward to furth~r underwrite the 
critical nature of the coming decade. However, most: 'significantly , the 
character and direction of government policy will be the significant 
factor. It is government policy, whether action or inaction, that will 
determine the nature and extent of the impact of the changing resource 
situation, both as to scarcities and price increases, on the U.S. econ-
omy and on the level of living in the United States. 
Prototypically, government can pursue four courses of action: 
and constraint mechanisms; minimal intervention; high R&D and 
investments to produce substitut,e materials; and conservation 
resource reutilization emphasis. 
rationing 
capital 
and 
Clearly, government will not follow any one0f the stated strategies 'in 
its pure form. A mixed set of strategies is virtually inevitable •. In 
this context, it is worth noting that one cannot, in any realistic 
sense, speak of the existence ofa market mechanism in the energy and 
. resource field. Virtually ,all prices have, to a ve,ry substantial 
extent, become administered prices, whether the administering agency 
is national or foreign government, oligopolitically structured private 
industry or a multinational cartel. 
Policy Scenarios 
The question is, then~ what mixes of policy might result vis-a-vis 
resources and energy? Since the number of possible combinations of 
policy is very large, it will probably suffice for the discussion at 
hand to consider the end positions in the continuum of policy choices. 
At one extreme one may postulate a "heroic effort" scenario directed 
at fulfilling all of the objectives of Project Independence, and all 
of its thus far not-spelled-out implications, by the year 2000. Such 
a course of action would invol~fe a near-term; high-level allocation of 
both public and private capital investment funds to the location and 
exploitation of available mateirial and energy supplies. 
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This development emphasis is not as easy, by any means, as it is some-
times made out to be. There are serious infrastructure constraints; for 
example, there is only a very low level of current production of offshore 
oil drilling equipment; there is little production of the equipment 
required for efficient strip coal mining; there is little capacity for 
the manufacture of the kinds of pressure vessels used in the generation 
of nuclear energy; and oil refining capacity is severely constrained. 
Thus, even this often advocated course of action requires major invest-
ments in additional infrastructuLe and requires a reallocation of re-
sources from other sectors of the economy. 
Laaking farther ahead, the "heroic effart" course af actianwauld require 
majar alIa cations af capital to. research and develapment of new materials 
and new technalogies as well. as new energy sources, so that bath new 
energy saurces and the distribution systems required by these could came 
on-line at the end af the century. There is no questian but that, in the 
interim, even with cantinued GNP growth and perhaps a resumption of pra-
ductivity increases, the "heraic effart" caurse af actian wauld cause a 
major reallacatian af resaurces and would have, in the periad during 
which it was pursued, significant effects on the praductian af cansumer 
gaads and services and thus an the quality of life. 
While one cannot assume that all shartage prablems can be resolved 
through an increase in investment in research and develapment nar that 
substitutes can be faund far all exhausted, nonrenewable resaurces, ane 
could, thraugh a caurse af actian invalving heraic effart and same likely 
near-term shortages andecanamic dislacatians, came to. a situation in 
which energy would be available in abundancefram basically renewable 
sources. Materials technalagy wauld then be much less dependent up an 
the use of nanrenewable resaurces. 
The other end of; the cantinuum might be characterized as a, "stumble 
along and pray" caurse of actian, characterized in the next ten years by 
a law level af investment in research and development, no. effart to. deal 
explicitly and cansistently.with the infrastructure canstraints that 
affect energy and resource praductian, and efforts to meet shartages by 
permitting prices to. increase. In this scenario., ane Jllust make the 
assumptian that shartages that develap for ane reasan or another would 
be dealt with by a gavernment-spansared rationing system farmulated to 
produce same degree af equity in allacatioh of scarce resources. The 
equity concept is, hawever, unlikely to be formulated in relatian to 
canc~pts of the differentiaJ impact of; -the chasen allocatian mechanism 
on variaus sec tars of the ecanamy. 
In this latter scenario, ane must expect very real prablems of several 
kinds to develop. First, there is a very high prabability that per~ 
mit ted increases in price wauld nat be a sufficient mechanism to. offset 
the apparent disinvestment strategies af same af the domestic energy 
producers ar to attract the level af capital funding necessary. 
Similarly, it is unlikely that, withaut external incentives, a great 
effart 'will be made to overcome the previausly mentioned infrastructure 
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bottlenecks. Also, the infrastructure to support technological inno-
vat ion (e.g., a distribution system for methanol fuel additives, a 
support system for electric vehicles) is likely to be slow in developing. 
The basic point is that in the absence of a very varied policy dealing 
with the entire system related to raw materials and energy, which for 
practical purposes is the entire economy, shortages will result, and 
long delays in being able to deal with them will ensue. These events 
will, however, be postponed to the end of the century. The long-range 
impact on the economy, and the society more generally, will be enormous 
and may even come to approximate the fearful predictions of the prophets 
of doom. 
The actual course of action will no doubt lie somewhere between these 
two extremes. Exactly where will probably become more apparent in the 
next two to three years, these being critical with respect to policy 
formulation. At the moment, there is no doubt that the course of action 
on which the country is embarked lies closer to the "stumble along and 
pray" end of the continuum. The believers in the determinism of the 
electoral cycle will no doubt say that all this will change after this 
year's presidential election. Whether that will in fact be the case 
remains to be seen. 
Impact on Intercity Transportation 
The question then 
above impact upon 
and complex ways. 
arises, how do the potential directions summarized 
intercity transportation? Clearly, they do in many 
.1 
At least one consequence of the materials and energy situation is likely 
to impact severely upon intercity transportation regardless of the policy
 
options pursued: a highly probable shortage of investment capital. As 
indicated earlier, energy and materials development will, with the price 
increases already in effect as well as additional ones to be expected in 
the future, inevitably absorb a far greater share of available capital 
funds than has been the case in the past. Assuming that the recent trend
 
toward a decline or stabilization of funds available for capital invest-
ment continues, all other activities requiring capital investment funding
 
will have to compete for portions of a smaller pool. Given the not over
ly 
impressive past performance of the intercity transportation sector, the 
sector will have increasing difficuity in attracting capital. 
The implications of a scarcity of capital funds are complex and are 
likely to impact intercity transportation rna.des differentially. Thus, 
it seems inappropriate in a very general paper to·try to sketch these 
impacts in detail. Generally speaking, it is likely, however, that the 
scarcity of capital resources will militate against the introduction of 
technologies that are radical departures from existing ones and that 
require an entirely newirtfrastructure. 
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A second overall factor is likely to be increased costs of both materials 
and of energy used in intercity transportation. It is very difficult to 
find reasonable estimates of the rate and extent of likely cost increases 
over the next 25 years. The recent past has witnessed very large jumps 
in prices, particularly of fossil fuels, and some additional large jumps 
are likely in the very near future. 
Several points occur in relation to these cost increases. First, the 
price of both materials and fuel drawn from the pool of nonr~newable 
resources is unlikely to stabilize until substitutes become available on 
a large scale. For example, if by the end of the century a very large 
proportion of the electrical energy in use is obtained from hydrogen 
fusion, if electricity is even more widely used than it is now as a sub-
stitute for fossil fuel in heating and industrial processes, and if 
electric vehicles are the preponderant means of urban transportation, 
then the need for fossil fuels may be relatively small compared to pres-
sent requirements and ample quantities may be available for necessary 
uses. The point is, though, that price stability is in the rather dis-
tant future even under the best circumstances. Even though vast quan-
tities of petroleum might be found along the continental shelves, the 
cost of petroleum is going to be higher than it was for the simple 
reason that the cost of production is going to be higher; and price, in 
any case,is going to be an administered one. 
Further, regardless of price increases in materials and fuels, the costs 
of these are not likely to be the major determinants of overall costs of 
intercity transportation services. Labor costs, the cost of capital, 
and other cost elements have tended to rise very rapidly also and are 
likely to continue to rise. Such Cbsts have historically been by far 
the greatest part of all of the cost elements in providing intercity 
transportation services. 
'Both of the extreme scenarios sketched above imply that resource and 
energy scarcities will develop at some point, early or late, and that 
these will impact in rather direct fashion on intercity transportation. 
In the "heroic effort." scenario with its long-range orientation and its 
emphasis on producing alternative materials and energy sources not 
principally d~pendent upon nonrenewable resources, the scarcities are 
likely to occur in the relatively near-term. Scarcities would basically 
be the result of an allocation of available capital resources to research, 
development, and implementation of a strategy centering on the use of 
renewable resources, thereby shifting capital.resources away from dis-
covery and development of supplies of nonrenewable resources, such as 
petroleum. If not scarcity, then the expectation, within the' logic of 
this scenariO, would be very much increased costs, because near-term 
dependence would fall almost entirely on imported materials and energy 
resources. In the longer term; that is, by the end of the century, the 
expectation within this scenario would be for .re1ative abundance of 
needed materials and energy at stable if not lower prices. 
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In contrast, the "stumble along and pray" scenario implies, other things 
being equal, that: in the near-term there would be no shortages of 
material and energy resources, although dependence on imports would be 
great and the costs of these resources would be high and would probably 
continue to.increase. Scarcities are likely, however, to develop in the 
longer future as nonrenewable resources, both of petroleum and of certain 
metals, would begin to run out entirely without there being a usable and 
adequate set of substitutes for some period of time. 
It is of course possible for the providers of intercity transportation 
services to pass most of the cost increases on to the user. Intercity 
personal transportation should be considered quite separately here. 
But, overall, the expectation must be that rising costs of intercity 
transportation, whatever the source of the costs might be, will force 
out less essential transportation. There is some evidence that this is 
already happening in social and recreational travel by the carrier 
modes. 
If transportation costs, as a result of the various factors that have 
been considered,. increase to become a larger component of the total 
cost of goods and seryices, some .additional consequence-s- may become 
visible. There may result in a geographic restructuring of activities 
to minimize transportation costs. The pressure to make the transpor-
tation system as efficient a~ possible would certainly increase, and 
substantial changes in regulation may result. 
Additional impacts on intercity transportation can be inferred. An 
extreme version of the "heroic effort" scenario would probably involve 
the possibility of fuel rationing, particularly petroleum fuels, which 
would have a negative impact on the availability of air passenger 
transportation and, most likely, highway freight: transportation. 
Generally, the near-term policy sets would probably favor the most fuel 
efficient modes of· traIi~portation. ' 
In the longer term, this scenario is likely to result in even more 
fundamental changes. For example, only a minute part of the U.S.rail~; 
road system is currently electrified. Electrification has not been 
extended largely because it involves high costs and would not (and did 
not in the past) promise greater efficiency than the use of diesel 
locomotives. The availability of large quantites of relatively cheap 
electric power from 1:'enewable sources, including in the relatively 
distant future hydrogen fusion, could make electrification far more 
attractive. Pressure to increase transport efficiency and to use each 
mode in its optimal operating regime is also likely to lead to a 
restructuring of the modes. Long-haul commodity movement would be 
handled by a lean railroad system or by water carriers,and highway 
goods transportation would be principally confined to relatively short 
distances, providing feeder service for the more efficient long"':haul 
carriers. 
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Similar restructuring might well take place on the passenger side. The 
essential point worth repeating, though, is that because investment 
capital will be so strongly committed to the areas discussed previously, 
the restructuring of intercity transport will likely take the direction 
of increased energy efficiency in relation to whatever principal types 
of energy might be available. 
This scenario also indicates that, in the period beyond the turn of the 
century, if the basic energy and materials problems are reasonably 
resolv~d, there may be a great deal of innovation in intercity trans-
portation. Presumably, other things being equal, once the more funda-
mental problems have been dealt with, investment capital would again be 
available for other sectors, including transportation. Research and 
development in intercity transportation in a manner far more focused 
and product oriented than the scatter gun approaches of the past ten or 
fifteen years may well begin in the 1990s. 
Within the perspective of the "stumble along and pray" scenario, inter-
city transportation would, in the near term, be much less impacted. 
Lack of capital funds will make for even less upgrading and improvement 
of the existing plant, but service, much as it exists now, could be 
expected to continue tor some time. The cost, as already indicated, 
will inevitably increase but, as also indicated, the cost increases can 
be passed on to the user. . 
Essentially, this scenario would indicate that the day of reckoning 
will be postponed, but that it would inevitably come, and come at a time 
when the intercity transportation indust:t:"ywould be ill-prepared to deal 
with it. Materials shortages would develop and would affect the indus-
try, but f)'el shortages especially would develop and begin to have major 
impacts, i:l'th the availability and evolution of substitutes and alterna-
tives then postponed until at least the second decade of the 21st 
Century. 
If energy shortages become so extreme that transport is seriously 
impf.l,;ired. one can even visualize a res tructuring of the national economy 
in{~ a number of more or less separate, more or less self-sufficient, 
regIonal economies minimizing long-haul transport. 
Personal Intercity Transportation 
Personal intercity transportation needs to be treated somewhat sepa~ately 
from the carrier modes. The principal factors likely to affect personal 
intercity transportation are fuel availability and price. 
Personal intercity trips using automobiles or similar vehicles are made 
principally for two reasons ,business and social and recreational pur-
poses. As long as the required fuel is available, it is unlikely that 
travel for business purposes would be very much affected, regardless of 
the price of fuel. 
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The situaUon with social and recreational travel would differ sharply. 
however, depending upon availability of fuel and upon price. This type 
of travel is essentially voluntary and subject to a variety of factors. 
If fuel is rationed or its availabi.lity is uncertain, there will inevi-
tably be a marked decrease in social and recreational trips, parU.cularly 
the long(>r types of trips which have become something of an institution 
in the summer time. Similarly. one must expect that substantial increases 
in the price of fuel will lead to a decline in social and recreational 
travel. A complex set of fac tors centered on available income for such 
purposes is likely to be a causal factor here. If inflation continues, 
and particularly if price rises of basic requirements such as housing, 
heal, e \l'ctric ity, and other necessiL ies continue, without being offset 
by increases in personal income, a ,substantial portion of recreational 
travel by personal vehi.cle may weli. fall victim to the lesser amount of 
di.scretionary income that will be available for such purposes. 
It is possible to visualize:' many situational factors that might affect 
or nullify this inference. The life styles of a significant proportion 
of the population involve the use, on an extensive basis, of recreational 
vehlcles. These activities may be of such significance and centrality 
that other optional expenditures are foregone rather than limiting those 
involv ing travel. Behavior during and immediately after the recent oil 
embargo indicated a decline of such travel and a similar decline in 
rec.rcutional vehicle sales. However, both of these trends have been 
reversed since th€h". It is difficult to know what the price threshold 
is at which recreational travel by personal vehicle will begin to be 
significantly affected. It seems likely, in the near-term, that such 
travel would be more impacted under the condition of the "heroic effort" 
scenario than under the "stumble along and pray" one. In the longer term, 
however, there is no question that the shortages that would develop under 
the latter scenario would be so severe as to have a major impact upon 
social and recreational travel along with many other aspects of life. 
Summary 
To summarize, then, the inferences to be drawn from this rather cursory 
survey of, the way in which resource and energy factors are likely to 
affect intercity transportation, it is reasonably apparent that the 
impact will be a major one. The principal source of this impact will be 
scarcity of investment capital, the scarcity being greater or lesser, 
more immediate or more distant, depending upon the policy sets pursued, 
principally, by the federal government~ There are those looking at the 
same data set who would say that it is possible to have both ."guns" and 
"butter," that the socioeconomic system can respond so that all diffi-
culties and shortages can be obviated. The thought here is that a more 
realistic view is either guns or butter, and that a strategy of post-
pone~ent, i.e., the choice of butter, will simply lead to a more severe 
and cr:i:t:i<:alsituation by the end of the century. 
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Given that the system is currently oriented to utilization, principally, 
of nonrenewable resourc,es and that relatively small investments have 
been made in R&D and iq' geveloping a new and more useful capital plant, 
scarcities and limitations will make themselves felt one way or the 
other. Nonrenewable resources are by definition exhaustible or become 
so costly to use as to be noneconomic. Similarly, a low level of capital 
investment in an industrialized society, either to do research and develop-
ment that will have future payoff or to bring the capital plant up-to-date, 
will make an impact later, if not sooner. 
In a situation such as that, transportation does not fare well, because 
transportation can at best, as long ~s there is an adequately, if not 
efficiently, functioning system, claim no more than intermediate prior-
ity. Thus, the conclusion, that between now and the end of the century, 
only relatively small, though possibly highly useful, state-of-the-art 
improvements will be made in intercity transportation and that no great 
expectation of the implementation of radically new technologies should 
be entertained. 
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XIII. THE FUTURE OF CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
by 
RobertH. Doyle 
Richard W. Schmidt 
D. Michae.l Cullivan 
Peat, Marwick, Mitcbell & Co. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers key issues, trends, and factors related to the 
future of concern for the environment. 
A relatively low level of concern for the environment prevailed in 
the United States until the 1960s. The growth ethic approach to 
community and economic development was seldom questioned. 
Minority-view groups and organizations can and often do hold the bal-
ance of power in American elections, which is increased even further 
when money and personnel are available. Many minority environmentally 
oriented groups have successfully applied this marginal control fea-
ture to get federal and state governments to enact needed environ-
mental legislation. 
The .sierra Club and similar organizations, the National Parks System, 
and the 1899 Rivers and Harbor Act, for example, developed the initial 
concern for the environment. Federally sponsored conservation-related 
job programs during the Depression also contributed. Environmental 
programs were also developed by companies attempting to correct 
damage they per;petrated and by agricultural business interest. 
In the late 1940s, following a large influx of people into the cities 
during the war, water pollution problems intensified. In 1965, the 
federal government began enacting meaningful water pollution legisla-
tion. Air pollution also became acute during this period. Significant 
'corrective legislation was finally passed in 1967. 
Land must be considered a resource which, if improperly used, can 
have the same ill effects as pollution of air and water. Tax reform 
and increased state control represent the greatest chance for some 
mo4ification of the land use problem. 
Though initial environmental legislative efforts were relatively unsuc-
cessful, they did establish research programs and funded educational 
grants, both of which later provided a considerable amount of scien-
tific data to support the need for additional federal action. 
The 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) represented the 
culmination of public concern about unplanned environmental develop-
ment. The Act directed all federal agencies to encourage a "productive 
and enj oyable harmony between man and his environment." . 
Though NEPA is seemingly devoid of enforcement and administrative pro-
visions, the key to i.tr~· success to date is the required Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS). 
A combination of factors and events--the Vietnam ~.Jar, the fuel-oil 
crisis, Watergate, and an erratic economy--has resulted in a blunting 
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of the overall environmental movement. A moderate level of concern 
for environmentally oriented problems is apparent. 
Future debate of environmental quality will center around the identi-
fication of key environmental issues and standards by which the merit 
of an identified issue can be judged. Regional variations, geology, 
climate, etc., will, of course, be important. Considerations of 
environmental quality involve high cost. A universally acceptable 
level of environmental quality will consequently not be determined. 
The NEPA's EIS will continue to affect most federal decisions. State, 
regional, and city governments wql adopt some form of EIS process. 
Procedures should become more refii;led and straightforward, and the 
development of computerized models,! should permit a higher degree of 
sophistication. 
Simple environmental solutions to the problem of waste management do 
not now exist. With the increasing scarcity of satisfactory and con-
venient urban fill areas, it is highly likely that the situation will 
reach crisis proportions in some areas. 
While it is impossible to predict accurately future resource use and 
future resource supply conditions, as it is impossible to predict 
technological advances, an increased scarcity of resources could none-
theless generate a profound environmental impact. Interests who need 
resources will no doubt press for their extraction; regardless of 
consequences to the natural environment or to foreign political 
relations. Environmental interests will, of course, attempt to 
emphasize alternatives. Except for those projects which create numer-
ous job opportunities, dollars for aesthetically oriented environmental 
improvements will be increasingly difficult to appropriate at any level 
of government. 
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XIII. THE FUTURE OF CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
Robert H. Doyle 
Richard W. Schmidt 
D. Michael Cu11ivan 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
The purpose of this paper is to set forth observations about key 
issues, prevailing trends, and other factors of relevance to the future 
of concern for the environment in the United States. 
Part One of the paper discusses the context within which environmental 
concern is typically developed and/or expressed under a democratic form 
of government, and also traces the history of what is often referred 
to as the environmental movement. Part Two details a number of obser-
vations as to the form, degree, and extent of concern for the environ-
ment that may be anticipated over the next 25 years and beyond. 'A 
representative bibliography of reference sources is also included. 
"Part One: The Nature of, Environmental Concern 
It should be noted at the beginning that the~inphasis of this paper is 
not on the future of man's environment per se, but on the future of 
man's concern for his environment. The underlying assumption is that 
the human environment is controlled by decisions of man; that such 
decisions are influenced by the degree of concern exhibiteduy man; 
and that the degree of concern is, in turn, influenced by the various 
components of society. The latter include political, religious, and 
economic components~ in particular. 
An understanding of the various observ~~ions set out in Part Two of 
the paper requires some agreement as to the terms "environment" and 
"concern." 'Unfortunately, a consensus as to what is encompassed by 
"the environment" does not exist at the present time, according to 
a recent surveY,sponsored by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
The findings of this EPA inquiry revealed that conflicting definitions 
for the term "environment" were held by policy makers and managers at 
the municipal and county levels ofgoverntnent. Respondents were 
offered four dif)tinct definitions. None of the four received a major-
ity of votes. Each received one-third or less. The important con-
clusion drawn from this survey is that local officials do not have a 
uniform concept of the term environment; and that no simple defini-
tion exists. 
(i 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Seventh Edition) defines the term' 
"environment" as being our "surroundings." In a more technical per-
spective, this definition may be expanded to include our natural 
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surroundings (air, water, land, flora, fauna, minerals, etc.) and our 
human or man-made surroundings (homes, factories, roads, and other 
structures) . 
Man has traditio,nally recognized himself as different from other ani-
mals, and thr,p}lghout the known history of development has continued to 
enhance his personal surroundings at the expense of his natural sur-
roundings. As a result, man has become ingrained with the philosophy 
that his existence is predicated not only on his control of the nat-
ural surroundings, but often on the full utilization of same. The 
concept of man over nature, the "I-it" philosophy, continues to be a 
dominant theme of man's activities. However, in more recent times, 
s'~ch as the past one hundred years or sO,a new philosophy has been 
emerging, arguing that man is one with nature, the "we" philosophy. 
Given the changing understanding of man's relation to nature, use of 
the word "surroundings" to describe the environment is perhaps inap-:-
prbpriate. Since this paper attempts to describe possible future 
changes in concern for the environment, the simple term "surroundings" 
will imply that such concern is equally distributed between man-made 
and natural surroundings. If the 'relationship between man and nature 
is in fact changing, then such a definition is inconsistent. What 
might be mo.re appropriate is to define the term environment as the 
relationship between man and his surroundings. In this manner, we 
can then explore how man's interaction with nature might change over 
time. 
The other term that requires some discussion is "concern." For pur-
poses of this paper, "concern" will include anyone of three actions: 
(1) perception of a situation, (2) awareness of alternatives, and 
(3) a commitment to pursue one or more alternatives. On any given 
issue, an individual can be at anyone of the three stages of concern. 
In order to reach the second or third stage it is presumed that he or 
she passed through the preceding one or two stages,respectively. 
Only the last or third stage will produce any results. Further, .since 
the alternatives can be either good or bad, the awareness acquired 
during the second stage can produce positive or negative r.esutJbr\),~ 
the third stage. ) 
I, 
As noted previously, our American society is made up of political";' 
economic, and religious components, for the most part. With regard. to 
environmental concerns, thepolitic'al element is of greatest impor-
tance, because, of course, applicable laws and regulations are either 
made. or changed via the political process. 
The political system in the United States includes the various govern-
. . 
~ 
mental agencies and bureaucrats together with thos'e persons elected to 
represent the people. The "game of politics" is the effort needed to 
influence governmental decisions and actions. The reward and penalty 
situations in the political system, like the economic system, relates 
not to the total but to the margin. 
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For example, in an election the candidates of each party are virtually 
assured of x percent of the total vote simply because of party affili-
ation. Thus, what often determines the outcome of the election is not 
the 90% or so of the assured vote that each party will more or less 
evenly share but, rather, the unconnnitted 10% in each case. As a 
result, this 10%-20%(±) acquires a power to influence the election 
outcome that is dis'proportionate to its size. Because of the pre-
dictability of the great majority of voters, minority-view groups and 
organizations can and often do hold the balance of power. Such power 
is, increased even further when minority interests are able to provide 
money and personnel to assist in the financing of political campaigns. 
Thro'ughout the past decade, in particular, many environmentally" 
oriented groups have successfully applied this marginal control fea-
ture to get federal and state governments to enact needed environmental 
legislation. 
There are differences of oJn.n10n as to just when "the environment" be-
came a political subject. One school of~hought points out that ini~ 
tial concern for the environment was expressed in the late 19th and 
early 20th Centuries with the formation of groups such as the Sierra 
Club, the Issac Walton League, and the Audubon Society, along with 
establishment of the National Park System and passage of landmark 
legislation, including the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act. Other histo-
rians argue that federally sponsored conservation-related job programs 
of the 1930 to 1940 Depression era, as spawned by soil conservation, 
range management, and reforestation activities, among others, are 
representative of the real beginning of today's intense interest in the 
environment. 
In retrospect, however, many of these earlier environmental programs 
were either self-serving efforts of the wealthy to preserve natur,al 
wonders from the ravishes of their own companies (at public expense), 
or they wereJ::eactions to crises which were threatening agricultural 
business interests at a time when life on the farm and the provision 
of'jobs was most important to economic survival. 
The more recent efforts at preserving the environment are apparently 
based on a wide-ranging grass roots concern for mankind's relation 
with nature. Such concern not only stems from study, observation, 
and experience with real environmental problems, but also from the 
opportunity afforded middle- to high-income interests to preserve 
what they perceive as the quality of life through the imposition and 
enforcement of environmental controls. Initiation of the latest ap-
proach began in the 1950s when independent researchers like'Rachel 
Carson produced books such as SiLent Spr'ing" which told of the 
damage to nature produced by insecticides, herbacides, and other 
insect control chemicals. 
During this same post-World War II incubation period, other problems 
were identified and many were experienced. Water pollution, a concern 
originally recognized in the late l800s, had received relatively little 
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attention once the health hazards associated with the disposal of 
human waste had been addressed. But in the late 1940s, following 
the large influx of people into cities during the War, problems of 
industrial pollutants in water supply systems became a reality for 
many individuals and communities. 
Initial. legislative efforts provided some research money and a small 
program to solve such problems in the affected cities. However, by 
the 1960s, water quality problems had grown even more intense. For 
example, between 1961 and 1970 there were 128 known outbreaks of dis-
ease or poisoning attributable to polluted drinking water. Of these, 
35 outbreaks (39,810 cases of illness) involved contaminated drinking 
water provided by or through public water supply systems. In response 
to the various crises, the federal government began to enact mean-
ingful water pollution legislation in 1965. 
Air pollution problems also became acute during this same period. In 
October 1948, an air pollution episode in Donora, Pennsylvania, 
killed 18 persons, and made nearly 6,000 persons ill out of a total 
population of 14,000 •. Similar incidents occurred in New York City in 
1953, 1962, 1963, and 1966. It was estimated that 405 and 169 deaths, 
respectively, took place as a result of the last two attacks in the 
nation's largest metropolis. Again, early efforts by the federal 
government were insignificant in terms of fully or realistically deal-
ing with the situation. Significant legislation was finally passed in 
1967, but not until the public perceived that a crisis condition 
existed in certain areas. 
Initial legislative efforts, as outlined above, may have been impo-
tent in addressing the postwar air and water pollution problems. 
However, each of these early pollution control actions established 
research programs and funded educational grants, both of which later 
provided a considerable amount of scientific data to support the need 
for additional federal action. 
The added scientific data did many other things too. For example, 
such data provided fac.tua1 information to those who wrote "doomsday" 
essays, or, conversely, those who were skeptics of the doomsday ap-
proach. In any event, additional numbers of persons were educated to 
the fact that something had to be done to improve the deteriorating 
condition of our natural surroundings. Such data also pointed up 
areas in which research was lacking and thereby offered new horizons 
for budding scientists who filled numerous college classrooms during 
the mid-1960s. \1, 
In short,theearly legislation, though ineffective at solving real 
problems, provided one mechanism for the educational exposure of many 
new people to pollution problems, and thereby contributed to the 
groundwork of what was to become a major environmental movement in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. 
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Without a doubt, the most significant long-term environmental legis-
lation passed at that time was and is the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) of 1969. For perhaps the first time, NEPA provided a means 
for changing the structure of decision-making on federally funded 
projects. The Act represented the culmination of public concern over 
unplanned development that was aided and abetted by federal grant 
money. As passed and subsequently amended, NEPA directs all federal 
agencies to comply with a national policy designed to encourage "pro-
ductive and enjoyable harmony between man and, his environment." The 
key to NEPA's success to date is the environmental impact statement 
(EIS) required by the legislation relative to every major federal 
action that has a significant environmental effect. While NEPA is 
seemingly devoid of enforcement and administrative provisions, its 
strength flows from the required public review process which provides 
the public with an opportunity to know of and support or challenge a 
given project. 
Whether NEPA will continue to have its present strength and effect 
will depend in large part on the politics of environmental legislation. 
The loophole in NEPA is that Congress can decree the type of federal 
action that will or will not be considered of environmental conse-
quence. The first and most recent example of this form of legislative 
action occurred during passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972. Specific provisions were made to apply NEPA 
to the construction of publicly owned treatment works, as well as to 
requests for discharge permits from new sources. However, exempted 
activities include such things as regional water quality management 
plans, new source discharge performance standards, guidelines for 
state control of nonpoint sources, and others. If such a precedent 
were to continue or be expanded during the enactment of future legis-
lation, it is possible that the current effectiveness of NEPA could 
be greatly diminished. 
Based on all of the foregoing, long-term trends in connection with the 
environmental movement can be summarized as follows: 
1. A relatively Zow level of concern for the environment pre-
vailed in the United States until the 1960s. Prior to that 
period, the "growth ethic" or "chamber of commerce approach" 
to community and economic development was seldom questioned' 
and almost never challenged. 
2. As air qua1ity,water supply, traffic congestion and urban 
sprawl problems proliferated in our then fast-growing 
met,ropo1itan areas, a widespread multifaceted environmental 
campaign gained momentum in th~.1960s and reached a high peak' 
in the last half of 1973. Passage of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act in 1969 represents the signal achievement 
of this campaign.' 
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3. A combination of factors and events--the Vietnam War contro-
versy, the fuel-oil crisis of early 1974, Watergate revela-
tions, and an er,ratic national economy--has resulted in a 
blunting of the overall movement, producing the present 
moderate level of concern for environmentally oriented prob-
lems. 
Present-day environmental concern and perception of environmental prob-
lems seem to vary widely from one section of the country to another. 
Residents of states that are particularly coveted for their climate, 
beaches, mountains, lakes, and other natural attributes are more 
deeply involved in environmental issues than many of their less-favored 
counterparts. For example, Hawaii, California, Arizona, Colorado, 
Oregon, Washington, New Mexico, Florida, Virginia, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Minnesota are very conscious of 
environmental matters. This is in contrast to industrial states such 
as Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylvania or plains states such as Texas, 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and th~ like. Alaska and several others seem to be 
somewhere in the middle," at the present time. 
Part Two: EnvironmentalConcern--The Next 25 Years 
No one can chart the exact course to be taken by the environmental 
move~ent during the remainder of this century and beyond. However, 
a number of useful observations about the nature and direction of con-
cern for the environment over the next 25 years can be drawn. Such 
observations--essentially indicators of likely change--are briefly 
described and discussed in. the reminder of this paper. 
The Environmental Quality Issue. A great deal of debate in the 
near future will probably focus on a more precise definition of "envi-
ronmental quality." The debate will center around the identification 
of (a) key environmental issues, and (b) standards by which the qual-
ity or merit of an identified issue can and should be judged. More-
over, regional variations in geology, climate, and other natural 
factors will be responsible for the injection of differing personal 
values into\ this debate; and regional differences in governmental 
structure, as well as land and water ownership patterns, will mean 
dissimilar solutions will be applied to similar problems. 
When dealing with issues relating to "quality," each individual and 
each unit of government must balance the general welfare, health, and 
safety aspects of a given environmental situation (and the costs of 
meeting those requirements) against solutions that involveahighei: 
quality and .perhapsmore aesthetic treatment of that situation. Un-
fortunately, costs also tend to rise. As a consequence of this fact, 
and because of the aforementioned regional differences that do prevail 
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in the United States, it is anticipated that little or no real progress 
will be made in determining what constitutes a universally acceptable u 
level of environmental quality. 
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS). The environmental impact 
assessment process, as defined by NEPA and subsequent federal agency 
guidelines, will remain in effect, and its use will be expanded. The 
assessment process outlined by federal regulations will continue to 
affect most federal decisions. More importantly, perhaps, there will 
be a continuation of the trend toward adoption of some form of environ-
mental impact assessment process by state, regional, and even city 
governments. This expansion of the impact review process will begin to 
deal with environmental issues that do not now fall under the federal 
review requirements. Depending on the extent of such expansion in the 
different regions of our country, many private development projects may 
come under the same scrutiny as public actions. The latter condition 
is already true in California. 
As experience is gained by all interests who participate in the pro-
cess, and as court decisions are handed down which clarify points of 
contention, procedures should become more refined and hopefully more 
straightforward. In addition, the continuing development of comput-
erized models should permit a higher degree of sophistication in the 
field of environmental analysis, especially with regard to the fair 
and objective consideration of alternatives. 
Regional Response Variations. As has ,been mentioned, some areas 
of the United States have been more deeply involved with the environ-
mental movement than others. However, the low-interest group will 
need to pay more attention to environmental concerns in the'future 
due primarily to the extensive institutionalization of the EIS process 
at all levels of government. 
In contrast, states that now have a high level of environmental in-
volvement may be expected to become increasingly embroiled in 
economic versus environmental trade-off controversies. Florida* is 
currently a case in point--a coalition of business and labor interests 
in this southeastern state is urging that legislation ,be passed which 
would mandate economic impact statements as a counter to federal ErS 
and the,state DRI (Development'of Regional Impact) procedures. 
*Florida is one of 20 states that have enacted environmental legislation 
in addition to NEPA. Additional states will no doubt join this list in 
the next few years 
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Intensity of Environmental Concern. The moderate level of environ-
mental concern prevalent in the United States today should remain in 
effect throughout the last 25 years of the 20th Century unlesB a 
severe and prolonged economic depression takes place. If such a de-
pression does occur, the need for jobs will tend to override the desire 
.for better air quality and other environmentally oriented improvements. 
In order to counter any depression-generated movements that could 
lead to a reduction in the current level of concern, environmentalists 
may be expected to argue that jobs and thereby economic gain can be 
created as a result of projects designed to effect environmental bet-
terment. For example, a federally financed program to construct 
sewage treatment facilities that feature tertiary treatment could 
generate many jobs and, at the same tim~, improve water quality condi-
tions wherever the facilities are installed. 
As for the other side of the coin, an increase-I-in intensity of concern 
for the environment is not anticipated unless a series of crises occurs 
over a short space of time (such as three major oil spills in various 
parts of the country within a three-month period). Even if such a 
situation were to arise, the authOrfi qf this paper do not believe that 
the higher level of environmental cl:tncer-n- would last for very long. 
Urban Development Patterns. A combination of rlslng costs, con-
cern for the environment, congestion, overcrowding (perceived if not 
actual), and other factors have been collectively responsible for what 
is known as the no-growth ethic that has recently sprung up in many 
sections of the United States. In some instances, this ethic has also 
been nurtured by the "drawbridge" syndrome; that is, a conscious 
desire on the part of those who are "on the inside" to exclude anyone 
else from their community or neighborhood, if at all possible. 
Regardless of the motivation for such antigrowthattitudes, this type 
of movement can and is having a profound effect on urban development -
patterns. One of these effects is to reduce the raw land usage rate 
heretofore typical of metropolitan areas (particularly in the post-
World War iI era). Allother is to increase interest in the rehabilita-
tion and improvement of deteriorating portions of. our cities. 
Theen,d result seems to be growing support for an overall policy that 
maximizes the use of existing facilities and areas, and downplays the 
need for brand new provisions. Such a policy obviously has enormous 
implications relative to the planning and construction of major 
public-~ facilities (airports, highways, hospitals, s<;.hools, etc.), as 
well as to the redevelopmel1t of obsolete urban-locales tbat may have 
been ignored or overlooked in the past. . 
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Land Use Considerations. Until recently, land use considerations 
received far less attention in the United States than air and water 
pollution problems, in part because land use is a far more complicated 
subject than pollution. Nonetheless, the manner in which land is used 
constitutes a fundamental environmental issue, one that vitally af-
fects transportation, housing, recreation, air and water quality, and 
even job opportunities. 
One of the more serious conditions that needs to be faced before any 
significant change in our land use system can come about is the view 
that land is little more than a commodity to be exploited and traded. 
What is required, according to most urbanologists, is an ethic that 
considers land to be a resoUX'ce which, if improperly used, can have 
the same ill effects as the pollution of air and water. However, in 
order to effect sl13:.:11 a11 attitudinal change, the various levels of 
government will have ,to address the related problems of taxation, 
regulation, and the taking of private property rights. 
Although the use/misuse of land will continue to receive a lot of 
rhetoric and written attention, effective ways and means to deal 
with this issue may not be possible until the end of this century, if 
then. Tax reform and increased state control over land use matters 
represent the greatest chance for some modification of this observa-
tion. 
Development Costs. The twin influences of inflation and environ-
mental concern have combined in recent years to make almost any type 
of development project a costly and time consuming proposition. This 
unfortunate trend is most likely to continue and may even grow worse 
over the next 25-year period. 
Stated in another way, the environmental impact factor is now aninte-
gral part of what might be called the "development decision equation." 
If . it r~mains there, as we believe it will, and if the rate of infla-
tion continues (hopefully under better control than atpresent),then 
a significant amount of dollars and hours will be required to complete 
almost any major undertaking. The implications of this judgment 
vis-a-vis new or improved forms of intercity transportation would ap-
pear to be substantial. 
Waste Management. The management of waste is expected tp become 
an increasingly more important environmental issue in the next five 
to ten years." There is already a growing body of knowledge pertaining 
.to management activities, environmental impacts, handling methods, and" 
other factors relating to solid wastes which are typically generated 
'. in cities and other urban areas. Some practical applications of 
feasible technology, as well as continuing research programs in solid 
waste management have already been funded by federal and other govern-
mental agencies, and such activities will likely continue. 
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Scientists researching new energy forms have also begun to consider 
the use of waste products. Their research has in~luded evaluation of 
the direct conversion of waste products into energy, as well as the 
possibilities of recycling waste products in order to reduce energy 
consumption. Because such changes would involve the pricing mechanism 
of our economic and political systems, in that prices of some products 
are artificially high or low by law, modifications considered to be 
feasible are likely to be slow in coming. However, the proliferation 
of waste products, unlike air or water pollution, has yet to create 
a crises situation in the United States. Simple environmental 
solutions to this problem do not now exist and with the increasing 
scarcity of satisfactory and convenient urban land fill areas, it is 
highly likely that the situation will reach crises proportions in some 
areas. When and if that happens, the management of waste will be-
come a serious environmental issue. 
World Population Growth. If the world population continues to ex-
pand as generally anticipated at this time (over 6 billion people by 
the year 2000), the demand placed on the world's natural resources 
and food supplies will be tremendous. As the food supplies dwindle, 
the United States will be called upon to grow and export ever increas-
ing quantities of food. If this condition comes about, it may well 
trigger extensive debate in the Congress and elsewhere as to the use 
of pesticides, fertilizers, and similar products that can and do gene~ 
ate environmental problems of one kind or another. 
The food producing resources of the world are not capable of feeding a 
continuously expanding population. The "green revolution," which 
occurred between 1965 and 1969 has not been a' permanent solution to 
the world's food problems. Instead, it has been a means for buying 
time to get population unde.r control, to develop even more advanced 
technology in food production, and to change some attitudes about what 
constitutes a desirable way of life. Therefore, given the situation 
where millions of adults and children ar.e starving to death in other 
parts of the globe, the need for more food may be expected to be 
debated not only on environmental grounds, but on the basis of moral 
responsibility. . 
Resource Depletion/Technology. While it might be desirable to 
bring. the production efforts of all nations to levels currently en-
joyed by the United States and a handful of other highly inqustria1ized 
nations, the resources of the globe--given current levels of technol-
ogy-';;'wi1l not permit this to take place. The enormous growth of 
developed nations has not been made possible via the advancement of 
technology alQne. A supply of natural resources was also needed and 
this demand was' often met through importation of raw materHtls from 
less developed nations. Today, as these underdeveloped nations grow 
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and require more of their own resources for their own industrial needs, 
their interest in exporting raw materials to already developed nations 
is not likely to be enthusiastic or cooperative. 
While it is impossible to accurately predict future resource use and 
future resource supply conditions, just as it is impossible to pre-
dict future technological advances, an increased scarcity of.resources 
could nonetheless generate a profound environmental impact. Interests 
who need such resources will no doubt press for their extraction, re-
gardless of consequences to the natural environment or to foreign 
political relations. In the United States, environmental interests 
will attempt to emphasize alternatives, some of which may not be 
economically or technologically feasible at the time. The Colorado 
oil shale debate now in progress iS,most representative of this con-
tention. 
Aesthetic Considerations. As costs continue to rise, and community 
priorities become more and more difficult to resolve, it is anticipated 
that public dollars for aesthetically-oriented environmental improve-
ments will be difficult to appropriate at any level of government in 
the near future. Examples of such improvements include open space, 
national seashores, wilderness areas, and view protection or en-
hancement projects. Efforts" of this nature that clearly involve 
numerous job opportunities could be exceptions to this judgment. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper characterizes the social and attitudinal context within which 
tr.ansportation development, investment decisions, a,nd regulation are 
expected to occur. No attempt is made to draw dir~c.t implications for 
intercity transportation. ';:: 
Every U.S. post-war period has had problems of social stagnation, infla-
tion, recession, and general pessimism. In the post-Vietnam years, a 
mood of alienation and pessimism is widespread and growing, because of 
the stalemate of Vietnam, the collapse of the Nixon Administration, dis-
trust of government cl,lldbusinel?s, the loss of discretionary income by 
American workers through inflation and recession, and a high unemploy-
ment rate. Millions do not vote or otherwise participate in the polit-
ical process. 
Business managers show their loss 6f cO.nfidence by going but of business", 
not adjusting to regulatory changes, an~» hiking prices substantially to. 
generate excessive profits as a hedge l1'gainst the future .• 
While the Black social movement has had ramifications for federal spend-
ing and education, the women's movement has brought about additional 
and profound social changes: laws prohibiting sex discrimination; , 
changing roles of husbands and wives in child-rearing ,and working; and 
the rising number of career women in business. 
Coupled with an increasing population is the shift of population away 
fr6m larger cities toward mid-size ones. The national birthrate is 
declining, and family sizes are reducing. A very large increase in the 
number of single-parent and separated families. has occurred. With 
changing sexual mores have come increasing sexual activity, contraception, 
and abortion. 
The growth of gross national product (GNP) and personal income was signif-' 
icant through 1973, effecting a growth in the siz~ of the middle class 
population. A boom arising from this affluence occurred in recreational 
and other luxury industries, and in the number of people,enro11ed in 
higher education institutions. Rising "quality of 1ife j ! expectations 
haveyhowever, contributed to declining levels of satisfaction. 
Two critical facets oi:_the U. S." emp1oym;:'pt ,picture are automation and a 
labor shortage in the midst of an unemployment crisis. Automationhas 
eliminated unskilled and semisk:l.l1edjobs, and has increased the number 
of boring materials-handling jobs and the demand for certain high~leve1, " 
specialized positions (eIg., in electronics and data process:ing). 
The recent introduction of employment and admission quotas base'i on sex, 
,race, ,or national origin by the federal government has severely damaged 
the traditiona1--value of individual performance, and it may, in the long· 
run, retard the process of racial and economic integra.tion. 
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The computer has had the greatest impact of all modern innovations on 
individuality. The living human core of business organizations is lost. 
One's identity is replaced with a coded number. The computer is the 
perfect "fall guy".'; all errors and difficulties are passed off as the 
fault of the, machine. 
Industrial and office workers have pushed for improved working conditions 
and fringe benefits and for a voice in policy-making and personnel prac-
tices. Minorities, because of disparities between their incomes and 
those of whites, will press more vigorously for relief. 
Two diverging "societies" have emerged: an urban-pluralistic society, 
and amid-American and southern society. One result of this drift has 
been the refusal of suburban and rural areas to alleviate the financial 
and social plight of urban areas; while the urban dweller worries about 
mass transit, the mid-American seeks commercial aviation for his town 
and more, better roads for his car. 
.\ 
The overwhelming fact of life in the three major U.S. i).ndustria1 cor-
ridors (Boston-Washington~ Evanston-Chicago-Gary, San 1iFrancisco-San 
Diego) is stress due to irritants, affronts, and sensory shocks: air, 
water, visual, and noise pollution; accidents; crime;: and inner-city 
poverty. 
The high level of expectations of Americans for both domestic and for-
eign travel were met by an aggressive and growing airline industry. 
The desire to travel has become transformed into a perception of a right 
to travel; groups such as the elderly and the physically handicapped 
have pressed for low-cost fares and mechanical equipment to allow them 
the same freedom of access to travel as the general public; to accommo-
date these demands would mean a substantial cost overburden imposed ort 
all other travelers. 
One particular traveler concern is the transportation interface, the 
major source of transport system inefficiency: inconvenient or no.n-
existent parking facilities around airports and train stations; slow or 
intermittent service on ground carriers from airports to downtown areas; 
and substandard, low-security terminals for rail and bus transport 
systems. 
The momentous task of rebuilding public confidence awaits federal and 
state governments. The federal government has already perceived that 
the electorate will give it a mandate to correct business abu!:ies. 
Transportation systems will have to be planned to provide an inc,~;easing 
degree of local se1f-determination~ The success of any long-term trans:"" 
portation system investment is directly related to its acceptance and 
use by the public. Gaining acceptance, however, is difficult in a . 
divided and emotionally charged ,political arena. 
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XIV. SOCIAL IMPACTS ON INTERCITY TRANSPORTATION 
.~ Robert P. Whor f and Willia.m White, Jr. 
I, Gellman Research Associates, Inc. 
Introduction 
The present paper examines and seeks to illuminate a number of qualita-
tive social and psychological issues which may affect intercity trans-
portation systems. An adequate understanding of any complex of human 
activities requires an examination of the less de.terminant social and 
psychological forces, as well as a comprehension of the hard economic 
facts. Often the inspirations of the artist and musician foreshadow the 
insights and analyses of the scientist. 
While popular fads and enthusiasms are short-lived, major social move-
ments can only be minimally altered in two generations. There is every 
reason to believe, therefore, that most present day social forces will 
still be in evidence in 2025. Once a popular mood becomes institution-
alized in law, as with. the passage of amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 
effects may be felt many decades after the debate of the moment has 
passed. 
We do not doubt that ,the American governmental and economic system, al-
though presently going through a period of adjustment, is still a viable 
and maintainable method for offering personal economic advancement and 
private freedom to the greatest number of citizens. The authors' long-
term expectations are for the American people to continue their leader-
ship in the solution of both human and technical problems. This leader-
ship will pass through periods of turmoil and serenity, but it will con-
tinue. The long-term economic future of the United States is strong, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that there will be any fundamental 
alteration in the increasing economic output which has characterized 
the growth of the United States for these last two centuries. 
While the general mood of the present paper is decidedly "down," we have 
deemed it appropriC3;te to call attention to a number of negative factors 
that we believe deserve consideration. This mood, however, does not in 
any sense reflect a doomsday outlook; quite the contrary. 
The major concern of the present paper is to characterize the social and 
attitudinal c9ntext within which transportation development, investment 
decisions, and regulation are expected to occur. The paper is seen as 
providing important background to other papers in this series, particu-
larly those on implementation, regulation, and finance. It has not 
appeared appropriate, therefore, to attempt to draw direct implications 
for intercity transportation. The melange of changing and emerging 
values, attitudes, and feelings in American society, often sharply cOn"" 
U:i:cting, represent the well from which politicians derive their con-
stituencies, aha which collectively define the mood of the nation. 
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Social and Psychological Undercurrents 
The Europeans of the last century were accustomed to speaking of the 
Zeitgeist, or "timely-mood" of a culture or people. After every war 
in which the United States has been engaged there has followed a period 
of social stagnation, inflation, recession, and general pessimism. One 
outstanding exception was the period following the Second World War. 
In some ways, it may be said that for America the Se.cond World War 
dragged on from December 7, 1941 until the final American pullout from 
Vietnam, some 34 years later. No single influence has so impacted and 
structured the present state of American public opinion and mood as 
that 34 years of tension and foreign military conflicts, notwithstanding 
the interludes of "peace." 
While the immediate decade after the Second World War, 1946 to 1956, was 
one of unparalleled growth and success, vast military expenditures went 
unabated throughout the period. The 16 million men and women who 
served in the armed forces in the Second World War participated in one 
of the most total victories in the annals of warfare. They were con-
vinced that the rightness of American technology and political view-
point were unassailable, as proven by the military triumph. They picked 
up their careers and family expe17ieIV.!es in a world in which the main-
land United States was one of thd, url'scathed nations and in which Ameri-
\ )'" 
can industry and economics were ddminant. The same methods of management 
and production which had brought the War to an end were applied to the 
era of peace. 
The first decade after the War brought vast prosperity, including a baby 
and housing boom and the innovation of universally appealing consumer 
products, such as television and high-fidelity sound. In the U~S., it 
was assumed that the American concept of the world, which had been 
tested in wartime, was both right and proven. Along with the sheer 
possession of many new consumer objects, new habits of living were 
spread to more and (more citizens. Millions of post-War American families 
became accustomed to private luxury cars, paid vacations, and suburban 
living as simple matters of course. 
This bright picture began to darken slightly with·theopening of the 
Korean War in 1950. The debate within the United States began to center 
on the policy of containment of communist expansion. From that time on, 
one military commitment seemed to follow another with no apparent out-
come. The post-War generation in all countries began to grow to adult .... 
hood. In Western Europe and the United States, they grew up ~n un'-
paralleled affluence. The. defeated axis powers, Germany and Japan, 
participated in this affluent outburst to a greater degree than most of 
the victors. 
Along with this affluence came an increase in educational opportunities 
and a sense of expression. This indulgence was shattered by one sin-
gular difficulty, and that was the continuing drain of the young man-
hood of the U.s. into foreign military commitments. While their parents 
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grew up in a period of peace and were called to war as adults, the 
children of the post-War baby boom grew up in a country continually at 
war, a decisive factor that has been a major cause of a vast generation 
gap which has now existed for nearly two generations. 
While the World War II generation never seriously accepted any other world 
view than that of the Republican-Democratic establishment in Washington, 
D.C., the post-World War II generation has continually refused to accept 
this world view without serious qualification. This deep;...seated dif-
ference in viewpoint has been the direct cause of many other rejections 
of customs and mores by the generation of the 1940s and the 1950s. The 
following sections examine some of the most widely felt social and 
psychological undercurrents abroad in contemporary America. 
Ambivalent Attitudes of Optimism and Alienation. Even though the 
u.s. extricated itself from Vietnam, shifted the presidency from the 
Nixon to the Ford administration, and maintained a reasonable distribu-
tion of oil and gas in the face of the energy crisis, a deep mood of 
alienation is widespread and growing. While optimism about the American 
economy has kept the stock market from a serious decline and brought 
down the prime interest rates, there has appeared a mood of pessimism 
among all levels o~ society, which has been increased by the high un-
employment rate. 
Deeper and more pervasive than considerations of the day-to-day stock 
market quotations, a deep-seated resentment has been growing since the 
1960s.* This feeling is found in all levels of society, all ages and 
conditions, and all economic situations. Three factors have contributed 
to its reinforcement and extension: first, the stalemate in Vietnam 
and the realization that the same paralysis of policy which typified 
the Korean War is still in effect at the highest levels; second, the 
compromise and collapse of the Nixon Administration; third, the loss of 
discretionary income on the part of the vast mass of American workers 
through inflation and recession. 
The presence of this resentment or alienation makes its appearance in 
increased .incidence of social or. personal dysfunctional behavior and 
a wide variety of outward antisocial acts.** To mention only a few of 
the indicators: 
• Increased divorce rates, wife and child beatings. 
• Increased drug addiction and alcoholism*** 
*1155% Mistrust Government,1I PhiZ-adeZ-phia Inquirer~ Tuesday, June 10, 
1975; D. Hapgood, The Screwing of the Average Man (N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1975). 
**K. Keniston, The Uncommitted: AZ-ienated Youth in Americro~ Society 
(N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965). 
***T.B. SZClSZ, liThe Ethics of Addiction,1I Harper's Maga;3ine~ AtJril 1972. 
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InGreased street violence and aggravated assaults 
• Increased white-collar crime and industrial sabotage 
• Increased arson and insurance frauds 
Somewhat the same alienation has also been evidenced by businesses. 
Since, after all, the managers of businesses are also citizens, they 
are subject ';to the same moods and 'psycho10gica1 pressures as the rest 
of the population. Being producers, they cannot display their concern 
over an insecure economic future in the same fashion as consumers. Their 
fears have been passed on in a variety of ways. The simplest is to not 
adjust to changing regulatory demands, labor negotiation, or whatever 
and to lock up and go out of business. Another, is to "go pUblic" and 
then sellout. In those industries such as food preparation and supply 
where there is inelastic demand, this loss of confidence can be evi-
denced by substantial and unparalleled price hiKes. Certain producers 
will seek to hedge themselves .against the future\\by attempting to 
generate excessive profits. I"~ .' 
The consumer has been faced with "sugar crises," "beef crises," "toilet 
paper crises ," "soap and detergent crises," and similar excessive, 
temporary upheavals in the price and availability of basic commodities. 
These upheavals are ultimately as much caused by panic buying and syn-
thetic shortages as any other factors. 
The heart of the matter is the restructuring of public confidence. In 
a complex society such as America in the third quarter of the 20th 
Century, there will always be a percentage of the population who are dis-
satisfied with their situation and who have neither the ability nor the 
intent to improve it.. However, this should not be a very large or we11-
distributed minority. At the present time, there are millions of Ameri-
cans who feel that they are not, and perhaps will not, be able to keep 
themselves out of poverty. Many feel betrayed by the very institutions 
founded to protect and further their interests. Public opinion polls of 
the elderly, the factory worker, the school teacher, the unionized pro-
duction worker, the college student, the financial analyst, the physician, 
and other social groupings; show that the majority are troubled about the 
social and economic future of the country and are suspicious of govern-
ment and business at all 1eve1s.* 
The most openly visible alienation is among the racial-ethnic minorities. 
In the Black and Spanish-speaking communities there are children growing 
up in the. third, fourth, and even fifth generation in families on relief 
or other social assistance. There are pockets of minority persons where 
i: 
*0. Demavis, Dirty Business: The Corporate PoZi·tieal. Money-Power Game 
(N.Y.: Harper's Magazine press, 1975). 
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not one member has held other than a part-time or temporary job since 
the Second World War. 
This class was the rare exception only five years ago, but now they are 
being joined by thousands of youths and Vietnam veterans who have tired 
of looking for work or a productive position and have dropped out of the· 
bottom of the American class structure. These people are not even 
tallied in the unemployment figures and in most cases are past their 
allotments for any type of public assistance. Just how many Americans 
are in this number has been variously estimated at from 750,000 to 15 
million, which indicates the lack of data and interest in the problem. 
They are a highly mobile group and;will often move with the seasons 
around the country. With respect to various manifestations of aliena-
tion, it is important to recognize that there often exists structural 
alienation coupled with feelings of alienation. 
Changes of Traditional Roles Within Society. Two major social 
rearrangements have come about since 1950. The first is the new im-
portance of civil rights. Beginning in 1954, the impetus for civil 
rights legislation and. the whole process of attempting to provide equal 
advantage (often entailing special advantage) to members of minorities 
for better distribution of social and economic benefits has become part 
of the American legal system. The new social motivation and mobility 
of Blacks has been followed by organized women's groups. 
While the Black social movement has had ramifications for federal spend-
ing and education, additional and profound changes in society are now 
coming about with changes in law brought about by the women's movement. 
Already the alteration in management in many public institutions away 
from men and in favor of women has had a marked influence.* 
The United States 1970 Census showed 104.3 million women over the age of 
one year and 98.9 million men over one year. The female life expectan.cy 
in 1972 was 74.5 years as compared to the male life expectancy of 66.6 
years. Several detailed studies of the historical role of women in 
English-speaking societies have concluded that five interrelated inno-
vations have brought about the current situation of civil rights activism. 
These are: the industrial revolution, which brought women off the farms 
to work in factories; the perfecting of the typewriter and telephone, 
which created the role of secretary-typist; the development of total war, 
which forced the use of women in the manufacture of war materials; the 
advance of the electronic media, Which gave alternative opinions a voice; 
and the development of the birth contrblpill.** 
*M. Eastwood, "The Dou1Jle Standard of Justice: Women's Rights Under the 
Constitution," VaZparaiso University Law Review., 5 Vol., D.L. 
**W. White, Jr. (ed.) The New Woman (Philadelphia: North American Pub. 
Co., 1972), pp~ 9-14. 
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To date, the American industrial and commercial complex has been the most 
relucta~t of institutions to accede to the pressure of feminism; although 
such capitulation is bound to occur. The long-term effects of feminism 
as a social undercurrent are undeniable as they are being felt already 
at every level of American public and private education. Recent Supreme 
Court decisions and agency guidelirv:\s have demanded compliance with a 
none.xclusion principle based upon sexual difference. This means that 
many of the assumed roles of male and female in American society are in-
tentionally being programmed out of public education, whether for good or 
ill result cannot yet be determined. 
The role of the woman will command consideration of another viewpoint as 
has the alteration of the role of the Black within the corporation. 
Feminist and min~.r~ty viewpoints will be heard and are already dominating 
som~ fields of endeavor. As new legal structures institutionalize these 
role' changes, there will be basic and far-reaching implications for all 
.. of society. For example, rather than having a husband work 40 to 48 
hours Iter week while the wife cares for one or more children, it may be-
come feasible for the wife and husband to each work possibly 25 hours 
per week, and each in turn may be responsible for child rearing. Such 
systems are already being adopted on a small scale in Sweden, Denmark, 
Finlan.d, Holland, and other countries. 
At a broader level, this newly changing role of women will ultimately 
mean a decided restructuring of American labor, one in which women wi.l1 
insist on maternity and child-rearing leaves and long-term employment 
commitments. The present situation of rapid turnover of female employees 
is already beginning to change. 
The major force of the role-change undercurrent is in the roles that 
women see for themselves.* A young woman employee entering a major 
institution such as a bank, hospital, or manufacturing organization no 
longer sees herself as merely fulfilling a role as a restricted func-
tionary within the firm. She sees herself as a potential candidate for 
a higher managerial position and as a direct competitor to all of the 
other management trainees, male and female. This change from a "mere 
job" to ··career" orientation will cause vast changes in the internal 
organization of business. While social and economic class and regional 
considerations also come into play, the general thrust of feminism is 
clearly already at work. 
Attitudes Concerning the Size and Pervasiveness of Institutions. 
With the coming of electronic data processing and information automation, 
economies of scale could be realized in human transactions and communi-
cations, as well as in the massive manipulation of facts and figures. 
*C. Mattiasson, (ed.) Many Sisters: Women in Cross-CuUuraZPerspeotive 
(Glencoe,IlL: Free Press, 1974). 
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The size and impersonality of most institutions grew by a factor of two 
and more with the new information processing tools. At the same time, 
approximately the early 1960s, a deepening mistrust and resentment of 
government and industry began to appear. While attitudes involving mis-
trust of big government are endemic and almost prototypically American, 
the key is whether they are coupled with hope or despair. The early his-
tory of the country was certainly characterized by an almost boundless 
hope and confidence that rational solutions would emerge or be found for 
all problems. More recently, however, there is evidence of increasing 
despair and loss of confidence. 
The many consumer and public advocacy groups which have recently arisen 
have served to further catalyze and focus anti-institutional sentiment. 
One manifestation has been a dropping off of membership in almost every 
kind of large-scale organization. For example: in the two years 1973-
74 and 1974~75 loss of membership has been reported for organizations 
as diverse as: 
i 
-I 
.1 
-
-I 
-: 
-
! 
i 
I B9Y Scouts of America 
i 
i AFL-CIO 
American Heart Association 
American Legion 
, . i 
American Medical Association 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
Klu Klux Klan 
_ Socialist Labor Party 
Interestingly, consumer and environmental interest organizations have 
also had trouble maintaining membership. In part, such organizational 
decline is also related to a retreat to privatism. 
In addition, the incidence of computer frauds and minor sabotage has 
risen steadily until record security is an acute problem.* Unfortunate 
as petty destruction may be, the real problem is the large number of 
individuals who just turn their back upon the institutions. There are 
millions who no longer vote, register, or take any part in the political 
process. There are additional millions who distrust all and every type 
of large corporation, school, hospital, state or federal office or agency, 
and all similar institutions.· 
*S. W. Liebholz and L. D. Wilson, User's Guide to Computer Crime (Radnor, 
Pa.: Chilton, 1974). 
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As in the case of the current genera,! pess~m~sm in American society, 
'r ~, 
r 
the revelations of the Watergate era will have lingering effects on con-
fidence in government, with doubt and pessimism giving way to cynicism. 
The payoffs granted by large American businesses, the feather-light 
sentences given major political conspirators, and the continuous illegal 
spying on American citizens have eroded faith in the structure of the 
government to deal effectively and impartially with abuses either inside 
or outside of government. 
At the consumer level, the continuous revelations of faulty and dangerous 
foodstuffs, automobiles, and .electrical appliances by "consumer advo-
cates" has left the majority of Americans very wary of the goods they 
purchase and aggressive in pursuit of what they perceive as any attempt 
at "welshing" on the part of big business. Almost characteristically, 
"consumerism" itself has become big business. 
A further important indicator of this distrust 'of the large institutions 
in American society .is the unwillingness of many of the best young minds 
to go to work for them. The trend, which is now ten years old, is for 
many young physicians, lawyers, engineers, and others to work for public 
interest and other service organizations rather than for the giants of 
American industry and commerce.* It is not clear just how deep and 
abiding this antagonism will be. Part and parcel of this distrust of 
large institutions is the inability of individuals to relate on a human 
scale with such institutions. 
These attitudes can appear in any number of variations and combinations. 
The important aspect is that they are found at the center of conscious-
ness of a vast majority of Americans. The causes and directions of 
these attitudes are much too interrelated and complex for complete 
analysis. Bundles of such sensibilities lie just beneath the political 
and economic events of our times. 
Major Issues in the Social Sphere Affecting Transportation 
Increases and Shifts in Population. Most of the problems and 
difficulties in the supplying of food and basic commodities, energy 
included, go back to the problem of expanding population and the inabil-
ity of the world economic, social, and legal system to cope with it. 
In the United States, the population has continued to increase at every 
decennial since 1790. The only two periods when it showed significant 
lags in increase were the periods of the Civil War and the Second World 
War. The most conservative estimates put the present population of 
America at about 207 million. The expectation for the population over 
*W. H. Sewell and R. M. Hauser, Education3 Occupation and Earnings 
(N.Y.: Harcourt,Brace, Javanovich, 1975). 
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the next 50 years is for 267 million by 2025. This will mean an in-
crease from the present 60 persons per square mile to nearly 75.* 
The shift from rural to urban was most pronounced from 1939 through 1959. 
However, a more recent tendency is for the larger cities to lose popu-
lation while the mid-size cities gain it. There is no question that this 
trend will continue. Clouding the population picture are the two recent 
social phenomena discussed below. 
D.ecline in the Birthrate and Reduction in Family Size.. In the 
last five years, there has been a definite decline in the number of 
births in the United States, as much as a 55% drop over the baby boom days 
of the late 1940s. The specific figures in live births per 1,000 popula-
tion are as follows: 1970, 18.4; 1971, 17.3; 1972, 15.6; 1973, 14.2; (and 
projected for 1974 and 1975).1974, 9.8; 1975, 8.3.** This has not de-
creased the overall population because of the relatively young median 
age of the U.S. population which is now about 27 years. Of greater im-
portance is the very large increase in single-parent or separated fam-
ilies. In some areas of the U.S., notably California, the divorce rate 
is now about equal to the marriage rate. The fertility of continued 
marriages, i.e., number of children produced, is ~qual to families ul-
timately split by divorce with the result that large numbers of single-
parent households have come into existence. 
Sometime during early 1975, the changing birthrate is expected to again 
produce 1.87 children per American fami.ly which was set in the depression 
years 1929 to 1939. This will mean that in the foreseeable future there 
will be fewer and fewer members in any given family group. The number 
of subnuc1ear families of a child (under 18 years of age) living with 
one adult, whether mother, father, or some other relative, is increas-
ingrapidly. 
Alteration in Sexual Mores. The contraceptive pill was invented 
in 1961 by the pharmaceutical firm of G. D. Searle. Several other 
changes in the social mores concerning sexuality appeared at the same 
time.. One was the increased use and distribution of other contraceptive 
devices and the more active sex roles of women. Despite the enthusiasm 
for the "new morality" o~ situational ethics, there has been no appre-
ciable increase in sexual promiscuity in the U.S. However, there has 
been a large-scale increase in nonmarital cohabitation. Such arrange-
ments between consenting adults have made their impact upon the overall 
birthrate, eventhough this is assumed to be relatively small.' The 
broadening sexual morality has also meant that many young warnell are more 
*U.S. Bureau of the Census,.Cm.rent Population Reports .. series P,-60. 
**U. S. Bureau of the Census/Current Population Reports.. series P-2S " 
No. 521. 
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likely to travel and live apart from the previously considered "male 
guardian," whether father or husband. This has definite ramifications 
for the whole notion of security.* 
There is no evidence to suggest a reversal of the trends in sexuality 
and sexual expressiveness. However, as with the Japanese experience with 
massive programs of birth control and government-supported contraception, 
we have seen a sharp drop in the birthrate at the same time that there 
is a rise in sexual activity (among the aging and the young unmarried) 
in the general population. In Japan, this has led to a very definite 
labor shortage; whether it will do so in the u.s. remains to be deter-
mined. 
Another aspect of the alteration in sexual mores is the widespread and 
very popular introduction of legalized abortion. Although there will 
be some long-term opposition from the Roman Catholic, and certain .Pres-
byterian-type churches; and various "Right-to-Life" groups, there 
does not appear to be a strong concerted movement to severely limit the 
statutes as approved by the u.s. Supreme Court. It is now estimated 
that as many as one of four pregnancies in the U.S. are terminated by 
therapeutic abortion in a gynecol,ogica1 clinic or acute-care health 
institution. This will be a definite depressant to the birthrate and 
the size of the population a decade hence and probably more so each 
decade thereafter. The national goal of zero popUlation growth based 
upon "replacement reproduction" was posited on the assumption of a static 
state of immigration. Since there has not been a consistent policy con-
cerning immigration, a readjustment of the projected population for 2025 
is probably needed.** 
Rise in "Quality of Life" Expectations. It has often been asked: 
What social force impelled the civil rights and other upheavals of the 
1960s7 The answer is the growing expectation of better economic and 
social conditions which grew out of the boom in business production and 
sales after the Second World War. The expansion came almost coinciden-
tally with the wide-scale marketing of television to the American con-
sumer. The two forces combined to show, through that medium, desirable 
new products which greatly increased consumer appetites and expectations. 
Of course, the impact of TV has been much more pervasive, touching as it 
has, heightened awareness in political, social, educational arenas. 
Economic Growth., The United States came out of the Second 
World War with its vast economic and industrial machinery intact and 
*B. 1. Nurstein, Love, Sex and Marriage (N. Y.: Springer, 1974). 
**The United Nations and Population: Major Resolutions and Instruments 
(N.Y.: U.N. Fund for Population Activities, 1974)~ 
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producing at full potential. The U.S. held the commanding economic lead 
in the world and in 1948 envisioned no peers. The GNP (in current 
dollars) was $284,769 million in 1950, rose to $977,080 million in 1970 
and to $1,294,919 million in 1973. While the GNP rose so substantially, 
the personal income of Americans rose at essentially the same rate. The 
figure (in current dollars) stood at $277,619 million in 1950, rising to 
$800,290 million in 1970, and to $1,035,400 million in 1973. This gave 
the average American family the highest standard of living in the world 
for all but the last few years, with the special exception of certain 
small, restricted European states, for the first time span from 1939 to 
1973 or 1974. 
Increase in Wages and Salaries. The growth in GNP and personal 
income is even more vivid in terms of per capita income during the same 
period. It rose from $1,501 in 1950 to over $4,921 in 1973 (in current 
dollars). When it is recognized that this tripling occurred within the 
working career of many millions of Americans, who are still very much a 
part of the labor force, the psychological effect can be realized. Such 
sharp increases in wages and salaries meant that many workers who began 
in the lower and lower-middle class in the 1950s, rose to the middle 
and upper-middle class by the 1970s. rul even more interesting indicator 
is the boom in recreational hardware, recreational facilities, the 
"experience business," and similar luxury industries. A number of studies 
have revealed that the overwhelming majority even below the poverty line 
in America, live among a plethora of automobiles, telephones, color 
television, and convenience foods. Given this, one might well ask: how 
ought such people react to galloping inflation? 
Increased Education. With the increase in personal income 
came the chance for acquiring other habits previously the domain of the 
upper class on the economic laddeI," .", One of the most prominent of these 
acquisitions was higher education. 'In a typical suburban high school in 
one of the areas surrounding an AIr,erican city, 20% of the students went 
on to higher education in the de.cade of the 1950s. In the 1960s this 
rose to 55% in an average year, and by 1972 it was over 60%. On the 
national scene, the student population in post-secondary schools of all 
types was 2.2 million in 1950, which rose to 8.2 million by 1973. The 
percentage rise from 1950 to 19@ was 61. 2% and from 1960 to 1973, 
111. 7%. Before the recent downturn due to the slowdown in the job mar-
ket, the student population was projected to climb to 11 million by the 
year 2000. 
This increase in education not only meant a strong rise in the qualifi-
cation of job seekers, but also some unique corollaries in the patterns 
of American higher education. Four of these shifts are of importance. 
• A shift of student enrollments away from the exact and tech-
nological sciences toward the social sciences, humanities, 
and arts. 
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A high degree of skepticism concerning what had been presumed 
to be the "verities of science."* 
• Increasingly more sophisticated types of pressure being brought 
to bear, first, upon the acadel!1ic institutions, and second, 
upon the legislative branches ~>f\ govr::.nment. 
'\ \,> 
• A l~rge increase in the size of the professoriate, with an" 
attendant increase in public visibility and political power. 
The overall effect of this increase and shift in educational experience 
has been a loss of mandate by almost every level of government and a 
marked increase in the popularity of political "independence" from the 
major parties. This has already added impetus to the "populist" style 
of American politics and is being felt by regulatory agencies and others. 
There is something of a paradox here. One would expect with increased 
levels of education to find an increased level of political partic,ipa--
tion. On the other hand, the more educated are less willing to accept 
the old political saws and shibboleths. There is also the sobering fact 
that increasing numbers of people view politics as dirty. 
Decline in Satisfaction. The quality of life expectation has 
risen rapidly since the Second World War, but the level of satisfaction 
with that quality of life has not. The increase in affluence has not 
resulted in an increase in "happiness." Other sections of this paper 
will also indicate the extent of the general foreboding malaise in which 
many millions of Americans find themselves. There is widespread dis-
content with all aspects of life in the midst of increased affluence and 
unparalleled wealth. 
Conflicts Between Individuality and Need For Group Action. 
Loss of Individuality in the Marketplace. American culture 
has traditionally put great emphasis on the value of individuality. The 
typical folk heroes from Miles Standish to Shaft have been rugged in-
dividualists. As a culture, America has frowned upon group, collective, 
or communal efforts and actions. For example, take the antagonism to 
"cooperatives," even though they were a form of organization which con-
tributed a great deal to the first century of the nation's progress. 
In other parts of the world, communal effort or "socialization" has been 
a way of life for centuries. With the continued growth of population 
and the complexity and compression of urbanization, the pressure toward 
"sociali..zation" has also increased. A crucial point where individuality 
and socialization are conflicting is at the point of employment. 
*C. Bird, The Case Against College (N.Y.: McKay, 1975). 
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Two critical facts of the employment picture in the u.s. are: (1) auto-
nk~tion, and (2) a labor shortage in the midst of an umemployment crisis. 
Automation has meant the slow but continuous elimination of thousands 
of unskilled and semiskilled jobs. Simultaneously, it has meant an in-
crease in the uumberof boring, frustrating, materials-handling situations 
wherein the worker is simply the extension of the machine which is being 
fed.* It has also meant the appearance, within a short period of time, 
of many new sophisticated positions at a high level, requiring both train-
ing and experience in specialized skills. The best example of such posi-
tions is in the electronics and EDP industries. Such skills tend not 
only to be industry-specific, but require particular knowledge of the 
management information system or production programming within that in-
dustry and within a unique departmenE. 
The trade unionist movement in the u.s. has been very unsuccessful in 
organizing these new information and electronics-related skilled trades. 
One reason is that they are part of the middle and traditionally conser-
vative, entrepreneurial grouping and are therefore resistant to any sort 
of collective or communal activity. A specter of change has appeared in 
the frequency of white. collar strikes which have already involved school 
teachers, government workers, and postal employees. The gnawing fear of 
being forced out on the street too early for comfortable retirement is 
making inroads where the old adages for unionization fell on deaf ears. 
"Perhaps it is this specter that most haunts working men and 
women: the planned obsolescence of people that is of a piece 
with the planned obsolescence of the things they make. Or sell. 
It is perhaps this fear of no longer being needed in a world of 
needless things that most clearly spells out the unnaturalness, 
the surreality of much that is called work today. "*", 
The effect of this loss of personal estimation of worth has lowered pro-
duction and quality standards as well as depressed the sense of job 
satisfaction of many workers in a variety of industries. Many younger 
workers have despaired of finding any other satisfactions or securities 
on a job and simply define all aspects of labor in terms of cash payment.-
Transportation industries certainly suffer from this trend as much as 
any North American business organization. Steps must betaken to miti-
gate the future impact of such despair. 
e- c _ Individual Performance and Affirmative Action. The recent in-
troductionc-.f employment and admission quotas based on sex, race, and 
nationalpTf'gin, and enforced by the federal government has severely 
*w. Kornblum, Blue CoUar Community (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974). 
**S. Terkel, Working (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1974)~ pp. xviii. 
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damaged the traditional value of individual performance. Beginning with 
the feminist insistence that university faculties have a sufficient 
number of women in policy-making positions, the requirement for quota 
hiring and promotion has been advocated by most other minority groups.* 
The severity of the antagonism with which such programs conflict with 
the clear mandates of the Constitution has not yet surfaced. The sup-
positions at the root of such social justification schemes bring about 
the most unacceptable of'euphemistic behavior. Institutions, which in-
sist on their origins in the American liberal tradition which began with 
Jane Addams at the turn of the century, will demand "equal opportunity" 
employment, which is little more than an appeal for preferential treat-
ment on the basis of race or sex. The justification for this interpre-
tation of the American ethic is the idea of "correcting" the abuses of 
the past. Recent cliometric studies at a number of locations show that 
the abuses of the past may not have been nearly as severe as those which 
result from proposals to correct them. Although the Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to face this extremely controversial issue by 
hearing crucial cases, it will have to make some definitive decision on 
the matter. The ramifications of that decision will have far-reaching 
consequences for employment in the U.S. 
A potential difficulty of this forced advantage policy is that it may, 
in the long run, retard the process of racial and economic integration. 
In many areas of the country, it has caused severe racial animosity 
and has meant that industries have moved out further from cities 
to be less accessible to minority individuals. Other industries have 
simply erected nominal positions with no real policy-making substance in 
areas such as personnel and customer relations where women and Blacks 
can have managerial titles without really affecting the organization of 
the company. 
Conformity and Control of Behavior. One of the less fortunate 
aspects of new technology is that there is little effective restraint, 
such that what is possible generally is accomplished. The greatest sin-
gle instance of such determinism in the 20th Century is the invention 
and use of atomic weapons. This may be exceeded by genetic and cytologi-
cal manipulation. In the psychological realm also, behavior modification 
has become widely applied in what are commonly considered severe social 
maladjustments such as drug addiction, alcoholism and homosexuality. 
ThiB modification might be attempted through reconditioning the autono-
mic nervous system by electric or other discomfort or through the use of 
drugs as psychometric agents. 
However, in an attempt to control and enforce what are thought to be 
beneficial results on an ever-increasing population, other more subtle 
~*K. Millet,.Token Learning: A Study of Women's Higher Education in 
America (N.Y.: NOW Press, 1968). Based on position papers produced 
by the Women's Liberation Group of Columbia University in the early 
1960s. 
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means are being employed by industries and governments all around the 
world. Psychological pressure can be brought through denial of a cer-
tain advantage, let us say education, or employment, to all those who 
do not conform to some desired pattern. Needless to say, the potential 
for abuse is horrendous. It'has been assumed by too many scientists 
that the aseptic, abstract quality of computerized data somehow imputes 
an objectivity and a certainty to the results of their research which 
transcends the imprecise and messy world of human events. This has 
caused many persons to become wary' of all expert opinions involving the 
behavioral sciences and human activities. 
In the United States, as elsewhere, major experiments have been under-
taken with the expenditures of billions of dollars, e.g., the War on 
Poverty, the elimination of de faato segregation in the schools, and 
,\ . - . 
the massiv'e federal ,housing program. Whenever popular support becomes 
hard to enlist or d,tizen apathy is in danger of destroying the program, 
reverse public rela(ions are employed to attempt to instill the desired 
positive motive. 
At the personal and individual level, motivational psychology is utilized 
for all sorts of purposes in and out of government. The initial steps 
are taken by the American public school system while the subjects are 
between four and six years of age. Unfortunately, a good bit of any 
individual child's SUCl'!ess in the school experience and thus his or her 
chance for "success" is. related to how well that child fits into the 
organizational system. This programming is carried out all through life. 
American media advertising is dependent on this programming. 
One of the greatest and most enduring of social protests carried on during 
the post-Second World War period has been for the right or respect of 
individual behavior. Begitming with the Black and then women's social 
protests, there have been many other groups that have taken up this 
issue. While these groups are obviously visible and highly vocal, the 
same feeling of being "pushed around" or controlled has been voiced by 
millions of other Americans. 
Since mass transit involves a high degree of group action, it is unlikely 
that it will be easily achieved in the face of the traditional ethiC of 
individualism. In the countries where mass transit has become a large-
scale success, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, and the Benelux states, group 
action or "socialization" is much further developed than in the U.S. 
There is still a deep-seated class consciousness associated with travel 
modes which is ultimately based UPOll the notion of individuality and thus 
nonconformity.* In the popular mind as determined by mass culture, e.g., 
movies, T.V. etc., the wealthy classes transport themselves in private 
motor cars or jet aircraft. The middle classes use train as well as 
plane. However, the lower classes must relinquish their right to individ-
uality and privacy and utilize bus transportation. 
1(H. M. McLuhan, The Mechanical Bride (N .• Y .; Beacon, 1967). 
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Automation of Information and Judgmental Function. No other 
modern innovation has so adversely affected th,e se~se of individuality 
as has the application of the computer. The bigness of corporations, 
organizations, and governmental jurisdictions is brought home to the 
average citizen with devastating and frustrating force by the imperson-
ality of electronic data processing. The individual becomes disoriented 
and confounded when dealing with a faceless, emotionless machine. The 
living human core of the organization is lost and two-way communication 
becomes impossible. The situation is made worse by the enormous econo-
mies of scale that the computer and electronic word processing provide. 
These economies are of such magnitude that it is virtually impossible 
for a large company or jurisdiction to operate in any other fashion than 
with automated information-handling procedures.* 
The replacement of one's identity by a coded number or series of dark 
bars is enough of an emotional affront. The substitution of electro-
mechanical logic for human judgment is an even more traumatic, experience. 
Basic decisions which result in the inclusion or exclusion of applicants 
for jobs, students for advanced education, recipients for loans, and 
the other components of the largess of modern society, ar,e being made, 
so it is felt by many, by computers without human intervention. The 
computer, furthermore; is the perfect "fall guy"; all errors and diffi-
culties are passed off as the fault of the faceless machine. This ten-
dency will become more commonplace as the population grows larger. A 
contributing factor may derive from the circumstance that personal 
judgments by administrators, personnel officers, and educators are more 
and more vulnerable to legal challenge. 
#; 
Since the founding of the republic, the notion of individualism has been 
a cherished concept in American life. Collective action has never 
appealed to the ethical fancy of Americans and has usually been equated 
with socialization, a concept almost universally abhorred in American 
history. Within the last 30 years, as the frontiers of the U.S. have 
closed and networks of communication and organizational structure have 
grown up in every field of human endeavor, it has become increasingly 
clear that social control is inevitable to avoid the exercise of one 
person's "rights" from interfering with those of another. Along with 
this concern has come, almost simultaneously, the notion of the inherent 
success of science. This has been labeled by H. Th. Dooyeveerd and other 
legal scholars as "the science ideal."** The obvious conclusion is that 
through the scientific application of certain principles, absolute social 
equality could be approached, if not achieved. The price to be paid for 
this sort of social engineering is an immense loss of personal choice 
*A. Neier, Dossier: The Secret Fil-es They Keep on You (N.Y.: Stein 
and Day, 1975); W. H. Ware, "Computer Privacy and Computer Security," 
BuUetin of ASIS~ Vol. 1, No.3, October 1974, pp •. 9, 32. 
**H. Th. Dooyeveerd, The New Critique of Theoretical- Thought~· Vol. 2 
(Amsterdam:J. H. Kole, 1962). 
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and 4iscretion. The older a person, the more categorized he or she be-
comes. The net result is a deep-seated conflict in America~} attitudes; 
on the one hand, there is pressure for being an individual, "do your 
own thing"; while on the other hand, there is the ever-increasing deter-
minism and control based on societal we1~-being.* 
I) 
A new class of professionals may arise in the U.S. The only function of 
thislgroup would be to insulate the individu?i.l. from the psychic shock 
of ))eing controlled by his information env:!:c6nment. The incredible -
reliance on mental health professionals which is now common in urban 
centers is indication enough that such a class of psychic insulators is 
making its appearance. 
Changes in Work Behavior. The increase in wages and education avail-
able to a majority of industrial and office workers in the developed 
countries has led to a new interest and pressure for improved working 
conditions and fringe benefits. In the United States, there has been a 
decline in union membership but no decline in the hold of the unions over 
the closed-shop industries. 
Aside from the traditional labor-management adversary relationship, there 
is also a strong movement toward increased humanization of the. work en-
vironment. American workers have been buffeted by repeated layoffs and 
steady erosion of purchasing power. Many have sought increased control 
over the.ir own economic destinies. One definite step is to gain a voice 
in policy-making and personnel practices. Another, of course, involves 
getting a "piece of the action." 
The New Role of Women in Work. The legal structure of the 
United States regarding work has been changed profoundly by the efforts 
of feminist groups. As a heritage of the last century, many states and 
other jurisdictions had laws on their books which subordinated female 
workers on account of their sex to their male counterparts. The impetus 
which pushed the American women into the job market was the labor short-
age brought on by war. 
In both the First and Second World Wars, there were strong pressures 
for women to replace those in the Armed Forces. In 1940, only 27.4% 0 f 
American women worked outside of the home for wages. This rose to 35% 
in 1944 and dropped again to 29.8% in 1947. From 1965 'to 1975, there has 
been a steady increase until somewhere around 47% of American :women now 
work.** However, their distribution throughout the labor force is still 
*H. Van Riessen, DeMaatschappij Der Toekomist3 Franeker, T. Wever (1952) 
pp. 176 .... 201-
**U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor 
Statistics (1974). 
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toward the lower'end of the wage/responsibility scale. While there were 
14 million male p-rofessional and managerial workers employed in the U. S. 
in April 1974, there were only six million women in a similar position. 
The differenc~ in ~ages was even more acute, with the average female wage 
being 20% to 50% below the male wage for the same job with identical 
responsibilities. 
The biggest obstacle to long-term career commitments by women is, of 
course, the requirement of childbearing. In the foreseeable future, 
there may be broader legal structures allowing w~men to take leaves of 
absence or temporary health compensation so that they could bear chil-
dren. The difficulty will be that such an exception concerning atten-
dance at a place and time of employment will put strain on traditional 
concepts of the masculine role in employment. 
The Minority Position in Industry. Starting with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, there has been a long series of court challenges 
and decisions affecting the place of the various minorities in the labor 
force. The minorities thus cited have been those with the most dif-
ficulty gaining a position in the economic middle class. Black Ameri-
cans, numbering about 24 million, have successfully won virtually all 
of the rights granted any other group of American citizens. Certain 
other racial and ethnic minorities including Spanish-Americans, Puerto 
Ricans, American Indians, and Eskimos have followed the lead of the 
Blacks in demonstrating and bringing court suits for their rights. Even 
though the Blacks have won political and social gains, they are still 
far behind the whites in regard to income. While the average weekly 
earnings of white males (in current dollars) for 1973 was $146, the same 
figure for Black males was $97. * As inflation and other economic con-
straints become greater, it is possible that Black economic and social 
groups will press more vigorously for relief from this disparity in 
incomes. 
Bifurcation of Urban and Mid-American Cultures. From 1616 until 
1840, America was predominantly an agrarian society. Scholars such as 
Alexis de Tocqueville (circa 1845) praised this aspect of the U.S. and 
its citizenry. After the Civil War (1865), the pressure of new immi-
grants coming to the East Coast forced the longer settled middle and 
lowe.I" economic classes to migrate West. In waves, each group of immi:-
grantssucceed,ed the other. The Scap,diuavians, Germans" English, and 
Scotch were followed by the Irish, -li:uLi.1:!llS, Polish, Russians, Central 
European Jews, and peoples from the Balkans. They-were succeeded in 
turn by the Blacks from the South moving 'into northern urban centers 
during and after the First World War, and, finally, by the Puerto Ricans 
*U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings Monthly:, 
December, 1974. 
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and other Spanish-speaking groups. After 100 years of immigration and 
internal migrations, a separate social system had developed in the Mid-
dle Ame rican and SoUthern states in contrast w:~th the major urban cen ters 
of the Northeast and Far West. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, a new political alignment arose. The previously 
middle and ·upper class Republican Party and the wor1<illg class and immi-
grant Democratic Party lost their traditional characteristics. The most 
overt sign of this melding of political philosophies was the attempt at 
organizing a 1eft..;.leaning third party by Henry Wallace in 19L~8, and the 
numerous attempts to build a strong conservative third party since. In 
the intervening years, a new sociopolitical reality has come into being. 
This divergence is best seen in the two sets of contrasting tendencies 
shown schematically below: 
Urban-Pluralistic Society 
Immediate foreign or lower class 
Unionist and collectivist 
Ethnic and urban culture 
Sexually active 
Interest-group oriented 
Self-image: "liberal" 
Democrat/Liberal Republican 
Socioneurotic 
Mid-American and Southern Society 
Mediate foreign or middle class 
Antiunionist and individualistic 
Country and western, pop culture 
Sexually latent 
Social-hierarchial oriented 
Self-image: "conservative" 
Republican/Conservative Democrat 
Xenophobic 
Although firm data in the area of social indicators are extremely dif-
ficult to acquire or interpret,* that this immense bifurcation does exist 
has been shown by a great many studies. Differences are also found in 
the social mores and tolerances of the two groups. As an effect of the 
Vietnam War and the Watergate affair it appears that the two societies 
may'be drifting further and further apart. The most obvious result of 
this drift is the refusal of the suburban and rural a~eas to aid or help 
the financial and social plight of the urban areas. 
The geographical distribution of these two sets of world views and cul-
tures is made more difficult to define by virtue of the frequency of 
interregional migration. However, the urban-pluralistic category 
appears to be located in the three major industrial corridors: Boston 
to Washington (BOSWASH) in the East, Evanston-Chicago-Gary (EVANRY) in 
the Midwest, and San Francisco to San Diego in the West. The California 
picture is further confused by the proxinq,ty of free-form life-styles 
and right-wing conservatives. Just as thEJre are deep-seated differences 
between the two large factions, so there tis a different set of priorities 
regarding social problems. While the trrb:!m-plura1istic population worries 
about mass transit, the Mid-American se~ks commercial aviation for his 
town and more, better roads for his car. 
*E. B. Sheldon and R. Parke, "Social Indicators," Science~ 188, May 16, 
1975, pp. 693-699. 
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One very serious aspect of the difference between these two cultures is 
the variance of opinion concerning security and individualism. The 
urban-pluralist dweller, particularly the upper-middle class, will 
quickly trade a portion of his or her individual right to O~7{l, let us 
say, a gun for the collective security of gun registration and control. 
The Mid-American cannot see any necessity for such a radical commitment. 
The result is that regionalization and provincialism within the American 
system is still too strong to demand any unified effort against common 
social woes. 
Urban Stresses. The overwhelming fact of life in anyone of 
the three urbanized corridors of the U.S. is stress. The individual 
citizen is continually subjected to irritants, affronts, and sensory 
shocks. Accident, crime, and life-threatening situations are many times 
more common in the urban environment than in either the suburban or rural 
environmen t. 
There are many kinds of affronts against the health of the individual in 
the urban environment. Many of these are detectable. by the senses. 
Possibly the most evident are air pollution and noise. The condition 
of the air over any major city varies with the time of year and the 
meterological conditions; but under any circumstance, it will have from 
10 to 100 times the amounts of carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide, and 
other pollutants as the air only 100 miles away in open country. Tests 
have shown the amount of lead from leaded fuels in the blood of street 
workers to be as high as 0.038 mg/100g.* This is within 50% of the 
dosage where poisoning occurs. Added to these noxious gases are micro-
scopic grit, carbonized waste, mineral acids, and metallic particles as 
well as strands of airborne asbestos, nylon, fiberglass, and the like. 
Noise pollution has been shown to be the other great destroyer of health 
and cause of neurologic impairment. One type of auditory impairment is 
known as PTS (permanent threshold shift); a sound level of 80 dB (deci-
bel) is thought to be the upper limit for total safety from hearing 
damage.** The typical quiet country road produces approximately 45 dB; 
the city street, 90dB; the pneumatic jackhammer, a steady 115 dB. 
The symptoms of continued exposure to air pollution are bronchial irri-
tations and infections, sinusitis, pneumonia, and emphysema. The symp-
toms of continued exposure to noise pollution are reduction in the 
*U.3. Department of HeaZth" Education and WeZfare"Public Health Service 
pub1.11999-AP-12 ,January, 1965. 
**R.R. Coles, G. R. Garinther, D. C. Hodge, and C. G. Rice, Critex-ia for 
Assessing Hearing Damage Risk from ImpuZse-Noise Exposure" U.S. Army 
Tech. Memo 13-67. AMCMS Code 5011.11. 84100. 
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peripheral circulation, build·-up of fatty deposits inside the blood 
vessels, constriction of the iris, excessive tension in the muscles, 
increased gastric secretion, increased blood pressure, anxiety, ner-
vousness, insomnia, irritability, and antagonism. So pervasive is noise, 
that unconscious physiological responses to noise stimulations continue 
during sleep and even under anesthesia.* Many hundreds of thousands of 
persons living and working in inner-city environments have become accus-
tomed to a continual state of neurosis. They have maladapted their 
homeostasis to a steady-state which is only a caricature of the normal.** 
In a secondary manner,the urban-dweller is affronted by water pollution 
to such a degree that the only available water is laced with chemical 
substances ranging from common sodium and potassium salts to picotrace 
amounts of such radioactive substances as astatine and strontium. The 
city dweller is also affronted by the health and psychic hazard of 
mountains of solid waste which at best breed rats, mice, and roaches, 
and at worst leak partially reduced organic solvents and potentially 
dangerous hydrocarbons into ground receiving waters. 
Perhaps even more damage is done to human beings by the psychological 
shocks of urban existence. One of these shocks is the effect of visual 
pollution. This is the continual grating effect of dirty streets, 
garish billboards, clashing light-patterns and on-rushing traffic. 
Whereas these sense-jarring affronts used to be centered in the cities, 
they are now, through the extension of "stripdevelopment," spread all 
across the American landscape. It is this disregard for aesthetics 
which has homogenized the American landscape into a disquieting monotony 
seen nowhere else in the world.*** With nearly one-half million gas 
stations, fast-food establishments, roadside taprooms, and similar 
facilities distributed across the country, there is relatively little 
relief in visual aspect. 
There is another more serious side to the problem of psychic shock, and 
that is the deep-seated concern for personal safety and security in the 
urban environment. Violent crime in America, spawned in poverty and 
impelled by drug addiction and alcoholism,'f has caused the curtailment 
or cessation of most necessary services within the inner cities across 
the U.S. Private physicians, drug stores, grocery stores, delicatessens, 
and similar establishments have fled the decay of social and legal security" 
*R. T. Wilkinson, "Interaction of Noise with Knowledge of R~sults and 
Sleep Deprivation," Exp. PsychoZ. 66, 332, 1963. 
**P. Gildstonand H. Gildston, "Noise Pollution" in North American Ref-
erence Encyclopedia of Ecology and Pollution (3rd ed.)W. White, Jr. 
(ed.) (Philadelphia: 1975) pp. 222-223. 
***N. 1. Reiger, "Visual Pollution," JAMA., January 31, 1972. 
tJ. M. MacDonald, The Murderer and His Victim (Springfield, Ill.: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1970). -
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The legal system is on the verge of disintegration and collapse due to 
the overload of untried cases. The correctional system has proven incap-
able of rehabilitation; in fact, the concept itself is in jeopardy. 
As a result of these affronts, the majority of urban dwellers have 
retreated into some small collective or group situation for security. 
While the youth find safety in urban street gangs, their elders find 
mutual benefit in neighborhood, ethnic, or cultural groupings and shun 
contact beyond their small boundaries. They have given up individuality 
for security. Unfortunately, this will not improve the overall function-
ing of the city or the nation but lead to increased tribalism among the 
lower socioeconomic class. All this bodes ill for the long-term improve-
ment of life in the urban environment. The remedy which is already being 
attempted is to pass the cost of renewal on to the suburban and rural 
populations, as a sort of "price of redemption." 
Despite the efforts of the news media, the Mid-American culture and pop-
ulation appear substantially indifferent to the plight of the urban 
centers. Massive federal rebuilding schemes for urban transit and in-
numerable other renovations to the urban corridors have repeatedly died 
in the legislative process. The portion of the population which is 
least able to achieve economically or socially has been drawn to the 
cities since 1900. This has produced a hard-core grouping of virtually 
unemployable persons in the inner city. Here are located racial, ethnic, 
and disadvantaged subgroups of all types. It is this aspect of the ur-
ban migration which has contributed to the current crises in Detroit, 
Cleveland, and New York, as well as in many of the other urban areas of 
the U.S. When or how the situation will improve cannot be foreseen at 
this time. 
The Ultimate Problem of Equity -- Who Pays? Some of the social 
impacts presented here are only indirectly important for intercity 
transportation planning. Others are crucial. The solutions to many of 
the problems that beset modern urban life can be approached through 
long-term planning and the judicious expenditure of money. Unfortunately, 
there is no one federal, state, or local agency which has demonstrated 
this capability over the last decade. The various jurisdictions, boards, 
and agencies have labored for nearly 50 years to turn back the double 
tide of population and urban stagnation. 
The ultimate root of the problem is equity. Under the American system, 
the federal government is the seat of most large-scale spendi~g. Asa 
result, it is concerned with those problems which have the greatest 
popular political appeal. The plight of the cities does not fit· that 
category. None of the last six presidents of the United States or their 
administrations has come from the urban-pluralistic segment of American 
society. Although they required support from this segment to attain the 
White House, they have not been overly empathetic to the ,problems of the 
urban environment. 
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The renovat:i,on or rehabilitation of any sector of the transportation 
system or its real estate involves enormous monetary expenditures, 
usually estimated in the billions of dollars. The example of the current 
problems of the railroads in the Northeast isa case in point. As 
complex as are the problems confronting the rail system, the problems of 
the City of Detroit, or New York City, or public education in rural 
America are as complex or more so. 
In the case of these and similar problems, the crucial question is: 
Who pays? The curt;ent system of taxation rests most heavily upon the 
wage-earning middle class, both blue collar and white collar. The 
shrinkage in semiskilled and skilled jobs has resulted in regressive 
labor practices by unions and closed shops in many industries. This 
means that the taxes of the middle class are being used to bring and keep 
a large number of persons in the middle class by a kind of social agree-
ment rather than the market value of their labor. ' 
Akin to this difficulty is the continuing rise in the cost of money 
itself. While a relatively small number of banks, insurance companies, 
and conglomerates control a lion's share of the available capital, they 
in turn, are subsidized in a great many ,~ays through federal chatters, 
federal R&D expenditures, or federal contracts. The result is that the 
taxes of the middle classes are used to help the money vendors n~intain 
their advantaged position. 
Implications for Intercity Transportation i~; 
Although it is extremely difficult to assess the priority of one social 
issue over another, and it is impossible to quantify the degree of 
impact that anyone social issue may make, some of the immed,iate impli-
cations and most likely outcomes can. be outlined. The two general 
areas of impact involve, first, what may be characterized as the non-
monetary aspects of the demand for transportation; and, second, the 
societal background within which governance is exercised. The strength 
of the effects of these implications is not yet apparent, and the final 
form of their results will not be clear for many years to come. They 
are, however, vitally important considerations for transportation 
planning looking to the year 2025. 
The Nonmonetary Aspects of Transportation Demand. A number of con-
tributory factors have led to the current high level of expectations 
regarding travel on the part of the American population. The'federal 
government itself "msthe institution which initiated the vogue for 
air travel by dispatching so many millions of citizens around the U.S. 
and around the world. Air travel, both military and civilian, came into 
its own as a direct result of World War II. The pattern of behavior was 
translated into civilian demand as soon as the War was ended and has been 
growing ever since. 
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The glamour and allure of travel was enhanced by its constant usage in 
films, radio and TV advertising, and drama. It has become a pervasive 
theme in popular culture, and easy and accessible travel by manifold 
means has become instilled in the American consciousness. 
The high level of expectation for both domestic and foreign travel was 
met by an aggressive and growing airline industry. Student fares, 
family fares, group and charter far.es, and all sorts of special market-
ing approaches were tried with evi.dent success. This ability to travel 
was quickly interpreted to involve all of the other personal changes in 
mOTes and customs. The "jet set," the "airport romance," and the sup-
posed sexual liberty of stewardesses came into being. All of these 
manifold impressions reinforced the growing desire to travel. 
By some strange phenomenon, possibly peculiar to Americans, this desire 
to travel. has become transformed into a perception of the right to 
travel.. This perception is already being expressed by women's and ethnic 
minority g-roups. These organizations are demanding the bases of wide-
ranging travel, such as credit cards, favorable rates, and the like., 
A special case of this perception has arisen very recently in the demand 
by the elderly and the physically handicapped that they be provided with 
low-cost fares and mechanical and other requi-':~:;d equipment to allow them 
the same freedom of access to travel as the general public. It is clear 
that government jurisdictions and regulatory agencies will be hard put to 
refuse their demands on the basis of compensatory actions already taken 
with regard to minorities in other areas of society. 
The accommodation of such demands, of course, costs money. The couching 
of such demands in terms of "human rights," as in the case of the host 
of other rights of citizenship, will tend to force consideration in 
egalitarian and noneconomic terms. The net result may be a substantial 
cost overburden, imposed on all travelers, to accommodate the few. The 
situation is entirely analagous to that concerning the Clean Air Act 
amendments in which all automobile owners are expected to bear the costs 
required to meet the needs of the Los Angeles basin and a few other 
major cities. 
Even more important than the positive inroads of demands for increased 
availability and ease of travel are the negative implications. It is 
clear that any attempt by government, no matter how high-minded the 
motivation, that seeks to curtail or limit the direction, accessibility, 
or ease of travel on various modes, will be met with stiff and large-
scale opposition from a broad section of the population. The notion of 
the "right to travel" will not be easily thwarted, such that any efforts 
to prescribe when, where, or how one should travel will meet strong 
opposition. 
One particularly intransigent problem which is the subject of general 
tra,,'eler concern is the transportation interface, the major source of 
transportation system inefficiency. The specifics include inconvenient 
or nonexistent parking facilities around airports and_ train stations; 
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slow or intermittent service on ground carriers from airport to downtown 
areas; substandard, low-security terminals at interfaces between air and 
rail, or rail and bus transport systems. 
The Societal Context of the Government Mandate. Any govern-
mental jurisdiction must keep in contact with its constituents. It makes 
no difference whether it is a township supervisor or a United States 
senator. The representative in government must continually "read" the 
mood of the electorate. As the 50-year period of this overview pro-
gresses, representatives at every level must be sensitive to the chang-
ing opinions of the populace. The very nature of the anti-big-business 
feeling is such that it will not generally volunteer its vehemence to 
constituted authority. 
The informed electorate of today is quickly developing into the even bet-
ter informed electorate 'of tomorrow. The old excuses and regional plat-
itudes will no longer suffice to justify governmental actions and 
certainly will not be admissable as defenses for abuse of that authority. 
The momentous task of rebuilding public confidence awaits federal and 
state governments. It is best begun before a large minority of disen-
chanted citizens becomes a majority. 
As much as this minority distrusts government, it distrusts big business 
even more. The depth and strength of the anti-business sentiment is not 
perceived by many business leaders. The federal government has already 
correctly perceived that the electorate will give it the mandate to 
correct abuses in the business segment. The results of this will be 
more and further-ranging government regulation; regulation not only over 
the specific operations of the business in the marketplace, but also 
over many of the aspects of its internal operations as well. Business 
hiring and firing practices, wage increases, stock options, and health 
and safety programs must all be sufficiently well-organized and docu-
mented to withstand the inspection of regulatory agencies. The public 
mistrust of corporate enterprise has reached the stage that a certain 
vindictiveness is evident. The social interest sector will ignore its 
own economic best interest to demand "justice" by federal intervention. 
This control and intervention will not stop at the federal level~ but will 
penetrate even to the local level. Some local jurisdictions already have 
a voice in the control and operations of locally situated industries. 
They are particularly concerned with taxation, environment, and job 
opportunities, all of which are at the heart of corporate plan~ing and 
decision-making. The problem of jurisdictional autonomy will become 
more acute~ and corporate and business institutions will be the battle-
ground over which it is fought. 
Transportation systems will have to be planned in such a fashion that they 
can allow and provide an increasing degree of local self-determination. 
This is in direct contradiction to many of the schemes currently being 
considered and the need for systemwide integrity. The success of 
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any long-term transportation system ir~vestment is directly related to 
its acceptance and use by the public,' The opinions and the fears of 
I 
J 
the populace, whether judged rational or irrational, must be given 
serious credence for the enterprise to be successful. ,What must evolve, 
then, is some mechanism for assuring a high degree of local or regional 
control of implementation within the contex.t of federally established 
policy and rational coordination. It is clear that: some intercity 
transportation issues are properly addressed at the federal level, others 
at a regional or state level. What is not clear is how or whether such 
issues can be addressed rationally in a divided and emotionally charged 
poli tical arena •. 
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ABSTRACT 
The next generation of telecommunication technologies will offer audio, 
video, and data communication capabilities that allow managers and pro-
fessionals to talk with several remotely located individuals simulta-
neously; to transmit and receive document facsimile copies in seconds; 
to transmit and receive motionless pictures of drawings, contracts, 
X-rays, or blackboards; to transmit and receive video pictures of 
remotely located persons or groups; to compose and edit documents 
simultaneously and interactively with remotely located individuals; and 
to access and retrieve remotely located computer-stored data. 
The capabilities have generated speculation that new communication 
technologies will reduce travel by substituting electronic interaction 
for face-to-face meetings. More thoughtful analysts expect the elimi-
nation of some trips, the postponement or reorganization of other trips 
and itineraries, and the development and sustenance of more extensive 
social networks that induce travel. 
Research efforts to date have not produced a predictive model of the 
interaction between communication and transportation that incorporates 
travel substitution, displacement, supplementation, and inducement. 
The behavioral, attitudinal, and situational nuances of consumer 
choices between currently available communication and transportation 
services remain largely unknown. 
In the absence of a persuasive model of transportation/communication 
interaction, futurists have simply assumed a trade-off comparable to 
the choice between travel modes. A rival hypothesis that communica-
tions capabilities stimulate travel by enhancing our opportunities to 
sU"stainand update a social/transactional network that is larger in 
terms of both membership and spatial reach, leads to reasonable predic-
tions of a net increase in travel demand, which is consistent with 
trends in corporate organizational size such as multinationalism and 
vertical and horizontal integration. 
Without a model, current research has focused on trip characteristics 
deemed to be prone to communication substitution by an intuitively 
established consensus. A recent Canadian study's questioning of the 
assumption of telecommunications as a replacement for, rather than as 
a supplement to, travel indicates the need to test assumptions thor-
oughly before estimating impacts on travel and the need to conduct 
basic behavioral research on travel/communications interactions. 
if 
Certain predictions remain intact. New communications technology will f 
significantly enhance the quality of communications in the 1980s and Ii 
beyond, will provide the opportunity to eliminate or defer some travel,J 
and will allow some firms to increase the reach and efficiency of hi 
their operations, and therefore, the opportunity or requirement for ;f 
travel. it 
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Conununication substitutions will probably include: video demonstrations 
in place of sales calls; training and retraining uSing video and inter-
active computers; routine appointments involving collegial information 
exchange but not high-risk negotiation; and briefings and presentations 
of relatively short duration. 
J.n short, credible projections of the net impact of new communication 
technology on travel demand and actual travel behavior are premature in 
light of our current understanding of the interaction between face-to-
face and mediated transactions. 
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XV. THE TRANSPORTATION/COMMUNICATION TRADE-OFF 
David W. Jones, Jr. 
Stanford University 
* ·l 
. __ .. J 
The next generation of telecommunication technologies will offer broad-band audio, video, and data communication capabilities that closely approximate the information-exchange capability of face-to-face inter-action. The forebears of this new communication capability include such on-the-shelf technologies as videophone, video cassettes, confer-ence telephone arrangements, computer. terminals, and telefax. 
Next generation technologies will enhance the ability of managers and professionals to: 
• Talk to several individuals at remote locations at the same time 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Transmit and receive facsimile copies of documents in a matter 
of seconds 
Transmit and receive motionless pictures of drawings, con-tracts, X-rays, or blackboards 
Transmit and receive video pictures of persons or groups at 
remote locations 
Compose and edit documents simultaneously and interactively 
with individuals at remote locations 
Access and retrieve computer-stored data from remote locations. 
These capabilities have generated enthusiastic speculation that new 
communication technologies will reduce travel by substituting electronic interaction for face-to-face meetings. More thoughtful analysts expect communication technologies to allow the elimination of some trips, en-courage the postponement or reorganization of other trips and trip itineraries, and permit the development and sustenance of more exten-sive social n~tworks that, in turn, induce travel. 
Research on Effects of New Communications Technology on Travel 
Research efforts to determine the net impact of the so-called trans-portation/ communication trade-off on travel have follmved three paths: surveys of potential communication users, cost comparisons, and esti-mates of the upper-bound limit of substitution-prone travel based on the match between current trip characteristics and communication 
capability. 
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None of these paths has produced anything approaching a predictive 
model of travel substitution, displacement, supplementation, and induce-
ment. The behavioral, attitudinal, and situational nuances of consumer 
choices between currently available communication and transportation 
services remain largely unknown. We do not know, for example, the net 
impact on travel of postal service or the near-universal diffusion of 
the telephone. We do know that the travel and communication require-
ments of firms in the information and transaction sectors of the econ-
omy have increased in tandem. We also know that these sectors of the 
economy are growing faster than basic industry and even personal ser-
vices. 
In the absence of a persuasive model of transportation/communication 
interaction, futurists have assumed the existence of a trade-off com-
parable to the choice between travel modes. This simplification of 
the research problem has produced a number of polemical inquiries 
intended to demonstrate the social and environmental benefits of travel 
substitution and the high quality of interaction obtainable from elec-
tronically mediated communication. These studies have generally ig~ 
nored a rival hypothesis: communication capabilities will stimulate 
travel by enhancing our opportunities to sustain and update a social/ 
transactional network that is larger in terms of both membership and 
spatial reach. Viewing communication as a supplement rather than a 
surrogate for trip-making can lead to reasonable predictions of a net 
increase in travel demand. The net-increase hypothesis seems to be 
consistent with trends in the size of corporate organizations such as 
multinationalism and both vertical and horizontal integration. If 
enhanced communication increases the reach and efficiency of large, 
spatially-diffuse organizations, it seems reasonable to expect some 
correlative increase in travel for site visits and high-risk negotia-
tions. This prospect has been ignored by most communication futurists. 
In the absence of a model of transportation/communication interaction, 
current research has focused on the characteristics of trips that 
might be prone to communication substitution. The technical literature 
reflects an intuitively-established consensus that some trip types are 
more susceptible to substitution than others. "Substitution-prone" 
trips have. been categorized in terms of trip purpose, trip-end activ-
ities, and the trip-maker's occupational and personal characteristics. 
These expectations can be charted as follows. 
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TRIP PURPOSE: 
TRIP-END ACTIVITY 
DESCRIPTORS: 
TRIP MAKER CHAR-
ACTERISTICS: 
... l. 
SOME LIKELIHOOD OF 
SUBSTITUTION 
Business and conventions 
Routine contact with 
familiar persons 
Low-risk negotiations; 
passive observation 
Exchange of data, ideas, 
and documents 
One-to-one meetings 
Speeches or lectures 
(one to many) 
Brief appointments 
One-day, sparse-calendar 
trips 
One-destination trips 
Does not enjoy travel 
Controls travel choice 
Profesldonal, technical, 
or mana.gerial status; 
sales or sales engineer-
ing 
XV-9 
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LOW LIKELIHOOD OF 
SUBSTITUTION 
r 
Visit friends and rela-
tives 
Outdoor recreation 
Sightseeing and enter-
tainment 
Mixed business and lei-
sure trips 
Exploratory contact with 
unfamiliar persons 
High-risk negotiations, 
active participation 
Demonstration or use of 
equipment; site visits 
Group meetings 
Seminars and team work-
shops 
Extended, multihour 
meetings 
Multiple-day, multi-
meeting trips 
Multileg, multidestina-
tion trips 
Enjoys travel 
Scheduled by organiza-
tional superior 
Service, clerical, or 
blue~collar employment 
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These expectations have been stated as hypothesis and tested by a Bell 
Canada research team using survey methods. * Kollen and Garwood sur-
veyed 10,000 Canadian air, bus, rail, and auto travelers, securing in-
formation on trip purpose, trip-end activity, and traveler demograph-
ics. They also asked the respondents whether they would have made 
the trip-in-progress if the communication capability described on 
page one of this issue paper had been available to them. 
Twenty percent of the Canadian respondents indicated that they would 
not have made the trip if a communication alternative were available. 
However, the Bell Canada research group was not able to establish 
strong correlations between trip or traveler characteristics and the 
inclination to use communication substitutes. The inclination to 
substitute correlated most strongly with the travelers' attitude 
toward the proposed technology--not the trip-end descriptors. Kollen 
and Garwood reported that "the analysis offers little support for 
hypotheses which attempt to distinguish substituters from non-
substituters." They concluded that "the present study offers little 
support for hypotheses concerning the replacement of travel by -tele-
communications" and that "the lack of explanatory power may also in-
dicate that conceptualizing substitution of telecommunications as a 
replacement process rather than as a supplement to travel is ill-
conceived." 
The Canadian research group's cautious conclusion still indicates 
that transportation/communication trade-off researchers will have to 
test their assumptions thoroughly before we can accept the validity of 
enthusiastic estimates of the travel that can be replaced or displaced 
by communication technology. 
Cbnclusion 
These let's-start-all-over-again findings establish the need for basic 
behavioral research on -:he. interaction between travel and communica-
tion. They virtually dismantle earlier conclusions reached on the 
basis of small-sample or case-study research, leaving communication 
futurists with some very spartan and highly qualitative predictions 
intact: 
1. New communication technology will significantly enhance the 
quality of communication in the 1980s and beyond. 
*James H. Kollen and John Garwood, "Replacement of Travel by Tele-
communications," Business Planning Paper 1t29, H. Q. Planning Department, 
Bell Canada, Montreal, 1974. 
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2. New communication technology will provide the opportunity to 
eliminate or defer some travel--20% is a reasonable bet. 
3. New communication technology will allow some firms to increase 
the reach and efficiency of their operations--increasing 
either the opportunity or requirement for travel. 
The communications substitutions will probably include: 
., 
• 
• 
:Vi~eo demonstrations in the place of sales calls 
Training and retraining using video and interactive computers 
Routine appointments involving collegial information exchange 
rather than high-risk negotiation 
• Briefings and presentations of relatively short duration 
We must conclude that credible projections of the net impact of new 
communication technology on travel demand and actual travel be-
havior are premature in light of our current understanding of the 
interaction between face-to-face and mediated transactions. 
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39. Scientific American, September 1972--Communication. 
40. Roman Krzyczkowski and S. Henneman, "Reducing the Need for Travel," 
UMTA-DOT Report No. CA-06-004S-2, March 1974. 
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XVI. A NOTE ON TECHNOLOGY PESSIMISM 
w. L. Garrison 
University of California, Berkeley 
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This note is motivated by a remark by the author in a discussion of the 
future of intercity transportation, "Given present conditions, the out-
look for increased [technological] efficiency is modest other than in 
air transportation."* The author feels his remark is too pessimistic, 
and this note explores the reasons for pessimism about technology. 
Technology pessimism appears in many circumstances. There are those who 
do not believe that technology will continue to provide solutions for 
food, pollution, energy, and other problems. These matters raise serious 
questions and are the subject of much current debate (e.g., see recent 
issues of Science). They are not to be dismissed lightly. 
However, concern in this note is less with global issues; it is with our 
seeming inability to forecast the evolution of specific technologies 
using a forecasting horizon of several decades. Such technology fore-
casts have been undertaken in this study of intercity transportation in 
an effort to help define feasible futures for related transportation 
systems. As Jantsch has pointed out, these futures must be reachable 
through feasible paths.** Do such paths exist and, if so, are they 
feasible from social, technology, resource, and other points of view? 
When attempting to answer this question, why is there pessimism about 
technology? 
The widespread tendency to miss the mark in technology forecasting has 
lead Arthur Clarke to formulate what he terms Clarke's Law: "When a 
distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, 
he is almost certainly right. lVhen he states that something is impossi-
ble, he is almost certainly wrong."*** And Clark lays the erroneous 
predictions to either a failure of imagination or a failure of nerve. 
The view in this note is that failures mainly result from lack of 
appreciation of the technology development and implementation processes, 
and these processes will be explored for causes of forecasting failures. 
The processes, as is well known, are research, development, and imple-
mentation activities based on knowledge and markets. The predominance 
of the energy expended in these processes occurs when marketing or 
implementation is undertaken. Implementation involves development and 
shakedown of prototypes, trials, revisions, and the winning of clients 
*W. Garrison, "Current and Future Forms of Intercity Passenger Trans-
portation," an issue paper in this report. 
**Erich Jantsch, "The New Testament," Futu:r>es, 3 (1971), pp. 68-72. 
***A. Clarke, quoted in Time, February 15, 1971, p. 38. 
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:Ind H\ll1lH·wn, 1"01' tilL' pnHllIct. The proeeHSt'S work IWHt where innov
at'l,io 
:l1ld highly mnllv:lll'd l\l"l~l"S an' involved who Iwld views apart from thrHH!
 
of L1lt'.1 I' Pl.'l.'I'S. :IS ~IIlI'1 son IIiIS shown. * Often, lhe Htngt' for thest' I.' 
neton; 1:-; lhl' small, 1'[Hk-lll'al-ing finn. OIH.' paltern ror It'citnology Is 
tltat It slIh:-;lllllll'S \01' smnl' pl-ocess when it offers erricl('IH'Y. SubHe-
qlll.'nlly, till' tl'l"hlllliogy Is [mpnlVed by orders of mngnitlldt' lind hy ('hl111~es 
in tilL' l'IlVIl"lllllnl'nl within which it is Imbedded. ()II llll' Iltlll'r hnlld, 
lnsLnm'l.'H 1':111 Ill' cltl'd in which the substitutioll It'l'hnoloKY had Il
tLlt' 
l'Cfl.'l'l \llh1ll tht' l:l1'gl."- task and the Impacts wt'rl' smllll. 'I'hl' worki
ngs or 
LIlL'Sl' \lI'Ol'l'Sl,l'S In t ,'ansporL(lt I on, )~* urban syslellls, and l'OIllI)\llt'rs*l~* 
havl.' IWl'\l disl'\lSSl'd by thl.' author elsewhere. 
It is spL'l"\dlltl'd hl"-C' that lhl' pC'sslmism pitcnolllt'non arist,s from rl
tllurl's 
tll ,'cad lltl' tl'chnllillgy prm'l'sses at several polnls. /\n Important'
 inHI:;III<:(' 
Is till' mlsn'adlllg of the cl knt, "the market is so-and-so, tlwre,/'or
L' [t 
\vlll :lhvaYH Ill' so." This was certainly the case 1n computers, \oI/
here it 
\v:IS l'stlm:ltl.'d LllLIt till' market would never be laq~er than that f,,1r hal f a 
dn7.L'n m:lt'h I nes. New markets may be [onned, and the technology.,assessment 
problem is very much that or trying to understand new markets i3.nd 
activ-
ities implied by these new markets. 
Failure to understand the market may have been part of Dean's prob
lem 
(the quotations used here ,md below are from a collection by Gamarra
t ) : 
"You could put in this room [his office], de Forest, all the 
radiotelephone apparatus that the country will ever ne(~d." 
\.J. \.J. Dean, president of Dean Telephone Co., 1907 
It certainly would have been a problem if a technology ass!~ssment ha
d 
been made of the automobile, for in its early days it was ~arketed 
mainly [IS a novelty. 
Another cause of failures might be the reading of the technology d
evelop-
ment and implementation process too closely. This seemingly leads
 in two 
directions. Persons involved in the process are very sensitive to
 the 
great effort required for marginal improvements in the technology 
and the 
penetration of markets. Through years of experience, they develop
 a 
calculus that gives them great insight into the market and technol
ogy 
fr~:1tiers as they have experienced them. Their calculus fails wheneve
r 
dny of its implicit ground rules are broken. This may have been Fu
rnas' 
problem: 
*E. Horison, Man and Machines, M.I.T. Press. 
**H. Garrison, "Transportation Systems Invention and Innovation," 
Proceedings, Intersociety Conference on Transportation, 1972, pp. 
10l~109, SAE Paper 720556. 
*** , "Computer Technology, Urban Processes and Problems
, New 
Futures for Urban Areas," Bulletin, World Future Society, 3 (1970); 
.Pp. 1-15. 
TN. Gamarra, Chemical and Engineering News, August 11, 1969, p. 68. 
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"What the ultimate attainable speed (of airplanes) may be one 
would not care to guess but it might well approach 500 miles 
per hour, and certainly 350 miles per hour for transport 
planes at the higher altitudes is not an unreasonable figure 
to expec t within a few years." 
C. C. Furnas, American chemical engineer and educator, 1936 
Furnas knew his processes-so well that his calculus gave him a clear 
view of its margins. 
A variant is that a group involved in a technology may be limited by its 
span of knowledge; they may be unaware of other technologies that may 
invade their territories and supersede them; perhaps this was Leahy's 
problem: 
"That is the biggest fool thing we have ever done. The 
(atomic) bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert 
in explosives." 
Admiral William Leahy, 1945 
An associated matter is that of the relation of a new technology to an 
extant peer group. The peer group in producing and marketing a tech-
nology has its values and behavior mannerisms tied up in that process. 
Some change that would shock that process is simply unthinkable. This 
was probably part of Leahy's problem and Woodward's problem: 
"As far as sinking a ship with a bomb is concerned, you just 
can't do it." 
Rear-Admiral Clark Woodward, 1939 
In transportation, the unthinkable has been evidence in some of the high-
way communities' views of mass transit and in the rail transportation 
view of diesel locomotives. 
It is very often the case that the arguments supporting technology 
pessimism are couched in technological terms, "it cannot be done." This 
is not surprising because this is the language of the technologist, and 
his most powerful arguments turn on the physical principles. Thus, 
Symonds argued that screw propellers would not work, and Chanute explained 
that airplanes will always be small: 
" •.. even if the (screw) propeller had the power of pro-
pelling a • . . vessel, it would be found altogether uS.e-
less in practice, because the power being applied in the' 
stern it would be absolutely impossible to make the vessel 
steer. 
Sir William Symonds, Surveyor of the British Navy, 1837 
"(Airplanes) will eventually be fast, they will be used in 
sport, but they are not to be thought of as commercial 
carriers. To say nothing of the danger, the sizes must 
XVI-5. 
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remain small and the passengers few, because the weight will, 
for the same design,increase as the cube of the dimensions, 
while the supporting surfaces will only increase as the 
square." 
Octave Chanute, American aviation pioneer, 1904 
The above illustrates why things might go wrong, and it is not a con-
structive discussion of what to do to guard against errors. It could 
be if each of the above observations was cast in a "Thou Shall Not" 
framework, but because that is simply a matter of rewording, it will 
not be undertaken here. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper demonstrates that capital stock is an important determinant 
of technological possibilities because of the inertia inherent in an 
existing stock of assets. The implication is that future possibilities 
are preconditioned by past investments. Therefore, a technology assess-
ment must take into account changes in the existing stocks of capital 
that are needed to facilitate a projected technological innovation. 
Capital, by definition, is a resource with a significant lifetime. The 
period over which the asset provides a usable output flow is an impor-
tant dimension of capital stock. This concept, known as "service life," 
has different connotations for economists, engineers, accountafits, tech-
nologists, and internal revenue service agents. A multiyear service 
life means that an enterprise has a capital stock of a given type of 
technology; this investment constitutes "sunk costs" in fixed assets. 
Sunk costs, such as those inherent in transportation equipment and infra-
structure, are important in shaping future investment policy, because 
any commitment to a particular technology requires compatibility with 
the existing capital stock, which, in part, explains why standardization 
of products is such an important issue in many industries. Compatibility 
of new technology with existing capital is important because it may 
necessitate investments to add support facilities, to interface new 
technology with existing capital stock, or to upgrade existing capital 
stocks to a higher level of performance matching the new technology. 
These investment costs should be considered part of any technology deci-
sion because the efficiency of the overall system, as well as of the 
new technology, can be lowered by incompatibility of various capital 
stocks. 
As a result, sunk costs can impede flexibility in technological planning; 
however, investments in long-lived assets do not necessarily preclude 
replacement of capital, if the resale market is liquid. Sunk costs 
raise the risks in decisions to shift the technology complexion of the 
capital stock. One such risk facing managers of publicly funded enter-
prises is the political consequences of projects into ill-fated technol-
ogy; such a risk. is an impediment to the pursuit of radical innovations. 
Associated with an existing capital stock are demand-related factors 
many of which are externalities to the technology decision. Idle capac-
ity, changes in land use patterns,' or imposition of extraordi~ary and 
nonrecoverable economic gains or losses are"all externalities likely to 
arouse vociferous reaction by affected parties. Imposition of changes 
in traditional pat·terns of investment and technology must, therefore, be 
tempered by recognition of dislocatio·n Cimong both users and nonusers. 
On the supply side of transport, government policy priorities (for example, 
foreign trade and international factors) sometimes impose constraints 
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on technologies which are available to alter the existing capital stock. 
Raw material supplies from abroad, balance of payment considerations, 
tariff restrictions, and foreign policy objectives can direct changes in 
technology. 
Another supply-related impediment to utilization of a.new technology is 
an overwhelming commitment to a singular technology. In short~ past 
investment policies have influenced the direction of technology change. 
And, demand and supply factors reinforce the argument that capital stock
s 
do influence technology shift. 
Investment experiences of AMTRAK clearly indicate that the existing 
capital stock fundamentally affects technology changes in intercity rail 
passenger transport, and sunk costs in equipment and infrastructure 
strongly shape the direction of technology activities. 
AMTRAK also exemplifies ways in which demand factors are important to, 
future investment decisions. For exa~ple, the specifications for per-
formance of new equipment are warranted so as to procure cars and loco-
motives that stimulate additional ridership. 
Supply-side factors constrain AMTRAK as well, where for example, the 
threshold size of an order needed for equipment procurement must be large
 
enough to achieve economies of scale. Also on the supply side, AMTRAK 
investment policy has a built-in bias toward labor-saving technologies 
since capital funds are grants. 
Because air carrier regulation largely prohibits price competition, air-
lines resort to extensive competition in quality and quantity of service
. 
Airframe reequipping cycles are made economically feasible by the liquid
-
ity of the used aircraft market. 
However, changes in aircraft technology and design have ptecipitated 
changes in techniques and design in the interface between the terminal 
building and the aircraft. 
Changing land use patterns and worsened congestion at hubs may increase 
the demand for service to satellite airports. Intermodalism may encour-
age development of satellites, contingent upon technological developments
 
in short takeoff and landing (STOL) and quiet takeoff and landing (QTOL) 
aircraft. Civil Aeronautics Board and Federal Aviation Administration 
regulations can also be an inducement to decentralize metropolitan air 
service. 
Because planners are increasingly compelled to seek ways to prolong the 
service life of the existing capital stocks of land, access facilities, 
runways, terminal buildings, and parking facilities, technological inno-.
 
vations aimed at alleviating peak period congestion and cramped facili-
ties will be all the more crucial. 
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Cross subsidization by equipment manufacturers also influences the 
directions of technology. Innovations in airplanes, power plants, and 
avionics have come about, at least in part, as a result of military 
expenditures. 
In air transport, compatibility of existing equipment with new technol-
ogies is important to management. Normally, increased homogeneity of 
an air carrier fleet enables cheaper maintenance through savings in 
inventories, skills of maintenance personnel, and interchangeability of 
spares. 
The auto system exhibits the highest degree of inertia, technological 
and otherwise, related to past capital investment decisions. The system 
consists of a number of components, each of which has a number of major 
elements of capital investment; in turn, these are intimately and exten-
sively interrelated with other system investments. These systems require 
massive capital stocks for manufacture; ownership and use; the logistics 
support system for vehicles; the roadway system; and urban and land use 
considerations. 
A multiplicity of technological factors relating to the manufacture of 
motor vehicles needs to be recognized, including investments in parts, 
tooling, and engineering. Lead times involved in bringing about changes 
in automotive technology are particularly significant. The greater the 
technological radicalness of the change, the longer the lead time, par-
ticularly if the change in technology affects another of the interdepen-
dent systems of automotive transport. New technology internal to the 
vehicle generally involves shorter lead times, but even these may require 
years. 
The auto system requires an enormous logistics support system including 
hundreds of parts suppliers, tens of thousands of service stations and 
garages, and the huge capital investment of the petroleum industry in 
gasoline refining, distribution, and marketing. A change in automotive 
technology can, of cours'e, imply substantially different skills require-
ments in the maintenance and service industries. For example, the 
increased use of electronic devices for control of various functions 
can introduce severe dislocations into the service industries, with an 
attendant need for extensive educational and training programs required 
to provide new skills. 
The highway infrastructure is considered a separate component in the auto-
motive transport system because of the enormous capital investment repre-
sented by the highway system; the fact that this system is introduced 
and maintained within the public domain; and the profound effect that 
its characteristics and existence have on so many other matters relating 
to automotive transportation. The technology invested in the highway 
system can be viewed in two different ways. First, it should be exam-
ined in terms of the technology involved in laying down the highway sur-
faces and in erecting the various fixed structures and appurtenances. 
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Second, highway system technology investment is represented by the set 
of operating rules and procedures for the use of the highways. These 
institutional considerations can have a profound effect on the technology 
of the automotive transportation system, and it is here that their inter-
dependence is so pronounced. 
Land use (urban, suburban, rural) is, of course, determined in part by 
the highway and auto system which provides aC.cess, without which most 
land uses would hardly be possible. Changes in the automobile system 
will then have a profound impact on land use. 
Changes in vehicular technology would also affect raw materials and 
processing industries. Scrap and .recycling industries would probably be 
the most directly affected. 
The paper closes with an appendix, which examines in rigorous theoretical 
terms the effects of capital stocks on technological changes. 
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An integral component of any complete assessment of technological trends 
is a sensitivity to the nature of the existing capital stocks. Flows of 
capital funds are heavily constrained by the stock of capital already in 
place at the time of an investment decision. Recognition of the capital', 
stock factor will temper judgments of what technological directions are 
possible in a given time frame. 
The basic economic reason that capital stock is an important determinant 
of technological possibilities is that allocations of investment funds 
are made from a limited and finite resource pool. Because resources 
are scarce, priorities must be set among alternative projects of asset 
acquisitions. These priorities are influenced by those technologies 
which are feasible. The contention made herein is that future produc-
tion possibilities are preconditioned by past investment policy. Any 
credible technology assessment must examine the dislocations in capital 
stocks that are required to facilitate a projected technological policy. 
Service Life 
Capital, by definition, is a resource with a significant lifetime. Once 
a capital stock is formed, it exists for i?f. substantial time until it is 
scrapped or wears out. The period over which the asset provides a 
usable output flow is an important dimension of capital stock. This 
concept, known as "service life," has different connotations for econ-
omists, engineers, accountants, technologists, and Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) agents. To an economist, service life is the time period 
over which the product is actually engaged in production. Depreciation 
is obviously a strong influence over the service life of an asset. It 
is measured as physical deterioration in terms of incremental units of 
production. Depreciation and service life can be established on the 
basis of other factors such as the time period during which the asset 
can be used in a particular market. Indeed, in the United States, the 
certificated airlines depreciate airframes over a period which is gen-
erally recognized to be significantly less than the actual physical 
service life of the asset. A third way to calculate service life is 
via its technological lifet·ime which may be longer or shorter than its 
other lifetimes. A fourth way involves accountants who look at past 
experiences to find precedents; sometimes they consider service life 
to be the term to maturity of debts used to finance the asset. Finally, 
IRS constraints or regulatory rulings also influence service life. 
The definitiol1 of service life is, then, an important descriptor of the 
capital stock in place at any given time. If the establishment of the 
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capital's service life is,inaccurate and inconsistent, then in all like-
lihood the timing of investment decisions will be affected. 
Sunk Costs 
Long-lived capital capable of producing a needed service can be substi-
tuted for shorter-lived capital. For example, a Checker cab produces 
transportation services with a service lire several times that of ordi-
nary automobiles. Capital sunk in the Checker cab technology will be 
producing taxi services a lot longer than capital sunk. in shorter-lived 
taxis. 
Compatibil~"!:y'. Sunk costs are also important in shaping future in-
vestment policy because any commitment to a particular technology re-
quires compatibility with the existing capital stock. The interface of 
a new technology with other factors of production must be economically 
realistic, but it cannot be when the existing infrastructure cannot be 
integrated with the incremental investment. Compatibility explains why 
standardization of products is such an important issue in many industries. 
For example, if couplers on railroad equipment were not standardized, 
then the introduction of equipment with new couplers would be severely 
inhibited by incompatibility with the remainder of the fleet. 
The compatibility concept has other meanings. Commitments to new tech-
nology may require investments in additional support facilities, in 
interfacing new technology with existing capital stock, or in upgrading 
existing capital stocks to a higher level of performance matching the 
new technology. Examples of these secondary technological impacts are 
widespread in the transportation sector. The introduction of the B-747 
jumbo jet necessitated the acquisition of an entirely new (and very 
expensive) tractor for maneuvering the aircraft to and from the termi-
nal gate. Investments in Metrcliner-type rail equipment do not attain 
their full potential without accompanying investments in upgraded road-
bed and raL.ed platforms. Such investment costs should be considered 
part of technological decision, because the efficiency of the overall 
system and the new technology can be lowered by the incompatibility 
of the two capital stocks. 
Resale Market. Sunk costs can also be an impediment to flexibility 
in technological planning; however, investments in long-lived.assets do 
not necessarily preclude replacement of capital, if the resale market 
is liquid. In fact, there is a highly liquid market for some types of 
transportation equipment. As a result, operators have the opportunity 
t( reevaluate their current capital stock. Indeed, in the airline in-
due try, the retirement or sale of equipment that is not fully depreciated 
is virtually a science. Because each manager has calculated an optimal 
replacement period for his own fleet, aircraft move through several 
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tiers of use during their physical lifetime. 
technology is 40 years old, and yet over 500 
today, many of them in commercial service. 
J 
For example, the DC-3 
of them are in service 
Risk. Another outlook on the sunk costs concept is the risk in-
volved in decisions to shift the technological complexion of a capital 
stock. Obviously, successful market adaptation of a new technology 
often comes with high front-end costs needed to research, develop, and 
market the technological innovation. This commitment must be justified 
with a prospect for an acceptable return on investment. 
Other types of risk are also factors in technological assessments. In 
the transportation sector, one such risk is the political considerations 
facing managers of publicly funded enterprises. Technological commit-
ments of the managers of public-sector transportation enterprises can 
be influenced by legislative bodies. This ,factor is significant when 
one considers that legislatures are being asked to fund transportation 
infrastructure and equipment with expected service lives of 20 to 50 
years. The political risks facing managers and the sponsoring legis-
lators in promoting an ill-fated technology is an impediment to pursuit 
of radical innovations. (Conversely, Congress has funded various 
agencies with the mandate to develop radical transport innovations.) 
In the private sector, the character of the existing capital stock fUr-
ther tempers the direction of new technology because management is 
reluctant to "write down" assets. Entrepreneurial decisions are con-
strained by the specter of forced obsolescence of existing assets and 
the accompanying report of an extraordinary loss. 
Demand Influen~es 
One factor with influence on the existing capital stock is demand. Any 
technological assessment must look toward the demand for the new product 
or service (and how well that demand is being met by the existing stock 
of capital). Is this demand sufficient to achieve efficient production 
levels? In other words, is the gap between present capabilities and 
future needs big enough to justify investment in ,the new technology? 
Externalities are also an important demand-related factor. Even though 
the market mechanism is supposed to arbitrate the flow of funds to 
technologies, it is obvious that the impact of changes in capital stock 
may have important benefits or detriments for nonusers. One obvious 
party that could be impacted is labor. ~1any shifts in investment and 
technology policies influence adjacent landowners. Capital dislocations 
are important because idle capacity, changes in 'land use patterns, or 
imposition of extraordinary and nonrecoverable economic gains or losses 
are all externalities likely to arouse vociferous reaction by various 
parties. Therefore, the imposition of changes in traditional patterns 
of investment must be tempered by recognition of dislocations among both 
users and nonusers. 
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Supply Influences 
Changes in capital stock are influenced by supply-side factors. One 
factor on the supply side is government policy priorities. For example, 
long-haul intercity rail passenger service is deemed worthy of subsidi-
zation even though the service is generally recognized to be economically 
and technologically obsolete. This policy commitment attached to the 
supply of public funds definitely influences the trends in technologies 
needed to serve these markets. In general terms, this case exemplifies 
a government decision that investments in a specific form of "social 
overhead capital" are in the public interest. 
Foreign trade and international factors sometimes impose constraints on 
investment flows. Raw material supplies from abroad, balance of payment 
considerations, tariff restrictions, and foreign policy objectives can 
direct changes in technology. For example, technologies in electric-
powered locomotives would be vastly different ih the United States if 
northern European technologies i,'7ere unavailable to AHTRAK (which is 
presently evaluating Swedish locomotive technology). In contrast, 
federal policy precludes u.S. cities from using Urban Mass Transportation 
Administration (ll1TA) funds for purchase of foreign-made light-rail ve-
hicles. Obviously, if this policy were applied to AHTRAK, the techno-
logical direction of rail travel may be quite different. 
Another supply-related impediment to utilization of a new technology is 
an overwhelming commitment to a singular variety of technology. For 
example, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and various regu-
lators have resisted innovations in hardware such as braking or coupling 
because of vast commitments to present techniques. Similarly, in the 
airline sector, standardized airport planning has conflicted with inno-
vations like mobile passenger lounges which are a substitute for con-
course buildings. 
Based on the several reasons given above on how past investment policies 
influence the direction of technological change, the remainder of this 
paper examines the effects of capital stock on technological changes 
for different modes of intercity transportation. 
AMTRAK 
Investment experiences of AHTRAK provide clear examples of how the 
existing capital stock fundamentally affects technological changes in 
intercity rail passenger transport; sunk costs in equipment arid infra-
structure strongly shape the direction of technological activities. A 
current example is the selection of "scenarios" developed by the Federal 
Railroad Administration from which development of the Northeast Corridor 
was planned. The feasibility of each scenario was directly .depen~ent on 
the existing right-of-way specifications, roadbed conditions, and 
equipment types. Investment in an extension of the catenary structure 
from New Haven to Boston is justified, considering the existiag 
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electrified service between Washington and New Haven. Its equipment 
decisions are also clearly contingent on the fact that future pas-
senger service will be provided on an electrified corridor between 
Washington and Boston. 
AMTRAK investment policy will also be shaped by the compatibility of 
the acquired assets with the various other components of its system: 
interchangeability of motive power and passenger fleet, maintenance 
shop requirements, and required terminal facilities to interface with 
a new generation of equipment. For example, a decision to operate a 
train of new equipment design must be formulated with respect to the 
length of the station platform. Is expensive and disruptive recon-
struction required to change platform dimensions? Changes in these or 
other terminal facilities could have long ,lasting effects, since their 
service lives extend up to 50 years. 
Future resale of equipment should be an important part of AHTRAK's in-
vestment decisions. AlITRAK will have much flexibility in equipment 
planning, if it can sell used passenger cars to metropolitan commuter 
operators. If the resale prices approximate the value of comparably 
depreciated commuter equipment, then the resale value will be several 
times the scrap value. Thus, the forecasting of resale values 10 or 15 
years hence should be a very significant factor in equipment decisions. 
Similarly, AMTRAK management should be looking closely at opportunities 
in its terminal facilities. The location of passenger terminals must be 
considered in light of population distribution and automobile access; 
a shrewd location decision may generate extensive ancillary revenues 
ranging from real estate development to that from vendors. 
The AMTRAK situation is a good example of the conflicts that can arise 
between several institutions participating in the provision of intercity 
rail passenger service. The roadbed is owned by private-sector corpor-
ations principally engaged in activit;i.es other than moving passenge,rs. 
M1TRAK, the carrier, is a public-sector enterprise whose funding and 
goals diverge substantially from those of the suppliers of the rail 
infrastructure. AMTRAK management is required to provide high quality 
service to the public at rate levels 'which entail substantial operating 
and capital deficits. Furthermore, l~MTRAK is encouraged to make long-
term investments designed to maximize a long-run social return on public 
investment. In contrast, the private-sector managers are heavily con-
strained by the high cost of their cc(pital; they are far more interested 
in short-term, high-payout investmen:s, typically in equipment, not 
plant. This dichotomy logically con1ributes to conflicts in ~uality of 
service, pricing, and investment in lung-term assets. 
AMTRAK also exemplifies ways in which demand factors are important in 
making future investment decisions. To the extent that demand is in-
fluenced by improvements in E:quipment, then concern over specifications 
is warranted; some of the va~iables are speed, reliability, ride char-
acteristics, seating configurations, aesthetics, food and bever.age 
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service, and communica.tions services. These variables are among the 
factors which must be adjusted to expand Al1TRAK's market by attracting 
new passengers. The impact of changes in these variables must be 
gauged against demand for transportation alternatives such as automobile, 
airline, Eastern Air Shuttle, and bus service. 
Supply-side factors constrain AMTRAK even more forcefully. One of the 
most prominent constraints is the threshold size of an order needed for 
equipment procurement. Recently, new equipment orders have been on the 
order of several hundred million dollars each. The huge size of each 
order is due more to the tremendous economies inherent in large-sized 
orders than AMTRAK's need for large quantities of equipment. M1TRAK is 
able to achieve significant savings in the price of new equipment if it 
orders large quantities with standardized features. Thus, the risks in 
development and tooling of new technologies are spread among a large 
number of units; savings are also reaped from follow-on orders of a 
standard design. 
Another supply-side factor entering into an investment decision is the 
operating costs of the new asset. AMTRAK investments have a buil~-in 
bias toward labor-saving technologies since capital funds ar~ ~0stless-­
they are grants. AMTRAK can procure the capital component of its pro-
duction function for a nominal cost; yet the variable costs of these 
incremental additions must be recovered through operating 7:evenues. 
Even though AMTRAK does not depend exclusively upon the "farebox'l to 
pay operating expenses, management realizes that funding for operating 
deficits is a bigger headache to obtain from Congress tl:Lan money for 
hardware. That is to say, AMTRAK's management perfor:dance appears better 
by acquiring a fancy system with no operating deficit than when it ex-
pends fewer resources (in the long run) to provide comparable services 
with a more labor-intensive technique that happens to result ~~ large 
operating deficits. 
Of course, most assets inevitably require some variable inputs. In the 
AJITRAK case, fuel and crew expenses are difficult to eliminate no matter 
what technology underlies the equipment. There are opportunities to 
optimize equipment investments, however. One such opportunity is to 
forecast and to take into account the levels of maintenance needed for 
motive power and rolling stock in order to optimize long-run costs, both 
operating and capital. 
Certificated Air Carriers 
The certificated air carrier industry is perhaps the best example of a 
transportation mode that uses innovative equipment as a tool of compe-
tition. Because regulation largely prohibits price competition,air-
lines resort to extensive competition in quality and quantity service. 
The size and configuration of aircraft are one of the best channels for 
these competitive efforts. Fat' the'· certificated air carriers, it is 
rational to phase out a given aircraft before its physical life has 
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expired. Indeed, this phenomenon is sufficiently institutionalized so 
that equipment manufacturers stimulate the reequipping cycles with a 
steady stream of technological innovations. The development of a new 
generation of aircraft makes older aircraft obsolete in a particular 
market. 
This phenomenon is relevant to capital stock because these reequipping 
cycles are made feasible by the liquidity of the used aircraft market. 
Airlines have succeeded in disposing of aircraft with several years of 
unamortized investment remaining at prices in excess of book value. 
(These sales have the added benefit of contributing to accounting prof-
its.) The market in fully depreciated aircraft is liquid because of 
the myriad commercial and private uses for aircraft no longer needed by 
the certificated carriers. Thus, this liquidity has enabled the cer-
tificated air carriers to engage in frequent modernizations of aircraft 
technologies. 
These changes have not been without disruptions, many of which are 
traceable to the airline's capital stock in existence at the time of 
the reequipping cycle. One obvious facet of the capital stock is the 
route structure of the airline. Because aircraft investments are 
essentially "lumpy investments"--aircraft are not divisible into frac-
tional units--a plane must be usable within the confines of the carrier's 
routes. The type of plane is contingent upon passenger counts, peak 
period loads, stage length, and airport capacity and configuration. As 
a result, the latest in a given technology is not necessarily relevant 
to all the certificated carriers. The obvious example is that none of 
the local service air carriers have purchased a jumbo jet. In fact, 
several of the local service air carriers at one time operated B-727 
aircraft, but they have gradually disposed of even this medium-sized 
plane. On the other hand, developments in the stretch versions of 
feeder-route-type aircraft (e.g., DC-9-S0) have minimal impact on a 
technological assessment of trunk carriers. 
Compatibility with the capital stock is important to certificated air 
carriers because a new acquisition must conveniently interface with 
the carrier's airport-airway system. The productivity of new aircraft, 
airport facilities, or marketing programs can be severely impaired by 
unforeseen bottlenecks emerging in the production line. The introduc-
tion of the B-747 caused massive disruptions in the normal flows of 
passengers and baggage until lands ide systems were adjusted to meet the 
jumbo-jet technology. 
The airport is the classic example of the ~omponent in the air travel 
production function. which is overlooked in initial decisions regarding 
a technological change. These oversights often caine back to haunt the 
carrier and the airport operator. Changing aircraft technology and 
design have precipitated changes in techniques and design of the inter-
face between the terminal building and the aircraft. The interface has 
traditionally been a concourse-type building requiring a tremendous 
capital commitment for the building of a two-story building capable of 
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providing additional gates for jumbo jets. Expected developments in 
STOL, QTOL, and cargo aircraft may have future repercussions on the 
airport area, and especially on concourses. 
One of the most interesting developments during the next 50 years will 
be the emergence of commercial service at satellite airports in the 
major hub areas. Changing land use patterns and worsened congestion at 
hubs may increase demand for service to satellite airports. Inter-
modalism may encourage development of satellites. However, their re-
naissance is contingent upon technological developments in STOL and 
QTOL aircraft. Regulatory policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board and 
the Federal Aviation Administration can also be an inducement to de-
centralize\1letropolitan air services. Because the satellite is not 
likely to have high-density services, airlines will be reluctant to 
develop the satellite services, unless they can devise ways to operate 
the small-scale facilities economically. 
Because of the increasing costs of raising funds for construction of new 
airports, it is expf.'!cted that the "ground up" airport exemplified by 
the Dallas-Ft. Worth Reg:ional Airport is highly unlikely to be chosen 
in the future as the solution to lands ide problems. Most planners are 
constrained to seek ways to prolong the lifetime of the existing capital 
stocks of land, access facilities, runways, terminal buildings, and 
parking facilities. As a result, technological activities aimed at 
alleviating peak period congestion and cramped facilities may be all the 
more crucial. 
Capital stock influences technological assessments in this industry in 
still another way--cross-subsidization by equipment manufacturers. 
Since World War II, much technology used in passenger air transport 
waS originally developed on behalf of the Department of Defense. In 
effect, much of the risk bearing needed to develop innovations in air-
frames, power plants, and avionics has come about, at least in part, as 
as result of military expenditures. The private-sector has been able 
to apply these technologies to commercial use. This spillover impact 
has been important in the past, and its continuation will assist the 
certificated air carriers in obtaining innovations--both good and bad--
for their use. 
To this point, the discussion ofcertific.ated air carriers has concen-
trated on the influences of existing technologies upon new technolog~:_es. 
Technological changes are shaped by the demand for air service which 
has cross elasticities in various markets with demand for short-haul 
high-speed rail, automobiles, some exotic modes (e.g., TACV) , 'buses, 
and several nontransport substitutes for travel (telecommunications, 
computers, and relocation decisibns). In addition, demand factors with--
in the air travel industry affect the directi.ons of technological changes. 
The hest €!xample is the heroic--but so far unsuccessful--struggles of 
the Concorde to obtain a niche in the fleets of the major air carriers 
of the world. The Concorde has been heavily constrained by the air-
lines' perception that capital and operating costs are too high for the 
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demand for supersonic air travel. In light of its substitutes (con-
ventional subsonic jets), the Concorde technology does not now generate 
a differential demand (for supersonic as opposed to subsonic travel) 
sufficient to make an investment profitable. 
Similarly, other marketing and technological innovations of the air 
carriers must also be looked at in light of the demand for the service 
they provide. Another example is Laker Airways' proposed "Skybus" 
service from New York to London. (Similar concepts have been proposed 
for U.S. routes.) The Skybus is a radical departure in the marketing 
of jumbo-jet technologies. Regulation has impeded market testing of 
this innovation. However, if the Skybus is introduced, its success 
will depend on new demand for this type of service over and above con-
ventional air service. 
Introduction of new technologies into the certificated air carrier field 
is tempered by the realities on the supply side of air service. A 
prominent sup?ly-side constraint is the scarcity of cap.ital funds to 
finance new reequipping cycles. Simply put ,the balance shee·t prevents 
expansion into more than one major reequipment project. These financial 
constraints are definitely related to the. existing capital stock which 
is the strength and security of the balance sheet. These financial 
limitations force the airlines to select only a few of the available 
additions to their stock of assets. As an example, a massive reequipment 
cycle to medium-size jets (e.g., 727-300) probably could not be financed 
if a supersonic aircraft were added to the fleet during the same time. 
The compatibility theme carries over to the supply side because a major 
component in the operating expenses of an airline is the maintenance 
program. Normally, increased homogeneity of a fleet enables cheaper 
maintenance through savings in inventories, skills of maintenance per-
sonnel, and interchangeability of spares. Thus, an important cost con-
sideration relates to the compatibility of existing equipment with new 
technologies. The diverse array of available engines which can be in-
stalled in the basic DC-lO airframe has resulted from the purchaser's 
desire to standardize the DC-IO engines with the power plants on their 
other aircraft. Because several of the airlines purchasing DC-lOs 
preferred a Pratt & Whitney power plant to the standard General Electric 
power plant, McDonnell Douglas produced a DC-lO with Pratt & Hhitney 
engine,; compatible with the B-747s of the purchaser. 
In summary, this discussion of the certificated air carriers shows that 
the ec-isting capital stocks of the carriers and the airport operators 
play a fundamental role in the speed and direction of technological 
change. In this particular case, the most important phenomenon is the 
compatibilities of the existing route structure, aircraft fleet, and 
terminal facilities with the projected acquisitions. 
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Automotive Trat)sportation 
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As with AMTRAK and the airlines, automotive transport evidences in-
fluences of pa;st capital investment on technological change. The auto-
mot.ive transportation system, including trucks, buses, and other highway 
motor vehicles of all tranr,portation modes, exhibits the highest degree 
of inertj.a, technological and otherwise. This inertia is related to 
paSi.:capital investment decisions. It is important to recognize not 
only that the automotive transportation system consists of a number of 
components, each of which has a number of major elements of capital in-
vestment, but also that these system components, in turn, are intimately 
interrelated with other systems investments. This interaction among 
the components evolved over a considerable period of time with a net 
result of an extremely high degree of interdependency with major impacts 
on technology and the behavior patterns of institutions which built 
around this technology. In order to illustrate at least part of this 
complexity and interdependency, there are a number of issues to be 
noted concerning vehicles: their manufacture, ownership, and use; the 
logistics support system for these vehicles; the roadway system; urban 
and land use considerations; plus a variety of additional subject matters. 
Vehicles. There are two broad categories of issues concerning ve-
hicles. On the one hand, there are those factors relating to the users' 
investment in an inventory of vehicles, which at the present time, con-
sists of something on the order of 100 million private passenger cars, 
about 25 million trucks, and approximately 500,000 buses. In addition, 
there is the consideration of the users' learning behavior concerning 
the operation of motor vehicles, and ·the many elements concerning cul-
teral patterns which are intimately bound up with the private passenger 
car. On the other hand, there is a multiplicity of technological fac-
tors relating to the manufacture of motor vehicles which need to be 
recognized, including investment in plant, tooling, and engineering. 
Of particular concern is the matter of the lead times involved in bring-
ing about changes in automotive technology. In general, the greater 
the magnitude of the change, the longer the lead time. This is particu-
larly true if the q.hange in technology affects one or another of the 
elements interdependent with the automobile. New technology internal 
to the vehicle generally involves shorter lead times, but even these 
still may require years. For example, the development of an automo-
tive gas turbine from the prototype stage to mass production has been 
estimated to require approximi:1tely 11 y.ears. with 16 years required to 
move into full production. While the example of a gas turbine may be 
considered internal to the vehicle, there are, of course, many external 
ramifications of such a.. change,including a substantial impact on parts 
suppliers, service and maintenance industries, fuel production and 
distribution industries, to mention only the most obvious. 
Logistics Support Systems. As suggested above, the passenger car 
and motor vehiclet:ransportation system entails an enormous logistics 
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support system including hundreds of parts suppliers, tens of thousands 
of service stations and garages, and the major capital investment of 
the petroleum industry in gasoline refining, distribution, and marketing. 
It is appropriate to note in this latter regard that changes in auto-
motive engine technology--whether mandated by federal regulation or the 
result of evolutionary engineering development--can have profound impli-
cations on refinery product requirements and the demand for gasoline of 
various octane numbers and antiknock compounds. The circumstance, for 
example, that new engines may require lead-free gasoline of a certain 
research octane number must be taken in relation to the circumstance 
that there is a changing inventory--or capital stoc.k--of older cars with 
varying requirements for gasoline. Similarly, the development of cata-
lytic converters for exhaust emissions control, which includes the use 
of platinum and paladium, imposes severe demands on the minerals pro-
duction and refining industries and the related technology of catalyst 
development. A change in automotive technology can imply substantially 
different skill requirements in the maintenance and service industries. 
For example, the increased use of electronic devices for control of 
various functions can introduce severe dislocations into the service 
industries with an attendant need for extensive educational and train-
ing programs required to provide new skills. 
The Highway System. While the highwqy system might be regarded as 
part of the logistic support system, it is appropriate to consider it 
separately in view of (1) the enormous capital investment represented 
by the highway system, (2) the fact that this system is in.troduced and 
maintained within the public domain, and (3) the profound effect that its 
characteristics and existence have on so many other matters related to 
automotive transportation. The technology invested in the highway system 
can be viewed in two different ways. 
First, it should be examined in terms of the technology involved in 
laying down of highway surfaces and erecting the various fixed struc-
tures and appurtenances thereto. Involved, of course, is an enormous 
investment in structures and roadways. (IssU{~s relating to the use of 
rights-of-ways and the land removed from other uses by being dedicated 
to highway use will be discussed below.) 
The second point of view concerning highway technology i.s that representE!d 
by the set of operating rules and procedures for the use of the highways. 
These institutional considerations can have a profound effect on the 
technology of the automotive transportation system, and it is here. that 
their interdependence is so pronounced. It is appr.opriate to'nqte that 
what might appear to be relatively small changes in operating rules can 
have very large implications for the rest of the system. ~~lat might 
appear to be change with few technological impacts, for example, is the 
reduction of maximum speed limits to 55 miles per hour for all vehicles 
on all roadways. The basis for the development of a motor freight trans-
portatiCln system was a speed limit over 55 miles an hour and the longer 
stage length permitted by higher speed. As a result, major terminals 
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and distribution points and labor work rules are such that a trucker 
cannot complete the haul between major terminal points in the time 
permitted by the Teamsters work rules and still abide by the federal 
safety regulations traveling at 55 miles per hour. In the long run, 
more dramatic changes can emerge from regulatory changes in the maximum 
load limits of double- and single-bottom trailers. 
Urban and Other Land Use Consideration. It is important to recog-
nize that patterns of land use in the United States (urban, suburban, 
rural) are determined to a major degree by the highway system and auto-
motive transportation. While it is undeniable that a large quantity of 
real estate is dedicated to highway and roadway use, it is equally im-
portant to recognize that most other land uses are influenced by the 
highway system--it provides access without which most o't:her land uses 
would hardly be possible. Residential areas, regional shopping centers, 
and industry are typically accessible only by automotive transportation. 
Therefore, any significant change that might be contemplated concerning 
the use and characteristics of automobiles may have a profound impact 
on all of these dependent land uses. Stated another way, the incredibly 
vast capital investment in land use that is dependent in one way or 
another on automotive transportation, and the access provided by such 
transportation, represents an enormous initial component to technology 
change that might conflict with such investment. 
Other Automotive:Depen~ent Industries and Concerns. While a number 
of raw materials and processing industries would be affected by changes 
in automotive technology, probably the most directly affected would be 
the scrap and recycling industries. Changes in material inputs to the 
manufacture of automobiles will appear as inputs to the scrap processing 
industry when the automobile reaches the end of its useful life. As the 
stock of cars-in-use changes over time, there may be substantial changes 
in the inputs to the scrap processing industries. Capital investment in 
scrap processing technologies can, of course, have an impact on deter-
mining that part of the materials stream that is reprocessed. 
The net import of the preceding observations is that change in the, tech-
nology of automotive transportation can only be incremental and probably 
can occur realistically only in relatively small steps. The larger the 
attempted change regarding the technology at hand,the more difficult 
the transition will be; efforts to accelerate the transition are likely 
to result in excessive costs and inefficiencies. Hhile the vehicle 'is 
probably the most important from the point of view of technology, it is 
nevertheless also the case that large change in the u~,e or ownership of 
automobiles is likely to be accompanied by substantial changes in the 
entire bundle of considerations that tr.ake up urban land use and American 
culture. 
XVII-20 
.... t-
1 
I 
J 
l 
.1 
j 
I 
1 
i 
I 
r-
t 
I I 
, -l,,""G -~"""'---'c'~i ... 
f i 
Appendix 
ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORT INVESTMENT FLOlVS 
The concepts of stock and flow are often confused in investment 
theory. The stock concept refers to a value which has no tj,me dimension 
(although, of course, it exists in time). It is an absolute number 
such as dollars. Time is used only to denote various dates on which the 
stock is (was) held. Flows, on the other hand, have a time dimension; 
e.g., a flow per unit of time, dollars per unit of time. Furthermore, 
investment is a flow item, while capital is a stock item. Capital is 
augmented by investment; capital stock shrinks through depreciation and 
disinvestment. 
Given pieces of capital equipment will be replaced from time to 
time under certain prescribed conditions (to be outlined below). -The 
optimal replacement pattern of capital stock through a flow of new 
investments is relevant for new technology projections and for the 
acceptance of those projections. 
Investments (flows) cannot be projected unless some inventory of 
the existing capital (stock) is taken at the time of projection. For 
an individual who must merely replace existing machines with like 
machines, a machine is replaced when its marginal rate of quasi-rent 
flow per year net of depreciation equals the present value of the 
average return per year of a new machine net of its invest.ment cost, 
less the scrap va1ue of the old machine. The same basic rules follow 
for the replacement of an existing piece of capital by a new type of 
capita.l with a different revenue expectation, cost, and scrap value. 
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The general theory of optimal capital replacement follows the 
treatment of Henderson and Quandt (Micpoeconomic Theopy, McGraw Hill, 
New York, 1971, pp. 325-329). 
Suppose that a piece of capital equipment produces an output Q 
which sells for P. For simplicity, assume that P is independent of the 
number of Q produced, i.e., the demand curve is horizontal as perceived 
by the producer. The amount of revenue generated during time period t 
is qt (a flow concept). The amount of revenue generated during time 
period t is thus Pqt' 
The cost of the piece of capital equipment at time zero is 1
0
, The 
input cost flow is C
t 
at time t, and it is a function of the amount of 
Q(qt) produced. The capital must be maintained, and maintenance costs 
1ft are a function of output flow and age. 
We would expect 
That is, input costs increase as more output is prodl},-ced (unless there 
are scale economies in the production of the product). 
. ! 
That is, the more output (use) produced by a unit of capital, in any 
given time period, the more maintenance is necessary .to ~eep the equip-
ment in working order. 
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That is, as the equipment gets older, the maintenance costs required to 
produce a unit of output increase. 
The piece of equipment can be sold for scrap when it is decided 
that its productive days are over. The scrap value of the machine at 
time t is 
as 
t 
--- < o. at 
Stet) and is a decreasing function of its age; that is, 
aS t at gives the rate of loss of market value from continuing to 
use the machine--depreciation. Of course, one could also assume that a 
buyer tq-ho wished to use the equipment might exist and that the equipment 
would be sold to the buyer or for scrap, whichever is higher. In trans-
portation, much equipment tends to pass on from owner to omler before it 
is scrapped; e.g., an extensive market for used automobiles ex:i,sts in 
the U. S.; old MITRAK coaches may find their way into local commuter 
operations, and aircraft will filter from trunks to local service car-
riers and ultimate.ly out of the. country. What is discarded by one becomes 
new and superior for another. Producers of capital, through obsolescence 
and market competitive factors, may c,ause certain pieces of capital 
equipment to be sold (scrapped) long before the physical life of the 
capital has been exhausted. The aircraft industry is one such example. 
-- The quasi-rerrt flow (i. e., profit) to the owner of the capital 
which is producing qt at time t is 
XVII-23 
'. -- '", , ......... "~ .. " 
! 
I 
I 
j 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 j 
! , 
, 
I 
i 
1 
1 j 
J 
I j 
1 
J 
l 
I 
'1 
j 
'.'~ 
r I ~'. 
r , 
I 
t 
r [ 
The present value (required because the operations and sales of the 
capital equipment occur over time) of the profit from the operation of 
the capital equipment is the present value of the quasi-rent stream minus 
the cost of the machine, plus t.he present value of the scrap receipts: 
where 
T J Z(t)e-it dt - 10 + S(T)e-it 
o 
-it 
e is the time continuous discount factdr. 
\\ 
The initial problem is to find the optimal time T for an analysis 
where just one machine will be bought. The owner of the equipment wants 
to know when is the optimal time to stop using the machine. This is 
found as 
d1Tl = "T 
dT [Z(T) - is(T) + S'(T)]e-1 0 
so that 
Z(T) + S'(T) = is(T) 
'Thus, the equipment will be retired when quasi-rent less depre-
ciation (recall S' (T) < 0) equals rille interest received from investment 
of the scrap value. 
However, if this firm is to produce forever, its problem is not when 
to retire the initial capital equipment, but when to replace it with new 
equipment and, further, when to replace that equipment with new equipment 
ad infinitum. 
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Assume that Z(t), I , and S(t) are the same for each piece of capital 
o 
equipment (except for dates). Also assume that the planned lives of the 
equipment are identical. Thus, the present value of the equipment is: 
First 
equipment 
Second " 
(replacement) 
equipment 
Third 
equipment 
T ~1 = ! Z(t)e-itdt 
o 
2T ~2 = ! Z(t - T)e -itdt 
T 
nth equipment ~ = 
n 
nT 
r (n-1)T 
Z(t - nT)e-itdt - I e-i (n-1)T + S(T)e-inT 
o 
thus, in general, 
-~ 
The present value of the aggregate profit frem an infinite stream 
of machines is 
00 
~ = 1: 
h = 1 
~ = ~o~ __________________ __ 
h -iT 1- e 
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where 
-it -1 (1 - e ) is the sum to infinity of the geometric progression 
[1 + e-iT + e-i2T + e-i3T + ... ] 
d1T The optimal T is found from DT = 0, that is, 
which will equal zero if 
Since e-iT is on both sides of the equality, the equality will hold if 
or 
(1- e-iT) [Z(T) + s' (T)] - is(T) + is (T)e-iT = i[} Z(t)e-itdt - 10] + is (T)e-iT 
o 
subtra~ting is(T)e-iT and adding is(T) to both sides yields 
or 
(1 - e-iT) [Z(T) + S'(T)] = i[1 Z(t)e-itdt - 10 + S(T)] 
o 
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or 
where 
Z(T) + SI(T) = i [IT Z(t)e-itdt _ I + S(T)] 
I -u 0 - e 0 
Z(T) + SI(t) = t [1 Z(t)e-itdt - 10 + S(T)] 
o 
-iT T ~l~-~e ___ = I e-itdt, 
i 
o 
that is, the present value of a one dollar income stream for T years. 
Thus, as stated above, capital equipment is replaced when its 
marginal rate of quasi-rent flow per year less depreciation, i.e., 
Z(T) + SI(T), equals the present value of the average return per year 
of a new piece of equipment, net of its investment cost less the scrap 
value of the old machine. [1 Z(t)e-itdt - 10 + S(T)] gives a return 
o 
for T years,and thus, the multiplication by t annualizes the return. 
Note that the solution for the one piece of equipment problem, i. e., 
Z (T) + S I (T) = is (T), diffets quite a bit from the solution of the 
replacement of capital problem, that is, 
Z(T) + SI(T) = ~. [1 Z(t)e -i~dt_ - 10] + is (T) ~. 0 1 _ e-iT 
The difference, of course, reflects the difference in the options open 
to the decision maker, since the decision maker replacing capital will 
operate new machines. 
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At any given point of time, a firm will have a given capital stock. 
Whether they will sell or scrap that capital stock and invest (flow) in 
a different piece of equipment depends on the expected Z(t) function of 
the new capital equipment vis-a-vis the capital equipment on hand, the 
purchase cost of a new piece of capital, the scrap or sale value of the 
old and the new equipment, and of course the discount rate i. The 
equation 
Z(T) + S'(T) =t [1 Z(t)e-itdt - 10 + S(T)] 
o 
can be rewritten 
or 
T . 
8[Z(T) + S'(T)] = ! Z(t)e-1tdt I + S(T) o 
o 
T . 
10 - S(T) =! Z(t)e-1tdt - 8[Z(T) + S'(T)] 
o 
T 
Since 6 = I e-itdt, the second part of the right-hand side of the 
o· 
above equation becomes 
T 
![Z(T) + S'(T)]e-itdt 
o 
thus the equation becomes 
T 
10 - S(T) =! {Z(t) - [Z(T) + S'(T)]}e-itdt 
o 
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also note that 
T 
is(T) J e-itdt 
o 
-iT . 
is(T)(I - t ] = S(T) - S(T)e-J..T 
T 
Thus, if is(T) J e-itdt is added to both sides of the above ques-: 
o 
o 
tion [call it Equation (A)], then we obtain 
I - S(T)e-iT 
o 
T 
= J {Z(t) - [Z(T) + S'(T) - is(T)]}e-itdt 
o 
(B) 
Equation (B) is another traditional way of expressing the optimal 
replacement problem. 
palling 
M, 
C(T) I - S(T)e-iT 
o 
= The capital consumption of the investment. 
G(T) = Z(T) + dS(T) - is(T) = The generated surplus of the investment, dT 
that is, the net operating receipts at time T[Z(T)] plus the loss of 
salvage value [dSdi)] minus the opportunity cost of the salvage value 
[is(T)]. 
G(T) is thus the revenue from keeping the investment for an addi-
tiona1 short time period. Substituting above in (B) yields 
T . J {Z(t) - G(T)}e-J..tdt = C(T) (C) 
o 
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where 
Z(T) - G(T) = inferiority in revenue between the investment now in 
use and an investment which is T years old. 
Thus, (C) says that when the sum of the present value of the revenue 
inferiority is equal to the capital consumption of the investment, it is 
time to reinvest. If dS ~ 0, then equation (B) becomes dT 
or 
or 
ori 
or 
T I {Z(t) - Z(T) + is(T)}e-itdt = 
o 
I - S(T)e-iT 
o 
T T I {z(t) - Z(T)}e-itdt + is(T) I e-itdt = 10 S(T)e-iT 
o o 
T -iT J tZ(t) - Z(T)}e-itdt + is(T)t1 -: }= 10 - S(T)e-iT 
o 
T J {Z(t) - Z(T)}e-itdt + S(T) - S(T)e-iT = I - S(T)e-iT o 
o 
T J {Z(t) - Z(T)}e-itdt = 10 - S(T). 
o 
(D) 
(E) 
(F) 
(G) 
(H) 
Consider the sensitivity of the above model to changes in investment 
costs, the discount rate, net operating receipts, and salvage value. 
Equation (H) :\s used for simplicity, i. e., we assume ~~ ~ O. (The 
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,results don't change in spirit as the result of this assumption, but. 
the mathematics is much simpler.) 
Suppose investment costs change. How is the optimal service U.fe 
affected? 
result is 
or 
If equation (H) is differentiated with respect to I , the 
o 
T dZ(T) e-itdt dT = dS(T) J dT dI I - dT 
0 0 
T dZ(T) e-itdt dT = dS(T) f 1, since = 
° dT dI dT 0 0 
(I) 
(J) 
Since dZd~T) < 0, for the left hand side of (J) to be positive, then 
dT dI > 0, that is, the larger the investment costs, 1
0
, the longer the 
o 
service life, T. 
Suppose the discount rate changes. If equation (H) is differentiated 
with respect Eo i, the result is 
T(i) 
I (K) 
o 
Since the right-hand most term of (K) is negative, the left-hand 
term must be positive so that (K) may equal zero. Since ~i < 0, then 
dT di > 0, that is, the service life, T, increases as the discount rate 
increases. This increase in i expresses a scarcity of money and thus 
a willingness to postpone investment. The present value of the new 
investment decreases; thus the attractiveness of the alternative 
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decreases, and the existing investment is retained for a longer period 
of time. 
Suppose that the net operating receipts change. If Equation (H) 
is differentiated with respect to Z, the result is, 
! -:i e-itdt :~ + ! d[Z(t) d~ Z(T)] e-itdt = 0 (L) 
o 0 
Since the second term on the left-hand side equals zero, so does 
the firs t term. 
dT Thus dZ = 0, that is, if the change in net operating 
receipts is independent of time (a parallel and straight-line shift 
upward or downward over time), the optimal service life will not be 
affected. 
However, if net operating revenues have a deterioration which is 
a function of time (a nonparallel shift) and this deterioration is 
denoted by a, it can be shown that d[Z(t) d~ Z(T)] > 0 and so :! < 0, 
that is, the optimal service life will decrease when the deterioration 
increases. 
Suppose the salvage value changes. If Equation (H) is differen-
tiated with respect to S, the result is, 
T1_ dZ e-itdt dT = -1 dT dS (M) 
o 
S ' dZ 0 E ' (M)' l' h dT 0 h " 
, 
1nce dT < ,quat10n 1mp 1est at dS < ,t at 1S, 1ncreas1ng 
salvage value decreases the optimal service life. 
The above analysis somewhat hid the effects of maintenance costs 
in Z(t) and' Z(T)7 Ti-~such=costs-~ar~e separated from Z and made explicit, 
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a fuller appreciation of the. interdependence of maintenance on net 
operating receipts and on salvage value can be shown. In general, 
increased levels of maintenance will improve salvage value and improve 
net operating receipts (receipts exclusive of maintenance). The analogue 
of Equation (B) becomes 
where 
T 1 tZo(t) + x(t) - Zo(T) + X(T) + L(V(T),T) - is(T)Je-itdt 
o 
T 
I - e-iT S(T) + 1 V(t)e-itdt 
o 
(N) 
X(T) = the accumlated effect on net operating receipts of 
previous outlays for maintenance expenditures 
L(V(t),t) dS = dt = the change in salvage value with time which is a 
function of the maintenance done on the investments 
and the age of the investment 
V(t) = maintenance expenditures at time t. 
Since a prediction of the flow cannot be made without knowledge of 
a firm's exist:ing stock, the demand for the service, and the likely 
behavior of competitors, among other items, it will be difficult to 
predict what the investment flows of the future will be and indeed 
what the capital stock of the future will be (since capital stock of 
time period t will equal the capital stock ofti.me period t-l plus the 
net investment from time -t-l to time t) without knowledge of these 
items. This is no small task since predicting future demands is a 
major project in its own right. 
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THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL ERA--IS IT AT AN END? 
by 
John Mollenkopf 
Stanford University 
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ABSTRACT 
Massive road networks and relatively low front-end costs have made the 
car a flexible, convenient and popular way to travel. The car not 
only symbolized America's post-World War II affluence, it was one of 
the main devices by which that affluence was achieved. World politics 
and domestic cleavages have, however, tarnished this symbol. Though 
the enormity of our society's investment prescribes continued auto 
usage, future decisions about incremental changes in the auto system 
will definitely be made by criteria far different than thos~ common 
place over the past few decades. 
This paper explores the automobile-based mobility system and the 
forces which may alter, and perhaps diminish, its role in intercity 
travel. 
A breakdown is occurring within the auto-industrial complex, accentu-
ated by changes in political views, social values, and life patterns 
among car users and policy makers. Related impacts include, for 
example, rising energy prices, the no-growth movement, labor antago-
nisms on the assembly line, industry mark~~ saturation and technolog-
ical exhaustion, negative externality and social costs, and a shift 
in federal investments from freeway to bus and mass transit systems. 
Perception of such impacts must necessarily be impressionistic, but 
the net effect will be to reduce auto usage, encourage use of small 
autos, make bus technologies more attractive, and increase air travel 
over longer distances. 
Technologies which have high new capital requirements or which would 
require the abandonment of existing public capital are highly un-
likely to replace the automobile as the main source of intercity 
mobility. Bus technology, and to a lesser extent, airplane technol-
ogy, will be the main beneficiaries of a decrease in automobile usage. 
New technology investments would appear to have, for example, the 
following general characteristics: no major demands for social 
capita; a changed pattern of highway capital investment; reduced 
energy and per capita costs; lower social, pollution, and congestion 
costs; and concentration of metropolitan development. 
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XVIII. THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL ERA--IS IT AT AN END? 
Summary 
John Mollenkopf 
Stanford University 
.. 
The usual method for predicting demand for intercity travel involves 
the regression of travel behavior against disposable income, the costs 
of various modes in time and money, population and economic activity 
trends, the velocity of money, and similar factors. This method can 
yield highly accurate projections when these independent variables 
relilain insulated from the tidal pressures exerted by basic social 
changes. When and if the tide does change, however, the typical re-
gression equations become treacherously unreliable--one need only 
think, for example, of the impact of rising oil prices on U.S. automo-
bile sa.les. Any careful consideration of the future of intercity 
travel demands must therefore scout out forces which, even though their 
present impact is relatively marginal, portend major shifts in what 
now seem to be stable explanatory patterns. 
This paper explores the automobile-based mobility system and the forces 
which may alter, and perhaps diminish, its role. It will consider not 
only how viable the automobile-based transportation system will be, 
but also how lessons from the automobile case can be applied to alter-· 
native technologies in order to evaluate their likelihood and worka-
bility. 
The basic thesis with which we must grapple is that major social forces 
have been undermining the economic, political, and social foundations 
which support the automobile-oriented society. These forces range 
from rising energy prices and the no-growth movement to labor antago-
nisms on the assembly line. While they may not lead to the abandon-
ment of the auto, these forces will lead our society to revise the 
auto's role and to supplant partially the existing technology. Newer 
technologies, however, will face the same general forces now bearing 
down on the automobile-industrial complex. As a result, technologies 
which have high new capital requirements or would require the abandon-
ment of existing public capital are highly unlikely to replace the 
automobile as the main source of intercity mobility. In the final 
analysis, it is the author's view that bus technology, and to a lesser 
extent airplane technology, will, quite fittingly, be the main bene-
ficiaries of these trends. High-technology solutions like space 
shuttle and intercity rail rapid transit will, it is felt, be ruled out 
by the same forces which will encourage bus technology. 
The forces acting on the 
under two main headings: 
,industrial complex itself 
and political views among 
auto-industrial complex may be summarized 
forces of breakdown within the auto-
and changes in values, social life patterns, 
car users and policy makers. 
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2. 
Forces of breakdown within the automobile-industrial complex 
a. Market saturation and technological exhaustion within the 
automobile industry. 
b. The accumulation of n~gative externalities and social 
costs generated by the automobile. 
c. The advent of a general era of austerity within the U.S. 
with an expressed desire by the business community and 
federal economic policy-makers to shift resources from 
consumption to investment. 
d. The shift in control of world oil resources to the OPEC 
nations with the consequent rise in oil prices, both 
absolutely and relatively. 
e. Rising antagonism on the production line which, though a 
general phenomenon in U.S. industry, is especially con-
centrated in automobile production. 
f. A shift in federal investments away from increased pri-
vate intercity transit facilities (freeways) toward urban 
and public facilities (bus systems). 
The end of the love affair with the car 
a. Rising political opposition to freeway construction; the 
development of no-growth political coalitions in met-
ropolitan areas. 
b. Development of a consensus within policy-oriented elites 
in favor of reorienting tran&portation policy toward 
urban mass transit. 
c. A slowing of suburbanization, the formation of suburban 
families, and birth rates, with a reinvigoration of 
urban social life, with consequently less emphasis on 
car ownership. 
d. Changing values among the young in terms of interest in 
smaller cars and non-car transportation. 
Each of these developments can even now be regarded as having sub-
stantial impacts on the role of the auto, though at present the per-
ception of such impacts must necessarily be impressionistic. Their 
net effect will be to reduce the importance of the auto, encourage the 
replacement of large autos by small ones, make bus technologies more 
attractive, and also make air travel more attractive over longer 
distances. 
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The institutional interests pushing to maintain an automobile-based 
mobility system have historically been strong and, though they·are in-
creasingly divided, will remain strong in the future. Regardless of 
the merits of the issue, a substantial policy orientation toward car-
like technologies will therefore probably continue. But on the merits 
as well, it appears that new technology investments, if they are to 
be viable and helpful, will have the following general characteristics. 
1. They will not impose major new demands for social capital nor 
substantially increase governmental outlays for "unproductive" 
activities. 
,2. They will not abandon highway capital investments, but prob-
ably make somewhat different uses of them. 
3. They will conserve on energy and per capita costs. 
4. They will involve lower social, pollution, and congestion 
costs. 
5. They will tend to concentrate, rather than further disperse, 
metropolitan development. 
6. Sinc~ a reduction in consumption expenditures will be para-
mount, they will tend to be collectively organized, and 
therefore publicly financed, rather than privately owned. 
7. They will be shaped especially to serve politically important 
groups whose mobility has been impaired in the past by the 
auto-organized system (namely the elderly, disabled, and 
working poor), or whose mobility will be impaired by increas-
ing expenses of mobility (namely white collar metropolitan 
commuters) • 
These constraints on future technology development stem directly from 
the forces outlined above. If these forces are actually operating at 
significant levels, and if the resulting constraints do come int~C" 
play, then many of the technologies being proposed for intercity~tran~ 
sit are at best naive and at worst extremely wasteful approaches. 
Instead, the author recommends a mundane but ultimately most useful 
alternative: bus technology. While smaller cars, perhaps electrically 
powered, might satisfy many of the conditions set out< above, they can-
not hope to have the short-term impact which high-speed, high-quality 
bus service could provide. In addition, some improvement of existing 
airline technology would help provide an alternative to longer range 
intercity car travel. 
This line of reasoning is reinforced if one considers how the forces 
described above will affect intracity travel. They will obviously 
reduce the attractiveness of the individual auto, especially the 
larger ones. To the extent that urban transportation policy 
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additionally concentrates development and renders car ownership less 
necessary, such intercity options as buses, rental cars, airplanes, 
and even rail will become more attractive. Of these possibilities, of 
course, buses best meet the criteria set out. In the final· analysis, 
this author contends then, that investments in bus technology prove to 
be the superior choice. 
The highway complex forms one of the two principal elements of inter-
city travel behavior. The prevalence of cars, the massive road net-
work, and the relatively low front-end costs to individual participa-
tion to this form of travel have made the car a flexible, convenient, 
and popular way to travel. Indeed, in the past 30 years, it has 
dominated the choices available to the average American. But this 
highly structured range of choices is not the only important determi-
nant of intercity travel behavior. 
The other element is a mobility-oriented life-style in which the car 
is a central comsumption item for the individual family. Not only 
was highway-based travel the main choice open to travelers, the car 
has attained, it seems, a central commercial, psychological, and 
avocational role in American life. More than any other good, it rep-
resents the affluence of consumption in our society. Working class 
kids tirelessly install mag wheels and headers and cruise through the 
drive-ins, while their more middle class peers still join the search 
for the perfect place to "park." To their parents a new car is as 
important a status symbol as a suburban tract house, while mammoth 
camper vans now constitute the ultim~te American marriage between 
town and country. This car-oriented life style not only represents 
our society's edge over less affluent countries, it performs a criti-
cal, dual economic. function of encouraging consumption and providing 
for economic growth. 
In short, the car not only symbolized America's post-World War II 
affluence, it was one of the main devices by which that affluence was 
achieved. It appears, however, that world politics and domestic 
cleavages have combined decisively to do in this epoch. The 
enormity of our society's investment in automobile-oriented ways will 
necessarily give them considerable momentum into the future, but 
decisions about incremental changes will definitely be made by cri-
teria far different from those commonplace over the past few decades. 
Extended Discussion 
Background. Since the 1920s, and especially since the post-World 
War II freeway and suburb-building boom, America has become a society 
whose mobility has increasingly centered on the automobile. At the 
national level, a political alliance of automobile manufacturers, oil 
companies, road building contractors, highway users, and real estate 
developers backed federal transportation policies which invested 
over $80 billion in freeways and caused federal, state, and local 
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.~ governments to spend more than $260 billion on highways.* At the 
local level, new f'reeways, increased automobile sales, and rapid sub-
urbanization provided a powerful impetus to the post-World War II 
economy. Indeed, some would argue that without this rapid growth of 
land values and home building another depression would have followed 
the war. Hetropolitan highway construction and the growth of car own-. 
ership proved to be the sine qua non for the post-war suburban boom. 
The growth of suburbs, car ownership, and commuting was more than com-
patible with using cars for longer-distance travel. By the mid-1960s, 
America was a full-blown highway society with car-related expenditures 
making up the single biggest item in the GNP. 
It is not surprising that, as a consequence, when one speaks of inter-
city travel, one speaks of the auto. According to statistics pub-
lished by the Transportation Association of America, seven out of eight 
person-trips longer than 100 miles are made by automobile. Naturally, 
air travel cuts into auto usage for the longer trips, but even on 
trips of over 1,000 miles, cars carry 63% of the travelers.** 
While the evidence is not all in, the u.s. appears to have lost its 
undisputed position in the nonsocialist world. The heavy costs of a 
failing war, increased competit,ion from Western Europe and Japan, 
relatively low rates of domestic productivity increase, and the costs 
of maintaining domestic peace during the 1960s have combined to under-
mine U.S. predominance, and therefore, U.S. affluence. These trends 
are all represented strongly in the auto industry, where foreign small 
cars manufactured in highly productive plants have eroded the Big 
Three's hold on the u.s. market. (Figures gathered by the California 
Department of Transportation show that in the first quarter of 1975 
almost 70% of all new car registrations in California were foreign 
makes!) Additionally, national policies designed to deflate the 
economy will necessarily reduce the common citizen's ability to buy 
and use cars, and to maintain the kind of lifestyle which requires 
large amounts of auto travel to continue. 
This downturn would not be so troublesome if it were only a short-
range economic difficulty. But since it stems from the U.S.'s declin-
ing international position, it poses a chronic problem. It means, in 
short, that America can no longer so freely afford the car; the econ-
omy cannot afford the car's technological stagnation, its social costs, 
the lavishness with which consumers spend money on it, the way it 
devours gas and oil, the expense of dealing with increasingly 
*Figures come from Transportation Association of America, Transporta-
tion Facts and Tferu1s~ Tenth Edition, October 1973, p. 26. For dis-
cussions of the highway lobby and the origins of federal highway 
policy, Helen Leavitt, Superhighway-Superhoax (New York, Doubleday, 
1970). 
**ATA, Transportation Facts and Trends~ p. 20. 
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antagonistic production workers, nor the expense of subsidizing its 
use through the highway program. (Highway maintenance costs repre-
sent a time bomb for government budgets. California Highway Depart-
~~nt projections show the maintenance cost curve rising above all 
~:unds available for transportation within the next ten years. This 
~;~tuation was created by years of lavish capital expenditures which 
took little account of long-term expenses.) However unpalatable 
these facts are to proponents of the existing travel technologies, a 
closer examination shows they are indeed facts which will have to be 
faced. 
Forces of Breakdown for the Highway Complex 
Market-Saturation and Technological Exhaustion with the Automobile 
Industry. In the major study of the auto industry, one economist has 
flatly stated "The auto industry can be described as a technologically 
stagnant industry in terms of its product. Cars are not fundamentally 
different from what they were in 1946; very little new technology 
has been instigated by the industry."* He further commented that the 
automakers' ability to respond to new conditions, particularly new 
public concerns, was "not impressive." 
Emma Rothschild, in her book Paradise Lost: The DecZine of the Auto-
Industrial Era, has attributed this failure of performance not only to 
oligopoly but to the underlying nature of the product. She compares 
the automobile industry to the 19th Century English textile industry, 
and concludes that the peak of productivity increases is long past, 
and that all the devices by which markets for the good can. be widened 
and deepened have been fully exploited. Car ownership in the u.S. has 
grown from 7% of all American families in 1920 to over 80% today; 
second car ownership, as well, seems to have reached a natural limit 
(especially with the relatively rising costs of car ownership). She 
concludes that "The u.S. auto business now seems likely to follow the 
same historical course as these British industries--down to its 
present and expected troubles with slow growth, market saturation, 
management inertia, capital stagnation, and technological demoraliza-
tion."** 
While mass transit technology, new urban-oriented small cars, and 
other novel products might lend new vigor to the automobile industry, 
these have never been major profit sources for Detroit and the indus"" 
try's current unwillingness or inability to shift toward them rein-
forces Rothschild's pessimistic views. While the point has not been 
*Lawrence J. White, The AutomobiZe Industry Since 1945 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 258 •. 
**Emma Rothschild, Paradise Lost (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 174. 
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definitely established, it is worth considering that the automobile 
era ilJdustry will not respond particularly,; well to an era of new, 
more pustere needs. 
The Accumulation of Negative Externalities and Social Costs Gener-
ated by the Automobile. A nationwide awareness of the costs automo-
biles impose on society has grown steadily over the past ten years. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the direct losses in damage to 
humans, cars, and other property from car accidents is colossal. More 
than 55,000 people are killed every year, while ten times as many are 
seriously injured. (One recent study suggested these costs add 
2.34 cents per mile to the cost of operating automobiles.)* But 
the external damages are equally high. Streets and parking facilities 
claim as much as half the land area of some cities (one-third is 
typical). Urban freeways have painfully displaced hundreds of thou-
sands of families. The public expense (both capital, maintenance, and 
policing) of roads in the San Francisco Bay Area (based on a 12% 
social discount rate) amq~nts to 2.7 cents per auto-mile.** Pollution 
and noise costs have become a national issue, leading the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to propose drastic reductions in car usage in 
metropolitan areas like Los Angeles and San Francisco. These costs 
have led many an~lysts to question whether auto diffusion and use 
would be so nearly universal if drivers were required to pay the full 
social cost of auto operation including congestion costs.*** If these 
costs were fully perceived and actually imposed, it is not clear that 
travel would display today's modal split characteristics. 
It seems likely, in fact, that urban areas would experience a modal 
shift toward public transportation--particularly if mass transit ser-
vice is delivered more effectively and efficiently in suburban corri-
dors. A significant modal shift in metropolitan areas could have 
important consequences for intercity travel. If auto ownership rates 
decline., bus and air traffic could increase due to the unavailability 
of personal transport. If the auto is changed dramatically to con-
serve fuel or reduce pollution, the resulting "urbanmobile" might be 
less t.han amenable for over-the-road travel purposes. 
*Ted Keeler, "On the Average Costs of Automobile Transportation in the 
San Francisco Bay Area" (Berkeley Economics Department, April 1974), 
p. 10. 
**Ibid~ p. 25. 
***For other studies of the social costs of autos, see John Jerome, The 
Death of the Automobile: The Fatal Effeat of the Golden E!'a~ 1955-
.1970 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972) and Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any 
Speed (New York: Grossman, 1965). 
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The Advent of an Era of Austerity and the Consequent Need To 
Shift Resources from Consumption to Capital Investment. Spokesmen for 
business, ranging from Business Week, Fortune, and the WaZZ Street 
JournaZ to Treasury Secretary Simon and Chase Manhattan board chair-
man, David Rockefeller, have been constantly declaiming that the U.S. 
currently faces a serious capital shortage. In a speech to the 
Detroit Economy Club, Rockefeller recently blamed part of the U.S.'s 
international competitive difficulties on the failure to plow suffi-
cient resources back into capital investment. Chase Manhattan studies 
suggest a shortfall of more than 30% in needed capital in the next 
decade. He and other business leaders have pinpointed two key 
places from which to find this capital: the sometimes extravagant 
affluence of the American standard of living and the growing scope of 
state expenditures, particularly welfare-oriented transfer payments. 
To the extent that national economic policy heeds these business warn-
ings and shifts expenditures from consumption to basic investment, the 
consequences for the car-oriented society are quite serious. The car 
is, as noted, a primary element in the affluent American life-style. 
Reducing its role and substituting more collective, less costly forms 
of travel (public mass transit) would reduce the amount spent in this 
area and free it for investment. In addition, highway expenditures 
currently run more than $24 billion, much of which is of dubious cost 
effectiveness. If one counts indirect social and public expenses., the 
figure is of course higher. Street and highway-related public ex-
penditures are thus a prime candidate for cutbacks in the public 
sector, and notwithstanding intense political pressures, the past two 
Presidents have impounded highway money as a result. National policies 
of this general sort seem destined to become more, rather than less, 
imperative in the future. 
The Shift in Control of World Oil Resources to OPEC Nations and the 
Consequent Rise in Oil Prices. Oil and gas costs make up roughly one-
eighth of the total cost and about one-quarter of the private costs 
of operating a car. They are, nevertheless, one of its most rapidly 
rising elements, owing to the near-revolutionary shift in power over 
the pricing and distribution of oil to the OPEC countries. While the 
general subject of the international politics of oil is perhaps more 
fraught with uncertainty and danger than any other subject considered 
here, it is probably safe to say that the U.S. will never return to 
an era of cheap oil and gas. If anything, the costs are likely to 
rise even more rapidly in the future. The only way the u.S. economy 
can react is to reduce energy consumption; toward this end, "automobile 
gas consumption is a prime target. While U.S. policy has not yet been 
authoritatively formulated (high gas taxes, rationing, and other 
alternatives are possible) any likely option will reduce car driving 
and encourage the substitution of smaller, more efficient cars and 
more energy-efficient modes. More than anything else, this will mean 
pUblic carriers will become more attractive as compared to large gas-
guzzling autos. 
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Rising Antagonism on Automobile Production Lines. While shop-floor 
militancy has risen in all production industries, it has been espe-
cially noticeable in the automobile business. Detroit's labor-
management relationships have been two-sided: generally smooth between 
the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the Big Three, and distinctly rocky 
on the factory floor. Abs'enteeism, sabotage, wildcat strikes, infor-
mal attempts to slow down the pace of production, foreman-worker 
an.tagonisms, violence, and radical organizing efforts are all rife in 
Detroit. A Detroit jury recently refused to convict a black line 
~orker who went home, got a rifle, and returned to the assembly line 
to shoot a foreman who the worker had claimed was harrassing him. The 
jury felt that conditions on the line were so intolerable that the 
worker was not responsible for his actions. In another incident, two 
black workers on a General Motors (GM) assembly line seized a control 
point and stopped production for several shifts. Their fellow 
workers strongly supported their demand that an alleged racist fore-
man be fired; though both GM and the UAW strongly deplored their 
actions, the foreman was indeed fired and the two remain in the GM 
workforce. 
To counteract such tendencies, GM has developed a special division to 
control production: the General Motors Assembly Division (GMAD). 
GMAD was responsible for organizing work at the Lordstown, Ohio, Vega 
plant. Lordstown was an experiment to see if a more rural setting, 
massive new production technologies, and a pool of young, white, 
small-town workers could be the answer to production difficulties in 
Detroit. The answer came during a now-famous walkout against GMAD's 
tactics at Lordstown. While perhaps not as highly politicized as 
Detroit's black workers, the Lordstown local of the UAW proved to be 
every bit as militant and stubborn. 
The implicit lesson seems to co~firm the findings of sociologists' 
studies of work in auto factories: the auto production line is one 
of the most alienating places to work in our society, and it breeds 
intense hostilities no matter what the particular ingredients are. 
While few really comparable statistics have been gathered, the 
severity and frequency of recent incidents seems to suggest this 
problem is getting worse, not better. The consequences for the 
auto-oriented society also seem fairly clear. Labor antagonisms 
will hinder efforts to raise productivity and make autos cheaper. 
Instead, these antagonisms may result in more poorly constructed, 
and hence ultimately more.icostly automobiles. They raise as well 
the issue of whether society wants to require as much of this un-
palatable and unfulfilling work as it presently does. 
The Shift in Federal Investments Away from New Highways Toward 
Urban Mass Transit. In response to some of the factors described 
above, and to political pressures as well, federal transportation 
policy is undergoing a gradual but steady transformation. Relatively 
less is being spent on new highway construction, relatively more on 
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maintenance, and new expenditure categor~cs for urban mass transit 
capital and operating expenses have been opened. While this latter 
category has not yet outweighed Trust Fund expenditures, if past 
trends continue, it may do so within the decade. Contested urban 
freeways, for example, may now be converted into mass transit funds, 
and on the order of $5 billion to $6 billion may thus be shifted. 
The rapidly rising costs of highway maintenance also suggest that few 
new highways (a key stimulus to additional car usage) will be built, 
for maintaining existing capital investments will impose an overriding 
demand on Trust Fund capabilities. 
The net result of this policy shift will also be to cut down the rate 
of growth of demand for cars and to make alternative modes, especially 
buses, more attractive. While this impact will be most clearly felt 
within metropolitan areas, if car ownership and usage begins to sub-
side, a secondary effect will also be felt on intercity transportation. 
Families without cars will look to buses, car rentals, and (for the 
more affluent) air travel. 
The End of the Love Affair with the Car 
The foregoing discussion examines difficulties either internal to the 
automobile production-distribution-consumption system or stemming 
from that system's location in a rapidly changing world economic en-
vironment. The system has also been sustained by a particularly 
American life-style--the love affair wit.:h. the car--and a particularly 
strong political coalit;ion. These two more or less external elements 
of the system and its social and political bases are also changing. 
While these changes are less susceptible to being operationalized and 
quantitized, in the end they are equally 'real in their impact on the 
auto-industrial complex. 
Urban freeway opponents, the ecology movement, and consumer mili-
tancy provide the most obvious examples of how the political basis 
for the car-oriented society has been eroded. Once faced with little 
or no opposition, the highway lobby now seems challenged from all 
sides. Particularly in the cities, where freeway construction 
damage, negative externalities, and fiscal costs of the car society 
have been concentrated, and where those least likely to own or use 
cars (the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped) are aZso most 
highly concentrated, the car is no longer king. 
In Boston, San Francisco, New York, and many other major cities, urban 
freeways have been halted and a massive clamor has arisen to shift 
freeway money to mass transit uses. (Hence, the federal policy 
change for which big city mayors and urban governors lobbied 
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vigorous1y.)* San Francisco's Mayor Alioto, for example, vowed that 
new freeway construction would take place over his dead body, and many 
other mayors would doubtless echo this sentiment, chambers of commerce 
notwithstanding. In suburban areas, ecology activists and opponents 
of suburban sprawl have been similarly effective in halting highways 
and promoting mass transit alternatives. 
This political development, which has been at least partly successful 
in challenging the dominance formerly enjoyed by the Federal Highway 
Administration and the state highway departments, has been mirrored by 
a shift in thinking among policy and academic elites. In fact, profes-
sional sentiment, antihighway political initiatives, a newly invigo~ 
rated mass transit lobby (the American Public Transit Association), 
and newly established urban mass transit bureaucracies are forging a 
new consensus in favor of mass transit capital investments. The San 
Francisco Bay Area has recently completed a commuter rail rapid tran-
sit system, another is under construction in Washington, D.C., and 
advanced planning has occurred in Atlanta and many other cities. The 
Urban Mass Transit Administration has spent roughly $1.35 billion 
over FY 1974, much of which has gone into bus systems. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in California, once the citadel of car culture, 
where Sid McCausland, Deputy Secretary of the Business and Transporta-
tion Agency, promised that the Brown Administration would attempt to 
"pry the king of the road out of his car." CALTRANS is undertaking an 
experiment on the Santa Monica Freeway (one of the busiest in the 
world) in which one lane will be used for commuter buses and access to 
the other lanes would be metered in such a way as to strongly dis-
courage usage. Whether or not CALTRANS can persist in this course, it 
is a lBO-degree turnabout from the days when the state's freeway 
system was originally constructed. These policy changes are backed by 
growing academic literature which suggests ways to limit auto usage 
and encourage the shift to mass transit.** 
Once again, though these policies have their main impact on intracity 
travel, to the extent that they are successful, they will have an in-
evitable secondary impact on intercity travel patterns. Cars designed 
to cope with urban requirements are not likely to be suitable for 
high-speed, long-distance travel. To the extent that car1ess life 
patterns become not only possible but widely desired (and this is the 
Brown Administration's avowed aim), the intercity implications are 
plain. 
*For a discussion of freeway fights see Alan Lupo et a1., Rites of Way 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1971), and Kenneth Geiser, PoLiticaL Processes 
of Urban Freeway Controversies (Cambridge: MIT Urban Systems Labora 
tory, 1970). 
**See, for example, John Kain, "How to Improve Urban Transportation at 
Practically No Cost," PubLic PoLicy~ Vol. XX, No.3, Summer 1972. 
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Another trend in social life reinforces this change in professional 
sentiment and political-bureaucratic practices. If the suburban way of 
life, with the demand for car travel implicit in it, has not yet per-
ished, it is certainly not expanding with anything like the vigor of the 
1950s and early 1960s. Birth rates and family formation rates have 
fallen, and young single people, particularly the kind of managers 
and professionals who would formerly have provided a principal source 
of suburbanites, have been showing a distinct tendency to locate in 
central cities. This may mean only that suburban families will get 
formed slightly later in the life cycle; but in the. aggregate, it also 
means less reliance on cars and car-oriented mobility (and likely more 
on air travel). Indeed, it may well be that much of the increase in 
air travel (particularly nonbusiness air travel) comes from exactly 
this source. 
Similarly, the auto is becoming a progressively less important status 
symbol and consumption item in America's great middle culture, at 
least in part because its defects, drawbacks, and costs are becoming 
pressingly apparent. Once more California seems to be pointing the 
way. In place of the highly sophisticated machines Tom Wolfe 
described as "Tangerine Flaked Streamlined Babies," the youth of 
California have turned to 1956 International Harvester vans capable 
of at most half the speed. Jeeps, trucks, VWs, and similarly sturdy 
and serviceable vehicles have become the byword. 
While it is hard to specify how these changes in popular sentiment 
and life-style will affect the use of cars and therefore the demand 
for different types of intercity travel, at the very least one impli-
cation emerges. If these trends become prevalent, the demand for new 
autos and large amounts of high-speed intercity auto travel will 
diminish. In its place with be either air travel, or more sedate 
travel organized in a public fashion (that is to say bus travel and 
individuals gathering together to ride in vans or similar v~hicles). 
In other words, a highway- and auto-centered transportation policy 
consensus has broken down in the last decade. So too has the polit-
ical coalition which backed it. In its place a new professional 
consensus, backed by a new lobby of transit systems, transport 
workers, and mass transit equipment manufacturers, and propelled by 
substantial political conflicts over highway policies, has emerged. 
In parallel, new life-styles which are much less dependent on the 
automobile have also emerged. For some, these life-styles are urban 
and middle class; for others they are compounded of many marginal 
elemertts. But in both cases they point to less reliance on "the 
auto generally and less use of it for intercity travel. 
Of course the auto-based suburban life-style remains predominant, and 
this fact adds an interesting twist to the demand for mobility. If 
the earlier discussion of the forces of breakdown internal to the 
automobile-industrial complex is correct, then the political pressure 
to keep the auto a viable ans~.,er will mount sharply over the next 
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few years. Systemic imperatives make the auto an increasingly harder 
answer to sustain; on the other hand, a whole life-style has been 
built upon it. It is a life-style which cannot be shrunk in scope 
and scale without great protest from those who have become accustomed 
to it. It is therefore likely that society will find some substitute 
for the auto which allows a smooth transition from an era of affluence 
and suburban expansion to an era of denser, more concentrated develop-
ment. The growth of suburban condominium developments with privately 
maintained bus links to work centers suggests how this may be ac-
complished. The very strength of the suburban dream may therefore add 
fuel to the search for a good substitute for the individually owned 
automobile. Some substitute is necessary, but it will need to be one 
that allows suburban life-styles to continue, if at an abated tempo. 
The Issues to be Faced 
Let us assume for the moment that the gist of the foregoing argument 
is correct. This is not an unreasonable conclusion to make, and it 
is one which even the presidents of the auto corporations now find 
themselves accepting. (Automotive News wrote that "The automobile 
industry is suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune to 
a greater degree today than at any time in its history.") What are 
the policy choice implications? 
The first is that some substitute to the car will need to be found. 
This substitute will have to have certain properties which make it 
less vulnerable than the auto-based mobility system, and yet make it 
an attractive choice to the auto-based system given the needs and 
political demand for travel outlined above. In particular, any rea-
sonable choice will have most or all of the following characteristics. 
1. They will not impose major new demands for social capital or 
unproductive government expenditures. 
2. They will not abandon highway capital investments, but 
probably use them in a slightly different way. 
3. 
5. 
6. 
They will conserve on energy costs and per-mile private costs 
ot operating the mode. 
They will reduce the social, pollution, and congestion costs 
now imposed by the automobile. 
They will tend to concentrate rather than further disperse 
metropolitan development. 
They will t-end to be organized collectively, and quite likely 
be financed publicly. 
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They will be shaped especially to serve: 
a. Low wage workers whose mobility has been impaired by 
the overall crisis, but whose mobility is essential, and 
b. Middle class commuters whose suburban life-style is both 
deeply ingrained and progressively less tenable. 
These characteristics follow directly from the previ.ous discussion. 
While they seem most clearly directed at intracity transportation 
needs (and this, indeed, is the locale in wltich most travel happens), 
they also apply to intercity transportation modes. Indeed, the more 
they apply to intracity travel behavior, the less likely that the car 
can remain as the principal intercity travel technology. 
A second implication is also clear from this list of criteria: radical 
new technologie& are ouL Our society cannot afford them given its 
current straits, and they face many of the other difficulties now 
plaguing the auto industry. They would not only waste existing 
capital investments, require large amounts of new funds, and carry high 
risks, but they seem destined not to provide the kind of car-substitute 
needed. 
Instead, something which fairly closely matches existing technology, 
but which does not have its drawbacks, seems the most likely and most 
wise alternative. For shorter-range trips, including intracity trips, 
bus or bus-like technologies (dial-a-van, rental cars, jitneys, etc.) 
and smaller, safer, and more efficient cars seem to provide the 
answer, while cheaper and less energy-consuming air travel technology 
responds to the need for longer-distance travel. This would make an 
intercity trip from one relatively car-free environment to another 
possible, and within each of these environments, a relatively high 
degree of mobility would prevail. 
This set of solutions avoids some key problems: it would not set high 
capital or government expenditure requirements, it would involve 
fewer damages to individuals and environments, and it would tend to 
concentrate development and reduce the flamboyance of everyday life-
styles without imposing severe hardships and generating intense con-
flict. It would also reduce energy costs, reduce the amount of 
vehicles which would be required (and probably reduce tension on the 
production line, if aircraft production lines offer any useful com-
parison to car production lines), and facilitate the policy and 
life-style shifts currently under way. For many it would even in-
crease the amount of mobility enjoyed, for the car has adversely 
affect~d the few, while it has increased mobility for the many. 
In summary, it appears that substantial changes in intercity travel 
patterns may well accrue from America's changed domestic and 
international economic and political position. These forces will 
require a decrease in auto-related individual consumption and lead to 
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the gradual but st~~ady substitution of more collective, less energy-
and cost-vulnerable technologies. While smaller and better cars may 
provide part. of the answers for urban travel, even they would face many 
of the problems sketched out above. The best kind of answer will not, 
in all probability, depart much from what we know, nor will it abandon 
existing infrastructural investments. As prosaic as tt seems, old 
and new versions of the bus, together with airplanes for long distance 
intercity travel, may well be the main beneficiaries of these 
developments. To the extent that the line of reasoning advanced above 
is found to be correct, they will also be the most appropriate modes 
in which to invest in technological advaJ:!.cement. 
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XIX. ELECTRIC HIGHWAY VEHICLES: A WAY TO SAVE OUR 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the operational, engineering, energy and resources, 
air pollution, safety, and economic aspects of electric road vehicles 
(EVs) and highway accommodations to permit comprehensive use of them. 
EVs are now restricted to special applications by the power, energy, 
and charging-rate limitations of portable batteries, and by highway 
systems that exclude energizing facilities en route. 
With highway accommodations, portable energy limitation can be readily 
circumvented. Freeway electrification would provide ideal complementary 
power en route. 
With 80% of u.S. road travel in EVs, U.S. petroleum needs would be cut 
32%, and tctal energy needs about 10%. Air pollution would be reduced 
50% nationwide, alld 90% in places like Los Angeles. Energy-saving EV 
weight reductions would not compromise passenger safety, as inexpensive 
EV electronics would prevent vehicle crashes. 
Owner-driven electric cars would offer an attractive, low-cost alterna-
tive to gasoline engine autos. Electric buses can combine neighborhood 
stops with rapid travel on electrified routes, without downtime for 
recharging portable energy, and would not need depots or depot parking 
lots. 
Long, high-speed parts of a trip would be traveled on electrified free-
ways. A pair of electrified strips installed on the surface of selected 
freeways would furnish power to EVs through rolling/sliding contact, at 
speeds of up to 70 to 80 miles per hour. 
EVs would automatically switch to portable power while traveling over 
disconnected sections, maintain alignment, and return to external power 
upon reaching normal electrified strips. 
Contact wheels with wedge-shaped rims that fit into grooved electrified 
strips appear to be a good means to make contact with external power. 
Working synergistically with the driver, machine-language road marking, 
other vehicle electronics, and stationary signaling equipment, elec-
tronics on EVs can facilitate in-transit energizing, control electric 
motors with regenerative drive, follow road instructions, automatically 
avoid collisions, and alert the vehicle's operator (or other appropriate 
drivers) to errors which might cause collisions. 
Optoelectronic reading could be performed by a photodetector under the 
EV. Highway instructions, lane identification, and other information 
could be encoded by a series of stripes across the road surface, ortho-
gonal to the centerline. Wrong-way driving could be prevented, legal 
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cruising speed could be encoded on the road surface at periodic spacing, 
freeway exits and interchanges could be identified for photo detector 
reading, etc. 
Collision avoidance e1e~tronics would be most effective on EVs traveling 
on electrified lanes, where segregation from unequipped vehicles would 
permit economical devices, without the need to install reciprocal devices 
on existing vehicles. 
Conversion to 80% EV road transportation would require that U.S. electri-
cal energy output be increased less than 15% over a reasonable imple-
mentation period. 
Energy needed to generate electricity for EVs, with weight and driving 
conditions equivalent to contemporary engine vehicles, is about 40% 
less than in the petroleum currently expanded to produce gasoline for 
such vehicles. 
A net reduction of 75 million tons of pollutants per year would result 
from replacing 80% of our fuel burning vehicles, plus the improvement 
occurring at the refineries which furnish gasoline. 
Maintenance and depreciation costs would be less than those of fuel-
burning vehicles. 
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XXI. ELECTRIC HIGHWAY VEHICLES: A WAY TO SAVE OUR 
MOBILITY, AIR, ENERGY, AND FORTUNES 
Richard B. Fradella* 
We recognize the importance of flexible, portal-to-portal, comprehensive 
road transportation, the freedom of personal mobility it allows and the 
inherent energy, pollution, and safety problems that plague fuel-burning 
vehicles. 
More than 100 million autos, plus over 20 million trucks and buses, are 
dependent on 40% of the petroleum (17% of the total energy) used in the 
U.S. each year. (Known U.S. oil deposits, plus anticipated discoveries, 
may be virtually depleted in 20 to 30 years. It is likely that petroleum 
fuel will be practically unavailable for most autos long before that, due 
to higher priority for agriculture, military, aircraft, petrochemicals, 
etc.) 
Road vehicles cause 60% of air polluting emissions nationwide, and 90% 
in places like Los Angeles. Highway collisions and crashes claim 
50,000 lives and injure millions in the U.S. each year. 
A means of alleviating the above problems would be to equip our highways 
to accommodate electric road vehicles (EVs) that provide even better 
portal-to-portal and personal mobility, at lower cost than fuel-burning 
vehicles and without their negative consequences. This paper analyzes 
the operational, engineering, energy and resources, air pollution, 
safety, and economic aspects of this option. 
EVa and the Cooperative Systems Concept 
EVs are now restricted to special applications by the power, energy, and 
charging-rate limitations of portable batteries, and by highway systems 
that exclude energizing facilities en route. 
Nobody is sure that practical portable energy devices, without comple-
mentary power en route, can ever provide the means for EVs to achieve 
the broad usefulness that inspired the phenomenal market success of the 
auto. However, with practical and profitable highway accommodations, 
portable energy limitations can be readily circumvented. Freeway 
electrification would provide ideal complementary power en route for an 
optimum overall road transportation system. The resultant combination 
*Richard B. Fradella is a circuit and systems design consultant located 
in San Juan Capistrano, California. While not a member of the study 
team, he contributed this paper for inclusion in the study reports in 
order that the point of view and arguments it contains would receive 
due attention. Mr. Fradella has degrees in electrical engineering from 
the University of California and the California Institute of Technology. 
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of portable energy and in-transit energizing would be practical and 
broadly effective. 
EVs might then be used for 80% of our personal, public, and cargo trans-
portation. They would be especially effective where vehicular traffic 
is heavy, and able to reach destinations in less time. than existing road 
vehicles, at lower cost • 
. With 80% e1.ectric road travel, U.S. petroleum needs would be cut 32%, 
and total energy needs about 10%. Air pollution would be reduced 50% 
nationwide, and 90% in places like Los Angeles. Energy-saving weight 
reductions would not compromise passenger safety, with inexpensive EV 
electronics to prevent vehicle collisions and crashes. 
Accommodating EVs on our highways would not inconvenience owners of 
existing road vehicles or add tax burdens. Indeed, owner-driven and 
commercial EVs would soon become a substantial source of tax revenues. 
With machine-language road marking, on-vehicle electronics can inexpen-
sively control EV motors without need for interface hardware to improve 
safety and increase capacity on our highways by facilitating safe high-
speed travel with close vehicle spacing. 
'These electric cars, buses, and trucks would share electrified freeways 
and existing city streets, garages, and parking lots, compatibly with 
existing road vehicles. 
Owner-driven electric cars would offer an attractive, low cost alterna-
tive to gasoline engine autos. Electric buses can combine neighborhood 
stops with rapid travel on electrified routes, without downtime for 
recharging portable energy, and would not need depots or depot parking 
lo·ts. Electric trucks can be driven inside buildings, for easy and 
secure indoor loading, and regenerative braking can handle long, steep 
grac:les without brake burnout hazard. 
EVs--Somewhat Different, but More Useful 
For short off-freeway trips, average speeds of 20 to 30 miles per hour 
(mph) with modest acceleration are acceptable to many drivers. Portable 
lead-acid batteries can provide enough power for this, at low cost. 
Nickel-cadmium batteries offer about double the speed and acceleration 
capability. Their higher price becomes more affordable with the small 
portable battery capacity needed to complement in-transit energizing. 
Long, high-speed parts of a trip would be traveled on electrified free-
ways. A pair of electrified strips, installed on the surface of selected 
freeways, would furnish power to EVs through rolling/sliding contact 
during medium or long trips at speeds up to 70 or 80 mph. (See Figul::e 
XIX-l.) Storage batteries, recharged at home, at charging stations, or 
while traveling on electrified routes, would permit 50-mile excursions 
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(at 25 mph with lead-acid batteries, 40 mph with nickel-cadmium) from 
these facilities. 
A typical 50-mile trip--IO miles on city streets and 40 miles on electri-
fied freeway--would thus take an EV with nickel-cadmium batteries 45 
minutes; an EV with lead-acid batteries 54 Ininutes; an auto, traveling 
40 mph on city streets and restricted to 55 mph on the freeway, 58 
minutes. 
EVs would enter and exit freeways conventionally, using portable power. 
When in acquisition range of the electrified strips, on dtiver command, 
EVs would automatically acquire and maintain alignment, wi.th optoelectric 
servo-assisted steering. When aligned, EVs would extend a pair of 
rolling/sliding contacts to ride on the electrified strips. When not 
aligned within tolerance, contacts would automatically be retracted. 
Electronics would facilitate safe, rapid travel, and prevent EV colli-
sions by complementing the driver's perception apd responses with prompt 
and unflagging sensor, computer, warning, and control assistance. 
Although instrument control would be subordinate to prompt and easy 
manual override, an audible signal could inform the driver when he over-
rides, warning him of a possible driving error. 
Electric Motors for Propulsion and Regenerative Braking 
DC motors, converting energy from electrical to mechanical (and vice 
versa) at 80% to 90% efficiency over a broad speed range would furnish 
propulsion ar.d braking thrust. When braking, about 80% of EV kinetic 
and potential energy would be recovered--tlot dissipated as heat by 
friction brakes. EVs would even have inherent skid protection, since 
regenerative electric braking cannot grab. 
Regenerative drive can accommodate high acceleration and stop-and-go 
traffic, and travel over hilly roads with practically no increase in 
energy consumption per mile driven. Indeed, the low average speeds 
which typify difficult driving would probably require less energy per 
mile than nonstop, high-speed freeway trips, where air drag consumes 
most of the propulsion power. Also, unlike idling internal combustion 
engines, electric motors do not consume power during momentary stops. 
On early models, a DC motor (with conventional carbon-brush commutator) 
could be connected to the wheels by speed-reducing differential gears. 
Brushless transistor conmlUtation may add up to 30% onto the first cost 
of the combined motor and its controller, but lifetime cost would be 
comparable, with no periodic maintenance. Later, motors might even be 
built into the wheels. Higher unsprung mass of motorized wheels and 
lower power-to-mass ratio at their relatively low speed are obstacles 
to this mechanization; but absence of gears, chains, belts, or mechanical 
drive linkages and low commutation rates are promising advantages. 
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Air Drag, Rolling Friction, and Power 
Comparison data between auto and aircraft aerodynamic drag coefficients 
indicate that streamlined vehicle bodies could have air drag well undl~r 
half that oftoday's typical auto. Contrary to their present image, 
EVs are particularly suited to streamlined body design: relatively low 
heat generation does not require as much convective air circulation, as 
is needed to remove heat from fuel-buring engines; undersides can be 
aerodynamically smooth, with no accumulation of toxic or explosive fumes, 
fuel, fluid, or oil to prevent a practical bottom inclosure. With 
existing body designs, air drag should be about 50 pounds at 60 mph for 
a personal-size EV, requiring about 6.0 kilowatts for propulsion. 
Future streamlining may reduce this to about 3 kilowatts. 
Rolling friction is proportional to vehicle weight and inverse to wheel 
diameter, inflation pressure of pneumatic tires, and road hardness and 
smoothness. Good, steel-belted radial tires have about 30 pounds rolling 
friction total, for a 2,000-pound car on smooth, hard roads; this requires 
3.6 kilowatts to maintain a 60 mph speed. Future weight reduction, tire 
optimization, etc., may reduce this to 2 kilowatts. 
Other power required at 60 mph is: 1.0 kilowatts for 10% motor loss; 
0.5 kilowatts for 5% motor controller loss; 0.1 kilowatts for all other 
electronics; and an average 0.5 kilowatts for passenger temperature con-
trol, lights, and miscellaneous occasional needs. Total electric power 
is about 11.7 kilowatts at 60 mph. On future improved EVs, power needs 
at 60 mph may be reduced to 6 kilowatts. (See Figure XIX-2.) 
At 25 mph, air drag takes 0.5 kilowatts, rolling friction 1.4 kilowatts, 
motor loss 0.2 kilowatts, controller loss 0.2 kilowatts, and all other 
power requirements under 0.1 kilowatts. (Temperature control and lights 
are not used for typical short daylight trips.) Total power at 25 mph 
is then 2.4 kilowatts, normally from portable batteries. 
Portable Power on Vehicles 
The equivalent of 10 lead-acid batteries, weighing about 500 pounds 
total, would provide 2,500 watts for a 2.5-hour excursion, from home or 
other charging facilities or from electrified freeways. This 6,250 watt-
hour portable supply, converted to motor output at 85% overall efficiency, 
would permit an excursion range of 70 miles at 29 mph or ·65 miles at 
25 mph, for a 2,000-pound EVon good roads with no net climb. Or it 
could power a 5,500-foot climb at about 1 mph, up a 30° grade, covering 
2.1 road miles. Ten batteries could also furnish 40 kilowatts (for 
about 30 seconds). This power burst can accelerate a 2,OOO-pound EV 
to 60 mph from standstill in 15 seconds. (See Figure XIX-3.) 
The slow charging and light use afforded by in-transit energizing should 
result in a typical battery life of three to five years, with 75% charge 
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Figure XIX-2. POWER NEEDS VS SPEED OF EXISTING 
DESIGNS AND IMPROVED ELECTRONICS 
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Figure XIX-3. ACCELERATION FROM STANDSTILL OF 2,OOO-POUND EV POWERED 
BY 10 LEAD-ACID BATTERIES (Rated minimum 40 kilowatts for 30 seconds) 
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retention per month of storage, and 70% overall charger-battery effi-
ciency in daily use. 
Of course, portable energy devices with higher power and energy density 
would improve EV performance off electrified freeways. Lead-acid bat-
teries are the most economical devices now available. Nickel-cadmium 
provides about double the power, and costs about triple for equivalent 
energy capacity. As other devices become available, they can be used 
as replacements or complements. 
Solar cells on cars, with a 4-square-meter-area facing, 1 kilowatt per 
square meter solar intensity, can provide about 500 watts for several 
hours daily. This is not enough to sustain typical cruising speed but 
is ideal to charge batteries and permit unlimited travel on roads not 
equipped to furnish external line power. 
In-transit energizing would be a good complement to existing portable 
energy storage devices, as well as possible new developments. It affords 
a practical way to circumvent their limitations, allows lower curb weight 
to save energy off as well as on freeways, and minimizes any portable 
energy device crash hazard. 
Power from Electrified Freeways 
In-transit 'energizing would permit driving virtually unlimited distances 
at high speed over electrified routes without time out to recharge 
portable energy. Power from a pair of parallel electrified strips, 
about 1 meter apart, on one freeway lane (until the number of EVs in use 
warrants more lanes), would supply about 15 kilowatt per car (more for 
larger vehicles) for propulsion, battery charging, and incidentals at 
speed of up to 80 mph. The left (fast) lanes could be equipped first, 
with adjacent lanes electrified as required. 
Low-voltage DC (less than +100 and -100 volts to ground) would suit tran-
sistor electronics; be compatible with batteries, electrically coupled 
flywheels, and solar cells; minimize insulation and shock hazard; and 
facilitate efficient regenerative power control with practical motor 
controllers. 
The electrified conducting strips, in half-mile typical length-segments, 
could be installed on existing road surfaces with adhesive bo~ding 
material. Each segment would be electrically insulated from adjoining 
ones, so a shorted or overloaded section can be disconnected by automatic 
circuit breakers from normal electrified ones. Breakers could self-reset 
when the overload is corrected or might be reset by remote control. 
Segments would be connected at both ends to subsurface, lateral feeder 
lines, which furnish DC power and strip continuity through the circuit 
breakers, located in service vaults on freeway medians. Typically, each 
XIX-14 
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vault would house voltage step-down power transformers, rectifiers, the 
breakers, fault signaling equipment, and switchgear. 
Power to the vaults can be purchased from an electric utility serving 
that region, transmitted to the vaults via high-voltage lines, and 
metered at the vaults. 
Electrical continuity (through two series breakers) would allow DC power 
exchange between adjoining sections--also to adjacent sections across 
the freeway divider--so power could be efficiently exchanged between EVs 
for several miles along the freeway, traveling in both directions. On 
long, steep grades, downhill traffic would supply power to uphill 
traffic. 
EVs would automatically switch to portable power while traveling over 
disconnected sections, maintain alignment, and return to external power 
upon reaching normal electrified strips. 
With 5.5 square inch cross-sectional area, half-mile long copper strips, 
power loss in the strips will never exceed 10% of that delivered. This 
is based on 200 volts line-to-line, 75 amperes per vehicle, at 50 feet 
minimum spacing. 
There are significant differences between this low-voltage electrifi-
cation (which would supply a somewhat constant, distributed load) and 
the 25,000 volts commonly used for locomotives (which must supply great 
power at infrequent intervals to a concentrated load). The conductivity 
of electrified strips for EVs is a more important requirement, due to 
their high current. However, ease of insulating them and the relative 
safety of their low voltage permits surface strips that do not need 
supporting structures, do not compromise aesthetics, and do facilitate 
a convenient method to electrically c,mnect and disconnect a continuous 
progression of EVs. Appropriate desi~n and maintenance should provide 
the requisite high-contact area, ste~dy pressure, and high surface con-
ductivity needed for low contact resistance without sparking and pitting, 
despite exposure of the copper s!lrfaces to moisture, salt spray, and 
corrosives. 
Contact wheels with wedge-shaped rims that fit into grooved electrified 
strips with their other surfaces electrically insulated appear to be a 
good means to make contact with external power. This design should result 
in minimal abrasive wear of both contact surfaces, low friction drag, and 
quiet operation. (See Figure XIX-4.) 
Electronics on Vehicles 
Working synergistically with the driver, machine-language road marking, 
other vehicle electronics, and stationary signaling equipment, electronics 
on EVs can facilitate in-transit energizing, control electric motors with 
regenerative drive, follow road instructions, automatically avoid 
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collisions, and alert the vehicle's operator (or other appropriate 
drivers) to prevent errors which might otherwise cause collisions. 
Failure of any electronic circuit would not cause loss of vehicle con-
tr;)1. All electronics would have mechanical or fail-safe electrical 
backup with manual control. Automatic controls would assist the driver, 
not replace him. 
Complex functions can be performed inexpensively and reliably with multi-
element chip integrated transistor circuits, handling low power (less 
than 1- watt) at low frequencies (below 1 megahertz). All EV electronics·· 
can be implemented with off-the-shelf components, though special-purpose 
parts would reduce costs significantly in production quantities. They 
include custom integrated circuits and high-current transistor switches. 
Battery charging would be controlled by an adaptive duty cycle (ON/OFF 
time ratio) circuit switched at 10 to 100 kilohertz. 
The motor controller would provide smoothly variable power to (and from) 
the motor for forward and reverse drive, with regenerative braking, by 
similar duty cycle control. 
An optoelectronic servo would acquire and hold alignment to the electri-
fied strips on freeways. The surface between the strips could be coated 
white, to provide a continuous stripe, about 30 inches wide, with com-
paratively high reflectance against a dark background surface. Two 
photudetectors at each side of the vehicle would sense road position 
relative to this stripe. Illumination of the road under the detectors 
could be modulated by a light source flashing at about 100 kilohertz. 
Synchronous demodulation of the detector signals would sense comparative 
reflectance and reject false indications due to shadows, stray light, 
etc. The acquisition range for this self-steering servo would be the 
width of the stripe: about 30 inches on each side of center. The two 
detectors at each side would provide an error signal for servo steering 
and automatic deployment of the vehicle's rolling/sliding contacts. 
Turning rate could conveniently be proportional to vehicle speed, so a 
constant ratio between steering loop time-lags is maintained over a wide 
speed range. This should contribute to optimum servo stability and 
dynamic response. Servo steering angle and turn rate can be liml-ted to 
accommodate only freeway curves. This insures that signal loss or servo 
malfunction would result only in the vehicle drifting from center; a 
condition safely and easily handled by the driver resuming manual 
steering control, or by simple override action. 
Servo steering could be deactivated when the driver exerts a manual 
steering wheel torque above a preset value, in either direction. The 
servo would not affect manual steering and would remain inactive until 
instrument tracking is again activated. 
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Road Marks for Literate Vehicles 
Optoelectronic reading could be performed by a photodetector under the 
EV, with the road surface illuminated by a synchronous flasher--identical 
to those used for servo steering. Highway instructions! lane identifi-
cation, and other information could be encoded by a series of stripes 
across the road surface. orthogonal to the centerline. This "sign 
reading," combined with memory, logic, audio connnunication with the 
driver, ultrasonic transmitters and receivers, and linked to the motor 
controller, provides unambiguous collision avoidance, driving convenience, 
and even presents further opportunities to save enrgy, by permitting 
lighter vehicles without compromi,sing safety. 
"Wrong way" driving could be prevented. When this warning appears under 
the vehicle, optoelectronics would detect it, alert the driver, and 
brake the EV's forward motion, so it would not proceed into oncoming 
traffic. Normal operation might be restored by driving backward over 
the warning. 
Legal cruising speed could be encoded on the road surface, at periodic 
spacing. It would be read and held in memory for cruise control, and 
automatically updated by subsequent readings. In the absence of manual 
override or collision avoidance priority, cruising speed would conform 
to road instructions without need for driver attention. 
Freeway exits and interchanges could be identified for photodetector 
reading, so the driver would be reminded when approaching a preselected 
one. Traffic at intersections might be more safely controlled by redun-
dant ultrasonic signals, operating simultaneously with conventional 
signal lights, aided by road markings at "decelerate" and "stop" posi-
tions. Optoelectronics could furnish lane identification, position 
relative to the center of the lane, and reference position along the 
length of the freeway for collision avoidance electronics with one-way 
signaling. 
Lest it be assumed that electronic driving aids could just as easily be 
added to heat engine vehicles and ought not embellish the fundamental 
concept of battery electric vehicles with in-transit energizing, the 
following specifics should be noted which illustrate the relevance of 
each feature to the total system concept. 
Self-steering maintains precision alignment for practical in-transit 
energizing. Its safety and convenience aspects are attractive secondary 
benefits. 
Adding error/collision avoidance to EV motor control requires little 
more than "plugging in" these devices to the motor controller. Con-
versely, the electromechanical actuators, mechanical linkages, and 
additional electronics and sensors needed to automatically control a 
fuel-burning engine and friction brakes would cost at least as much as 
the basic collision avoidance electronics described here. Because 
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electronics can prevent most collisions, important secondary benefits 
can be achieved (greater acceleration, speed, and range on battery power, 
plus reduced energy consumption) by cutting EV weight without sacrificing 
safety. Furthermore, collision avoidance electronics would be more effec-
ti"l,Te on EVs travelin.g on electrified lanes, where segregation from 
unequipped vehicles would permit economical devices, without the need to 
install reciprocal devices on existing vehicles. 
Collision Avoidance Electronics 
A priority signal to the motor controller of one EV following another, 
based on their speed, closing rate, and spacing, can avoid rear-end 
collisions by maintaining spacing that is never less than worst-case 
deceleration distance required to stop the rear EV. 
As existing vehicles are replaced by new ones with collision avoidance 
electronics, more than one lane on most freeways could be used by 
vehicles equipped with it. Then, lane recognition would be essential 
to avoid false alarms from vehicles in adjacent lanes and dependably 
receive signals from vehicles in the same lane (even when not aligned). 
This can be accomplished with transmitters on vehicles which radiate a 
different frequency for each lane of a multi-lane freeway, in accordance 
with optoelectronic lane identification from machine-language road 
marking. One transmitter and receiver would face forward. A second set 
would face to the rear. A third and fourth set might face left and 
right, to alert a driver if he attempts to move into a lane occupied by 
a vehicle directly alongside. Forward receivers would be tuned to rear 
transmitter frequencies, rear to forward, left to right, and right to 
left. 
Distance measurement to the vehicle ahead in the same lane (which may 
be requir~d without benefit of lane marking) could be provided by rear 
transmitter signal modulation, in response to periodic pulse transmission 
from the following vehicle. This would provide range data by two-way 
signal propagation delay. 
Relative speed from Doppler frequency shift would be integrated to p~o­
vide continuous ranging data, so distance reckoning intervals can be 
several seconds (or even longer) since the intervals need only establish 
a reference position (i.e., the initial integrator setting and integrated 
error correction) for the Doppler shift integrator, which would receive 
continuous data. 
One-way rear transmitter signals from vehicles ahead in adjacent lanes 
would permit monitoring their positions, too. This feature would facili-
tate safe, effective, and smooth lane mergers by automatically providing 
safe spacing to the merging vehicle, with predictable "courtesy" and math-
ematical precision. And, drivers would be automatically warned within 
milliseconds, if they attempted an unsafe lane change. The nearest 
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endangered vehicle's forward transmitter would serve as an electronic 
horn, alerting only the erring driver, without disturbing others. 
One-way signal monitoring would require machine-language road marking 
of freeway lanes at, say, one-mile intervals, to establish relative 
position along the length of the route. Wheel rotation data would pro-
vide continuous position data for transmission by pu1se-code-modu1ation 
(PCM) synchronized to possible "echoes" from a following vehicle's trans-
mitter. Relative speed would be continuously available from Doppler 
shift and PCM reference transmitted at intervals of several seconds. 
Vehicles further than a half-mile ahead would be out of collision and 
signal range, so position reference coding can be repeated, say, every 
two miles. 
Lack of lane identification on remote roads or city streets should not 
be troublesome, as less-traveled roads probably have only one lane of 
traffic in each direction, and on crowded city streets, ordinarily close 
spacing would minimize false alarms between vehicles in adjacent lanes. 
Nevertheless, the motor control function of the collision avoidance 
electronics should be inactive with only driver alert signals provided 
where lane identification is not available. An occasional false alert 
is a nuisance, but braking in response to ambiguous data introduces 
unnecessary hazards that are best avoided. 
Ultrasonics appears to have substantial cost and reliability advantages 
over microwave. Wavelength is about a millionth that of electromagnetic 
of the same frequency, so equivalent directivity could be achieved with 
smaller transmitters and receivers, operating with relatively low fre-
quency (below 1 megahertz) circuits. Percentage Doppler shift is almost 
a million times greater than electromagnetic, so relative vehicle speeds 
could be easily detected by one-way signaling. (With an ultrasonic fre-
quency tolerance of 0.1%, closing rate can be measured to an accuracy of 
0.7 mph.) Acoustic wave propagation velocity would add less than 10% to 
the safe following distance at 70 mph, 5% at 35 mph, etc. 
With active transponder "echo" ranging and one-way signaling, vehicles 
could radiate low signal power and yet have high signal strength at 
receivers. 
The expected cost to include this collision avoidance feature on each 
EV is less than $200. 
Other Possible Improvements 
Electric window operators, thermal insulation, and sun-screening windows 
are more important to these EVs than to present fuel-burning vehicles. 
Closed windows will probably be necessary for low air drag at high 
speed. And power needs for air conditioning must be minimized, especiall
y 
when powered by portable batteries. 
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With windows closed on freeways, passenger air could bE~ effectively 
filtered at negligible cost. It is also important (and very practical 
on EVs) to filter air circulated to the electric motors, batteries, and 
electronics. 
Friction brakes would not be used for dynamic braking, except as a 
failure contingency. So, electrically actuated friction brakes, which 
hold when de-energized and release when energizeo., could replace the 
cable connection and "parking gear" on EVs for fail-safe braking that 
is easily interlocked with other operator controls. 
Brake actuator circuits could be ganged to the main power switch and 
brake pedal, so the friction brakes would be engaged by turning the main 
switch off or forcibly flooring the brake pedal for a "panic" stop. 
These interlocks would end problems like engaging the "parking gear" 
with the vehicle in motion and forgetting to set or release the cable. 
Consistent preset brake pressure with electric actuators would hold EVs 
reliably, without depending on the operator to apply correct cable ten-
sion. Friction brake linings, used only for holding, should be virtually 
free of wear and resulting wear products (e.g., asbestos dust). 
Energy Conservation and a Shift to Alternate Sources 
Conversion to 80% electric road transportation would require that U.S. 
electric energy output be increased less than 15% over a reasonable 
implementation period (two to five years for orderly planning, develop-
ment, demonstration, and tooling for EV production, plus about ten years 
for an equitable transition, with existing fuel-burning vehicles retired 
only after they have provided a normal service life, as determined by 
their owners). 
By shifting our source for 80% of U.S. road vehicle energy from oil to 
other options, petroleum use in the U.S. would be cut 32%. 
Energy needed to generate electricity for EVs, with weight and driving 
conditions equivalent to contemporary gasoline engine vehicles, is about 
40% less than in the petroleum needed for gasoline. Design refinements 
will surely reduce future EV power needs, perhaps by 50%. Electronics 
would help to accomplish this. With safety emphasis shifted from heavy 
crash survivable vehicle bodies to practically weightless collision 
avoidance electronics, lighter EV weight would reduce rolling friction 
and other forces that consume energy. In-transit energizing would also 
help, by reducing the weight of its portable energy about 80%'. Even 
before design refinements, EVs would enable a 6% reduction of total 
U.S. energy needs. Future improved EVs would probably save 10% to 12%. 
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Air Pollution 
A comparison of present tailpipe and smokestack emissions in the U.S. 
with that for a hypothetical replacement of 80% of road vehicle-miles 
by EVs allows the following. 
About 120 million road-vehicle tailpipes now spew 90 million tons of 
pollutants per year into the air over the U.S., gasoline refineries 
another 4 million, electric generating plants (50% coal burning) add 
f 
15 million, and manufacturing, heating, waste disposal, etc., bring the 
total to about 145 million tons. 
To meet the energy needs of 100 million EVs, each traveling an average 
of 10,000 miles per year (i.e., 80% of U.S. road vehicle-miles), with 
15% additional electric power generated by burning coal at present 
emission rates, total pollution from electric generating plants would 
increase less than 4 million tons per year. This is certainly a worst 
case assumption. 
Straightforward arithmetic shows that a net reduction of 75 million tons 
of pollutants per year would result from replacing 80% of our fue1-
burning vehicles, plus the refineries which furnish gasoline, with EVs 
powered by coal-burning generating plants. This would cut air pollution 
over the entire U.S. by about half. Of course, nonpolluting electric 
power plants that may be on-line in the future, as well as reduced 
pollution from other sources, would enable further improvements. And 
reducing pollution from gasoline delivery trucks, fuel and oil vapors, 
and asbestos dust from friction brakes will also help. 
With dirty electric power plants sited outside population centers and 
EVs used inside them, conversion to EVs could cut air pollution about 
90% over cities like Los Angeles. 
Auto accidents claim about 50,000 lives each year in the U.S. plus 
millions injured and a financial loss estimated at $16 billion. 
Electronics could prevent most types of serious accidents (e,.g., rear-
end collisions, head-on with "wrong-way" vehicle, side swipe, loss of 
control due to excessive speed, etc.). 
With portable energy needs minimized by theavailab:i.lity of in-transit 
energizing, any possible crash danger from ·these devices is also m1n1-
mized. Fi,re danger would be virtually eliminated, as EVs do not need 
to carry flammable or explosive fuel. 
Electrocution, by contact with EV power or electrified strips on £):ee-
ways, is highly improbable. The number of deaths by auto accident now 
are about 50 times the total number of all electrocutions throughout 
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the U.S., and chance of contact with electrified conductors at comparable 
voltage would appear to be much higher at home or at work than inside 
electric vehicles, or outside them on electrified freeways. 
Better Mobility for Less 
When costs for all electrical and electronic hardware in EVs are compared 
to gasoline or diesel vehicle costs, it is apparent that in .production 
quantities EVs sou1d cost somewhat less. 
Maintenance and depreciation costs would certainly be less than for fue1-
burning vehicles. A battery replacement expense of about $60 per year 
for personal cars with in-transit energizing, air filters, and bearing 
lubrication should cost much less than the cost of auto tune-ups, brake 
relines, oil changes, coolants, oil filters, air filters, fuel filters, 
pollution reduction equipment, etc. EVs, operating without the combined 
heat, fluids, unfiltered cooling air, and grime of internal combustion 
engines should last much longer with correspondingly lower depreciation. 
At a price of 7.5¢ per kilowatt-hour (about double most residential rates) 
for in-transit electricity with 12 kilowatts needed to travel 60 mph, 
energy would cost 1.5¢ per mile .. At 60¢ per gallon, fuel for a comparable 
size gasoline engine car which can travel 20 miles per gallon, costs 3¢ 
per mile. 
New Markets, New Business Opportunities 
The potential U.S. market for versatile high performance EVs is about 
ten million vehicles per year, with annual sales of about $50 billion. 
There may also be a comparable export market. 
Electric power sales would increase about $2 billion per year to supply 
electrified freeways, plus $1 billion per year to stationary charging 
facilities, including residential. 
Lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, and perhaps other storage batteries installed 
in ten million new EVs per year would translate to retail sales of 
$2 billion to $5 billion. Replacement battery sales would climb with 
the number of EVs on the road and could pass $5 billion yearly, with 
100 million EVs in service. 
Electrically coupled flywheels, which don't need periodic maintenance 
or replacement, l:night become an attractive portable energy storage device 
for EVs, with over $5 billion annual sales. 
Electrical equipment, electronics, and semiconductor manufacturers would 
share increased annual sales of at least $15 billion. This. includes 
$5 billion for 20-ki10watt motors, at $500 each; $2 billion to $4 billion 
dollars for solid-state motor controllers; $2 billion for steering servos 
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and rolling contacts; $1 billion for collision avoidance electronics; 
$2 billion for battery chargers, meters, switches, small electric motors, 
etc., on EVs; $2 billion for electrified freeway and charging station 
equipment (power transformers, rectifiers, switchgear, etc.); and perhaps 
a few billion dollars for solar cells on EVs and solar generators along-
side remote electrified routes. 
To install one electrified lane on all 40,000 miles of U.S. Interstate 
highways within ten years would require 500,000 tons of copper each 
year. And, if ten million EVs are manufacturered each year, needing 
about 50 pounds more copper than a fuel-burning vehicle, EVs would need 
an additional 250,000 tons each year. These additional copper require-
ments would increase U. S. copper sales 45%, a jump of more than $1 bil-
lion per year. 
Revenues for in-transit electricity could reach $15 billion per year. 
When priced so user cost is only half that for gasoline, return on 
investment for route electrification would be about 30% per annum (before 
taxes) if 25% of full capacity is sold. Lower prices or higher investor 
profits would accompany increased use (i.e., higher sales). 
This investment prediction warrants a brief financial analysis. Esti-
mated material, equipment, and installation costs for freeway electrifi-
cation are: 
Copper strips, pair 
(224,000 lb/mi @ 75¢/lb) 
Transformers, rectifiers, switch-
gear, breakers, etc. 
Electrical insulation, adhesive 
Two vaults, lateral feeders, misc. 
Labor and/or machinery expense 
Estimated total electrifica-
tion cost per lane-mile 
$170,000 
100,000 
50,000 
80,000 
100,000 
$500,000 
Estimated annual operating expenses per lane-mile, to supply 25% of 
capacity; 
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Depreciation on $330,000 installa-
tion (copper not depreciated) 
Energy @ l¢/kwh + losses @ 25% 
capacity) 
Overhead, maintenance 
Revenue collection expense, misc. 
Estimated total annual operating 
expenses per lane-mile 
$ 16,500' 
42,000 
50,000 
3,000 
$111,500 
Gross income for in-transit electricity, at 7.5¢ per kilowatt-hour, would 
be $262,500 per year per lane-mile. Net income would then be $151,000 
per year per lane-mile, at 25% capacity. Percentage annual return on 
investment for freeway electrification, used at 25% of capacity, would 
then be 30%. 
If the 7.5¢ per kilowatt-hour rate continued as use increased to 50% of 
capacity, net income would be $361,500 before taxes, for a 75% per annum 
return on investment; so, we might expect rates would be reduced as use 
of electrified routes increased with the EV population. 
These primary market opportunities would certainly be accompanied by 
major markets for related products and services, plus a stimulus to 
diverse business activities. 
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ABSTRACT 
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Amid rising concern about automobile emissions, fuel economy, and safety, 
another aspect of the automobile's performance--durability--has received 
relatively little attention. 
A car's physical durability is difficult to isolate from other factors--
including economic and psychological considerations, climate, occurrence 
of accidents--that interact to determine the actual amount of time a car 
is used before being scrapped. The best, albeit rough, indicator of 
durability is actual useful life. 
Registration and scrap data indicate that 10 years after a fleet of new 
cars is registered, roughly the same number are scrapped; of course, some 
cars last a longer, and some a shorter, period than 10 years. During 
the last decade, roughly 60% to 70% of the cars on the road each year 
have been 7 or fewer years old, and the average age of cars on the road 
has held steady at 5.5 to 6.0 years old since 1960. 
Resource conservation is one benefit claimed to flow from an increase in 
a car's useful life; that is, a IS-year useful life (as compared with 10 
years) lowers the rate of depled.on of increasingly scarce resources. 
However, from the standpoint of resource use (at least those that 
actually become part of a car), there is no difference between oue 15-
year car and two 7-l/2-year cars. 
A combination of economic, regulatory, and technological p~oblems has 
prevented full, prompt recycling of scrapped vehicles: the relatively 
poor quality of auto scrap compared to the bulk of scrap used in iron 
and steel production; expensive technology required to convert auto 
hulks to usable ferrous scrap; differential tax treatment and freight 
rates of mining and manufacturing favoring newly extracted ore over 
recycled metals; restrictions on dismantlers' open burning of auto hulks; 
and legal complications in clearing title to, and asserting government 
jurisdiction over, abandoned vehicles on private land. Auto scrap com-
prises only 9% of total scrap used in iron and steel production. One 
group of 1970 figures indicates a large accumulation of junked cars: 
4 million abandoned, 14.5 million in dismantlers' inventories, and 1.2 
million in scrap processors' inventories. Still, studies show a high 
potential demand for ferrous aut.o scrap; improved technology is increas-
ingly available; and auto design changes could considerably speed dis-
mantling and improve scrap quality. 
A second possible benefit of increasing automobile useful life is 
economic efficiency. If one could make a car that could last on the 
average 20 years, one would have to weigh against its costs those costs 
involved in making two cars on the current design (lO-year useful life). 
Possible factors to consider would be the following: recycling costs, 
or, in the absence of recycling, costs of obtaining and processing new 
material; types of materials used in a more durable design and, perhaps, 
XX-3 
/ 
r 
r 
l 
i 
~~~~. r---~--~T~~~- ~~ 
r t 
increased assembly costs; the relative size of the additional cost of 
producing the second 10-year car; relative maintenance and operating 
costs; and the possible negative economic impacts of regulatory efforts 
to promote a more durable design, including description of the auto 
industry's operations, reduction of the annual market for new car pur-
chases affecting ability of low-income people to afford used cars, and 
slowing of the rate of introduction of new automotive technologies. 
Indirect evidence exists that auto accidents are not the primary deter-
minant of the scrapping decision; accident-related scrappage is rela-
tively low. The greater share of cars scrapped comes from the 7- to 
ll-year-old categories; very few cars are scrapped during the first few 
years of their lives. 
The decision to scrap a car is probably to a large extent an economic 
choice, influenced by a complex set of factors, including disposable 
income. The core economic element of the scrapping decision is the 
owner's comparison of the price of a replacement car with the cost of 
maintaining or repairing the present one. A government study indicates 
that many cars are traded in, needing repairs that the owner is unwilling 
to make. 
It is common knowledge that a car's market value drops sharply in the 
first few years; at the same time, costs of maintenance and repair 
increase. Clearly, the incentive to scrap grows with time, and one can 
expect the number of scrappings to grow. 
Annual style changes by the auto industry may be cited as one major 
factor in the precipitous decline in auto market value with age; a 
decline in psychological value to the consumer via aggressive advertising 
(psychological obsolescence) is translated into a decline in market 
value. Similarly, the practices of automobile manufacturing, insurance, 
parts, and repair industries have significantly inflated auto repair 
costs. Another factor is a decline in the physical durability of auto-
mobiles; CUl;'rent automobiles have been found to be far less resistant 
to accident damage and other wear than they could be. 
Clearly, much more information about the scrapping process is needed to 
know whether useful life can be and should be increased, what points in 
the complex scrapping process are most subject to intervention, and what 
means of intervention are most effective. It is necessary to know the 
following: the interacting roles that accidents, design and construc-
tion, prices and maintenance costs, income, and psychology play in the 
scrapping decision; how these effects flow from the stuructur'e and 
behavior of auto manufacturers and other elements of the auto transport 
system; and how structure and behavior can be influenced. 
Clearly, one cannot rely on the market to induce changes in auto useful 
life; the lack of improvement (and perhaps decline) of an observed useful 
life since the 1950s bolsters this conclusion. Fierce competition within 
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the industry militates against drastic departures from proven and 
accepted ways, even where such departures would increase industry 
profits. 
J 
Several alternative intervention routes are available. The government 
could specify the kinds of technology to be employed by manufacturers 
(as with safety belts). One drawback is the need for a large research 
and development effort which is probably better conducted privately. 
Government specification of technology would also remove the incentive 
of industry to find a better means to do the job. 
The government could set standards of performance to be met by whatever 
technology manufacturers decide to use (as with exhaust-emission stand-
ards). The problem of developing general criteria of durability, that 
can be applied to cars prior to the time of scrapping, arises. It has 
been noted, however, that just as marine insurers have successfully 
rated ship seaworthiness, auto insurers can rate car models on the basis 
of designed-in repairability and actual repair experience. 
Another possible measure is a scheme of graduated charges (line emissions 
charges proposed to deal with air pollution) to attribute the full social 
cost of a car's lack of durability to its users. Difficulty with this 
approach arises in attempting to measure the legitimate costs that can 
be imposed for each auto type. 
To the extent that manufacturers now lack the technical knowledge neces-
sary to perceive economic opportunity in producing more durable cars, 
government research and development assistance could be provided through 
direct aid or tax relief. 
A final measure open to the government is to alter the automobile industry 
itself: manufacturers, insurance, repair, parts, and other associated 
industries. Despite the inherent difficulties and conplexities, dura-
bility is, like other aspects of automobile performance, a product of the 
nature of the auto industry, and no full exploration of a performance 
problem is possible unless industry change itself is considered as one 
of a range of alternative intervention measures. 
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xx. AUTOMOBILE DURABILITY 
James F. Miller, Jr. 
University of California, Berkeley 
Introduction 
Amid rising concern about automobile emissions, fuel economy, and safety, 
another aspect of automobile performance--durability--has received rela-
tively little attention. This paper explores the issue of automobile 
durability, asking what factors determine its length, why it should or 
should not be increased, and how an increase might be accomplished, 
pointing out research needs along the way. 
Current Levels of Durability 
The physical durability of a car is difficult to isolate from the mix of 
other factors--including economic and psychological considerations, 
climate, occurrence of accidents, and so on--that interact to determine 
the actual amount of time a car is used before being scrapped. Thus, 
the best, if very rough, indicator of automobile durability is actual 
useful life. 
The common assumption that most American cars last about 10 years con-
ceals a somewhat more complicated pattern of automobile life. The 
number of cars in use in this country has risen from about 55 million 
in 1960 to about 85 million in 1973. 1* During that time, the number of 
new cars registered each year has risen from about 6.5 million to about 
11.5 million. 2 The number of cars scrapped each year from 1960 to 1972 
rose from about 4.3 million to 7-8 million. 3 These figures confirm in 
a rough way the common estimate of a 10-year useful life for automobiles. 
One would not expect the number of new cars registered in a given year 
to be immediately reflected in the number of cars scrapped during that 
year, since there has been a steady yearly increase of people buying 
cars for the first time and of families acquiring second and third cars. 4 
Instead, 10 years after a fleet of new cars was registered, roughly that 
same number would be scrapped; the new car registration and scrappage 
data in Table XX-I exhibit this general pattern. 
Of course, a year's fleet of new cars is not scrapped in toto aftt~r t:he 
tenth year of use; some cars last shorter and some longer periods. 
Sawyer has calculated, for the years 1946 to 1968, the percent of th~.~ 
original year's fleet still in use during each year of the fleet's life. 
Figure XX-I exhibits the average of his data. By the eighth year, a 
*Superscript numbers in this paper refer to the List of References at 
the end of the paper. 
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Table XX-I 
CARS REGISTERED AND SCRAPPED 
New Cars 
Registered Cars Scrapped 
Year During Year During Year 
1953 5,738,989 
1954 5,535,464 
1955 7,169,908 
1956 5,955,248 
1957' 5,982,342 
1958 4,651,002 
1959 6,041,275 
1960 6,576,650 
1961 5,854,747 
1962 6,938,863 
1963 7,556,717 5,319,286 
1964 8,065,150 5,704,373 
1965 9,313,912 6,173,512 
1966 9,008,488 6,957,988 
1967 8,357,421 6,226,243 
1968 9,403,862 6,348,488 
1969 9,527,283 7,460,984 
1970 8,459,503 6,021,041 
1971 9,963,558 7,058,029 
1972 10,608,236 7,987,384 
1973 11,477 ,559 7,193,679 
;/ 
t " i 
Source: Ward's 1975 Automotive Yearbook. 
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quarter of the fleet is gone. By the tenth year half remains, and by 
the twelfth year, 30%. After fifteen years, the residual becomes very 
small. These data and Sawyer's calculation of the probability of a car 
surviving each successive year (.483 for year 10)5 also support the 10-
year average useful life estimate. .----.... -.-... 
This scrappage pattern is in turn reflected in the age distribution of 
cars in use each year. During the last; decade, roughly 60% to 70% of 
the cars on the road each year have been 7 or fewer years 01d,6 and the 
average age of cars on the road has held steady at between 5.S and 6.0 
years since 1960. 7 . 
There is, in addition, some evidence of a decline in useful life of 
automobiles in the past. White has calculated the number of cars, as 
a percent of their original fleets, s'till on the road during the seventh, 
eighth, and ninth years of their lives, for the years 1955 to 1967. He 
found that during that period the percentage for 7-year old cars dropped 
from 92% to 84%, for 8-year old cars from 85% to 74%, and for 9-year old 
cars from 79% to 56%.8 
The Desirability of Increasing Useful Life 
Several distinct benefits are commonly claimed to flow from an increase 
in the useful life of automobiles, one of which is resource conservation. 
If the same bundle of metal and other resources can be made to give 15 
instead of ,10 years of service before being discarded, the net effect 
will be a lower rate of depletion of increasingly scarce resources. 
Of course, to the extent that this bundle of resources is recycled 
instead of discarded, the problem of resource waste is mitigated (ignoring 
the costs and energy use in fabrication), and the useful life of the car 
becomes irrelevant. From the standpoint of resource use (at least, 
resources that actually become part of the car), there is no difference 
between one car that lasts 15 years and two, made of the same materials, 
that last 7-1/2 years each. . 
Considerable attention has been paid the problem of rec.ycling scrapped 
automobiles in the United States. Studies have found that a combination 
of economic, regulatory, and technological problems has prevented full 
and prompt recycling of scrapped vehicles. Scrap from automobiles 
supplies a relatively small percent of the total scrap used in iron and 
steel production, about 9%,9 and is of relatively poor quality compared 
to the bulk of scrap used. laThe technology required to reduce auto-
mobile hulks to usable ferrous scrap has often been either unavailable 
or quite expensive, although that aspect of the situation is changing. 11 
Differences in tax treatment of mining and manufacturing industries and 
differential freight rates have favored use of newly extracted ore over 
recycled metals. 12 High transportation costs to central locations and 
new restrictions on open burning of auto hulks have hindered dismant-
lers. 13 Legal complications involved in clearing title to abandoned 
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automobiles and asserting government jurisdiction over cars left on 
private land have slowed the movement of scrapped automobiles to dis-
mantlers. 14 The result is a situation in which there is no market 
incentive for last owners of automobiles to turn cars over to dismant1ers 
instead of abandoning them,15 and little incentive for dismant1ers to 
process all of the cars they do get. This, in turn, has meant a large 
accumulation of junked cars--4 million abandoned, 14.5 million in dis-
mant1ers' inventories, and 1.2 million in scrap processors' inventories, 
according to one 1970 estimate. 16 
Clearly, for the iron and steel content of cars at least, recycling is 
far from complete. Still, the studies indicate that potential demand 
for ferrous auto scrap is high,17 the technology needed to improve the 
situation is increasingly avai1ab1e,18 and design changes in automobiles 
could conside.Lab1y speed dismantling and improve scrap quality. 19 A wide 
range of corrective measures has been discussed,20 and some estimates are 
that as much as 80% to 85% of cars scrapped are being processed. 21 
Still, there remains a considerable disparity between the percentage 
contribution of automobile scrap to total ferrous materials production 
(about 4%22) and the fractions of total U.S. production of steel and 
iron--19.5% (steel), 17.1% (gray and ductile iron), and 41. 7% (malleable 
iron)--used in automobile manufacture. 23 And, while most of the other 
metallic elements of cars are recoverable, few dismant1ers are able to 
recapture all of them, and there is 1it.t1e information on how much is 
actually recovered. 24 Clearly, further information is needed on the 
recoverabi1ity of various elements of automobiles, the possibility for 
changes in automobile design and processing technology, and the relative 
values and potential scarcities of the constituent elements of cars 
before the resource conservation benefits of increasing automobiles' 
useful life can be evaluated. 
A second possible benefit of increasing the useful life of automobiles 
is economic efficien~y. If it were possible, for example, to make a 
car that would last .:>n the average 20 years, we would then have to weigh 
against the cost of making that car the costs involved in making two 
cars on the current design. If there were no recycling of the materials 
in the first of these two cars, then we would have to include in the 
cost of the pair several additional factors. The cost of the new 
materials required to make the second 10-year car would have to reflect 
the full social cost of obtaining and processing the new materia1s. 25 
".Mt_ 
A recent article suggested that for every ton of steel made from recycled 
municipal waste, there is a 74% saving in energy, an 86% decline in air 
pollution, a 40% saving in water used, a 76% reduction in water pollution, 
and a decrease in 2.7 tons of the mining wastes dumped near mine sites. 26 
Though these figures might be lower for pure automobile scrap, since it 
is probably more difficult to use than municipal waste (which might, 
however, include automobile scrap), the figures suggest the kind of 
added cost that must be accounted for if new materials are used to pro-
duce the second lO-year car. In addition, the cost of dumping the first 
10-year car must be counted. Entirely aside from the strain this 
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procedure might put on scarce resources, there is a significant cost 
associated with letting scrapped cars accumulate at the rate of 7 mil-
lion per year or more. If the materials in the first 10-year car were 
recycled, on the other hand, we would have to include in the total cost 
of the two-car scheme the full social cost of recycling itself27 and the 
full social cost of whatever new materials were required in addition to 
the available recycled elements. 
Hhich ~.;ray the comparison of the one- and two-car schemes would come out 
~.;rould depend on several factors. Obviously, the cost of producing the 
first car in each scheme--the 20-year car in one, and the first 10-year 
car in the other--would have to be considered, and it is likely that it 
~.;rould cost more to make the longer lasting car. How much more is diffi-
cult to know given the available info~~ation. To some extent, more and 
more expensive materials would surely be used in the more durable car, 
and perhaps more complex and painstaking assembly procedures would be 
required. But it has also been argued forcefully that relatively simple 
design changes would substantially lower accident repair and insurance 
costs and, to some extent, nonaccident maintenance costs. 28 Since these 
costs playa substantial role in deciding when to scrap a car (a point 
developed more fully below), these design changes would probably have 
the effect of increasing the useful life of automobiles. 
Another factor influencing the comparison of the one- and two-car schemes 
is the relative size of the additional cost of producing the second 10-
year car. One element of this factor is the magnitude of the costs them-
selves. It would seem that, even if recycling is fairly complete and 
little new material were required to produce the second car (a situation 
that does not yet exist), the cost of recycling itself and actually 
assembling the second car would still be of the same order of magnitude 
as the cost of producing the first 10-year car. A second element of 
this factor is the fraction of the cost of producing the second lO-year 
car that must be ~\Teighed against the cost of the one-car scheme. In 
the example above, it was assumed that a car could be produced that 
would last exactly twice the useful life of the average existing car, 
but it may well be that it is possible to extend the life of a car 
practically by only 6 or 7 years instead of 10. In that case, only a 
proportionate fraction of the added cost of producing the second 10-year 
car could be weighed against the cost of the one-car scheme. 
A last factor in the comparison is relative maintenance and operating 
costs. It might be that these would turn out to be the same for the 
20-year and two lO-year cars, but several differences seem possible. 
The same design changes that might have the effect of lengthening useful 
life in the manner described above would do so by lowering repair costs. 
Gars made more durable in this way would prubably incur less accident 
damage, require cheaper repairs where repairs were necessary, and be 
relatively simpler to repair; and all this, in turn, might lower insurance 
premiums. 29 
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Here again, considerable research 'is necessary before an accurate com-
parison of the relative costs of a single, long-lived car and several 
shorter-lived cars is possible. We can conjecture from the rough out-
lines of the comparison that it is well worth making. There may be 
substantial economic benefits from a longer-lived car, but more must be 
known about the potential for, and cost of, a more durable car before 
much more can be said. Since projections of the cost and useful life of 
a more durable car are necessarily somewhat conjectural, it might be 
particularly useful to examine the handful of existing cars--some foreign 
models and a few domestic ones--that have, by design or accident, lasted 
longer than most other cars. Another useful, but necessarily limited, 
inquiry might be made into the useful life of trucks, whose average age 
has grown to the vicinity of 7 to 8 years while that of cars has held 
steady near 5.5 to 6 years. 3D 
Finally, there might also be clear disadvantages associated with a more 
durable car, even if considerations of resource conservation and effi-
ciency work out in favor of a longer useful life. Most of these are 
probably transitional, but no less serious for that. For example, there 
is the possibility that regulatory efforts to force American producers 
to make longer lasting cars would disrupt the industry enough to have 
undesirable economic consequences. It would certainly reduce the annual 
market for new car purchases. Or, some claim that introduction of more 
durable cars would so alter the existing pattern of new and used car 
purchasing as to erase a claimed subsidization by new car buyers (who 
absorb very large depreciation losses during the first few years of a 
car's life) of used car purchases, thus making cars available to more 
low-income people. These and similar considerations must be taken into 
account in weighing the desirability of producing longer lasting cars. 
Finally, there is the potential problem that longer-lived automobiles 
would slow the rate of introduction of future new automotive technologies. 
The Determinants of Useful Life 
Much more than simple physical durability is at work in the decis:lon to 
scrap a car; a complex set of factors is involved. There has apparently 
been relatively little investigation of the scrapping process, but one 
must know considerably more about it in order to determine the possi-
bility and desirability of lengthening the useful life of automobiles. 
Accidents. It is sometimes claimed, usually by automob~le manu-
facturers or someone speaking for them, that cars are often scrapped 
not because they wear out but because they are rendered useless by 
accidents. 31 If this is true, it might be claimed as a strong argument 
against increasing the physical durability of cars, since many accidents 
will involve relatively new cars, and these cars' potential for a long 
life will be useless. 
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Direct information on the fraction of yearly scrappage that is due to 
accidents is not immediately available, but some indirect evidence 
appears to argue against this interpretation. A 1967 Interior Depart-
ment study of automobile disposal indicated that wreckers got 38% of 
their cars from individuals, 26% from auto and truck dealers, 21% from 
insurance companies, 12% from state and local government, and 3% from 
other sources. 32 If it is assumed that most cars that have been 
"totaled" in accidents come from insurance companies or state and local 
governments, the share of accident-caused scrappages is on the order of 
30%. Testimony before a Senate committee has also indicated that a very 
small fraction of all the claims paid by insurance companies for auto 
property damage involved replacing the car--about 4%.33 Other testimony 
indicated that the percent of all claims that were for totaled cars 
hovered around 1% to 2% for the first 5 years of car life and then rose 
steadily to about 12% by the eighth year. 34 These figures do not, of 
course, fix the absolute magnitude of accident-related scrappages, but 
there is some evidence that the figure is relatively low. Along with 
other data, moreover, they belie the notion that accidents are the 
primary determinant of the scrapping decision. Table XX-2 gives pro-
files, for several recent years, of the numbers of cars of various ages 
that were scrapped during the year. These numbers, along with the data 
in the section above on current levels of automobile durability, indi-
cate that the great share of cars scrapped are from 7 to 11 years old, 
and that very few cars are scrapped during the first few years of their 
lives. If the simple occurrence of collisions were the prime determinant 
of useful life, one could expect the age distribution of cars scrapped in 
a year to be somewhat more even. To some extent, of course, it is proba-
bly true that older cars are more accident-prone, but even that would not 
seem to fully explain the tendency of scrappings to cluster around the 
ninth and tenth years. Other factors are certainly at work, and it seems 
more useful to treat accident-induced scrappings as a subset of a differ-
ent, more general mechanism. 
Prices and Repair Costs. The decision to scrap a car is probably 
to a large extent an economic choice, influenced by a complex set of 
factors, one of which is disposable income. There is no direct evidence 
of the effect this factor has on the scrapping decision, but a 1967 
Interior Department study provides a useful insight. A survey of the 
inventory of junk cars in urban and rural areas showed that in both, 
about half of the total inventory was between 8 and 12 years old, but 
the percent more than 12 years of age in rural areas was twice that in 
urban areas, and the percent less than 8 years of age in urban areas 
was twice that in rural areas. 35 If it is assumed that incomes are 
generally lower in rural areas, this difference in inventory age might 
be taken to demonstrate that useful life is stretched out longer where 
incomes are lower--a conclusion the study suggested. (Of course the 
difference might also be due to the greater difficulty of getting cars 
scrapped in rural areas to centrally located processors.) 
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AGES OF CARS SCRAPPED DURING CERTAIN YEARS 
1965 1968 
Age Number Age Number 
(years) Scrapped (years) Scrapped 
2 33 2 23 
3 3 3 9 
4 71 4 1 
5 132 5 124 
6 182 6 218 
7 331 7 369 
8 597 8 659 
9 702 9 882 
10 862 10 650 
11 604 11 749 
12 648 12 642 
13 321 13 593 
14 357 14 306 
15 320 15 266 
1971 1974 
Age Number Age Number 
(years) Scrapped (years) Scrapped 
2 19 2 11 
3 14 3 93 
4 106 4 119 
5 225 5 166 
6 335 6 360 
7 465 7 496 
8 644 8 802 
9 784 9 1005 
10 742 10 987 
11 741 11 874 
12 509 12 657 
13 236 13 367 
14 266 14 285 
15 214 15 157 
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With income accounted for, though, it seems likely that the core of the 
economic element of the scrapping decision is the comparison of the 
price of a replacement car with the cost of maintaining or repairing 
the present one. Cars wear and parts break; accidents, small and large, 
occur. The owner is faced with the choice whether to fix the car or 
get rid of it and get another. If the cost of repairs is high enough 
(as with a serious collision involving a relatively new car), or if the 
cost of replacing the car is high and the value of the unrepaired car 
is low (as with a relatively (lid car with several lingering ailments), 
the owner will get rid of tlH:! car by scrapping it since it will bring 
so little on the market. (The SCt'.<lP value of cars, still quite low, 
would appear to play little role in the scrapping decision.) Again, 
there is little information about this aspect of the scrapping decision, 
but one government study of the operating costs of cars indicates that 
many cars are traded in, usually to dealers, because they need repairs 
that the owner is not willing to make. 36 This implies that the same 
mechanism is at work when the car's last owner decides to scrap it. 
The combined trends of car prices and repair costs over a vehicle's life 
probably do much to explain the shape of the age distribution of cars 
scrapped in a given year. It is common knowledge that the market value 
of a car drops sharply during the first few years of its life. 37 At 
the same time, as the car gets older, the cost of maintenance and repair 
increases. 38 As prices fall and costs increase, the incentive to scrap 
grows, and one can expect the number of scrappings to grow. After some 
number of years of heavy scrapping, relatively few cars of a given vin-
tage are left on the road, and even though the incentive to scrap is 
still strong, the number of cars has declined, and consequently, the 
number of scrappings declines. This is the pattern actual sc~appage 
figures exhibit. 
These price and repair cost trends are rooted in the structure and 
behavior of the various elements of the automobile industry. Many 
observers of the industry feel that the major cause of the precipitous 
decline in the value of a car as i.t grows older is the industry's firmly 
entrenched practice of offering a wide variety of slightly differing 
styles of automobiles and changing these styles somewhat each year. 
This annual style change, coupled with aggressive advertising, it is 
claimed, creates a psychological pressure on new car buyers to trade in 
their cars after a few years for new ones, and a similar pressure on 
others to become new car buyers in order to keep pace with current 
styles. As the psychological value of a car drops in the eyes of the 
consumer, so does its market value; and the result, it is claimed, is 
that the industry sells more and more expensive cars. 39 The practice 
of annual style change was introduced into the automobile industry in 
the 1920s as a response to the saturation of the first-car market and 
the competition the new crop of used cars began to offer to new car 
sales. Style changes were seen as a way to create enough dissatis-
faction to get new car owners to trade in their old models, but not so 
much dissatisfaction that the old models had no remaining market value, 
for that would discourage trade-ins. 40 Whether the compulsion to 
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continue the practice is inherent in the industry4l or the result of the 
economic advantages the practice is claimed to offer--inc1uding inflated 
prices, greater sales, excuse from the need to make nonsty1istic design 
changes, and barriers to entry of competing firms42--is disputed. But 
annual style change and its effects on automobile prices, are clearly 
basic elements of the industry, linked inextricably to the industry's 
shape and process. 
The same is true of rising repair co~ts. Lengthy hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in 1969 revealed a pattern of abuse in the automobile manufacturing, 
insurance, parts, and repair industries that had significantly inflated 
repair costs. 43 Here the blame is shared by others, but an ample portion 
fell on the manufacturers themselves. Witnesses claimed that a series of 
manufacturers' activities--inc1uding procedures designed to guarantee a 
large share of the lucrative parts aftermarket, publication of "flat 
rate" repair manuals that discourage competition and encourage replace-
ment instead of rebuilding of parts, and failure to design cars with 
accident resistance and easy repairability in mind--had contributed to 
the high cost of repairs. 
Physical Durability. If some mixture of accidents and the economic 
calculus of income, car prices, repair costs, and other factors accounts 
for scrapping decisions, then what role is left to actual physical dura-
bility--that is to say that a car has simply "worn out"? Is it not true 
that old cars never just fade away, but rather that the invisible hand 
of fate or the market makes the cars useless to us? 
In one sense, the answer is yes. Putting aside psychological obsoles-
cence (see below), the scrapping decision seems likely always to be 
essentially an economic one. Something goes wrong with the car in one 
way or another; the owner adds up the costs of his options and either 
keeps the car or gets rid of it. Thus, it would be possible., if repair 
parts and labor were cheap and readily available, to continue fixing a 
car indefinitely, replacing an engine here, an axle there, a fender here, 
and so on. The car might eventually contain none of its original parts, 
but it would never simply "wear out." This process of replacement would 
end only when economic considerations made it irrational. As things 
stand now, this usually happens around the tenth year of a car's life 
or soon after. 
But this view of the scrapping process ignores the fact that the time 
in a car's life when the economic calculus dictates that it be junked 
is determined in part by the physical durability of the car. If two 
cars of the same age deteriorate in market value at the same rate and 
are subject to the same set of repair costs, but the first rusts out or 
develops serious engine trouble two years sooner, the second car will 
surely last longer, even if the final scrapping decision for both cars 
involves the same kind of economic factors. This will be true as much 
of scrappings induced by accidents as it is of other kinds of wear on 
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a car. Cars that, by virtue of their design and construction, are less 
subject to deterioration of any type will not as soon become uneconomical 
to keep running. 45 This mechanism might also interact with price to make 
a car last longer. If one kind of car is perceived to be more physically 
durable, it might well hold its market value in its later years better 
than a less durable model, in spite of the depressant effects of psycho-
logical obsolescence, and this will further delay the time when scrapping 
becomes economically necessary. 
Evidence of the role of physical durability is slim. White has attempted 
to isolate this factor from others at work in the scrapping process by 
statistical methods and has found a decline in actual useful life that 
may be due to a decrease in physical durabi1ity.46 And testimony at the 
1969 repair industry hearings indicated that current automobiles are far 
less resistant to accident damage and other wear than they could be~7 
Psychological Durability. It is frequently claimed that American 
automobile producers, faced each year with the need to sell new cars to 
a pool of buyers most of whom already have cars, resort to a practice of 
frequent style changes and persistent advertising designed to induce 
people to part with their old cars while there is still life in them. 48 
Implicit in these claims is the idea that car owners are induced in this 
way to scrap their vehicles before the time when all the other factors 
in the scrapping decision would have dictated getting rid of the car. 
Psychological obsolescence shortens actual useful life. 
Viewed one way, this argument seems incorrect. It can be argued that 
the target of the policy of annual style change and the associated adver-
tising is the pool of new car buyers, but most of these people probably 
never have anything to do with scrapping a car. The cars they trade in 
are resold one or more times. 49 A different group of people, arguably 
much less susceptible to advertising and style change, decides when cars 
will be junked. 
This conclusion seems to follow from the nature of the problem. One 
limit on the number of cars the manufacturers can sell in a year is set 
by the interaction of the average useful life of cars with the stock of 
cars people want to maintain to serve their driving needs. In a simple 
example, if there are 24 people each needing a car in a given year and 
cars last for 8 years, then 3 cars can be sold each year. Eight years 
after the first year's sale of 3 cars, those 3 buyers will discard their 
used-up cars and buy 3 more. The same thing will happen 8 years after 
the second year's sale, and 8 years after the third and fourth years 
and so on. A situation will be set up in which, each year, 3 people 
who bought cars 8 years ago will come back for 3 new cars. 
Introducing annual style change and new car trade-in into this simple 
example does not change the basic relationship between the stock of 
cars, average durability, and number of cars sold per year. Instead of 
8 groups of 3 car owners, each of which holds onto its cars for all 8 
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years of their lives, there will now be a group of new car buyers who 
trade their cars in at some point short of the end of the cars' useful 
lives and another group of owners who take over the used cars until they 
are ready to be discarded. If the time the new car buyers hang on to 
their cars is 2 years, then a situation will arise in which there are 2 
groups of 3 new car buyers each and 6 groups of 3 used car owners each. 
The manufacturers will sell 3 new cars to one or the other of the new 
car buying groups each year. For each of the first 6 years, the 3 used 
cars per year generated by this process will be taken over by one of the 
used-car-owning groups. By the seventh year the first of these groups 
will be ready for a new set of used cars, and :0 with the following 
years. Thus, the manufacturers will still sell 3 cars per year; the 
only difference is that they now sell more frequently to a smaller seg-
ment of the car-owning population. And if the manufacturers manage to 
induce new car buyers to hold their cars a shorter time before buying 
again, or induce more people to buy new cars, it will be seen that the 
stock of cars people are willing to hold and the average durability of 
those cars again dictate that 3 cars will be sold each year. Only the 
number of people in the new car-buying group varies. 
The real world, of course, is much more complex than this. Cars are 
traded in more than once, they last different periods of time, the 
stock held varies each year, and so on. But it would seem that the 
basic limitation imposed on the number of cars sold per year by the 
stock held and by average durability still holds, if in a rough way. 
After some point, the market is saturated with new and used cars, and 
no amount of additional advertising will increase sales. 
Does this mean that psychological obsolescence plays no role in the 
scrapping process? Probably not, for several reasons. One is the 
depressant effect that annual style change has on the prices of used 
cars, discussed above. Along with hastening the time when it becomes 
uneconomical to keep a car, this price effect may well enlarge the stock 
of cars people are willing to hold and thus increase the number of cars 
that can be sold in a given year. If prices of used cars are very low 
toward the end of their lives, one ob,ser'1er suggests, it is more likely 
that more low-income people will be able to own them, thus increasing 
the stock of cars held. 50 
Psychological obsolescence may also extend to used, as well as new, car 
owners and induce them to get ri1 of their cars "prematurely." There is 
Ii t tIe evidence on this point, hV-I1ever. 
Finall~;. ~nnual style cha~be may p..mplify other factors in the scrapping 
decisiuli, As :::he number and complexity of available models increase, 
repair costs increase,51 and to some extent styling changes come at the 
expense of design changes intended to increase safety and physical 
durability. 52 
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Research Needs. Clearly, much more information about the scrapping 
process is necessary in order to know whether useful life can be and 
should' be increased, wha t points in the complex scrapping process are 
most subject to intervention, and what means of intervention will be 
most effective. It is necessary to know the following: the interacting 
roles that accidents, design and construction, prices and maintenance 
costs, income, and psychology play in the scrapping decision; how these 
effects flow from the structure and behavior of the automobile manu-
facturers and other elements of the automotive transportation system; 
and how structure and behavior can be influenced . 
.Methods of Change 
The means of increasing the useful life of cars, assuming that is both 
desirable and technically possible, is a complex and necessarily specu-
lative subject, and only a few comments are made here. 
It seems clear that one cannot rely on the market to induce change. The 
simple fact that the observed useful life of American cars has not 
increased (and has perhaps decreased) since the beginning of the 1950s 
points to this conclusion. It might be argued that no one has seriously 
tried to market a more durable car, and thus, the market has never been 
tested. This might be so because there has never been a genuine con-
sumer preference for a longer lasting car, but it seems more likely that 
there has never been a clearly defined opportunity (in the form of a 
domestically built car at least) for consumers to express such a prefer-
ence. Nor, without some kind of intervention, is there likely to be 
such an opportunity. The discussion above indicated several ways in 
which the determinants of actual useful life are rooted in arrangements 
that the automobile industry finds profitable and is not likely to 
change. The yearly competition for shares of the new car market is 
fierce, and there is considerable incentive to avoid the risk of drastic 
departures from proven and accepted ways, even where such departure 
would increase industry profits. 53 
What means of intervention are available, then? A range of measures is 
possible in any public effort to alter some aspect of automobile per-
formance. One set. already is use for the automobile safety and air 
pollution problem, has the government either specifying certain kinds 
of technology the manufacturers must put in their products or setting 
standards of performance that must be met by whatever technology the 
manufacturers decide to use. Requirements for use of certain kinds of 
signal lights or safety belts and exhaust emission standards are examples 
of the two types of measures. Both approaches have limitations. Beyond 
a certain level of complexity of the problem to be solved, outright 
government specification of technology would require a large research 
effort that could probably be better conducted privately. Once the 
government decides on a specific device, the incentive to find better 
means of doing the same job disappears. The standard setting approach, 
on the other hand, encounters the problem of finding general criteria 
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of durability that can be applied to cars before the time they are 
scrapped. Unlike exhaust emissions, durability is not something that 
can be physically measured as a characteristic of the, car's daily per-
formance; the real measure of any car's longevity can only be taken on 
the last day of its useful life. Still, it seems possible to arrive at 
some kind of durability standard. Witnesses at the 1969 automobile 
repair industry hearings noted that marine insurers have long rated the 
seaworthiness of ships and that it would be possible for automobile 
insurers to rate car models on the basis of their designed-in repair-
ability and their actual repair experience. 54 
Another possible measure is a scheme of graduated charges, like the 
emissions charges sometimes proposed to deal with air pollution, designed 
to attribute the full social cost of a car's lack of durability to its 
users. Though it has the virtue of efficiency, such a scheme might have 
more than the usual difficulty associated with such methods in measuring 
the cost that can legitimately be imposed on each type of automobile. 
Beyond schemes of charges lie other measures a government can employ to 
alter the demand manufacturers face. Government might, for example, 
reduce speed limits as a means of reducing enginE~ size or have its 
agencies purchasE only certain types of vehicles. Short of the last 
example, though (which probably has little effect, since government 
operates a very small fraction of all cars registered 55), there seem to 
be few measures of this sort that would work for the durability problem. 
Another available measure is government provision of research and 
development assistance, in the form of either direct aid or tax relief 
to enhance private R&D efforts, or actual performance of research by 
government employees. To the extent that the manufacturers now lack 
the technical knowledge necessary to perceive economic opportunity in 
producing more durable cars, government-sponsored R&D would surely 
enhance the operation of the market. Under any circumstances, govern-
ment research would certainly smooth the transition to a new way of 
doing things and help guarantee that the measures the government chooses 
are the most effective and sensible ones" 
A last measure open to the government is to alter the automobile industry 
itself. This encompasses a wide range of possible actions taken to regu-
late not just the manufacturers, but the insurance, repair, parts, and 
other associated industries. This is obviously a difficult and complex 
subject, but durability, like other aspects of automobile performance, 
i.;: very much a product of the nature of the automobile indust!y, and no 
full exploration of a performance problem is possible unless change in 
the industry itself is one of a ran,ge of interventic'n measures considered. 
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ABSTRACT 
Though many of the accompanying papers would like to see attempts at 
organizational innovation in the political and economic scene, it would 
seem that government research agencies should continue to devote their 
resources and energies to technological innovations, an area of demon-
strated suceess. This paper considers possible directions of techno-
logical development within the different modes of intercity transpor-
tation (ICT), subject to tests of political acceptability. 
Though the organizational concepts of ICT need development, technolog-
ical innovation possibilities are available. Of those innovations 
suggested, the complementary package of highway automation, congestion 
processing, and expedited bus service seems most appealing for federal 
investigation and possible support; their complementary nature guarantees 
a broad political base, and is highly suitable to the incremental devel-
opment approach. These innovations would involve a substantial study 
of electronics control systems, which is generally within government 
research agency experience, and it should have broad political support. 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) also has a broad political base and allows 
incremental development. ATC needs improved systems analyses and hard-
ware. A major airport systems problem is the "break in gauge" between 
the small highway unit and the large air unit. 
Rail terminals do not have a broad political base. Apart from those of 
ConRail in the Northeast, they are jealously private and are unlikely to 
welcome outside suggestions. Thus, publically sponsored innovations at 
terminals would be more productive at airports. Probabilities are that 
there will be massive private sector involvement in rail, and rail re-
habilitation will not be innovative. Basic research and technology 
development should, then, explore possible rail innovations which could 
be applied during receptive periods. 
In sum, highway transportation holds out the best prospects for techno-
logical innovation, followed in decreasing order of success by air traf-
fic control and air terminals. Rail terminal and other rail-related 
innovations have the least likelihood of dev8lopment and implementation, 
due to failure to meet tests of political acceptability. 
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XXI. INTERCITY TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION: A PROPOSAL 
J. P. Carter 
University of California, Berkeley 
Introduction 
This paper considers possible directions of technological development 
within the different modes of intercity transportation (ICT) , subject to 
tests of political acceptability. 
Most of the innovative issues seen in other papers are organizati::mal 
rather than technological. And they are organizational at the political 
or economic level. Public agencies have shown the ability to innovate 
technologically, certainly with the requisite hardware, and with the 
organizational and systematic skills needed to operate that hardware. 
It is less clear that these agencies possess the skills required to make 
innovations on the political or economic scene, where methodology is 
already established and powerful interests are ready to defend the status 
quo. It is obvious that many of the accompanying papers would like to 
see a countervailing force develop. Public agencies need to ask whether 
they should devote their resources and energies to the development of 
such a force. 
A decision to move in that direction would be innovative, but it may well 
be that government should continue in those directions where demonstrated 
success is apparent. 
The latter choice would mean emphasizing innovations that are technolog-
ical, or those that involve the organization of technology or methodology. 
If that choice is accepted, we can then sift through the innovations 
suggE;!sted by the proj ect' s issue papers for those that meet the tests of 
political acceptability posited by Garrison and Jones, the two most im-
portant of which are the existence of a broad political base and sus-
ceptibility to incrementalism. A broad political base means that the 
innovations have the potential of bringing benefits to most, if not all, 
Congressional districts, and that funds be spent locally for the neces-
sary hardware and/or infrastructure construction. Incrementalism means 
that the innovation is susceptible to piecemeal development. One-shot 
deals are often acceptable, but an innovation which promises continuing 
and increasing benefits, together with future injections of s~ending, 
is preferred. 
To begin. with, there are organizational concepts of ICT to be developed. 
Garrison points out, in his conclusion, that there is no overall system. 
Carter points out the internodal nature of line-haul transport. The 
nodes are termini, and there is general agreement that there is room 
for innovations at the terminals. Conceptualization would seem an early 
need, and the theory of long-distance transportation flows needs 
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development. Transport prices are not simple functions of distance, and 
so Weberian tonmile models and the civil engineers' gravity models do 
not explain very satisfactorily the nature of rCT. The undirectional 
movement of freight, and the increasing specialization of vehicles for 
that movement compound the problem. 
Highway Transportation 
It does not follow, however, that technological inn.ovation must await 
the development of some theory of ICT. The technology of highway trans-
portation is important, popular, visible, and ubiquitous, and it accounts
 
for the majority of transportation spending. Some innovations there 
would clearly be ef.fective, would require no additional conceptual devel
-
opment, and would be helpful to the innovating agencies. 
Of all the innovations' suggested, the complementary package of highway 
automation, congestion pricing, and expedited bus service seems the most 
appealing for federal investigation and possible support. It involves 
a substantial study of electronic control systems, generally within the 
agencies' experience, and it should have broad political support. More-
over, it is something which is not yet being done; hence, there is no 
established organization to oppose the innovations. 
Garrison has suggested highway automation and has also mentioned con-
gestion pricing for urban areas. And Jones has suggested that improve-
ments to bus transportation would meet most political tests. It would 
seem that those three innovations could be made complementary. 
A pattern something like this could be foreseen: On the Interstate 
system one lane (presumably the center) could be automated. Automation 
means that properly equipped vehicles would be controlled from sensors 
in the pavement. Vehicle speed, direction, and clearances would be 
automated and the driver relieved of effort and strain. Automation may 
be applied incrementally to additional lanes, as required by traffic 
and/or political needs. 
An automated control system could be made compatible with a system of 
congestion pricing. An additional toll could be collected for the use 
of the automated lane (the fast lane under congested conditions) and 
that toll could be varied with the time of day. If the purpose of con-
gestion pricing is to relieve the congestion, then pricing must be in 
accordance with a predetermined price schedule, so that users can plan 
when to use the highway. Quite a few years of price experimeritation 
could be expected before the optimum traffic pattern could be made to 
develop. (A pricin~ s)'stem in dollars is not requisite. If the money 
price system is not ci.msidered an appropriate method to pay for con-
tributing to conge~,tion, equality among income groups could be achieved 
by issuing congestion ration coupons to all drivers.) 
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Notice that the three complementary items--the automation of long-distanc
e 
highway traffic, variable pricing in congested areas, and preferential 
traffic treatment for buses--mean that a single electronic system should 
stand on a broad political base. The long-distsnce traveler should be 
pleased that his attention is no longer demanded for long time periods 
and that his trip is safer. Truck and bus operators should feel. the same
 
way. In urban areas, many commuters would like to be automated and to 
avoid the strain and dangers of traffic congestion both before and after 
work. The urban bus rider, and especially the bus commuter, should be 
another supporter of the system. In short, political support could come 
from long-distance highway users, commuters by car, and commuters by bus,
 
a politically invincible group. 
Highway automation and congestion pr1c1ng are highly suitable to the 
incremental approach. Development can begin on suburban sections of the 
Interstate system and cart be gradually extended over the whole system, 
and beyond. 
Moreover, while a substantial investment is required (to be spent in most 
Congressional districts), the system shows promise of producing sub-
stantial revenues. Possibly it would be self-liquidating. If so, it 
could be financed on the money markets. 
Highway automation is only one direction in which we might move toward 
greater highway safety. Work could be done on the relations between 
automotive weight, size, and safety. With proper accounting for fatal-
ities and serious injuries, an increase in safety may well be congruent 
with a reduction in cost. The present emphasis on fuel economy might 
show itself to be a misallocation of innovative resources. 
Air Traffic Control 
While the highway transportation field offers the best prospects for 
innovation, there are other possibilities. Probably the second field 
in terms of potential for innovation is Air Traffic Control (ATC). 
There is general agreement that ATC needs improvement. ATC meets the 
political tests; innovation can be incremental, and it has an impact 
in all Congressional districts; air transport is, however, less popu-
lar than highway transport, and improvement spending there may be seen 
as benefitting business and the well-to-do. However, on intrastate 
flights, where fares are not held at the interstate levels imposed by 
the CAB, passengers appear to be a pretty fair cross section of the 
community. 
Recent accidents and near-misses imply the ATC has a systems problem. 
Controllers and pilots do not appear to have the same expectations for 
the meaning of the rules. All are working under difficult conditions 
and tremendous pressure. The cessation of growth in air traffic and 
the introduction of widebody jets has reduced the pressure to improve 
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the ATC system, but the need remains for both systems analysis and hard-
ware to permit the system to give a more positive performance. 
Terminals 
A third place where innovations may successfully be attempted is at ter-
minals. Airports represent the interface between the line-haul air 
movement and the distributive highway movement. That interchange is 
handled with some difficulty, particularly at the highway end. There is 
a systems problem with the "break in gauge" between the small highway 
unit and the large air unit, and with the loading space available for 
the highway vehicles. 
Railroad terminals also present a systems problem. That is probably less 
true in the large yards where line-haul trains are broken up and assem-
bled (Roseville, Colton, Barstow, North Platte) than in the smaller 
yards where movement is irregular. These smaller yards may not have 
humps, flat switching may be required, and orders for empty cars may 
offer little lead time for planning. Yard operations are conducted 
under the archaic AAR Car Service Rules, developed long before computers 
provided a central inventory of cars and their locations. A need exists 
for systems analysis and probably for computer programming. There is 
probably little need for the development of hardware; requisite computers 
are probably available on the shelf. 
Compared to· airports, rail yards lack political appeal. They are not 
very visible; freight doesn't vote. Their noise pollution is less per-
vasive than that of airports. Moreover, while ajrports are always in 
the public sector, only in the northeast are railroads now passing into 
public control. Elsewhere, they represent rather jealously guarded 
private property. Operating rules are not uniform among private rail-
way companies; resistance to change is strong. The interference of an 
outside agency is unlikely to be welcomed. 
Thus, with present organization and differentiation between public and 
private sector ownerships, federally sponsored innovation in terminals 
would more productively be devoted to airports. While rail yards and 
airports are both terminals, the methods of operation are so different 
that there may be little cross-fertilization in the analysis in any case. 
In the unlikely event that significant changes in rail organization 
occur, as suggested in the Carter paper, then rail terminal analysis 
could be undertaken as part of a broader systems study of railways. 
Rail-related Innovations 
The remaining innovative suggestions are rail-related; their effective-
ness and the welcome accorded to them will depend in part on the changes 
in rail organization which develop. As already indicated, innovations 
in the rail field may not be very visible, although the public sector 
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will become increasingly involved. Early 1976 will establish ConRail 
in the public sector; then planning for innovation may become acceptable 
and spread to that part of the industry remaining in the private sector, 
although the impact will not be immediate. While the political path by 
which it will be reached and its organizational form are not clear yet, 
the probabilities are large, of the order of 90%, that there will be 
public sector involvement and massive rehabilitation of railways by the 
end of the century. The probabilities are also high, perhaps 75%, that 
that rehabilitation will be repetitive rather than innovative. 
The federal government might reasor~ably foresee the upcoming public 
sector involvew:mt in railways and develop a shelf of innovations when 
the organization and management attitudes become more receptive. 
There is general agreement that large numbers of small technical items 
in the railway industry require innovative attention. These items do 
not depend necessarily on public sector dominance in the industry nor 
on massive organizational changes. They could be worked out coopera-
tively with the railway supply industry and then marketed through the 
usual industry channels. 
These small technical items are dominated by track. Nationwide, main-
tenance has deteriorated and standards have been reduced. Cars are 
heavier, track is rougher, and train speeds are slower than was true a 
generation ago. Slower trains mean less productive labor and capital. 
The rehabilitation of track to former standards or to the standards 
pr.evailing in other industrial nations could be done without innovation, 
merely using labor,. materials, and existing methodology. Innovation 
would consist of developing track which would be less expensive to 
maintain: a concrete roadbed, for example. That should be a politically 
welcome substitute for declining highway construction. 
Train-handling equipment is another i~pm. Couplers operate automatically 
under certain conditions of speed and alignment, but air brakes must be 
connected manually, The present air-braking system was invented long 
ago and does not operate uniformly and simultaneously through the train. 
Transit cars have couplers that grip automatically at proper speeds and 
alignments, and carry the controls as well. There is room for an inno-
vative braking system that is compatible with automatic coupling and 
does not require the making of connections manually. To meet the re-
quirement of incrementalism, the new system should probably be compatible 
with the present system. 
Innovations in the direction of safer and more easily maintained equip-
ment are also generally accepted as needed. Leaking or spilled cargo 
may cause fires and/or explosions. Even when two men are on lookout in 
the ~aboose, the length of a 100-car train may not always be visible. 
Finall/, there are many systems and communications innovations which 
could be made if the sort of organizational changes suggested in the 
Carter paper came about, that is, if the railways abandoned their 19th 
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Century form of organization and became public highways in the organi-
zational fashion of 20th Century technologies. But there is no popular 
clamor for access to the railways. Why should there be, with access to 
the highways available to the small carrier? There is strong institu-
tional opposition to the multiple use of rail lines within the AAR. If 
there were multiple use of rail lines, the monopoly issue would dis-
appear, and the regulatory agencies would lose their basic raison d'etre. 
Thus, the probability that the Carter proposal would come about is small, 
hardly 5%. 
The large probability is that public sector involvement in the railway 
industry will follow the pattern of other countries. Governments took 
over when railways were no longer profitable for the private sector. 
In most countries, however, the takeover occurred before the 20th Cen-
tury alternatives to rail transport were fully developed. Here and now, 
l.:here can hardly be the popular feeling for the necessity of the rail 
technology which prevailed at the beginning of the century; still, sup-
port or acquisition of railways by the public sector will be a step for 
preservation--hence, it will be conservative. 
The rail constituency is not large, maybe 750,000 employees, and it would 
be much larger if the railways were opened to public use. There is not 
likely to be great popular support for the preser.vation and conservation 
of the 19th Century monopolies with only a small cons~ituency; and thus, 
as public sector involvement in the rail industry becomes deeper, one 
can expect further shrinkage. Bruck's prediction that "long haul com-
modity movement would be handled by a lean railroad system or by water 
carriers ••• " could be assigned a probability of perhaps two-thirds. 
The railway industry is greatly in need of innovation, but the political 
and economic situation would not appear to be one in which outside con-
tributions might be welcomed. But they have at least cosmetic effect, 
and the rail field should not be written off entirely. 
In sum, highway transportation holds out the best prospects for techno-
logical innovation (e.g., highway automation, congestion pricing, plus 
expedited bus service) followed in decreasing order of success by air 
traffic control and airport terminals. Rail terminal and ether rai1-
related innovations face the least likelihood of development and imple-
mentation, because of their failure to meet tests of political accept-
ability. 
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ABSTRACT 
Transportation of freight in the year 2000 will not be very different 
from today. The next 25 years will be evolutionary. 
Volumes of freight will increase, but substantially less than often 
predicted. Lengths of hauls will shift; some products and commodities 
will move shorter average distances; others longer ones. Population 
growth will continue. Other characteristics affecting freight demand 
are less predictable. Standards of living may well decline. Income 
redistribution between groups will probably continue. Spatial arrange-
ments of communities will change, as will product characteristics. These 
and other factors will, of course, increase the quantities of some types 
of freight and decrease others. 
Significant increases of coal movements will hinge on the rate of increase 
of electric power consumption and, more generally, on the relative impor-
tance of nuclear, coal, and solar fuels. Power plants, however, can now 
be located near coal deposits, because of the improving technology of 
long-distance power transmission and because institutional restraints on 
power plant siting may change. 
Petroleum movements will change somewhat. Smaller and new-technology 
cars will burn less gasoline. Alaskan oil will cause redistribution of 
some flows from fields to markets. Long-distance moves will continue 
to be by pipelines, tankers, and barges. 
Transportation characteristics of construction materials (e.g., lumber, 
cement, and steel) should not change too much. Many manufactured prod-
ucts will change in size, weight, quantity ,and distance to be moved. 
The highway-transport distribution system will continue to predominate. 
Freight transport technology will not be significantly different from 
today. The past 25 years witnessed most of the innovations (e.g., the 
Interstate Highway System, supertankers, containerization of break-bulk 
shipping, and coal-slurry pipelines), and there are no pressing needs 
for improvements. 
The motor truck has been, and will continUl~ to be, the almost universal 
freight carrier. The new-construction era. of highways is, however, 
over. Trucks may change some, due to regl',latory changes rather than 
technological ones. Motor carrier operat:nrs want increases in truck 
dimensions and weights, "triple-bottoms," and turbine engines'. Con-
tainers and trailers on flat cars will cont].nue to develop. 
Evolutionary refinements of railroad technology will occur along with 
operational and institutional changes. Track, bridge, and tunnel tech-
nology will not change much. Large-scale rail electrifi.cations depend 
on removal of financial and institutional barriers. 
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Air freight will continue to expand in weight, volume, value, and 
revenue. Whether it will be profitable to carriers is less predictable. 
Whether a market exists for new airplanes for all-cargo or mixed cargo-
passenger services is a major issue. New, more efficient airfoils, 
quieter engines, better fuel efficiency, and other innovations make the 
concept of designing and building new aircraft attractive; on the other 
hand, the advantages of the newer planes over large fleets of existing 
ones are marginal, compared with the risks of large new capital invest-
ments in an industry with low profitability. Aircraft manufacturing in 
the next 25 years may possibly concentrate on replacing worn-out equip-
ment, providing maintenance and upgrading parts, and providing for some 
growth, but not offering a product that makes all existing equipment 
obsolete. 
Waterborne transport service technology is well advanced and requires 
no significant improvements. For deep-draft vessels, increased speed 
means greater fuel consumption and, thus, higher energy costs. Auto-
mation and advanced propulsion machinery have reduced crew sizes sub-
stantially. There is a glut of ships of all types on the high seas. 
And, ships have become enormously expensive to build, buy, and operar~. 
Inland or shallow-draft water carriers have well-established eq1,',ipment 
and operating patterns. Since the government has assumed the cost of 
building and maintaining the waterways, the only cost of provi~ing 
inland waterway transportation is the vessel operating cost, vhich is 
quite low for bulk shippers. In effect, inland waterways ma):.e possible 
private and contract carriage of bulk commodities which is not practical 
and cost-effective by rail or by highway. 
Oil and gas pip1ine technology is evolutionary. Solids pipelineu <;lre 
at earlier stages of development. A major problem is not technical ~~r 
rather one of water supply. Wyoming officials objected, for example, 
not to the mining of coal, but to the export of water in a proposed 
coai-slurry pipeline. 
In the next 25 years, the ownership patterns of U.S. railroad facilities 
and enterprises will change significantly and will fundamentally affect 
operations. The total freight transportation system will continue to 
have relatively low profitability. Direct governmental ownership and 
operation will increase well beyond today's significant levels, particu-
larly for railroads, but to some extent for each of the other modes. 
Private enterprise will continue to dominate in equipment and operations. 
Refinements of technology and operations will continue, motivated by 
safety and envircnmental considerations and by compelling needs to reduce 
costs and to increase efficiencies. 
Energy price, availability, and possible rationing problems will inhibit 
major changes in characteristics and technology of freight transport 
services. For example, developme\.lt and production of passenger-oriented, 
high-performance aircraft like vertical/short takeoff and landing 
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aircraft (V/STOL) and supersonic transports (SSTs), high-speed ground 
transport like tracked air cushion vehicles (TACVs) and magnetic 
levitation vehicles (MAGLEVs), and certain freight technologies, all of 
which have high energy consumption, will be slowed or stopped. Still, 
energy costs are only a small part of total operating costs. For 
example, doubling or even tripling of fuel prices will increase total 
costs of operating freight transport modes by only 10% to 20%. 
Some shifts in market shares between modes may be very significant, and 
range from lucrative to fatal for individual carriers, but they do not 
presage fundamental shifts in transport technology or services. 
Institutional changes will permit some rationalization of the railroad 
network, free all modes from some current regulatory restrictions~ and 
make more price and service competition possible. Operating changes 
offer major opportunities for innovation, especially for the rail mode 
(e.g., dynamic real-time scheduling of freight cars and trains). Work 
rule changes will yield higher productivity. Marketing changes, par-
ticularly orienting transport services to fit into total customer 
logistics systems, are probably the prime opportunity for continuing 
innovation. 
In short, freight transportation in the year 2000 will not be all that 
different from today. In service, quality, price, and profitability, 
some may be better, much will be the same, and quite a bit may be worse. 
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Transportation of freight in the year 2000 will not be very different 
from today. 
The next 25 years will be evolutionary. Quantities to be moved will 
increase moderately. Characteristics of shipments will gradually 
change. Technological innovations will be less significant than in the 
25 years just passed. Institutional and operating changes will probably 
be of greater importance. Freight and passenger transport operations 
will continue to be mostly separate, with interrelationships limited to 
small portions of total movements. 
Demand 
Volumes of freight will increase, but substantially less than often 
predicted. 'Lengths of hauls will shift; some products and commodities 
will move shorter average distances, others longer ones. 
Many analysts forecast much larger freight volumes. Such predictions 
are extensions of present trends, to which are added additional growth 
of some commodities. Increases of population and gross national product, 
technological changes, and rising standards of living are all interpreted 
as adding to the amounts of freight to be moved. 
Population growth will indeed continue; demographic characteristics make 
that certain. Population may stabilize after 2000, but this cannot hap-
pen before. Other characteristics affecting demand for freight trans-
port are less predictable. Standards of living may well decline. In-
come redistribution between groups of our population will probably con-
tinue. Life styles are changing. Spacial arrangements of communities 
will change. Product characteristics are changing too. These and many 
other factors will, increase the quantities of some of the kinds of freight 
to be moved, an0 decrease other kinds. 
Several e,:.amples may stimulate thoughts about many others. 
'Bulk Commodities. Coal movements may increase signficantly. The 
big unknown is how much electric power consumption will increase. Cer-
tainly less oil and gas will be used in generating stations. But what 
will be the relationships betw.een nuclear, coal, and solar fuels? 
Earlier optimism about nuclear plants, which need little transportation 
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once they are ope'rational, is decreasing. Coal requires, under some 
circumstances, a lot of transport. Solar energy needs none; this source 
may become significant well before 2000. Use of coal for making elec-
tricity will certainly increase. Some large tonnages will be moved over 
long distances, like from Utah to California, or from Montana to Tennes-
see. However, coal does not have to be moved to power plants; power 
plants can be located near the coal. Technology of long-distance power 
transmission improves steadily. More importantly, institutional 
restraints on power plant siting may change. Power companies usually 
locate generating plants within their service territories. But, does 
a Texas utility have to bring Wyoming coal to Texas? It could erect its 
power plant in Wyoming, and transport the electricity to Texas by wire. 
These are important considerations for forecasting volumes and patterns 
of railroad movements, and the alternative of coal-slurry pipeline 
developments as well. 
Iron ores and other minerals are other heavy bulk products. Their move-
ment volumes and patterns are established by the locations of mines, 
smelters, mills, and markets and are influenced by the demands of end 
users. A few large companies dominate each industry. Their logistics 
arrangements are well established, and there are no indications of needs 
for these to change substantially. 
Petroleum movements will change somewhat. Smaller cars will burn less 
gasoline; electric cars would burn none. Domestic production moves 
along different routes than imports. Alaskan oil will cause redistrib-
uting of many other flows from fields to markets. Long-distance moves 
will continue to be by pipelines, deep-draft tankers, and shallow-draft 
barges. Highways,and rail in certain special movements, will be used 
for local distribution. 
Construction materials, like lumber, cement, steel, and all sorts of 
other components, are related in the demand for their movements upon 
the extent and characteristics of construction operations. These are 
in t,urn dependent upon many factors, like social priorities, financial 
constraints, personal incomes, corp?rate profits, and governmental 
programs. They are related to building designs and perceptions about 
how much space people need. Similarly, construction of public works is 
variable, depending upon alternative uses of capital. Characteristics 
of the transportation of these commodities should not change too much. 
Rail is now significant for long hauls. Nuch of the movement is by 
truck because of the flexibility of delivery from plants and mills to 
construction sites. EOL example, a lot of lumber is trucked from 
Oregon to Southern California because the total logistics cos't is less, 
even though the rail freight-rate may appear competitive. 
Growing of bulk agricultural products, like corn and ,,,heat, will 
increase. Worldwide demand is increasing, and agricultural production 
is now governmentally encouraged instead of being regulated, as in the 
past. Trucks and trains and barges and ships will continue to move 
these products in ways not too different from the best practices today. 
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Manufactured Items. Many products may change in size, weight, 
quantity, and distance to be moved. Consider, for example, how smaller 
automobiles produced in smaller quantities, in fewer locations, will 
affect the transport of a large array of commodities--such as steel, 
plastics, rubber, parts and subassemblies, finished cars, and so forth. 
More home vegetable gardening may mean less transport of canned, frozen, 
and fresh foods. Smaller houses and more apartment living have all 
sorts of implications for consumption of home furnishings, recreational 
equipment, and other products. What will continue is the fact that a 
multitude of varied products moving from many factories through many 
distribution channels to many consumers implies continuation of a highway-
transport dominant distribution system. Rail and some water transport 
will be important for some but not all longer moves, and for certain 
specialized situations. Shippers today are willing to pay far more for 
truck than for rail services because their total logistics costs are 
less. This should continue to be true. 
Logistics. An understanding of the logistics concept, or total 
distribution system approach, makes it clear that the price charged the 
shipper by the transportation company is not the dominant factor in 
choice of mode or service. Large amounts of freight move by highway 
rather than by rail, often at higher rates, because other factors are 
more important to achieving lowest overall distribution costs and 
acceptable service qualities. And, for many movements, trucking, and 
particularly private carriage, may indeed be the low-cost mode. The 
premium price for air freight service is paid for many, many items, 
because there are advantages compared to highway, rail, or water move-
ments. 
Technology 
Freight transport technology will not be significantly different from 
now. Refinements of many details will continue. Measured in physical 
terms, both new capital investments and maintenance of existing equip-
ment and facilities may decline below recent levels. The current degra-
dation of rail facilities and services in the Northeast may be a fore-
taste of similar developments in other geographic areas, and for other 
modes. 
Technical changes from 1950 to 1975 were much more extE:nsive than what 
will happen from 1975 to 2000. 
This period just passed saw the construction of most of the Interstate 
Highway System; the dieselization of the railroads; containerization 
of break-bulk shipping; development of supertankers and specialized 
bulk-cargo ships; deepening of harbor channels; perfection of coal-
slurry pipelines; much larger inland waterway tows; increased mileages, 
depths, and lock capacities of inland waterways; and many other 
improvemen ts. 
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There is no reason to expect equal changes in the next quarter century. 
There are no pressing needs for improvements in the technology of freight 
transportation. Other opportunities for increasing productivity, service 
quality, and profitability are much more significant. Most of them are 
more related to operational and institutional changes, than to possible 
changes in physical plant and equipment for transportation. Most impor-
tantly, society may have altered priorities, and one of them may be that 
improving freight transportation is not all that important, compared to 
alternative uses for time, money, energy, and toil. 
Specific attention to the freight carrying modes follows. 
Highway. This is the general-purpose freight (and passenger) 
transportation mode. It is the first choice for moving most products 
between most places. All other modes are specialized. They do some 
things extremely well, and are used, sometimes on a large scale, for 
specific reasons. But the motor truck is the almost universal freight 
ca.rrier and will continue to play this role. Ever continuing fuel-cost 
increases will affect all modes, but highway more than rail or water. 
However, as already noted, the reasons shippers use highway transpor-
tation are not all that sensitive to the comparative costs or prices. 
As for highways, the new-construction era is over. Funding the last 
6,000 miles of the 42,SOO-mile Interstate System will last into the 
mid-l980s or even to 1990. Many of these miles may never be built. 
Monies for other roads and streets are becoming scarcer, as society's 
perceptions about highways change. It may well be that maintenance of 
what we already have, with selected capacity increases and safety 
improvements, will be the main activity. 
Trucks may change some, but this will be more because of regulatory than 
technological motivations. The biggest desires of motor carrier oper--
ators are for increases in dimensions and weights. Allowing an 8' 6" 
rather than 8'0" maximum width would result in an 8'0" interior dimen-
sion. Note that urban buses not operating on federal aid highways are 
now often 8'6" in width, making wider aisles and seats possible. 
Increased lengths and so-called triple-bottoms, or three tailing units, 
on major highways a.re. desired. These already operate in some states, 
and also in some countries in Europe, but are not permitted by many 
other states, including Pennsylvania, which is a geographic bottleneck 
in interstate trucking. A new law allows heavier axle loadings on 
Interstate highways; the motor carriers are working to keep those 
increases. 
As for equipment design, a major change for large trucks will be 
increased use of turbine engines. Some are already operating, and 
freight carriers are said to like them. Similarly, the largest inter-
city passenger bus operator favors them in its new buses. The difficulty 
is that the principal manufacturer of such engines is expanding produc-
tion very slowly. Fuel efficiency can be improved by using fiberglass 
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aerodynamic fairings fastened to the front of the first trailer in 
tractor-trailer rigs; this decreases wind resistance. Several manu-
facturers are selling them now. 
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Rail. Freight transportation is the basic activity of American 
railroads, with a few exceptions such as commuter services and passenger 
operations in the Northeast Corridor. Many people visualize this in 
reverse, seeing railroads in terms of passenger transportation, and are 
largely unaware of their freight-carrying roles. Viewing them as freight 
carriers helps to clarify technological forecasting for the railroads. 
Evolutionary refinements are the forecast for the future. Major inno-
vations in technology are not likely, though many opportunities exist 
for improving present physical facilities. The big opportunities will 
be in operational and institutional changes. 
Track will not change very much. Continuous welded rail on treated wood 
ties is the preferred track design for heavy-weight, high-speed, high-
impact freight trains. Current experiments with and limited installa-
tions of concrete ties and slab track will not encourage major instal-
lations in the foreseeable future. Bridges and tunnels will not change 
much. Signalling and control technology is evolving in parallel with 
other electronics) but the need for fail-safe high reliability in all 
climatic and operating conditions will continue to demand conservative 
design. Recent difficulties with automation of passenger transportation 
installations like the Bay Area Rapid Transit System and the many troubles 
of the automated coal-carrying Black Mesa and Lake Powell Railroad, are 
not going to hasten similar innovations and changes in conventional 
freight railroading. Communications will evolve with the state-of-the-
art in general. Use of computers will continue to increase, but most 
major applications will be further refinements of what is already hap-
pening on some properties. Automatic car identification is in trouble 
at least in part because its use is not that rewarding; computers and 
video equipment offer other ways of keeping track of car locations. 
Rolling stock design will evolve gradually. SpeCialization of freight 
cars will continue to increase as advantages from a total logistics 
standpoint outweigh the increased empty return miles. CoveJ:ed hopper 
cars for grain, automobile rack-and-parts cars, and special cars for 
chemicals are examples. Locomotive designs will evolve from the best 
currently operating diesel-electric and all-electric units. Easy 
maintainability is the biggest desire expressed by railroad managements. 
Couplings for freight cars may change, but the large require~ investment 
promises only modest returns and delays implementation.. Surprisingly, 
AMTRAK's new Metroliner-type cars have conventional couplings, even 
though these will operate in segregated services. Truc.k designs will 
gradually improve. Other gradual changes will take place. Mos t freight 
cars being built today will still be operating 25 years hence. 
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Recent research on track-train dynamics will result in many modifications 
to car components and dimensions, but more importantly to train makeup 
and operations. 
What will the major changes be? 
Containers and trailers of flat cars (COFC/TOFC) will continue to evolve 
and develop. They are not the answer for all freight; specialized 
freight cars are more suitable for many commodities and movements, and 
conventional freight cars will continue to have a role. They have their 
place, within limits of operating complexity, labor costs, regulatory 
constraints, institutional problems, and the like; and the percentage 
of merchandise freight moving by rail in trailers and containers will 
gradually increase. 
Railroad electrifications on a large scale will start when the financial 
and institutional barriers are taken care of; by the year 2000, many 
more miles of track will be under the wires. Barriers include the large 
amounts of money needed, problems about priorities of routes to electrify, 
the role of the U.S. government as a participant, and the laws restricting 
electric power companies to specific service territories. Nothing is 
still needed in the way of technical innovation. Everything required 
already exists in major operating installations, in Europe and North 
America. Catenaries carrying 25 kilovolt and 50 kilovolt, 60 Hertz power 
pose no problems, other than requiring modification of signal circuits. 
The t\vO maj or U. S. manufacturers of locomotives are already turning out 
high horse~ower electric locomotives. 
Air. Air freight, in weight, volume, value, and revenue, will 
continue to expand. Whether it will be profitable to carriers is less 
predictable. The logistics concept makes it clear that for many prod-
ucts and markets the premium paid for moving freight by air is returned 
by lower overall physical distribution costs, and improved service to 
customers. There are, in addition, many commodities that it is practical 
to move only by air; fresh flowers across oceans are one example. 
What is important at this point is the future of technology in relation 
to use of this mode for freight. Several factors are relevant. The 
volume is growing, and as it does, the price differential in comparison 
to other modes can become less. While most air freight moves in 
passenger airplanes, and many of the operating costs are thus shared 
with the passengers, a significant and expanding amount moves in air-
craft dedicated to this service. Airlines are still buying all-cargo 
versions of the largest commercial airplane, the 747F, which can move 
more than 100 tons (equal to the weight-carrying capacity of one large 
railroad freight car and the volume of several of them) over intercon-
tinental di.stances, and they are offering new services with them. 
An attractive variety of passenger and freight carrying aircraft, of 
all sizes and service characteristics, are avilable now from airplane 
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manufacturers; the~e range from the large widebody jets down to twin-
engine transports. 
The major issue here is'whether a market exists for new airplanes for 
all-cargo" or mixed cargo-passenger, services. Forecasting demand for 
equipment is more difficult than for other modes. It is obvious that a 
new large airplane can only be produced at enormous preproduction cost 
and the break-even point for profitability only comes after delivery of 
way over 100, and often several hundred, aircraft. The financial 
traumas caused by the L-10ll will not soon be forgotten. Even the armed 
forces, often the financial supporters and major customers for new air-
craft designs, are finding money more difficult to get, and their 
priorities may be directed toward procurement of other kinds of equip-
ment. 
New, more efficient airfoils, quieter engines, better fuel efficiency, 
and other innovations make the concept of designing and building a new 
airplane attractive. On the other hand, there are large fleets of 
existing airplanes, and the advantages of the new ones compared to them 
are marginal. This is not like the improvements of the new jet-powered 
over the older piston-powered aircraft, in the replacement cycle of 10 
to 15 years ago. Large improvements in subsonic speeds are impossible. 
Largey: lifts may bring some lowering of costs per ton-mile, but the costs 
of aircraft operations are only a part of the total costs of operating an 
airline. Thus, marginal savings are not that significant compared to the 
risks of large new capital investments. In an industry with low profit-
ability, with several important airlines in deep financial trouble, the 
time is not propitious for selling new kinds of airplanes to them. 
Thus, it is quite possible that the next 25 years may see the intro-
duction of no new aircraft important for air freight services. It may 
be that effort will be concentrated upon refining and improving existing 
types. Aircraft manufacturing will then have become similar to highway 
truck or railroad locomotive manufacturing. This is to serve a market 
of replacing worn-out equipment, providing maintenance and upgrading 
parts, and providing for some growth, but not offering a product that 
makes all existing equipment obsolete, as happened with the propeller 
to jet, or the steam to diesel-electric, changeover. A different world 
indeed for aviation! 
Wate'c. Two different kinds of transport service are waterborne. 
These are services provided by large ships operating in deep water, and 
those by :shallow draft barges in inland waterways. Though bo.th operate 
in water, they differ as much as highway and rail do as land modes. 
In both cases the technology is well advanced and requires no significant 
improvements. 
For deep-draft vessels, increased speed requires much larger increases 
in fuel comsumption. Thus, especially with energy costs increasing, 
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practical limits are imposed on voyage times. Size contributes to 
productivity, but the large bulk carriers, tankers, and containerships 
are at practical size maxima now. For general cargo, container ships 
are now the standard on major trade routes. Automation and advanced 
propulsion machinery have reduced crew sizes to the minimum acceptable 
to labor organization. There is a glut of ships of a:\-l types OIl the 
high seas. Charter rates ar(~ at unremuneratively low levels (owners may 
lose less money when their sl~ip is operating than when it is idle) and 
many ships dre tied up. Rate wars are prevalent for the merchandise 
trades. Ships have become enormously expensive to build and buy, as well 
as to operate. Not an encouraging setting for growth and change! 
Proposals for surface-effect ships for ocean commerce move forward 
slowly. Developing this technology would require large amounts of 
money, in the face of major operating unknowns, and at the cost of high 
fuel consumption per revenue ton-mile. The resulting services would 
fall between fast c9ntainerships and air freight in transit time. It 
may be that the market for this in-between service is small. 
Inland or shallow-draft water carriers have as their business the moving 
of bulk products, like grains, ores, coal, petroleum products, and sand 
and gravel. These move in large quantities, up and down major rivers 
that have been canalized. Equipment and operating patterns are well 
established. Groups of standardized barges are lashed together into 
large rafts, called tows. Dimensions of tows are determined by channel 
widths, including passing requirements, and by dimensions of navigation 
locks. These are pushed by towboats, most of them large diesel-engine 
propelled vessels, almost all built in recent years. If the very large 
cost to general society of building and maintaining the waterways is 
treated as a free good, which is current governmental policy, then the 
cost of providing inland waterway transportation is the vessel operating 
cost, and this is pleasantly low for shippers of bulk products. In 
effect, inland waterways make possible private and contract carriage of 
large quantities of bulk commodities, which is not practical or cost-
effective by highway, and not possible by railroads, which operate only 
as for-hire carriers charging published rates. 
Pipelines. Oil and gas pipeline technology is evolutionary. Larger 
diameters, operated over long distances in difficult climates (like the 
trans-Alaska project) pose many challenges, but they are all elabora-
tions of already exis ting indust:,.:y practices. Solids pipelines are at 
earlier stages of development. A coal-slurry pipeline has been operating 
for several years in Arizona. Many other .airlines are propos'ed. 
A major problem is not technical; it is one of water supply. For ex-
ample, a recently proposed line from Wyoming to the Southeast was 
dropped from consideration because Wyoming officials objected, not to 
the mining of the coal, but to the export of the water. Proposals for 
moving grain, potash, iron ore, and other commodities by pipeline are 
made from time to time, but have not gone beyond small experimental 
installations. 
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What is significant is not so much the technical details, but rather 
the competitive aspects. New movements of coal and other commodities 
are important to railroad companies, whose lines mostly operate well 
under capacity. If a pipeline is built, that traffic is permanently 
lost to the rail mode. In addition, the potential exists for substan-
tial shifting of present bulk traffic from existing railroads to new 
pipelines. Only the unwillingness of the State of Pennsylvania to grant
 
eminent domain rights for right-of-way acquisition, thus protecting its 
railroad companies, appeared to prevent major coal pipeline construction 
across the State in the mid-l960s. 
Operational and Institutional Changes 
Some transportation operations will change significantly, largely as a 
result of institutional factors. There will be institutional changes, 
because there have to be. For example, it appears almost certain that 
in the next 25 years the ownership patterns of u.S. railroad facilities 
and enterprises will change significantly, and this will fundamentally 
affect operations. Sufficient capital will not be available from either 
private or public sources to do what might be desirable, particularly as 
regards investments in new plant and equipment. Society may deliberately
 
reduce the percentage of available resources and the dollar amount of 
investment in transportation, as it is already doing in highway construc-
tion and passenger aircraft procurement. Other issues and activities 
will probably be seen by society to have higher priorities. The char-
acteristic of relatively low profitability of the total freight trans-
portation system will continue. Individual enterprises with superior 
managements, favorable geographic settings, or particularly desirable 
clienteles or commodity flows will prosper, even within modes that are 
unfavorable in an overall sense, just as now. Direct governmental 
involvement, through ownership and operation, will increase well beyond 
today's significant levels. This will be particularly true for rail-
roads, but to some extent for each of the modes. Private enterprise 
will continue to be dominant in equipment and operations, with govern-
ment increasingly dominant in providing fixed plant and significant in 
operating control systems, as well as continuing to regulate economics, 
safety, and operations. Regulatory constraints on price and service 
competition may be a little less than today, though this will not neces-
sarily result in improved transportation service~, or enhanced profit-
ability. Refinements in technology and ope~ations will continue to 
occur, motivated by safety and environmental considerations, and by 
compelling needs to reduce costs and increase efficiencies. 
Energy 
Energy price, availability, and possible rationing problems will inhibit 
major changes in characteristics and technology of freight transport 
services. For example, development and production of passenger-oriented,
 
high-performance aircraft like V/STOLs and SSTs or high-speed ground 
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transport like TACVs and MAGLEVs, 
tion, will be slowed or stopped. 
tation that require higher energy 
all of which have high energy consump-
Similar changes in freight transpor-
consumption will also not occur. 
On the other hand, it must be recognized that energy costs will still be 
only a small part of total operating costs. For example, doubling or 
even tripling of fuel prices will increase total costs of operating 
freight transport modes by 10% to 20%. If prices charged by transport 
companies increase proportionally more than those o~ other sectors of 
the economy, because of the high energy consumption of transportation, 
then use, at least growth in use, may decline. Some shifts in market 
shares of a few percentage points as between modes will occur, but these 
will be minor, as the uses of each mode for moving freight have evolved 
to what they are today for compelling reasons. Some shifts may be very 
significant, and range from lucrative to fatal for individual carriers, 
but they do not presage fundamental shifts in transport technology or 
services. 
Innovation 
Where will innovation in freight transportation occur, between now and 
the year 2000? 
Probably, it will not be in major technological changes. Numerous 
improvements will take place, but these will be incremental rather than 
fundamental. The physical plant and equipment in the year 2000 will 
not be substantially different, and most of the fixed plant and much of 
the equipment being constructed an4 manufactured today will still be in 
service. 
Institutional changes, as already noted, will occur) allowing some 
rationalization of the railroad network, and freeing all modes from 
some of the current regulatory restrictions imposed on them. These will 
make some more price and service competition possible. 
Operating changes offer major opportunities for innovation. This is 
especially true for the rail mode. New concepts of dynamic real-time 
scheduling of freight cars and trains are now possible by using com-
puters. Combined with changes in agreed rules about freight cars moving 
over more than one railroad company, and operating more city-pair and 
yard-pair freight train services, service quality and cost performance 
will improve. 
Work rule changes will offer opportunities for doing many things dif-
ferently from now, and yield higher productivity. Some modes have rela-
tively few such restrictions, other have many. Such changes cannot be 
imposed; they must be negotiated. This requires initiative and imagi-
nation on both sides, along with a willingness to share the rewards. 
It is often tedious to accomplish. 
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Marketing changes, particularly orienting transport services to fit 
ever more approp~iately into total customer logistics systems, are 
probably the prime opportunity for continuing innovation. 
Summary 
All in all, transportation of freight in the year 2000 will not be all 
that different from today. In service, quality, price, and profit-
ability some may be better, much will be the same, and quite a bit may 
be worse. 
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ABSTRACT 
There is need for a definitive study of U.S. goods transportation. The 
changes induced by altered residence patterns, industrial locations, and 
technologies have been accommodated only by straining the transportation 
system. The energy crisis, the Eastern railroad crisis, and the sharp 
increase in distribution costs should provide incentives for a critical 
examination of the goods transportation and distribution systems needed 
in the 1980s and beyond. 
Existing technology will allow significant improvement in performance 
and service of railroads and allow a better modal distribution •. The 
greatest obstacles to change are the institutions of transportation: 
regulatory agencies, trade unions, highway lobbies, railroad companies, 
and highly concentrated industries. 
Several methods exist for the reduction of energy utilization in a 
distribution system. In a decade, a 30% improvement in vehicle 
energy efficiency could be obtained. Government intervention to encour-
age higher vehicle utilization and intermodal transfer is perhaps the 
most promiEling means. Railroads, trucks, and air fleets are all oper-
ating at significantly below capacity levels, in part because of geo-
graphical and s,easanal patterns, vehicle specialization, and restric-
tions imposed by the regulatory agencies. A small reduction in 
service standards may have a very large energy conservation payoff. 
Because of the demand for high service standards, there is a tendency 
to use energy-inefficient modes (e.g., trucks, instead of rail for 
movements in excess of 750 miles). 
Perhaps the greatest gains in energy-cost effectiveness can be obtained 
by'reducing the ton-miles of freight demand. Geographical concentration 
of industry is too high for both distribution and energy efficiency in 
many industries. 
The existing distribution patterns and the widespread use of energy-
inefficient m.odes are, to a large extent, the result of careful cost-
analysis by users, bad price setting by carriers, and the inability of 
institutionalized transportation agencies to meet changes in population 
distribution, product mix, and service expectations. Now that energy 
costs are high and energy availability presents problems, companies 
mus t reexamin(~ th(~ir dis tribution plans. 
The logistic demands of goods distribution systems are influenced by 
many factors, somE~ of which can, in turn, be influenced by government 
policy, expressed in regulation, subsidy, taxes, government spending, 
resource allocation, and the pricing of public services. The factors 
include population and income .distributions, absolute and comparative 
advantage, economies of scale in production and marketing, total cost 
of transportation, and resource and industrial concentrations. 
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Any analysis of goods transportation must consider the total cost (or 
cost per unit) of a logistic system, rather than transportation costs 
alone, and the total energy consumption from plant to customer, rather 
than only the energy consumed by transportation vehicles in m01ving from 
plant to warehouse. In an era of abundant and low-cost energy supplies, 
small inventories and short lead times have been used as indicc:Ltors of 
efficient distribution systems. Changes in distribution systems, forGed 
by the energy shortage, can serve to reduce the cost of distribution. 
Models capable of reducing system costs can be developed by classifying 
user systems in terms of magnitude (weight or measurement tons), cover-
age (national, regional), product characteristics (density, fragility, 
etc.), and product type. . 
A "what if" model of distribution system operation and performan.ce is 
preferred in that it allows the user to examine the national behavior of 
carriers and shippers to policy action scenarios, and it allows the 
policymaker to estimate the effects of policy changes in terms of energy 
consumption, costs, and system throughput and performance. 
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XXIII. ENERGY CONSIDERATIONS IN GOODS TRANSPORTATION 
Ernest Koenigsberg 
University of California, Berkeley 
r 
There is need for a definitive study of goods transportation in the 
United States. The changes induced by altered residence patterns, 
industrial locations, and technologies have been accommodated only by 
straining the transportation system. The energy crisis, the Eastern 
railroad crisis, and the sharp increase in the cost of distribution 
should provide incentives for a critical examination of the goods 
transportation and distribution systems needed in the 1980s and beyond. 
The changes in population distribution and the increasing transportation 
demand have been met by three decades of massive highway investment and 
minor modifications in the rail system. Many changes in the post-World 
War II decade now appear to have been shortsighted (e.g., the removal of 
tracks on the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in 1958, the demise of 
the trolley network in Los Angeles to accommodate cars). The inability 
of railroad management and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to 
recognize the role of reliability in distribution and transportation 
has contributed to a railroad crisis which only strengthens the energy-
inefficient (for long distances) trucking industry. For example, ten 
years ago some major railroads refused to consider unit-train services 
for containerized freight, g~v~ng as one of the reasons that it would 
"destroy the existing rate structure." 
The problems of freight transportation are predominantly institutional 
problems. Existing technology will allow significant improvement in 
performance and service of railroads and allow a better modal distribu-
tion. No major technological innovations will affect goods transporta-
tion in the next decade. Significant changes in systems operations and 
materials handling (within the scope of existing technology) will be 
introduced and/or expanded. The rate of change will depend on govern-
ment policy (in terms of financial incentives and regulatory actions) 
and the pressures imposed by energy shortages. The greatest obstacles 
to ch,ange are. the institutions of transportation--regu1atory agencies, 
trade'unions, highway lobbies, railroad companies, and highly concen-
trated industries. 
The balance of the paper will deal with the following interrelated 
topics: The need for, and ways of, reducing energy inefficiencies in 
goods distribution systems in view of the current energy crisis; present 
patterns of goods distribution; factors affecting logistic demands of 
goods distribution systems; the need for evaluating total costs in a 
logistic goods system; elements for a proposed goods distribution model 
and related system~Performance measurements; and the need for a goods 
distribution system model. 
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Methods of Reducing Energy Inefficiencies in Goods Distribution Systems 
Goods distribution systems are related to the locations of population 
centers, production centers, and the existing investments in a transpor-
tation infrastructure. The current interest in energy forces a reevalu-
ation of these systems, particularly their distribution patterns. 
The energy used in a distribution system can be reduced by: 
1. Improvements in the energy efficiency of vehicles 
2. Improvements in the efficiency of the use of vehicles 
3. Transferring freight carriage to the more energy-efficient 
transportation modes 
4. Reducing the ton-miles of freight carriage demand 
5. Reducing the service standards of the distribution system 
The several methods are not completely independent, nor do they have 
equal effects. There are physical limitations on the extent to which 
vehicle efficiency can be extended; and given the size of existing 
vehicles, the transition to an overall increase of 30% in vehicle 
efficiency will require a decade. 
Much can be accomplished in a shorter time by increasing the efficiency 
of the use of vehicles. This would no doubt affect service standards. 
At the present time 43% of rail car-miles are empty car-miles; even for 
box car and trailer-on-flat-car service, 32% of car-miles are "empty." 
If one considers light loads and empty miles, perhaps as much as half 
of the rail-miles are empty. While the figures for trucks are somewhat 
better, the cargo-miles lost in empty backhauls represent a significant 
portion of intercity cargo capacity. Similarly, well over half of the 
belly cargo capacity of the U.S. air fleet is unused. 
While part of these losses are due to geogr~?hical and seasonal patterns 
and to vehicle specialization, restrictions imposed by regulatory 
agencies contribute to the wastage of capacity and, in turn, energy. 
If the role of the regulatory agencies is to serve the nation as a whole 
rather than their -own constituencies, then we already have a structure 
to change transportation and distribution patterns; but it may well be 
better to disband the agencies (or at least coalesce them) and use taxes 
and incentives to change the patterns. Since the regulatory agencies 
are prime candidates for change, the political problems of change may 
not be too difficult to overcome at this time. This suggests that 
government intervention to encourage higher vehicle utilization and 
intermodal transfer is the most promising means of increasing the energy-
cost effectiveness of goods distribution systems. Given existing knowl-
edge of inventory analysis, it is anticipated that these measures would 
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result in an increase of perhaps 20% in working inventories to compensate 
for the decline in. service standards for the same levels of production. 
Because of the demand for high service standards, there is a tendency to 
use energy-inefficient modes (e.g., truck instead of rail for movements 
in excess of 750 miles). The railroads have begun to respond, particu-
i1ar1y with trai1er-on-f1at-car (TOFC) and container-on-f1at-car (COFC) 
express services, but they have only recaptured part of their lost 
markets. A small reduction in service standards may have a very large 
enert~y conservation payoff. 
Perhaps the greatest gains, in terms of energy-cost effectiveness, can 
be obtained by reducing the ton-miles of freight demand. Geographical 
concentration of industry is too high for both distribution and energy 
efficiency in many industries (e.g., brewing, clothing, breakfast foods, 
some parts of the chemical industry, etc.). In short, many distribution 
systems are too concentrated for energy efficiency. 
In the short run, the largest gains in energy-cost effectiveness can be 
obtained by suitable mode transfers and increasing vehicle efficiency 
(at the cost of a loss in service standards). Over the medium term, 
efforts should be made to reduce the ton-mile demand by dispersing 
industries which can be economically efficient at a smaller scale. Thus 
we may once again hope to find, for example, breweries in Little Rock 
and Harrisburg. 
Work should also continue on new and/or more efficient internal combus-
tion engines, as well as on other means of propulsion. Of all means of 
reducing energy consumption, this requires the most time and money. The 
other alternatives may be more difficult in political and social terms. 
Present Patterns of Goods Distribution 
Previous studies of the problems of goods distribution have centered on 
the transportation network and the ways in which it is used. It would 
be more appropriate to concentrate on the demands imposed on the network 
and the ways in which demands can be met. The energy and environmental 
crises--and the other major problems of the transportation industry--
indicate that one can no longer look to patchwork solutions for meeting 
logistic needs. 
The existing distribution patterns and the widespread use of ,energy-
inefficient modes are, to a large extent, the result of careful cost 
analysis by users, bad price setting by carriers (and perhaps by regula-
tory agencies), and the inability of institutionalized transportation 
agencies to meet changes in population distribution, product mix, and 
service expectations. We "enjoy" the highest standard of distribution 
service level of any country, but we pay a high price (in energy consump-
tion and in cost) for that standard. Approximately 9% of the gross 
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national product goes to pay our freight bill; warehousing, inventory, 
and other items more than double our distribution bill. 
f 
Distribution systems of major companies were finely tuned to transporta-
tion and storage and handling costs and geared to meet the distribution 
of demands. Energy costs were a very small component of the total cost. 
Now that energy costs are high and energy availability presents problems, 
companies must reexamine their distribution plans. All analytic methods 
for the distribution of consumer goods under the previous energy situation 
yielded solutions that placed distribution centers located in or near the 
15 or 20 major population centers. For low-valued goods produced over 
fairly wide regions, handling centers at key railroads were used to co-
alesce shipments (e.g., lumber). 
The energy crunch suggests that the optimal solutions will change and 
result in a doubling of the number of distribution warehouses; empty 
warehouses in Spokane, Des Moines, Little Rock, Charleston, and perhaps 
Syracuse may be full in the 1980 to 1985 period. This would be a rever-
sal of the trends of 1965 to 1975, and it would reduce the growth rate 
of air cargo tonnage. The effect on truck and rail market shares is 
uncertain. 
In terms of transportation energy demands, the large urban center is 
more efficient than a suburban center. (It is probably more efficient 
in terms of total energy consumption as well.) The energy crisis in 
the period 1974 to 1985 will lead to a revi.va1 of the center city. An 
influx of middle-class residents has begun in a number of cities (San 
Francisco and Philadelphia, for example). The movement will probably 
be stronger at first in cities of less than 500,000. Population increases 
in center cities will provide large enough markets for some industries 
which are now highly concentrated to relocate. This would reduce the 
demand for intercity transportation, reduce, of course, the number of 
multiple-car families if the urban centers had adequate mass transporta-
tion (buses and light rail vehicles); and reduce the mileage by private 
cars. 
Up to now, government policy has inadvertently (or purposely) favored 
suburbia (e.g., FHA loan policies, highway grants, aid to commuter 
railroads) over the cities (except, perhaps, for social welfare programs). 
A reversal of their policies and additional tax incentives can accelerate 
the revival of the city. The political problems associated with the 
changes are significant if not overwhelming. The changes may well come 
without political action, but at a slower rate. 
Factors Affecting Lo~stic Demands of Goods Distribution Systems 
The logistic demands of goods distribution systems are influenced by 
many factors, some of which in turn, can be influenced by government 
policy expressed in regulation, subsidy, taxes, government spending, 
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resource allocation, and the pricing of public services. f'h<.! factors 
include: 
Population distribution 
Income distribution 
Absolute and comparative advantage 
Economies of scale in production 
Economies of scale in mark/ating 
Total cost of distribution 
Resource concentration 
Industrial concentration 
Population and income factors are important because they indicate centers 
of demand, particularly for consumer products. Absolute and comparative 
advantage, along with total transportation cost, determines the market 
area for a commodity or product. Absolute advantage may refer to natural 
or geographic features (for example, the concentration of fruit and 
produce in California, wood products in the Northwest) or to historical 
or technological conditions (for example, automobiles and parts in 
Detroit, breakfast foods in Hichigan). Economies of scale in production 
limit the number of sources for a product (for example, electric light 
bulbs in Nela Park), economies of scale in marketing limit the number of 
sources even when optimum production size has already been achieved (for 
example, brewing, breakfast foods). 
On the basis of distribution costs and service standards of 1970, large 
production and marketing companies such as Del Honte and General Electric 
(consumer products) have reduced the number of distribution centers for 
national marketing to fewer than 20. Until now, energy consumption has 
not been a consideration in logistic planning nor in the choice of modes 
into and out of the distribution centers. 
For point-to-point movement of a fully loaded vehicle, energy consump-
tion per ton-mile can be determined in a relatively straightforward 
manner (though recently published figures should be treated with caution 
if not skepticism). Unfortunately, the transportation involv~d in dis-
tribution systems is not usually point-to-point by a single mode. Often 
the movements require indirect routings and empty legs. Further, the 
commodities are not uniform in transportation density and the several 
modes use energy sources of different thermal content, form, efficiency, 
price, and availability. And finally, distribution system alternatives 
usually involve varying capital and labor factors. 
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Another indication of the extent of the omission of energy considerations 
in distribution system planning is that neither industry nor government 
has a good measure of the effect of a fu.el cutback on system performance. 
Further, there is no model that will allow industry or government to 
evaluate the effects on energy consumption of technological changes in 
energy use (for example, improved carburetion) or in rolling stock 
(for example, a national 70-foot highway-trailer length unit). 
The Need for Total Costs Evaluation in a Logistic Goods System 
In planning a distribution system, the planner must consider the size 
and location of market centers, the costs of transportation to and from 
warehouses by mode, the cost of holding and transshipping inventory, 
the lead time and the standard deviation of lead time by mode, and the 
standard of service expected by the customer. 
Any analysis of goods transportation must consider the total cost (or 
cost per unit) of a logistic system, rather than transportation cost 
alone. Similarly, it should consider the total energy consumption from 
plant to customer rather than only the energy consumed by the transpor-
tation vehicles in ffioving from plant to warehouse. Eventually, all 
costs are met by the consumer and all energy needs are drawn from the 
national stock. Therefore, any analysis of national logistics should 
include consideration of the throughput, location and market areas of 
distribution points, and both the loaded and backhaul movements of 
vehicles in the various modes. It should also consider, for example, 
the role of intercoastal; coastwise and inland waterway shipping, where 
applicable; and the proposed airfreight network. 
In. an era of abundant and low-cost energy supplies, small inventories 
and short lead times have been used, sometimes erroneously, as indica-
tors of efficient distribution systems. t-lith higher energy costs 
compounded by increasing scarcity, the indicators should be changed. 
The rate of such change can be influenced by government policies as 
well as by economic realities. A one-time increase in in-transit 
inventory or safety stock may be a small price to pay for a greater 
degree of energy independence. 
In developing distribution systems, there has been an overemphasis on 
time efficiency and an underemphasis on energy efficiency. A recent 
review of modal selection in goods transportation indicates that the 
resource allocations in existing distribution networks is, in fact, 
cost inefficient--even when the costs of safety stocks and in-transit 
inventories are included. Thus, it would appear that changes in dis-
tribution syste~s, forced by the energy shortage, can serve to reduce 
the cost of distribution. 
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Elements for a Proposed Goods Distribution Model and Related Systems 
Performance Measurements 
The alternatives available to specific shippers and consignees are 
generally limited. The choice made in both the long and short run can 
be influenced by government policy either fiscal, regulatory, or subsidy. 
It is essential that a technical and economic data base and evaluation 
procedures be developed to assist policymakers. 
Consideration should be given to such a study. At the very least, the 
needs for analysis and evaluation should be defined. The following are 
some views on factors that should be included: demand patterns,_ reor-
dering procedures, lead times, inventory levels, warehousing locations, 
frequency and size (unit loads, less than unit loads, multiunit loads) 
of shipments and regional and interregional markets of the company and 
the industry. The analysis must also recognize the type of cargo move-
ment (bulk, neobulk, unitized, and specialized freight) in order to 
compare alternative modes of transportation and alternative methods of 
storage. 
It seems that models capable of reducing system costs can be developed 
by classifying user systems in terms of magnitude (weight or measurement 
tons), coverage (national, regional), product ~haracteristics (density, 
fragility, etc.), and product type. The following product-type classi-
fications are suggested: 
1. Bulk industrial (coal, ore, heavy chemicals, etc.) 
2. Bulk agricultural 
3. Industrial products 
4. Consumer products (nonfood) 
5. Consumer products (processed food) 
6. Special handling (fresh produce, heavy equipment) 
All of the above factors have an impact on modal choice and they, in 
turn, are influenced by changes in modal performance. Any combination 
of reduced frequency and decreased speed will increase transportation 
lead times and require an increase in inventory levels if the same dis-
tribution service standard is to be maintained. If the changes in 
frequency and speed reduce transportation costs (and energy consumption), 
the resulting increase in inventory may well be justified on economic 
grounds. Transportation and distribution planning is very much a game 
of trade-offs. The introduction of new energy constraints tends to 
sharpen the analysis of trade-offs. 
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The trade-off potential should be analyzed in terms of measures of phys-
ical distribution system performance. These measures include the fol~ 
lowing: 
Transportation cost per ton-mile 
Inventory-to-sales ratio 
Total distribution cost per unit 
Variance of lead time 
Frequency of stock-cuts (or emergency replenishment) 
Determination of jus.t what measures, and what degree of detail, are 
critical. The possible variations are virtually limitless--but the study 
would have a strictly limited time frame and resource allocation. Since 
the study goal would be to go beyond the use of national averages, some 
degree of detail is essential. 
The basic criteria for what elements must be measured are directly 
related to the goal of obtaining estimates of the effect on shipping 
patterns--and thus on fuel consumption--of various potential governmental 
influences. To this end, it would be necessary, at a minimum, to measure 
the effect of: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Transportation service type (for example, rail TOFC, truck LTL/ 
PTL) as a determinant of elapsed time, operating cost charac-
teristics, and equipment utilization. 
Transportation freight equi.pment type (for example, rail 50-
foot plain boxcar, truck 45-foot van trailer) as a determinant 
of certain critical operating and capital cost elements, 
vehicle capacity and weight, and aerodynamic and rolling resis-
tance character.istics. 
Transportation ruot1.ve power equipment (for example, rail 300Q-
HP two-axle tractor) as a determinant of fuel consumption 
levels, load capacity, capital costs, and aerodynamic and 
rolling resistance characteristics. 
Right-of-way characteristics (for example, grade and curvature), 
as major determinants of fuel consumption, load capacity, and 
elapsed time. 
Average operating speed, as a major determine.nt of fuel con-
sumption, and as a potential contributing factor to elapsed-
time capabilities. 
Ty'pical operating patterns (for example, intermediate terminal 
incidents and delays, crew size, and work day) as determinants 
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of critical time and cost elements, even within a given service 
type. 
Technology level (for example, existing equipment mix, minor 
streamlining and efficiency improvements, major redesign within 
limits of developed technology) as a prime determinant of 
achievable transportation efficiencies. 
It is, of course, neither necessary nor desirable that those concerned 
with the formulation of national policy should trouble themselves with 
details of the type outlined above. But unless they are taken into 
account in some phase of the proposed analysis, the study results will 
be no better than if national averages were used. 
A "what if" model is preferred because it allows the user to examine the 
national behavior of carriers and shippers to scenarios which result 
from policy actions. In a similar way, it allows the po1icymaker to 
estimate the effects of policy changes in terms of energy consumption, 
costs, and system throughput and performance. 
Flexibility is essential if the model is to meet the requirements of 
po1icymakers. Given the pressu.res for technological and operational 
innovation, energy efficiencies and vehicle productivities cannot be 
expected to remain at present values. In fact, energy and fiscal policy 
can affect these values directly. Similarly, the distribution of popu-
lation or of industrial activity cannot be expected to remain the same 
over the next 10 to 20 years. The model should be able to treat sce-
narios that include the revival of the central city or a pattern of 
exurban and rural production centers, as well as new technologies of 
production, transportation, or consumption. 
Conclusion 
The operating and energy inefficiencies of existing goods transportation 
networks can be overcome without requiring extension of the state-of-the-
art in any mode. The obstacles to improvement are institutional, not 
technical. To understand the problems of distribution and transportation, 
we need better economic and energy models. With these, we can evaluate 
the trade-offs between service, cost, energy consumption, and investment 
and use the results of the analysis to influence institutional changes. 
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